FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 26, 20202019005721 (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/342,891 11/03/2016 Frederic STEFAN 83741933 5146 28395 7590 05/26/2020 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL 1000 TOWN CENTER 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 EXAMINER MUSTAFA, IMRAN K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3665 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/26/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FREDERIC STEFAN, UWE GUSSEN, and CHRISTOPH ARNDT Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 Technology Center 3600 Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6, 8–10, and 12–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM IN PART. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER According to Appellant, “[t]he disclosure relates to a method and to a system for preventing driver concentration errors when driving a motor vehicle.” Spec. ¶ 2. Independent claims 1 and 15, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for preventing driver concentration errors comprising: acquiring parameters that characterize a current driving situation of a vehicle; calculating, based on the acquired parameters, a current level of monotony as a characterization of a monotony of the current driving situation; checking whether the calculated current level of monotony exceeds a predetermined threshold; and driving according to a specified behavior to increase concentration on driving the motor vehicle when the threshold is exceeded. 15. A method for improving driving focus comprising: in response to acquired driving parameters, via an acquisition device, indicative of a monotony level of a driving situation being above a predetermined threshold, instructing a driver, via an exercise module, to perform an exercise to increase a concentration level, wherein the exercise is a set of exercises performed at predefined times specified by a preset schedule. REJECTION AND PRIOR ART The Examiner rejects the claims as follows: I. Claims 1–3, 6, 8–10, 12–17, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Demirdjian et al. (US 2010/0219955 A1, published Sept. 2, 2010) (“Demirdjian”) and Kuntzel (US 2012/0154156 A1, published June 21, 2012); and Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 3 II. Claims 4, 5, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Demirdjian, Kuntzel, and Nordbruch et al. (US 2014/0371981 A1, published Dec. 18, 2014) (“Nordbruch”). ANALYSIS Rejection I—Obviousness rejection of claims 1–3, 6, 8–10, 12–17, and 20 Independent claim 1, and its dependent claims 2, 3, and 8 The Examiner finds that Demirdjian discloses most of independent claim 1’s recitations, but fails to teach the claim recitation of “driving according to a specified behavior to increase concentration on driving the motor vehicle when the threshold is exceeded,” which the Examiner finds Kuntzel discloses in paragraph 46. Final Action 4–5. Appellant argues that the Examiner errs because “Kuntzel simply issues a ‘sharp wake-up alarm . . . if the higher alarm threshold is reached,’” and “does not explicitly pertain to ‘driving behavior’ within the context of the claims.” Appeal Br. 5–6. For the following reasons, we disagree with Appellant. Kuntzel “relates to a method to wake up a sleeping motor vehicle driver.” Kuntzel ¶ 1. Kuntzel teaches alerting a driver with a “wake-up alarm” based on detection systems that monitor driver inactivity and vehicle motion cross pre-determined thresholds. Id. ¶ 12. Kuntzel teaches a “sharp” alarm, such as in the situation where if a steering wheel activity threshold is exceeded, “a sharp wake-alarm . . . is initiated to wake up the driver . . . by means of a mechanical vibration . . . generated in the steering wheel.” Id. ¶ 35. Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 4 In addition, Kuntzel teaches a “mild warning alarm,” where an active driver, who is being alerted by a mild warning alarm . . . may be expected to take necessary actions to eliminate the situation, which caused the alarm. Such actions may be to activate the travelling direction indicator, which ought to be used when changing lanes, or to bring back the vehicle into a better lane position by corrective steering or to brake the vehicle to avoid an indicated danger. Id. ¶ 46. Kuntzel explains that a “sleeping/inactive driver may not take notice of the mild alarm . . . and thereafter [the] sharp wake-up alarm . . . will consequently follow, if the higher alarm threshold is reached.” Id. Appellant’s Specification describes “acquiring . . . parameters that characterize the current driving situation and are suitable for calculating a level of monotony.” Spec. ¶ 37 (cited at Appeal Br. 2). The parameters are used to calculate a current level of monotony, which is checked against a threshold. Id. ¶¶ 38–39 (cited at Appeal Br. 2). If the threshold is exceeded, “a selection . . . of exercises for the driver is offered,” where “the driver is first presented with a plurality of different exercises. This can be done by a voice output or a display on a screen, for example.” Id. ¶¶ 40, 42. The Specification further teaches that “[e]xamples of exercises are driving according to a specified driving behavior,” and that an “example of a specified driving behavior as an exercise may be a change of lane, driving at a certain speed, decelerating or accelerating slightly, assuming a certain lateral alignment of the vehicle inside a lane, switching on a high beam or a direction indicator, and the like.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 45. Although claim 1 does not recite a manner by which a driver is alerted when a level of monotony exceeds a threshold, some notice to the driver is implied in the claim, and described in the Specification. See id. ¶ 17 (“[T]he Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 5 driver can be invited to change lanes, to drive at a certain speed, to decelerate or accelerate slightly, to assume a certain lateral alignment of the vehicle inside a lane, or to switch on a high beam or direction indicator.”) (emphasis added). We interpret Kuntzel’s mild alarm as a form of invitation for the driver to take action that meets this implied notice. Kuntzel further teaches driver actions that include “to bring back the vehicle into a better lane position by corrective steering or to brake the vehicle to avoid an indicated danger.” Kuntzel ¶ 46 (cited at Final Action 5). These actions meet the claim language of “driving according to a specified behavior,” because the actions are consistent with the example in the Specification as forms of “decelerating or accelerating slightly, assuming a certain lateral alignment of the vehicle inside a lane.” Spec. ¶ 45. Because Appellant has not demonstrated persuasively that the rejection is erroneous, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2, 3, and 8, which are not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 7. Dependent claim 6 Dependent claim 6 recites “wherein calculating the current level of monotony accounts for previous levels of monotony over one or more of a specified time period and a specified distance.” The Examiner finds that Demirdjian teaches the claim recitation at paragraph 45. Final Action 6. The Examiner determines that because Demirdjian teaches “continuously determining” and “continuously monitoring the driver performance,” Demirdjian thus teaches “determining [a] previous[] level of monotony over a specified time and distance as the driver is driving along a road.” Answer 6. Appellant argues that the Examiner errs because “Demirdjian Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 6 discloses various categories of exercises, but does not describe any previous levels of monotony.” Appeal Br. 7. We agree with Appellant that continuous monitoring, and continuous determination, do not necessarily involve a “previous levels of monotony.” Thus, the Examiner has not shown that Demirdjian relies on any previous level of monotony in the determination of driver fatigue. Instead, the Examiner points out the monitored level of monotony is compared to a threshold, not a previous level monitored. Answer 6. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 6. Dependent claim 9 We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that “Demirdjian does not disclose such exercises at “certain times given by a preset schedule,’” as recited in dependent claim 9. Appeal Br. 8. Specifically, we agree with the Examiner that this limitation is taught in paragraph 11 of Demirdjian. Answer 6. This portion of Demirdjian, which summarizes the invention, states that the “data processor also provides a drowsiness reduction exercise to the driver at predetermined time intervals.” Demirdjian ¶ 11. A preset schedule would encompass predetermined time intervals. For this reason, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 9. Independent claim 10, and its dependent claims 13, and 14 The Examiner finds that independent claim 10 is similar to claim 1, and rejects claim 10 using the same rationale as claim 1. Final Action 6. Independent claim 10, which recites “to present an exercise such that a driver drives according to a specified behavior,” is argued primarily by reference to the arguments advanced for claim 1, and that “Kuntzel does not Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 7 ‘present an exercise such that a driver drives according to a specified behavior.’” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant’s Specification describes that: [D]riving according to a specified driving behavior is performed as an exercise for the driver. For example, the driver can be invited to change lanes, to drive at a certain speed, to decelerate or accelerate slightly, to assume a certain lateral alignment of the vehicle inside a lane, or to switch on a high beam or direction indicator. Spec. ¶ 17. The claimed presentation of an “exercise,” which does not appear in claim 1, is nonetheless similar in meaning to the language of claim 1, in that the presentation corresponds to the implied invitation in claim 1, and the exercise corresponds to the actions for “driving according to a specified behavior.” Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 10 for the same reasons as for claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 13 and 14, which are not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 7. Dependent claim 12 Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 12 is erroneous for “the same reasons” as claim 9. Because we sustain the claim 9’s obviousness rejection (supra), we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 12. Independent Claim 15, and its dependent claims 16 and 17 The Examiner finds that independent claim 15 is similar to claim 1, and rejects claim 15 using the same rationale as claim 1. Final Action 6. Appellant argues that the Examiner errs because “[n]either Demirdjian nor Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 8 Kuntzel teach[es] such instructions to a driver where the instructions include an exercise that is ‘a set of exercises performed at predefined times specified by a preset schedule.’” Appeal Br. 6. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, however, because we agree with Examiner that the limitation is taught in Demirdjian’s paragraph 11. Answer 5. This portion of Demirdjian, which summarizes the invention, states that the “data processor also provides a drowsiness reduction exercise to the driver at predetermined time intervals.” Demirdjian ¶ 11. A preset schedule would encompass predetermined time intervals. For this reason, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 15. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 16 and 17 because they are not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 7. Dependent claim 20 Dependent claim 20 recites a similar recitation as that discussed above with respect to claim 6. Further, the Examiner’s rationale for rejecting claim 20 is similar to that of claim 6. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 20 for the same reasons that we do not sustain claim 6’s rejection. Rejection II—Obviousness rejection of claims 4, 5, 18, and 19 With respect to the dependent claim 4, the Examiner finds that Nordbruch teaches “wherein the acquired parameters include at least one live status parameter for characterizing a vehicle status.” Final Action 7. This section of Nordbruch discloses, in relevant part, “the monitoring device encompasses one or more sensors.” Nordbruch ¶ 46. Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 9 We are not persuaded that the Examiner errs by Appellant’s argument that “Nordbruch does not appear to have anything to do with ‘preventing driver concentration errors,’ but instead is directed to mimicking driver behavior though autonomous driver assistance systems.” Appeal Br. 9. The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). In this case, the Examiner supports adequately that the use of Nordbruch’s sensors with components of Demirdjian and Kuntzel yields predictable results; and, Appellant does not persuasively argue otherwise. See, e.g., Answer 7; see also Final Action 6. To the extent that Appellant is arguing that Nordbruch is non-analogous art, Appellant fails to establish that the art is from a different field of endeavor than the claimed invention, or that the reference is not reasonably pertinent to the particular problem faced by the inventor. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 4. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claim 18, which Appellant argues for the “same reasons” as claim 4. Appeal Br. 9. Appellant does not argue against the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 5 and 19. Thus, inasmuch as we sustain the rejection of independent claims 1 and 15 from which claims 5 and 19 depend, we sustain the rejection of these dependent claims. Appeal 2019-005721 Application 15/342,891 10 CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1–5, 8–10, and 12–19. We REVERSE the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 6 and 20. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–3, 6, 8–10, 12–17, 20 103 Demirdjian, Kuntzel 1–3, 8–10, 12–17 6, 20 4, 5, 18, 19 103 Demirdjian, Kuntzel, Nordbruch 4, 5, 18, 19 Overall Outcome 1–5, 8–10, 12–19 6, 20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED IN PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation