Ford Global Technologies, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 26, 2021

2020000975 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/097,334 12/05/2013 Ciro Angel Soto FMC4069PUS 83385488 2784
28395 7590 04/26/2021
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
HUTCHINSON, ALAN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/26/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CIRO ANGEL SOTO, SUJITH RAPOLU,
OLEG YURIEVITCH GUSIKHIN,
PERRY ROBINSON MACNEILLE,
DAVID RICHENS BRIGHAM, POYU TSOU,
MARK JOHN JENNINGS, and YAN MENG
____________

Appeal 2020-000975
Application 14/097,334
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before EDWARD A. BROWN, JILL D. HILL, and
GEORGE R. HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Ford Global Technologies, LLC, as the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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to patent-ineligible subject matter.2,3 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMS
Claims 1 and 15 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below,
illustrates the claimed subject matter on appeal.
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive power-usage-affecting variables, including
acceleration and corresponding current and projected values
over a route;
break the route into segments;
for each segment, model, based at least on acceleration, a
predetermined power usage estimate, using look-up values
based on projected acceleration and predefined power-usage
equations accommodating varied acceleration; and
present total estimated power usage over the route based
on accumulated power usage estimates for each segment.
Appeal Br. 1 (Claims App.).

ANALYSIS
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract

2 Claims 2–6, 8–14, and 16–19 are withdrawn from consideration. Final
Act. 2.
3 The Board previously issued a Decision on January 29, 2018 in the Appeal
filed on August 29, 2016, in this application.
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219.
Concepts that have been determined to be abstract ideas, and thus
patent-ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity
(Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010));
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s two-step framework is the
Office’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (issued January 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Guidance”). Step 2A,
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Prong 1, of the Guidance involves first determining whether the claim
recites any judicial exception, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
(i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities,
or mental processes). See id. at 52.
If the claim is determined to recite a judicial exception, Step 2A,
Prong 2, of the Guidance involves next determining whether the claim
recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. 52; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h).
Only if the claim both recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application, do we proceed to Step 2B
of the Guidance. At Step 2B, we determine whether the claim adds a
specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. See 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Step 1— Statutory Category
Claim 1 recites a system, and claim 15 recites a non-transitory
computer readable storage medium. Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1–3). Thus,
both claims 1 and 15 are directed to one of the statutory classes of subject
matter eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Step 2A, Prong 1—Recitation of Judicial Exception
The Examiner determines that claims 1 and 15 recite “‘a system’ . . .
and ‘a non-transitory computer readable medium . . . to perform a method’
for ‘receiving power-usage-affecting variables . . . and corresponding current
and projected values,’ looking up ‘a predetermined power usage estimate’
and ‘presenting total estimated power usage.’” Final Act. 3. The Examiner
states, “the claim as written does not even require display of the estimated
power usage, as the claim recites ‘present total estimated power usage’
which could be simply presenting that data to a processor,” which statement
appears to pertain to the final limitation of claim 1. Id. The Examiner
determines that these concepts relate to a judicial exception; namely, a
concept falling within the certain methods of organizing human activity
grouping of abstract ideas. Final Act. 3; see 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant does not specifically address the
Examiner’s findings that both claims 1 and 15 recite the above-discussed
abstract idea, and thus, Appellant does not apprise us of error.4 See Appeal
Br. 4–5.
In the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner finds that both claims 1 and
15 recite limitations that additionally fall within the “mental processes”
grouping of abstract ideas. Ans. 4. As set forth in the Guidance, this
grouping includes concepts performed in the human mind, including an

4 Arguments that Appellant could have made, but chose not to make in the
Appeal Brief, have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075–76 (BPAI 2010,
precedential).
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observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion. See 84 Fed. Reg. 52; MPEP
§ 2106.04(a)(2)(II).
We agree with the Examiner that both claims 1 and 15 can be
considered as falling within this additional grouping. Claim 1 recites the
limitation “receive power-usage-affecting variables, including acceleration
and corresponding current and projected values over a route.” Appellant’s
Specification describes, “[u]sing modeling tools, many factors relating to
actual driving conditions can be modeled and observed long before a vehicle
is ever driven by a consumer” (see Spec. ¶ 17 (emphasis added)), and “[b]y
using the modeled values, estimated power consumption for a known trip
can be calculated, and the owner can leave a location with a relative degree
of confidence that a current power supply will be sufficient for the journey”
(id. ¶ 54 (emphasis added)). First, we note that claim 1 does not recite a
“vehicle.” Second, we determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation
of the “receive” limitation in light of the Specification encompasses
receiving the power-usage-affecting variables and corresponding current and
projected values over a route before a vehicle is driven on a route. This also
applies to the remaining limitations of claim 1. The recited receiving of
power-usage-affecting variables information could be performed by a
human, mentally or with pen and paper.
As for the next limitation “break the route into segments,” the
Specification states, “[t]he route can be segmented by time, distance or any
other suitable parameter.” See Spec. ¶ 54 (emphasis added). According to
the Specification, “[t]he energy usage for the segment can be estimated from
the table, which, in this example, was calculated in advance.” Id. (emphasis
added). We determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “break
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the route into segments” in light of the Specification encompasses
performing this limitation by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.
Claim 1 next recites, “for each segment, model, based at least on
acceleration, a predetermined power usage estimate, using look-up values
based on projected acceleration and predefined power-usage equations
accommodating varied acceleration.” We determine that the broadest
reasonable interpretation of this limitation encompasses performing
modeling by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.
Lastly, claim 1 recites the limitation “present total estimated power
usage over the route based on accumulated power usage estimates for each
segment.” We determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of this
limitation encompasses performing the “presenting” by a human, mentally
or with pen and paper.
In claim 15, the “receiving,” “breaking,” and “modeling” limitations
(steps) are closely similar to the “receive,” “break,” and “model” limitations,
respectively, recited in claim 1. Compare Appeal Br. (Claims App. 3), with
id. at 1. Accordingly, we determine that the broadest reasonable
interpretation of these method steps in claim 15 encompasses performing
each of them before driving a vehicle on the route, by a human, mentally or
with pen and paper, for reasons similar to those discussed for claim 1.
The final step of claim 15 recites:
if total estimated power usage over the route based on
aggregated segment power usage estimates, exceeds remaining
power, determining an acceleration limit, based on a lookup
table including a plurality of power-usage-affecting variables
other than acceleration, which will result in remaining power
being projectedly sufficient to complete the route.
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Appeal Br. (Claims App. 3). We determine that the broadest reasonable
interpretation of this step likewise encompasses performing it before driving
a vehicle on the route, by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.
Although the system of claim 1 requires “a processor,” and claim 15
utilizes a processor to execute instructions, causing the processor to perform
a method, we note that, “[i]f a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”
See 84 Fed. Reg. 52 n.14; see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec
Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of
generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims
themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally
or with pen and paper.”); Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the
use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible
invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”).
See also MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(C). We are unable to find any
disclosure in the Specification that the recited processor is required to be
more than a generic processor. Apart from the processor recited as an
element of the system of claim 1, and the processor utilized in performing
the method of claim 15, we determine that these claims cover performance
in the mind.
In the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner further finds that both claims
1 and 15 additionally recite concepts falling under the mathematical
concepts grouping of abstract ideas. Ans. 3. As set forth in the Guidance,
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this grouping includes mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or
equations, and mathematical calculations. See 84 Fed. Reg. 52; MPEP
§ 2106.04(a)(2)(I). Particularly, the Examiner states that the claims recite
receiving data, and modeling power usage based on the received data. Ans.
3. The Examiner points out that paragraph 53 of the Specification describes,
“Modeling, as used here, can include solving for a number of known
equations using varied parameters.” Id. (quoting Spec. ¶ 53). Therefore, the
Examiner determines, the claims additionally recite a mathematical concept.
Id.
We agree with the Examiner that both claims 1 and 15 can be
considered as falling within the “mathematical concepts” grouping of
abstract ideas. Claim 1 recites, “for each segment, model, based at least on
acceleration, a predetermined power usage estimate, using look-up values
based on projected acceleration and predefined power-usage equations
accommodating varied acceleration.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1)
(emphasis added). Claim 15 recites closely similar language. Id. (Claims
App. 2–3). The broadest reasonable interpretation of these limitations in
light of the Specification encompasses determining a predetermined power
usage estimate by performing mathematical calculations using (or solving)
“predefined power usage equations.”
Additionally, the final step of claim 15 recites, in part, “if total
estimated power usage over the route based on aggregated segment power
usage estimates, exceeds remaining power.” We construe this recitation as
calling for a simple comparison of two numerical values, which represents
determining a mathematical relationship between these values. According to
the final step, if the total estimated power usage exceeds the remaining
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power, then the claim requires “determining an acceleration limit, based on a
look-up table.” We construe this recitation as calling for a mathematical
calculation.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant does not specifically address the
Examiner’s findings that claims 1 and 15 both recite the additional abstract
ideas of mental processes and mathematical concepts. Hence, Appellant
does not apprise us of error.
As Appellant does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, we proceed to Step
2A, Prong 2, of the Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong 2—Practical Application of Judicial Exception
Under the Guidance, the next determination is whether claim 1, as a
whole, integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application.
This determination involves: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception; and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
See 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. An exemplary consideration indicative of an
additional element (or a combination of elements) that may integrate the
exception into a practical application is an additional element that reflects an
improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other
technology or technical field. See id. at 55.
The Examiner finds that claims 1 and 15 recite the additional element
of a processor to execute code. Final Act. 3. The Examiner submits that the
“hardware” is recited at a high level of generality, and as performing generic
computer functions routinely used in computer applications. Id. The
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Examiner determines that the recited additional element does not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea, and thus, the claims do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. at 3–4.
First, Appellant contends that “claim 1 results in a presentation (which
. . . a skilled artisan would understand to be a presentation to a person . . .) of
the total estimated power usage determined on a segment by segment basis.”
Appeal Br. 4. According to Appellant, “this is both a novel way of
determining power usage and represents a practical application of what to do
with the determined power usage.” Id.
The Examiner disagrees with Appellant’s contention that the
limitation “present total estimated power usage” would be understood to be
limited to a display to a user. Ans. 3. The Examiner notes that paragraph 56
of the Specification states, “‘the process may output a predicted power
consumption’ which could be outputting the data to a processor,” and
paragraph 50 states, “Results of the modeling can be stored on a cloud-
server or in a vehicle system.” Id. at 4 (quoting Spec. ¶ 50). The Examiner
submits that “the claim language appears to be nothing more than outputting
the results of the modeling to a server.” Id.
Appellant replies that “whether ‘present’ means present to a user or
present to a processor is actually irrelevant to eligibility.” Reply Br. 1
(citing “Gemalto”5). Nevertheless, Appellant contends, “[t]he context of the
specification, especially paragraph [0063], makes it dear that ‘present’ is

5 We understand that Appellant is referring to Koninklijke KPN N.V. v.
Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (hereinafter,
“Gemalto”). Gemalto was decided on November 15, 2019, subsequent to
the June 26, 2019 filing date of the Appeal Brief.
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reasonably given its plainly understood meaning, which is presenting
information to a user (driver).” Id. at 2.
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive. Paragraph 63 of the
Specification describes, “After any changes have been calculated, the
process can present the new consumption predictions 415 to a driver.”
Claim 1 does not, however, recite a limitation that requires the total
estimated power usage to be presented to a driver. In this regard, claim 1
does not recite, for example, an element that could present the information to
a driver. Furthermore, importing language from the written description into
the claims is generally disfavored. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV
Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding
the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the
written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that
are not a part of the claim.”). Accordingly, we do not agree with Appellant
that claim 1 requires presentation of the total estimated power usage to a
driver.
