FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 13, 202014220395 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 13, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/220,395 03/20/2014 Sangeetha Sangameswaran 83380333 4248 28866 7590 05/13/2020 MACMILLAN, SOBANSKI & TODD, LLC - FORD ONE MARITIME PLAZA - FIFTH FLOOR 720 WATER STREET TOLEDO, OH 43604 EXAMINER HUTCHINSON, ALAN D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3669 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/13/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): MST@mstfirm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SANGEETHA SANGAMESWARAN, MATHEW A. BOESCH, JEFFREY A. PALIC, AARON L. MILLS, and REBECCA L. SEILER Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 Technology Center 3600 Before JAMES P. CALVE, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global Technologies LLC. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a method of controlling an engine. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of controlling an engine comprising: automatically bringing a vehicle propelled by the engine to a stop with a first system while a second system is active; after a delay from the vehicle stopping, stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the second system provided a condition of the first system is met; restarting the stopped engine with the second system upon receipt of an input; resuming propelling the vehicle with the first system using the restarted engine. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Yamazaki US 2013/0296112 A1 Nov. 7, 2013 Seguchi US 2014/0207358 A1 July 24, 2014 Killy US 2015/0142265 A1 May 21, 2015 Fuji2 JP 2012206593 Oct. 25, 2012 REJECTIONS Claims 1–4, 7–9, 13–17, 19, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Seguchi and Killy. Claims 1–11 and 13–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Fuji and Killy. 2 Citations are to the English language translation. Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 3 Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Seguchi, Killy, and Yamazaki.3 Claims 12, 22, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Fuji, Killy, and Yamazaki. OPINION Seguchi Grounds Appellant provides a number of arguments against the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, including that “the examiner is eliminating ‘providing’ from the claim language.” Appeal Br. 9. The limitation in claim 1 referenced by Appellant requires “stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the second system provided a condition of the first system is met.” Similar to claim 1, claim 13 recites “stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the second system based upon a status of the first system.” Appellant provides similar arguments for claim 13. Appeal Br. 13. The examiner’s findings for the limitations noted above in claims 1 and 13 are similar. See Final Act. 3, 5. For simplicity, we discuss claim 1, with the understanding that the discussion applies equally to claim 13. The Examiner finds that Seguchi’s adaptive cruise control system (“ACC”) (ACC ECU 11) corresponds to recited “first system” and idle stop system (idle stop ECU 10) corresponds to the recited “second system.” Id. 3. With respect to the disputed limitation noted above, the Examiner finds that Seguchi teaches “stopping the engine (8) of the stationary vehicle with the 3 The rejection of claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Seguchi, Killy, and Yamazaki was withdrawn by the Examiner in the Answer. Ans. 4. Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 4 second system (10) provided a condition (ACC is active) of the first system (11) is met.” Id. (citing Seguchi ¶ 7). Paragraph 7 of Seguchi explains: The invention provides a control device and control method for a vehicle, which are able to improve convenience at the time when an automatically stopped internal combustion engine is automatically started in the case where ACC and an idle stop control are executed together. Appellant contends that “Seguchi allows for the ACC to be inactive (not just ‘active’).” Appeal Br. 9. In response to Appellant’s contentions, the Examiner indicates general disagreement, and reproduces the language of Seguchi’s paragraph 7. Ans. 6. The Examiner then “concedes that Seguchi discloses a method that can take different paths dependent upon ACC being activated or not (see at least Fig 2, S2),” but “notes that Seguchi only discloses th[e] ACC NOT being executed after the idle control begins stopping the engine.” Id. (emphasis omitted). The Examiner reasons that “[b]ecause Seguchi discloses that the idle stop and the ACC are executed together at the start of the method . . . the ACC must have been deactivated after the idle stop has begun stopping the engine.” Id. at 6–7. Based on the Examiner’s mapping of Seguchi’s teachings to those recited in claim 1, the Examiner’s findings require that Seguchi’s adaptive cruise control system brings the vehicle to a stop while the idle stop system is active. After a delay from the vehicle being stopped by the adaptive cruise control system, the engine of the stationary vehicle is stopped with Seguchi’s idle stop system provided a condition of its adaptive cruise control system is met. Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 5 Figure 2 of Seguchi, referenced by the Examiner as noted above, is reproduced below. Seguchi’s Figure 2 provides “a flowchart that shows the procedure of automatically starting an internal combustion engine.” Seguchi ¶ 21. As Appellant explains, Seguchi’s “[p]aragraph [0007] discusses a condition for automatically starting, not ‘stopping’ the engine.” Appeal Br. 9. The control scheme in Seguchi’s Figure 2 depicts a scenario at step S2, referenced by the Examiner, when the engine is already stopped using the idle stop system. A determination is subsequently made at step S4 or S7 regarding when to re-start the engine. The Examiner fails to provide sufficient basis to support a find that these portions of Seguchi teach “stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the [idle stop] system provided a condition of the [adaptive cruise control] system is met.” Simply stated, the rejection fails because these portions of Seguchi have already Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 6 stopped the engine using the idle stop system before any evaluation is made regarding the adaptive cruise control system. The Examiner further explains that even assuming that the ACC is not activated at the time of the automatic stopping, (which the Examiner does not concede) the claims merely say “stopping the engine . . . provided a condition . . . is met” and NOT --stopping the engine . . . only provided . . . a condition . . . is met-- in the claimed language, the reference must merely disclose stopping the engine provided a condition is met, but does not preclude the reference from stopping the engine in other conditions. Ans. 7. Appellant responds that “the examiner reads the word ‘provided’ out of the claim language in limiting the action of the second step of claim 1 to the condition of the first system having to be met.” Reply Br. 4. Appellant is correct that the Examiner fails to give any meaning to the “provided” limitation under his reading of the claim. Although the claim allows for the engine to be stopped under a variety of different conditions, it implicitly requires a determination that “a condition of the first system is met” in order to stop the engine as one of those conditions. That is, because the Examiner relies on Seguchi as teaching this limitation, the Examiner needs a finding that in at least one instance, Seguchi teaches “stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the [idle stop] system provided a condition of the [adaptive cruise control] system is met.” As explained above, the Examiner has failed to establish such a finding. Claims 2–4, 7–9, and 12 depend from claim 1. Claims 14–17, 19, and 21 depend from claim 13. The stated bases for the rejections of these claims do not cure the deficiencies noted above in the rejection of claims 1 and 13. Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 7 For the reasons set forth above, we do not sustain the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 7–9, 12–17, 19, and 21. Fuji Grounds In the rejection of claims 1–11 and 13–21, Appellant does not dispute any finding made by the Examiner in relation to Fuji. Rather, Appellant focuses on the teachings of Killy and the Examiner’s proposed combination of those teachings with the teachings of Fuji. Appeal Br. 16–21. Appellant’s contentions for the rejection of claim 13 are identical to those presented for claim 1.4 See Appeal Br. 16–21. Appellant does not present separate arguments for claims 2–11 and 14–21. See id. at 19, 21. For simplicity, we discuss the rejection of claim 1 and Appellant’s response in connection with claim 1, with the understanding that our discussion also applies claim 13. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 13 relies on Fuji teaching the majority of the limitations recited in those claims, but finds that “Fuji appears to be silent as to after a delay from the vehicle stopping.” Final Act. 8.5 The Examiner finds that “Killy . . . teaches after a delay from the vehicle stopping, stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the second system provided a condition of the first system is met.” Id. Specifically, the Examiner explains that Killy teaches that “when performing a parking maneuver or a parking-like maneuver, the driver may (1) stop the car, (2) turn 4 Appellant appears to have simply reproduced the contentions for claim 1 when addressing claim 13, even mistakenly referencing claim 1 rather than claim 13 in those contentions. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 20–21. 5 The Examiner’s findings and rationale are the same for the portions of the rejection of claims 1 and 13 in dispute. See Final Act. 8–9. Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 8 the steering wheel” and consequently “an engine auto stop is inhibited” until “a time since the delay is greater than a threshold” i.e. Killy teaches that the vehicle is stopped and the engine auto stop is delayed so as to allow the vehicle to perform necessary maneuvers). Appeal Br. 17 (citing Killy ¶¶ 21–23, Fig. 4). The Examiner reasons that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to provide the invention of Seguchi with . . . a delay from the vehicle stopping . . . to ensure that the engine is available to permit maneuvers necessary for the ACC can be performed.” Id. The Examiner further explains that “all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and . . . could have [been] combined . . . by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and . . . would have yielded predictable results.” Id. Appellant contends that Killy does not provide the teaching missing from Fuji because “it also does not teach or suggest a delay from the vehicle stopping before stopping the engine provided a condition of the first system (ACC of Fuji as cited by the examiner) is met.” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant explains that “Killy (see Abstract, [0006]) is directed to a power steering system, with the delay in an automatic engine stop if the current drawn by the electric power steering system is above a threshold-thus not related to the ACC of Fuji at all.” Id. at 17. Noting the Examiner’s citation to paragraphs 21–23 of Killy, Appellant contends that: (1) “Paragraph [0021] is directed to the graph of Fig. 3 and does not seem to indicate the vehicle stopping, as recited in the claim, as none of the graph lines appears to end at zero speed;” (2) “Paragraph [0022] . . . again repeats . . . that an engine automatic stop may be delayed based on power steering current being drawn––this process checks not only the speed threshold (step 310), but also whether the brakes Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 9 are applied (step 314);” and (3) The “end of paragraph [0022] through paragraph [0023] further discusses Fig. 4,” where “[i]f no parking maneuver is detected (step 324), then there is no delay mentioned, which is not consistent with the claim language.” Id. Appellant “note[s] that unless the driver is applying the brakes (step 314) and does not release them (step 320), there is no automatic engine stop (step 332)––this is the opposite of Fuji where the ACC system is braking, not a driver being required to apply the brakes in Killy.” Id. Appellant explains that Killy’s “method only reaches this step 358 when the brakes are manually applied (step 314) and not released (step 320), thus ACC would not be active.”6 Id. The Examiner responds that “Appellant appears to argue against the references individually.” Ans. 10. The Examiner explains that “Fuji discloses an ACC stopping a vehicle and Killy teaches a driver stopping a vehicle,” which are “both methods of stopping a vehicle [that] are well known.” Id. at 11. The Examiner explains that “a person of ordinary skill could easily have realized that the substitution of one known element for another would have yielded predictable results,” and “a person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton, and it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable, without change, to render obvious the invention under review.” Id. The Examiner further explains that “a person having ordinary skill in the art would have the requisite common sense and creativity to realize how to modify an engine idle stop after stopping from a driver to include a delay to 6 Step 358 “determines whether a time since the delay is greater than a threshold.” Killy ¶ 23. Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 10 said stopping” and “that it was capable of being used on an engine idle stop after stopping from an ACC.” Id. Appellant contends that the examiner’s reasons for combining with Killy “so as to assure that the engine is available to permit maneuvers necessary for ACC can be performed” does not seem to make sense since the claim language in the first step is to stop the vehicle and the claim language in the second step is applied to the stationary (i.e., not parking maneuvering) vehicle. Appeal Br. 18. Appellant’s contention does not apprise us of error because it, in fact, does make sense to delay stopping Fuji’s engine as explained by the Examiner. Even with the vehicle stopped, permitting maneuvers by the ACC means that resumed vehicle activity (e.g., resumed movement based on the ACC control) can occur without first requiring a vehicle re-start. Although Killy’s delay is directed to a different situation (parking, rather than cruise control), the idea of including a delay is effectively for the same purpose. The delay is meant to prevent the engine idle stop when such operation may not be desirable. This is done in Killy to prevent engine idle stop when a person is attempting to park. In the Examiner’s proposed modification to Fuji, this is to prevent engine idle stop when the vehicle is momentarily stopped based on ACC protocol (i.e., to control the following distance from a vehicle) and to allow resumed acceleration and cruising in such situations without unnecessary delay from an overly sensitive engine idle stop system. We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s rejection because Appellant does not apprise us of any erroneous findings and, contrary to appellant’s contentions, the rationale provided by the Examiner does make Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 11 sense, as explained above. Appellant does not provide separate argument for the patentability of dependent claims 2–11 and 14–21. Appeal Br. 19, 21. Claim 12 depends from claim 1. Appellant relies on the contentions regarding claim 1 for the patentability of claim 12, which are unpersuasive for the reasons explained above. Appeal Br. 22. Claim 22 is independent, and claim 23 depends from claim 22. Claim 22 requires “holding the vehicle stationary with the first system, without manual braking and while the second system keeps the engine stopped.” The Examiner considers Fuji’s ACC system as the recited “first system” and its idle stop system as the recited “second system.” Final Act. 12. The Examiner finds that Fuji teaches holding the vehicle stationary with the ACC system, but also “restart[ing] the engine [with the idle stop system] prior to releasing the brakes.” Id. at 13. The Examiner finds that “Yamazaki however teaches manually releasing the brake while the first and second systems are activated and the engine stopped; holding the vehicle stationary with the first system, without manual braking while keep[ing] the engine stopped.” Id. (citing Yamazaki ¶ 23). The Examiner simply proposes further modifying the teachings of Fuji with those of Yamazaki, such that the vehicle is held in a stopped condition with ACC without manual braking without first restarting the engine. Final Act. 13–14. The Examiner explains that all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing. Id.; see also Ans. 12 (providing similar explanation). Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 12 Appellant contends that Yamazaki does not overcome the deficiency in Fuji because “[t]he system cited in Yamazaki, being hill hold, does not teach that the first (ACC) and second (ESS) systems are activated as they are not relevant to Yamazaki.” Appeal Br. 23. The Examiner has the better position. As the Examiner explains, “Appellant appears to argue against the references individually.” Ans. 12. The Examiner does not rely on Yamazaki teaching ACC and idle stop control systems that are active during the hill hold operation. The rejection is based on “Fuji disclos[ing] the use of idle stop control on an uphill slope and ensuring the vehicle remains stationary without the brake operation by the driver.” Id. (citing Fuji ¶¶ 5, 26, 38). The Examiner explains that “Yamazaki . . . teaches a method by which a vehicle can remain motionless on an incline while the engine is off and the brake pedal is manually released,” and explains that the rejection proposes “modify[ing] the hillhold of Fuji with the methods of Yamazaki.” Id. These findings are not disputed. Although Appellant alleges that “[t]he Examiner admitted that . . . Fuji” does not “hold the vehicle stationary with the first system, without manual braking and while the second system keeps the engine stopped” (Appeal Br. 23), the Examiner finds that Fuji teaches “holding the vehicle stationary with the first system (ACC) while the second system (idle stop) keeps the engine stopped” (Final Act. 13). Holding the vehicle stationary with the ACC system is holding that vehicle stationary without the user manually braking. Appellant also alleges a teaching away from the proposed modification in Fuji, but identifies nothing that disparages the proposed Appeal 2019-006125 Application 14/220,395 13 modification, which appears to be nothing more than use of the normal features of an ACC system. Accordingly, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 22 and 23. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections based on Seguchi and various other references are reversed, and the rejections based on Fuji and various other references are affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–4, 7–9, 13–17, 19, 21 103 Seguchi, Killy 1–4, 7–9, 13–17, 19, 21 12 103 Seguchi, Killy, Yamazaki 12 1–11, 13– 21 103 Fuji, Killy 1–11, 13– 21 12, 22, 23 103 Fuji, Killy, Yamazaki 12, 22, 23 Overall Outcome 1–23 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation