Fotomat Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 2, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 59 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

FOTOMAT CORPORATION
Fotomat Corporation and Local 966, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America. Cases
29-CA-2639 and 29-CA-2768
March 2, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On October 16, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Benjamin B . Lipton issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and supporting arguments.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has' considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and has
decided to affirm the ru. ings, findings,' and conclu-
sions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt
his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Fotomat Corpora-
tion, Hicksville, New York, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall
Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings In In I of
his Decision , the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently stated that the
charge in Case 29-CA-2639 was filed and served on December 6 and 8,
1972 In fact, the charge was filed and served on December 6 and 8, 1971
2 We agree with the Administrative Law Judge' s finding that Respon-
dent herein violated Sec 8(a)(3) and, derivatively , Sec 8(a)(1) by
discharging the entire unit of five drivers because of their effort to obtain
union representation We also adopt the Administrative Law Judge's
finding that Respondent 's stated reason for the discharges, to wit, the
discriminatees ' unauthorized invitation to union agents to meet with them
on the nonpublic premises of Respondent , was pretextual , as explicated in
the attached Decision However, we disavow the Administrative Law
Judge's reliance upon N LR B v Buinup & Sims, Inc, 379 U S 21, which
we find distinguishable from the instant case Therefore , we do not adopt
his conclusion that the discharges independently violated Sec - 8(a)(1)
DECISION
STATEMENT'OF THE CASE
59
BENJAMIN B. LIPTON, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding was tried before me on June 19 and 20 , 1972, in
Brooklyn , New York, upon a complaint by the General
Counsel I alleging certain violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3),
and (5 ) of the Act. Briefs submitted by General Counsel
and Respondent have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record , and from my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent is engaged in the retail sale and distribution
of cameras , film, film processing , and related photographic
materials . It maintains numerous retail outlets, offices, and
places of business , variously situated in the United States.
This proceeding particularly involves the "area office"
located in Hicksville, New York. During the year preced-
ing issuance of the consolidated complaint , Respondent
derived gross revenues from its operations valued in excess
of $500,000. During the same period , it had a direct inflow
in interstate commerce in excess of $50,000. Respondent
admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce , and that
the Union is a labor organization , within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Basic Issues
1. Whether Respondent's discharge of five named
employees , consisting of its entire complement of drivers,
was discriminatory and unlawful.
2. Whether Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain
with the Union , upon request.
3. Whether a bargaining order under the Gissel case 2 is
justified , based on union authorization cards of all the
employees (drivers) in the alleged appropriate unit , in view
of the serious nature of the asserted unfair labor practices.
Respondent denies the violations alleged , and contends:
(a) The five drivers were terminated for violating company
rules by permitting "unauthorized personnel" to enter
upon company property ( i.e., when they held an organiza-
tional meeting with union representatives on Respondent's
i In Case 29-CA-2639, the charge by the Union was filed and served by
registered mail, respectively, on December 6 and 8, 1972 In Case
29-CA-2768, the filing and service of the charge took place on February 24,
1972 The consolidated amended complaint on both cases was issued on
April 19, 1972
2 NLRB v Gisse! Packing Co, 395 U S 575
202 NLRB No. 3
60 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
premises); and (b) it was under no duty to bargain "since
the drivers had been terminated for cause and no
bargaining unit existed."
B. Essential Facts
The drivers, or routemen, operated from the area office
in Hicksville. Their function was to pick up exposed film
and other photographic material from, and make deliveries
to, Respondent's retail outlets in the New York area. Their
working hours were from 1 to approximately 8 p.m. After
5:30 p.m., a receptionist was usually the only employee
present at the area office, other than the drivers returning
from their routes. During the material period, the five
drivers consisted of Jerome Alopari, Thomas Crean,
Robert Patafio, Santo Sciabbarrasi, and Robert Taub.
Their immediate supervisor was Jane Rousseau, an
"administrative assistant." James G. Martin, regional
director, was in overall charge of the area office.
On November 29, 1971,3 Crean made the initial
approach to the Union in a telephone call to John Agathos,
secretary-treasurer. It was agreed that representatives of
the Union would come to the area office on December 1 to
meet with the drivers.
1. December 1
Agathos testified that about 5:30 p.m. he appeared at the
area office and asked to see Crean. The receptionist told
him Crean was on his route. Agathos waited outside. He
was later met by Crean, who told him the other drivers
were still out. When all the drivers had returned, they
gathered in the reception room together with Agathos and
two other union agents who had arrived-Joseph Faicco
and Glen McCarthy. As described by Agathos-"we
decided to go downstairs . . . to have a little meeting
amongst ourselves." In the basement,4 for 30-40 minutes
they discussed organizational procedures, and each of the
five drivers signed authorization cards, which the Union
retained. Faicco arranged to meet the drivers about 1 p.m.
the next day outside the area office.
Crean testified that he alone invited the men downstairs,
and had no advance permission of management. The
receptionist, Colleen Carmody, was in the presence of the
group when they initially conferred in the reception room
and in the adjoining "sorting room."5 She testified that 2
days earlier Crean told her a meeting with the Union
would take place on December 1; before the meeting date,
she revealed this information to Margaret Terlikosky, an
area trainer and assistant supervisor; and she first learned
from Crean on December 1 that the meeting would be held
downstairs. Terlikosky testified she was at the reception
desk about 6:30 p.m. on December 1, and told "the man"
(Agathos) that Crean would be back about 7 p.m. She
worked late that night and was aware of the meeting with
the drivers downstairs. Alopari testified that on December
3 All dates are in 1971, except as otherwise specified
4 On the basement level, an "inventory room" was used to contain
valuable materials and was securely locked behind a steel door I am not
impressed that any of the items, such as used snow tires, which lay
elsewhere in the basement were of consequential value There is no claim or
evidence that anything was missing
5 No door or "divider" separated the two rooms In the sorting room
1, when he returned from his route , he worked on the
premises with two of the independent processors helping to
carry out film . He finished his job , punched out, and then
joined the others in the reception room before they went
downstairs .6
2. December 2
An election petition for a unit of drivers was filed with
the Board in Case 29-RC-1873 and, on the same date, a,
copy was served on Respondent by registered mail.
Between 9 and 10 a.m., Terlikosky spoke with Rudolph
Pusey, store supervisor, and Deborah Shuppe, an area
trainer. As Terlikosky testified, in substance, she told them
she heard that union representatives were in the area office
with the drivers the night before. Pusey indicated he was
going to tell Martin, the regional director, and walked
away. Shortly thereafter, Terlikosky was summoned to
Martin's office, where Shuppe and Pusey were present.
Martin asked her "if anyone had been in the office" the
previous night, and she replied, yes. Then he inquired if she
was aware that unauthorized personnel were not allowed in
the building. She could not recall her answer.
About 1 p.m., Union Agents Faicco and McCarthy met
with the five drivers outside the area office. There each
driver made out a duplicate authorization card for the
Union. The entire group then entered the outer office of
Martin.? Faicco told the "secretary" he was a business
agent of the Union and wished to see Martin. When asked
the purpose, he stated that the Union represented the
drivers and he wanted to discuss recognition. On request,
he supplied his business card. After a period of waiting, the
"secretary" indicated that Martin had no time to see them
that day as he had other engagements. In these circum-
stances, I find that Martin was made aware of all the
information given the "secretary," as well as the identity of
the persons waiting in his outer office.
About 7 p.m., the front office receptionist, Carmody, was
questioned by Attorney Haber for Respondent. She
confirmed that the union men came in the night before and
held a meeting with the drivers downstairs. However, she
did not know what occurred at the meeting.
About 8 p.m., after Alopari returned from his route, he
was told by Supervisor Rousseau, in substance, that "we
were not going to get the union in and we were going to get
fired for it." 8
3. December 3, et seq.
On December 3, each of the five drivers was called into
Rousseau's office and discharged by her "for having
unauthorized personnel on the premises." Rousseau
testified that the decision to discharge the drivers was
made by Martin and a corporate vice president in
California, after telephonic discussions, about 12 to 1 p.m.
that day.
there were closed bags which, for the most part, contained exposed film
6 The record is not clear as to the time of the meeting , or whether it was
held after all the drivers had clocked out While Respondent asserts that the
meeting occurred on company time, it does not rely upon this as a basis for
the discharge
7 Martin had a separate entrance to his office from outside the building
8 Undenied testimony of Alopari
FOTOMAT CORPORATION 61
Later that day, Carmody told one of the independent
film processors that the drivers were not working because
they were fired for union activity. Shortly thereafter Martin
cautioned Carmody not to say that, as they were
terminated "because of unauthorized personnel." She then
stated "that it wasn't all the boys that invited the union
man in, it was only one." Martin rhetorically asked, "Were
they all downstairs at the meeting?"
On Monday, December 6, the Union established a picket
line at the area office.9 During the day, Agathos had a
conversation with Martin outside the building. He told
Martin the Union represented the drivers and he would
like to sit down with him to negotiate a contract. Martin
replied that he was going to his lawyer's office next door.
C. Concluding Findings
Respondent devoted a considerable part of its defense
seeking to establish the existence of a company policy and
rule to the effect that employees who invite or permit
unauthorized personnel to enter on company property are
subject to immediate discharge. Respondent completely
failed to support this position, and it is clearly refuted in
the record that such a rule applied to the employees at the
area office. The drivers' testimony, as well as that of
Carmody, the receptionist, shows that they were never
informed and were entirely unaware of such a rule.10
However, it is not critical whether there was actually a rule
against unauthorized personnel entering beyond the
reception room of the area office.ii The real issues are
whether, under the Act, the drivers were discharged for
discriminatory reasons, and whether, by such conduct,
Respondent interfered with their protected rights.
In its defense, Respondent took the insistent position
that, when the discharges were effected on December 3, it
did not know the identity of the "unauthorized personnel"
who met with the drivers on December 1, and was
completely unaware that these persons were union repre-
sentatives. Martin testified that the only time he knew
these were union representatives in the area office was
about 10 days later when he was so advised by a Board
agent, and that theretofore it had never entered his mind.12
In his telephone conversations with high executives of
Respondent in California, during which the discharge
decision was reached, there was no mention that the
"unauthorized personnel" on December 1 were or might
have been the same union people who appeared at his
office with the drivers on December 2. Rousseau, equivocal
9 The transcript at p 28 , 1. 14, is hereby corrected to read "Is there an
allegation here of an unfair labor practice strike9" The answer was negative
to Ultimately in the hearing, at my request , Respondent furnished part of
a manual distributed to the sales girls, or "Fotomates ," in its retail outlets
The particular rule states in entirety "At no time will the Fotomate allow a
person or persons to enter the store without permission from the Area
Manager " My finding , in short, is that this rule would not on its face be
applicable to the drivers . Respondent relies on various other grounds' That
the drivers were instructed not to take "riders" on their vehicles , and that
the vehicles displayed a sign to such effect, was credibly denied by the
drivers , and is over-reaching to establish the rule claimed . That, on or before
December 1, a "Better Business Bureau" sign was posted on a wall in the
reception area , stating "No soliciting , peddling, things like that" (as
described by Rousseau), was credibly denied by Carmody, the receptionist
regularly present in this room Even assuming such a sign was posted before
December 1,-(a) it could not reasonably be construed by the employees as
in her testimony, admitted that she became aware on
December 2 that the people who visited the night before
were union organizers . When they came in to, see Martin
on December 2, she could "tell by looking at them" that
they were union organizers , as they were "tough-looking
characters," they "weren't very pleasant at all," and she
had asked them to leave. Especially in light of the evidence
earlier shown, I can only find that this is a clear case of
calculated dissimulation and prevarication on the part of
Martin and Rousseau. There can be no doubt on this
record that Respondent knew or surmised, when it decided
to discharge the drivers, that they had met with union
agents within the area office on December 1.
The evidence is ample that Respondent seized upon the
pretext of a purported rule violation to discharge the
drivers, and that in reality it was motivated by the
immediate discovery of the drivers' effort to obtain union
representation. The following factors are particularly
noted: (a) Rousseau's general threat, made to Alopari
(after one of the conversations with the California
executives), that all the drivers would get fired, and the
further union animus shown in Rousseau 's testimony; (b)
the drastic decision to eliminate all its drivers (and the later
claim there was no duty to bargain because no bargaining
unit existed); (c) the significant timing of such action
following upon its knowledge of the drivers' union activity
and the Union's approach to Respondent; (d) the false and
generally unreliable testimony of Martin and Rousseau;
and (e) Respondent's failure to question the drivers, and
the flimsy basis upon which it ostensibly concluded that
the drivers violated company policy.
The stated misconduct for which the drivers were
discharged took place, albeit on plant premises, in the
context of an organizational meeting with the Union-a
basic protected activity under Section 7 of the Act.13 The
essential law is well defined in N.L. R.B. v. Burnup & Sims,
379 U .S. 21. Section 8(a)(1) is violated if an employee is
discharged for misconduct arising out of a protected
activity where it is demonstrated that the misconduct never
occurred despite the employer's honest belief, or that the
employer's asserted belief was not in good faith. "A
protected activity acquires a precarious status if innocent
employees can be discharged while engaging in it, even
though the employer acts in good faith." Id at 23. I find
here, for the reasons described above, that the alleged rule
did not exist, and the purported misconduct did not occur.
Even if it did occur in some respect, it does not constitute
such misconduct as would reasonably justify discharge. It
a union no-solicitation rule, and (b), if it were so intended , it was vague,
restricted solicitation on nonworking time, and did not convey the
"unauthorized personnel " policy invoked by Respondent Respondent cites
a section of the New York Penal Law in arguing that the union agents on
December I engaged in "criminal trespass," as to impute a greater degree of
responsibility on the drivers This is rejected as without merit In sum, I find
that Respondent 's evidence and arguments scarcely substantiate its broad
assertions of the grounds for discharge.
i i Presumably , an employer would have such a right of exclusion, even
without prior announcement : in certain circumstances union agents may be
barred from company premises See Central Hardware Co v N L R B, 405
U.S 1061;NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U S 105
12 Martin was aware of a previous abortive attempt to organize the
"Fotomates" in the retail outlets
13 Corr,veau & Roughier Cement Block, Inc, 171 NLRB 787, 788
62 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was shown that Crean alone invited the union agents to the
basement for the purpose of the organizational meeting.
The mere presence of the other four drivers at the meeting
provides no ground to deprive them of their Section 7
rights. Carmody, the receptionist whose function was to see
that unauthorized persons do not enter beyond the
reception area, was not disciplined. Respondent conducted
no investigation and had no honest basis for deciding
which, if any, of the drivers were responsible. The
Respondent's good faith is clearly lacking in its conclusion
to discharge all five of the drivers as a group.
Upon all of the foregoing and the entire record, it is
found that the discharge of the five drivers violated Section
8(a)(3) and, independently, 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. The Refusal To Bargain
The complaint alleges an appropriate unit of all drivers
employed at the area office. Respondent denies this
allegation , but has offered no alternative unit or evidence
on the question. I find the alleged unit is appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining.
On December 6, as previously described, the Union
presented the demand for recognition and bargaining on
behalf of the employees in the appropriate unit. As of such
date, there were employed by Respondent in the unit-Al-
opari, Crean, Patafio, Sciabbarrasi, and Taub. It is
uncontested that union authorization cards were executed
by all these employees on December 1. Accordingly, it is
held that, on and since December 1, the Union has been,
and is now, the statutory bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit. On and since December
6, Respondent has failed and refused to accord recogni-
tion, as validly requested by the Union.
As detailed herein, Respondent engaged in serious
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3), which I find were
calculated to defeat the Union's organizing efforts and
destroy its majority status among the employees. These
unfair labor practices, in my opinion, are clearly in the
category of pervasive and extensive violations within the
terminology of the Gissel case.14 The effects of such
conduct preclude a fair representation test in a Board
election in the forseeable future without the continuing
impact and recurrence of Respondent's coercion. In these
circumstances, the use of traditional remedies is ineffectu-
al, and consideration is validly given to the signed
authorization cards as a more reliable measure of the
employees' representation desires. Therefore it is conclud-
ed that, by refusing the Union's bargaining request and
engaging in the aforesaid unfair labor practices , Respon-
dent violated Section 8 (a)(5), and that a bargaining order is
necessary and appropriate to protect the majority selection
of the Union through written authorizations, and otherwise
to remedy the violations committed.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section II,
above , occurring in connection with its operations de-
14 N L R B v Gissel Packing Co., 395 U S. 575. And see Restaurant
Associates Industries, Inc, 194 NLRB No. 172
scribed in section I , above , have a close , intimate, and
substantial relation to trade , traffic , and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. A broad
cease-and-desist order is warranted , particularly in view of
Respondent's patent discriminatory conduct.i5
It has been found that Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged Alopari, Crean, Patafio, Sciabbarrasi, and Taub. It
will therefore be recommended that Respondent offer
these employees immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist , to substantially
equivalent jobs , without prejudice to their seniority and
other rights and privileges , and make them whole for any
loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination
against them , by payment to them of a sum of money equal
to that which they normally would have earned, absent the
discrimination , less net earnings during such period, with
backpay computed on a quarterly basis in the manner
established in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
plus interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, as set forth
in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It will be
further recommended that Respondent preserve and upon
request, make available to the Board or its agents, all
payroll records , social security payment records , timecards,
personnel records and reports , and all other records
necessary and useful to determine the amounts of backpay
due and the rights of reinstatement under the terms of
these recommendations.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Jerome Alopari, Thomas Crean,
Robert Patafio, Santo Sciabbarrasi, and Robert Taub on
December 3, 1971, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) and , independently, Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. All drivers or routemen employed by Respondent at
its area office in New York , excluding all office clerical
and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in Section 2 ( 11) of the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
5. Since December 1, 1971, the Union has been, and is
now, the exclusive representative of all employees in the
15 N LR B v. Express Publishing Co, 312 U S 426 ; N LR B v Entwistle
Mfg Co, 120 F 2d 532 (C.A 4)
FOTOMAT CORPORATION 63
appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act.
6. By failing and refusing, at all times on and after
December 6, 1971, to bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
7. By the foregoing, Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act,
I hereby recommend the following: 16
ORDER
Respondent, Fotomat Corporation, Hicksville, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Local 966, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, or in any other labor organiza-
tion, by discharging or terminating employees, or in any
other manner discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Failing or refusing to bargain collectively with the
above-named labor organization as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of all employees in the appropriate unit,
described above.
(c) Threatening employees with discharge, and in any
other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights
may be affected by an agreement in conformity with
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit, and embody in a
signed agreement any understanding reached.
(b) Offer Jerome Alopari, Thomas Crean, Robert
Patafio, Santo Sciabbarrasi, and Robert Taub immediate
and full reinstatement to their former positions, or, if those
positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights or privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings, in the manner set forth in "The Remedy" section
of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
(c) Notify the above-named employees, if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of their
right to reinstatement upon application, in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
(d) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents all payroll and other records, as set forth in "The
Remedy" section of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
(e) Post at its Hicksville, New York, office and facilities,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 17
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 29, shall, after being duly signed by
Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Decision, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.18
16 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
17 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
18 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing , within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to
post this notice; and we intend to carry out the order of the
Board, and abide by the following:
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise punish you, in
order to discourage membership or support for Local
966, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, or other
reprisal, in order to stop you from joining or helping a
union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
above-named Union, as your exclusive bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed employees in the National Labor Relations
Act, which are as follows:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join or help unions
To bargain collectively through a representa-
tive of their own choosing
64 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all these things.
Since it has been found that we unlawfully dis-
charged Jerome Alopan, Thomas Crean, Robert
Tapafio, Santo Sciabbarrasi, and Robert Taub, WE
WILL offer to give them back their regular jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, give them substantially
equivalent jobs, and WE WILL pay all the above-named
employees for the earnings they lost because of the
discrimination against them, with 6 percent interest.
WE WILL notify the above-named employees, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of their right to reinstatement, upon application,
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training 'and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
WE WILL upon request, bargain collectively with
Local 966, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
as the exclusive representative of our employees in the
appropriate unit, and put into a signed agreement any
understanding reached.
The appropriate unit is:
All drivers or routemen employed at the New
York area office, excluding all office clerical and
professional employees, guards, and supervisors
as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
FOTOMAT CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, 16 Court Street, Fourth
Floor, Brooklyn, New York 11241, Telephone 212-
596-3535.