Second, as for Appellant’s contention that determining the total
estimated power usage “on a segment by segment basis” is a novel way of
determining power usage (Appeal Br. 4), the patent eligibility analysis is not
an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness. “A claim for a new abstract
idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics, Corp., 839
F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even assuming that the claimed method
may be novel, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of . . . the . . . [claim] itself, is of no relevance
in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” See Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 188–189 (1981). A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a
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purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at
90–91. Hence, even if determining the total estimated power usage “on a
segment by segment basis” is a novel way of determining power usage, this
does not make claim 1 patent eligible.
Third, in the Reply Brief, Appellant contends that, under Gemalto, the
claims solve an identified problem using a specific solution to achieve an
intended improvement, and thus, are patent eligible. Reply Br. 2.
As described in Gemalto, the inventors addressed a problem that
occurs in prior art data transmission systems that transmit information (data)
over the air from a transmitter to a receiver. In these systems, “check data”
is generated to check whether data was accurately transmitted over a
communications channel, that is, whether errors occurred during
transmission. Gemalto, 942 F.3d at 1145. The inventors determined that
prior art error detection systems were unable to reliably detect “systematic
errors,” and once those systems generated defective check data for an initial
data block with a given systematic error, they would continue to generate
defective check data for subsequent data blocks with the same systematic
error. Id. The inventors determined that the reason why the systemic errors
were able to persist without being detected was because the prior art systems
used a fixed generating function to process every data block. Id. at 1147.
The inventors solved this problem by varying the way check data is
generated from time to time, so that the same defective check data does not
continue to be produced for the same type of persistent systemic error. Id.
Gemalto states, “[s]ince Alice, we have found software inventions to
be patent-eligible where they have made non-abstract improvements to
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existing technological processes and computer technology.” Gemalto, 942
F.3d at 1150. However, the court further explained:
An improved result, without more stated in the claim, is not
enough to confer eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea.
[Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat System, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2018)] (stating that as a “foundational patent law
principle,” “a result, even an innovative result, is not itself
patentable”). To be patent-eligible, the claims must recite a
specific means or method that solves a problem in an existing
technological process.
Id. (emphasis added). The court in Gemalto determined that the claims
recite “a specific implementation of varying the way check data is generated
that improves the ability of prior art detection systems to detect systemic
errors.” Id. The court also stated that, “as in Finjan, the claimed invention
is also directed to a non-abstract improvement because it employs a new
way of generating check data that enables the detection of persistent
systematic errors in data transmissions that prior art systems were previously
not equipped to detect.” Id. at 1151.
Appellant states, in Gemalto “the inventors identified a problem,
identified a specific way of solving the problem, and incorporated a specific
solution, designed to achieve the improvement, into the claims.” Reply
Br. 3. According to Appellant, “the question is not whether the specific
solution is a highly technical solution, but whether it is a specific solution
that achieves the improvement to the identified problem.” Id. at 3–4.
Regarding its invention, Appellant states, “The improvement relates to an
improved calculation for distance to empty on an electric vehicle.” Id. at 4
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 3, 17, 54). Based on the description in these paragraphs, we
understand Appellant’s position is that the problem addressed by the
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invention is providing “an improved calculation” to avoid an electric vehicle
running out of power during a trip.
The Specification discloses, “By using the modeled values, estimated
power consumption for a known trip can be calculated, and the owner can
leave a location with a relative degree of confidence that a current power
supply will be sufficient for the journey.” See Spec. ¶ 54. We understand
Appellant’s invention uses modeling data to calculate estimated power
consumption to address the purported problem.
According to Appellant, the claims provide an improvement with a
two-part, specific solution to the problem. Reply Br. 4. Appellant contends
that the first part is “Segmenting the route, which makes predicting power
usage easier since it is predicted for a segment, which may have more
consistent variable values than a whole route)” (id. (citing Spec. ¶ 55)); and
the second part is “Predicting the power usage for each segment, to derive an
aggregate power usage . . . This portion also has a further degree of
specificity applied thereto requiring that ‘projected acceleration’ be the
basis for determining the power usage” (id.). Appellant asserts it “has
provided a specific solution ‘breaking a route into segments and using
projected acceleration to determine projected power usage over each
segment’ that results in the improvement noted in the specification, and this,
under Gemalto, is sufficient.” Id.
