Frank Beninate III, Complainant,v.Gordon R. England, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 22, 2004
01a34935 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 22, 2004)

01a34935

11-22-2004

Frank Beninate III, Complainant, v. Gordon R. England, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Frank Beninate III v. Department of the Navy

01A34935

November 22, 2004

.

Frank Beninate III,

Complainant,

v.

Gordon R. England,

Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A34935

Agency No. 00-66898-001

Hearing No. 270-A1-9143X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. , Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. , and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a GS-660-11 Pharmacist at

the agency's Naval Ambulatory Care Center, New Orleans, Louisiana

(�facility�), filed a formal EEO complaint on June 28, 2000, alleging

that the agency had discriminated against him on the bases of race

(Caucasian), national origin (Spanish/French/Italian/German), sex (male),

religion (Catholic), disability (irritable bowel syndrome, gastritis,

colitis, diverticulitis, back, shoulder and knee problems, dysthemia and

depression), age (D.O.B. 01-02-50), and reprisal for prior EEO activity

when: (1) beginning in May of 1998, he was denied leave and charged

Absent Without Leave (AWOL) to attend his Father-in-law's funeral, and

subsequently was treated less favorably with respect to his leave and work

schedule; (2) he was subjected to demeaning and insensitive comments at

the facility, his role was undermined and he was denied training and pay;

(3) he was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) on May 28, 1999;

(4) he was denied a reasonable accommodation; (5) he was subjected to

racial remarks and demeaning jokes/slurs due to his national origin and

race; and (6) the agency refused to accommodate his religious beliefs.

A review of the record establishes that complainant was employed by

the agency from July of 1977 to July of 2001 as a civilian Pharmacist.

The record establishes that complainant was supervised by military

officers, mainly Navy nurses. Complainant had several different reporting

times, but generally he was required to report for work between 7:45

a.m. and 8:15 a.m. The record further reflects that when complainant's

Father-in-law died in May of 1998, he was unable to locate his Supervisor

to request permission to leave the facility, so he left without approval

and was charged with AWOL. However, the AWOL designation was later

removed and he was charged with sick leave. The record further reflects

that complainant had problems with tardiness and unauthorized absences

in 1999 and 2000. On April 21, 1999, complainant was issued a letter of

requirement regarding absences, tardiness and unauthorized absences for

most of June and July of 1999. Further, a facility Supervisor found

that complainant had failed to provide documentation that he was a

qualified individual with a disability. In addition, in May of 1999,

complainant was notified that his performance was unacceptable and he

would receive the opportunity to improve his performance through a PIP.

One requirement of the PIP was that he arrive at work on time and depart

work on time and take no longer than one-half hour for lunch. On June 7,

1999, complainant was suspended for five (5) days by a facility Supervisor

(S1), for failure to follow orders/instructions and unauthorized absences.

On August 18, 1999, the facility's Officer-in-charge (OIC) issued

complainant a 14 day suspension effective August 22, 1999 to September 7,

1999 for failure to follow proper orders and instructions and unauthorized

absences. Subsequently, complainant's physicians wrote the OIC in

August of 1999 that complainant's tardiness was related to his irritable

bowel syndrome (IBS). The physicians recommended that the agency grant

complainant three (3) months of sick leave until December of 1999 and

then grant him an accommodation in the form of a flexible work schedule.

On January 6, 2000, complainant's physician's informed the agency that he

had not made progress over the three months, and could not return to work.

The physicians also diagnosed complainant as lethargic and obsessive.

Complainant was released to return to work on February 22, 2000 as

long as he had some accommodations regarding schedule, arrival at work

and other assigned duties. Upon his return, another Supervisor (S2)

notified complainant that he was to report for work between 7:30 a.m. and

8:00 p.m. daily. S2 warned complainant that if he arrived outside his

adjusted period, he would be required to submit a leave slip in advance.

Complainant was required to use the agency's computer system to account

for his time, as the OIC stated that his absences were frequent and his

time was difficult to record. Complainant objected to the reporting

time as not in keeping with his physicians request for an accommodation,

and he also objected to the agency's requirement that he work the front

line filling prescriptions. On May 10, 2000, the OIC placed complainant

on indefinite administrative leave while an investigation was initiated

regarding misconduct. As a result, complainant voluntarily retired from

the agency on July 13, 2001.

Believing he was the victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and filed the aforementioned formal EEO complaint. At the

conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no

discrimination.

The AJ initially concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of disability discrimination. In so finding, the AJ found

that none of complainant's physical or mental impairments substantially

limited any of his major life activities. However, the AJ found that even

assuming, arguendo, that complainant established that he is an individual

with a disability due to the effects of IBS, phobias and other emotional

conditions, he failed to establish that the agency failed to accommodate

his impairments. The AJ noted that the only request complainant made

with respect to reasonable accommodation was that his reporting time be

flexible and allow him to make up missed time during his lunch break or

after his normal tour of duty. AJ's Decision at 10-11. The OIC stated

that complainant's late arrival at work affected pharmacy operations,

as his absence affected the facility's ability to fill prescriptions.

Further, S1 stated that military technicians could not fill new civilian

prescriptions or refill prescriptions without complainant. The AJ

concluded that the agency did provide complainant with a reasonable

accommodation. In so finding, the AJ noted that as early as 1998, the OIC

adjusted complainant's work hours, allowed him to call if he was going to

be late and gave him a 30 minute window to arrive for work. AJ's Decision

at 12. The AJ found that problems between complainant and the agency

occurred when he failed to notify his supervisor that he would be late.

The AJ further concurred with the agency's statement that complainant

was the only civilian in the facility and his presence was required

as prescriptions could not be filled unless complainant was there.

While the AJ noted that there were instances where the agency did not

fully accommodate complainant regarding his IBS or required him to use

advanced leave if he was going to be late, she found that complainant

offered no examples of leave denied under these circumstances.

The AJ then found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination on the bases of race, color, national origin, sex,

age, religion or retaliation. Regarding the attendance issues, wherein

complainant was disciplined for not calling his supervisor to advise

that he would be late, the AJ found that there were no similarly situated

employees not in his protected groups who were treated differently under

similar circumstances. In so finding, the AJ noted that complainant was

the only civilian pharmacist and his attendance problems were related not

only to tardiness but his failure to call his supervisors when he knew

he would be late. As such, regarding the attendance issues, the AJ found

that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions for disciplining complainant, and these reasons were not proven to

be a pretext for discrimination. Regarding the promotion and pay issues,

the AJ found that complainant failed to show that he was entitled to a

promotion, nor did complainant establish that he requested special pay

or a special salary rate, or that he was entitled to it. As a result,

the AJ found that complainant failed to meet his burden of establishing

discrimination on these bases. The AJ then found that complainant failed

to establish that the conduct he was subjected to from his supervisors

regarding questions about his tardiness and demeaning jokes and slurs,

and found that the conduct complained of was not sufficiently severe

or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment. The AJ found that

complainant has offered no evidence showing the frequency of the remarks

nor evidence that he was threatened or humiliated or that the remarks

interfered with his employment.

Addressing complainant's allegations of religious discrimination,

the AJ noted that complainant alleged that he was not allowed to

adjust his lunch period to attend religious services on Ash Wednesday

and Good Friday. The AJ noted that S1 stated that complainant never

made the request to attend these services at lunch time, and when he

did request leave to attend the services, his request was approved.

As such, the AJ found that complainant failed to establish religious

discrimination based on the conduct of the agency. Finally, the AJ found

that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal.

In so finding, the AJ noted that complainant did not engage in EEO

activity before August 31, 1999, when he sought EEO counseling regarding

the allegations in the instant complaint. As such, the allegations

that occurred before August 31, 1999 were not valid claims of reprisal.

Regarding the allegations that arose after August 31, 1999, the AJ found

that complainant either failed to establish that he suffered an adverse

agency action or a causal connection between the incidents and his prior

EEO activity. The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant restates arguments previously made at the hearing.

In response, the agency restates the position it took in its FAD, and

requests that we affirm its final order.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record

and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that

complainant failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions

were in retaliation for his prior EEO activity or were motivated by

discriminatory animus toward complainant's race, color, national origin,

sex, age or religion. We further concur with the AJ's finding that even

assuming, arguendo, that complainant was a qualified individual with a

disability, he failed to demonstrate that the agency failed to provide a

reasonable accommodation for his IBS and his other impairments. While the

record and medical reports demonstrate that complainant's IBS required

him to use the bathroom 10-12 times in the morning and necessitated

his request for a flexible morning schedule, we concur with the AJ's

finding that the agency accommodated him by allowing him to use sick

leave when he had to be late to the facility. The record establishes

that as early as 1998, complainant was given a flexible schedule and a

30 minute window to arrive for work, with the proviso that complainant

notify his supervisors when he would be late. Investigative File at 842.

As found by the AJ, much of complainant's unauthorized leave occurred

when he failed to notify his supervisors that he planned on being late

on any given day.<1> We concur with the AJ's finding that complainant

was disciplined by the agency as he failed to notify his supervisors

when he was going to be late due to his medical condition, but the

evidence establishes that he was able to use leave as an accommodation.

Finally, we concur with the AJ's finding that while there is evidence of

demeaning jokes and slurs made by several parties at the facility, the

alleged discriminatory conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive

so as to alter the conditions of complainant's employment. See Harris

v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). We thus discern no

basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of

the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's

response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this

decision, we affirm the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 22, 2004

__________________

Date

1 In addition, we concur with the AJ's finding that complainant did

not establish how his condition prevented him from calling into the

facility to notify them that he would be late. We further concur that

while it was unreasonable for the agency to require complainant to use

advanced sick leave on specific days when his IBS affected him, there

is no evidence that his request for accrued sick leave taken after the

fact was ever denied or that the agency acted in less than good faith

regarding complainant's accommodation requests.