Appellant’s contentions premised on Gemalto are unpersuasive.
Claims 1 and 15 require breaking the route into segments, that is, two or
more segments. As noted, however, the Specification discloses that “The
route can be segmented by time, distance or any other suitable parameter.”
See Spec. ¶ 55 (emphasis added). The Specification does not particularly
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limit how the route is segmented, as it appears that any suitable “parameter”
will suffice for this purpose.
As for Appellant’s contention in the Appeal Brief that determining the
total estimated power usage “on a segment by segment basis” is a practical
application of the judicial exception, Appellant does not direct us to any
disclosure in the Specification that shows persuasively that segmenting the
route, in particular, is particularly responsible for, or effective in, providing
the purported improvement. The contentions of Appellant’s counsel in the
Reply Brief, therefore, are not supported by the evidence presently of record.
Nor does Appellant explain how determining total estimated power
usage in this way integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. See Appeal Br. 4. We construe the limitation “breaking the
route into segments” as encompassing breaking the route into two segments
that can have, for example, the same length and substantially the same road
grade. It is not apparent how breaking the route into two such segments
would provide an improvement. As another example, we construe the
limitation as encompassing breaking the route into two segments where one
segment equals substantially the entire length and/or time of the route, and
thus, account for substantially the entire predetermined power usage
estimate value. It is also not apparent how breaking the route into such
unequal-length segments would provide an improvement.
Additionally, Appellant does not direct us to any disclosure that
shows using the projected acceleration, in particular, is responsible for, or
effective in, providing the purported improvement as compared to other
“power-usage-affecting variables.” Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by
Appellant’s contentions that claim 1 provides a practical application.
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Appellant further contends:
claim 15 “uses” the output in a specific manner that
furthers the improvement, by deriving an acceleration limit,
which is a cap on the variable controlling the power usage
calculation, that should preserve sufficient power. In this
instance, the “use” is part of the specific solution and
improvement, rendering the solution even more specific and the
improvement even more clear.
Reply Br. 5.
We are not persuaded by this contention. First, the “receiving,”
“breaking,” and “modeling” steps recited in claim 15 are substantially the
same as the corresponding limitations in claim 1. Accordingly, these steps
do not provide a practical application for substantially the same reasons
discussed for claim 1.
As for the final step of claim 15, “determining an acceleration limit”
is performed “if total estimated power usage over the route based on
aggregated segment power usage estimates, exceeds remaining power.”
Accordingly, claim 15 encompasses not determining an acceleration limit
when the preceding condition is not satisfied. See, e.g., Applera Corp. v.
Illumina, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 12, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
(affirming a district court’s interpretation of a method claim as including a
step that need not be practiced if the condition for practicing the step is not
met); Cybersettle, Inc. v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 243 Fed. Appx. 603,
607 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“It is of course true that method steps
may be contingent. If the condition for performing a contingent step is not
satisfied, the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order
for the claimed method to be performed.”). As claim 15 encompasses not
“[using] the output in a specific manner that furthers the improvement, by
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deriving an acceleration limit,” we are not persuaded that “the ‘use’ is part
of the specific solution and improvement, rendering the solution even more
specific and the improvement even more clear,” as Appellant contends. See
Reply Br. 5.
For the above reasons, we are unpersuaded that the additional element
recited in claims 1 and 15 integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application of the exception. That is, we determine that the claims 1 and 15
are “directed to” the judicial exception. See 84 Fed. Reg. 54.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
The next consideration is whether claims 1 and 15 add a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field. See 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
The Examiner determines that the claims do not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because considering the limitations as an ordered combination
does not amount to more than looking at the elements taken individually.
Final Act. 4. The Examiner submits that there is no indication that the
combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or
improves another technology or technical field. Id.
Appellant does not address the Examiner’s position, and thus, does
not apprise us of error. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 15
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 15 101 Eligibility 1, 15

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED