Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1952

99 N.L.R.B. 1430 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

1430 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION and Roy E. BAUER
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, LOCAL LODGE 504, ET AL.
and Roy E. BAUER. Cases Nos. 20-CA-580 and 2O-CB-196. June
30, 195R
Decision and Order
On August 7, 1951, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of
the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respond-
ents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
On December 18, 1951, and May 6,1952, the Board heard oral argu-
ment at Washington, D. C., in which the Respondents 1 and the General
'Counsel participated.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial. error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner only insofar as they are consistent with
our decision herein.
1. The Trial Examiner found that the $60 reinstatement fee the
Respondent Union imposed on the Complainant Bauer, a former
member of a sister local of the Respondent Union, as a condition of
membership, as compared with the $30 initiation fee required of
first-time applicants, was "discriminatory under all the circum-
stances" within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5) of the Act. In so
doing, the Trial Examiner was of the opinion that the principle of
the Ferro case 2 impelled this conclusion. We do not agree that the
Ferro principle is applicable or that the General Counsel proved that
the reinstatement fee otherwise fell within the ban of Section 8 (b)
(5)
Section 8 (b) (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization
to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized un-
der subsection (a) (3) the payment, as a condition precedent to
becoming a member of such organization, of a fee in an amount
1 The Respondent Company only attended oral argument on December 18, 1951. Mem-
bers Houston and Peterson, although not present at that oral argument, have read and
fully considered the complete transcript of that proceeding.
2 Ferro Stamping and dtanufaeturtng Co., 93 NLRB 1459.
99 NLRB No. 167.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1431
which the Board finds excessive or discriminatory under all the
circumstances. In making such a finding, the Board shall con-
sider, among other relevant factors, the practices and customs
of labor organizations in the particular industry, and the wages
currently paid to the employees affected.
It is conceded that the reinstatement fee that Bauer was required to
pay is a "fee" contemplated by Section 8 (b) (5). It is also undis-
puted that this fee is not "excessive." The only question to be de-
cided is whether the reinstatement fee is "discriminatory under all
the circumstances" within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5).
In interpreting this section, the Board has recognized-and real-
istically so-that it does not prohibit unions from charging different
fees (provided they are not excessive) where they are based on a
reasonable classification .3 This is implicit in the applicable language
of the Act that condemns only fees that are "discriminatory under all
the circumstances" after due consideration of the "practices and
customs of labor organizations in the particular industry."
A careful reading of the record does not, in our opinion, support
the Trial Examiner 's and our dissenting colleagues ' conclusion that
the Respondent Union, through the imposition of a $60 reinstatement
fee, attempted to penalize Bauer solely because he had refrained from
membership in an affiliated lodge at a time when he was not obligated
to join it. This conclusion, the minority concedes, rests upon in-
ference, an inference that the Board was willing to draw in the Ferro
Stamping and Stacker cases, where the record clearly revealed that
the only basis for the disparate treatment of employees was the fact
that certain employees had been employed longer than others. More-
over, as the Trial Examiner in the former case found, with Board
approval, the events in that case revealed "the Union's underlying
discriminatory motive and intent." We do not believe that the facts
in this case warrant such an inference. Here the Respondent Union's
practice of charging former members a fee different from that charged
new members has existed without change since 19414 This fee has
not been in every instance larger than that charged a new applicant.
Under the Respondent Union's practice, Bauer, as a former member
of another affiliated lodge, would have been charged only a nominal
fee if he had held an honorary withdrawal or retiring card from
Local 394. In other words, all that the Respondent Union has done
3
Ferro Stamping and Manufacturing Co , supra; Local 153, International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-
CIO (Richard Stacker, et al.), 99 NLRB 1419.
Although this practice is not entitled to controlling weight, and contrary to the
-dissent' we have not given it controlling weight, we have considered it in reaching our
decision, in accordnace with the requirements of Section 8 (b) (5). Cf. Richard Stacker,
et al., supra.
1432 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in this case is to adopt a rule that former members are entitled to-
special consideration, more or less favorable than that accorded new
members depending on the history of the individual's association with
its affiliated organizations. Similarly, the Respondent Union has ac-
corded special consideration to recently discharged veterans, who are
admitted without the payment of any initiation fee. Were we to
adopt the rationale of the minority, new members of the Respondent
Union presumably could claim in some cases that they were being
subject to discriminatory treatment solely because they were not
former members of the Respondent Union or veterans at a time when
they were not obligated to enter into either category.
We read Section 8 (b) (5), particularly the cautionary language
specifically included by Congress and quoted above, to mean that
Congress did not intend the Board to find labor organizations in viola-
tion of the law, where, as here, following well-settled practice, they
have done no more than to establish a different, but fairly reasonable,
classification of former members as distinguished from new appli-
cants. In our opinion a contrary interpretation is unnecessarily harsh
and is required neither by the spirit nor the literal language of that
section. As indicated above, we do not have the question before us
whether the fees required by the Respondent Union were excessive.
We find only that the Respondent Union did not per se violate the
Act by according former members special consideration in setting their
reinstatement fee, whether that fee was greater or less than the initia-
tion fee required of new or other reasonable classifications of appli-
cants." The burden was on the General Counsel to prove not only
that the fee charged Bauer was disparate, but that it was discrimina-
tory in its application. Under all the circumstances, set forth above,
we find that he has failed to carry this burden.
Accordingly, we shall dismiss the Section 8 (b) (5) allegations of
the complaint.
2. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent Union vio-
lated Section 8 (b) (2) and (1) of the Act in demanding, and the
Respondent Company violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act,
in effecting, Bauer's discharge for failing to, secure membership in the
Union, as provided in the Respondents' union-shop contract. He
reached this conclusion on the basis of his finding that Bauer was re-
quired to pay a discriminatory fee as a condition of membership and
that therefore the union-shop contract could not serve as a defense
to the discharge.
' The distinction between this case and those cited by the minority in footnote 11 in
'which employees were required by the union to pay dues accrued during a period of time
when they were under no obligation to be members of the union would appear to be so
-obvious that we do not believe it merits discussion . Nevertheless , we reaffirm our holding
in those cases and emphasize that our decision here is limited to the facts of this case.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1433
In view of our disagreement with the Trial Examiner's finding
that the reinstatement fee was shown to be discriminatory under all
the circumstances within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5), we are
not persuaded for the same reasons that the discharge was unpro-
tected. As in the case of Section 8 (b) (5), the Board has construed
Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act to permit a labor organiza-
tion holding a union-security agreement to charge, as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership, different initiation fees and pe-
riodic dues provided they are based on a reasonable classification; 6
that is, one that is not discriminatory.
It is clear that Bauer failed to obtain membership in the Respond-
ent Union solely because he refused to pay the $60 reinstatement fee
which was uniformly required of all former members similarly situ-
ated. As this fee, which is conceded to be the equivalent of an initia-
tion fee, was not shown to be based on an improper classification, we
find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Bauer's discharge was
protected.
In view of our foregoing findings, we shall dismiss the complaint
in its entirety.
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the consolidated complaint against
the Respondent, Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation, San Jose,
California, and the Respondents, International Association of Ma-
chinists, Local 504, and International Association of Machinists, Dis-
trict.Lodge No. 93, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
C.IIIRMAN HERzoo and MEMBER HOUSTON, dissenting :
We have greater difficulty than the majority in reconciling the dis-
missal of this complaint with established precedent, or indeed with
the Board's unanimous decision finding a violation in the Stacker
case,7 which is being issued simultaneously with the present opinions.
To put the issues in proper perspective, we recite the pertinent facts :
In February 1951, Bauer, the charging party, obtained employment
with the Respondent Company in California. Upon being advised
at that time that the Respondent Union enjoyed a concededly valid
union-shop contract at the plant, which required new employees to
join that organization within 35 days as a condition of employment,
Bauer promptly applied for membership. However, he never became
a member, because of his refusal to pay a $60 reinstatement fee which
The Electric Auto-Lite Company, 92 NLRB 1073, enfd, 196 F. 2d 500 (C. A. 6).
z Local 153, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, UAW-CIO (Richard Stacker, et al.), 99 NLRB 1419.
1434 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union's bylaws imposed upon former members of the Union's
International, although he was willing to pay the $30 initiation fee
required of first-time applicants. The only reason for charging Bauer
the larger admission fee was that in 1949, while in the employ of an-
other company at St. Louis, he had permitted his membership in an
affiliated lodge to lapse. At that time another union had supplanted
the affiliated lodge as the employees' bargaining representative.,, Be-
cause , on refusing to pay the higher fee, Bauer failed to become a
member as the union-shop required, the Respondent Union procured
his discharge by the Respondent Company in 1951.
It seems to us, as it did to the Trial Examiner, that the reinstate-
ment fee thus imposed on Bauer, which was double the amount first-
time applicants were required to pay as a condition of membership,
was in effect a penalty for his not having previously maintained mem-
bership in the Union's affiliated lodge. Yet, as no union-shop agree-
ment was then in effect with his former employer, Section 7 of the
amended Act guaranteed his "right to refrain" from membership at
that time. We believe that, under the Ferro e principle, this fee, as it
applied to Bauer, was "discriminatory under all the circumstances,"
within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5) of the Act.
We might have assumed that the majority was here impliedly over-
ruling the principle of the Ferro case, were it not for the Board's
unanimous decision in the Stacker case, where the present majority
joins us in concluding that the statute was violated. In that case
the Board, reaffirming the theory of the Ferro case, holds that Section
8 (b) (5) prohibits a labor organization from charging older em-
ployees, subject for the first time to a union-security agreement, larger
initiation fees than newer employees, because of their greater length
of service with their employer during a period when no union-shop
contract was in existence, thereby penalizing prior nonmembership
at a time when membership was' not obligatory. We all condemned
the larger fee in the Stacker case, "because the employees against
whom it was assessed had exercised their statutory right, under the
amended Act, to refrain from joining the . . . [union] earlier." Un-
like the majority, we are unable to distinguish in principle between the
Stacker case and this one. But here our colleagues sanction the impo-
sition, upon a former member of an affiliated union, of a higher admis-
sion fee than that charged first-time applicants, solely because he had
8 As shown in the Intermediate Report, it appears that at that time Bauer requested
the affiliated lodge to give him an honorary withdrawal card, which it declined to do.
9 Ferro Stamping and Manufacturing Co, 93 NLRB 1459, where the Board unanimously
held that Section 8 ( b) (5) prohibited a labor union holding a union-security agreement
from charging old employees a larger initition fee than new employees , because this dis-
tinction in fees was based on the fact that the old employees had exercised their statutory
right to refrain fiom joining earlier.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1435
quit his union, as he was then privileged to do, at a time when that
union had ceased to function as the bargaining representative at his
former place of employment 10
The majority seems to rely substantially on the Respondent Union's
past practice and custom of charging the disparate fees in question
as justification for the Respondent Union's present conduct. We do
not believe, as our colleagues in the Stacker case do not believe, that
past practice and custom may serve as a defense to what otherwise
constitutes an unfair labor practice. To give controlling weight to
these factors, as our colleagues apparently do here, would require us
to make the untenable assumption that Congress, when amending the
law in 1947, intended to perpetuate, rather than to eliminate, discrim-
inatory admission fees if they had customarily been imposed by
unions in the past.
Nor are we persuaded by the majority's attempted distinction
between the Stacker case and the present case on evidentiary grounds.
The Board unanimously believed in the Stacker case that an initia-
tion fee based upon the length of employment which covered a period
when employees were entitled to refrain from joining the contracting
union warranted an inference that the larger fee was "discriminatory"
within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5). We believe that the same
inference should logically be drawn here from the fact that a higher
admission fee was exacted from a former member of an affiliated
union solely because he, too, had previously exercised his statutory
right to refrain from continuing his membership. At the very least,
the foregoing evidence established a prima facie case, which required
the Respondent Union to go forward with evidence showing a lawful
basis for the disparity in admission fees. This the Union failed to do.
Having found that the reinstatement fee was not discriminatory,
the majority apparently has little difficulty in concluding that Bauer's
discharge for failing to secure membership by paying this fee was
'D Cf Coionie Fibre Company, Inc., 69 NLRB 589, 71 NLRB 354, enfd. with mod. 163 F.
2d 65 .( C. A. 2), where the Board held that a maintenance -of-membership provision, which
required membership during a period when no union -security contract was in existence
as a condition of employment , was invalid. We said ( 71 NLRB at 356 ) that during that
interim period the employees
were free to exercise without restraint the right to select and change representatives
and the right to be or to refrain from being members of any union . This freedom
would be under substantial restraint if employees knew that they would have to
Pay, in a lump sum, dues which they were free to refrain from paying currently if
the union from which they withheld support was eventually chosen. Legalization of
this practice would provide a device for effectively constraining those who have not
remained members of the dominant union at a time when they are under no obligation
to do so.
The fact that the Respondent Union charges a nominal fee to members with an honorary
withdrawal card ( which was previously denied to Bauer ) and exempts recently discharged
veterans from paying any fee, plainly can have no bearing on the legality of the rein-
statement fee imposed on Bauer which was double the initiation fee required of first-time
applicants.
1436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
protected by the Respondents' union-shop agreement. Here, too, the
majority's decision seems to us to conflict with settled authority.
This Board has uniformly held, both under the original Wagner Act
and under the amended Act, that a union-security agreement may not
be retroactively applied to cause the discharge of an employee who
lost his membership in the contracting union because of his failure to
pay dues that accrued during a period of time when no union-security
agreement was in existence 11 Yet, in the comparable situation here,
the majority is sanctioning the discharge of an employee who also had
lost his membership as a result of nonpayment of dues accruing at a
time when he was not only under no obligation to maintain his mem-
bership, but was exercising a statutory right to refrain from doing
'so. It is immaterial that Bauer could have regained his membership-
although only with the rights of a new member-if he had paid the
required reinstatement fee 12 This fee, as compared with the initiation
fee that first-time applicants were required to pay, included a puni-
tive sum of $30 in excess of the initiation fee.
In view of the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude, as did the
Trial Examiner, that the reinstatement fee imposed upon Bauer was
not a term or condition of membership "generally applicable" to other
applicants, or an initiation fee "uniformly required as a condition"
of acquiring "membership," within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3)
and Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act 13 We therefore would find that the
Respondent Company, which admittedly was in possession of all the
facts concerning the disparity in fees and the terms on which member-
ship was available to Bauer, violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of
the Act, in honoring the Respondent Union's request for Bauer's
discharge. We would also find that the Respondent Union violated
Section 8 (b ) (2) and (1) of the Act in causing his discharge.
No less than our colleagues we recognize, as we did in deciding the
Stacker case, that the conclusions reached may seriously curtail the
earlier freedom of labor organizations to apply the understandable
policy of favoring employees whose allegience has been continuous and
longstanding. But discriminatory treatment of employees who have
exercised the "right to refrain" from union activities is forbidden by
existing law, and it is our duty to apply that law as written.
11 Cf. Colonie Fibre Company, Inc., 69 NLRB 589, 71 NLRB 354, enfd. with mod.
163 F. 2d 65 (C. A. 2) ; New York Shipbuilding Corporation, 89 NLRB 1446; General
American Aerocoach, etc., 90 NLRB 239; The Eclipse Lumber Company, Inc., 95 NLRB
464.
12 Cf. Eclipse Lumber Company and Colonic Fibre Company, supra
18 Ferro Stamping and Manufacturing Co., 93 NLRB 1459; Eclipse Lumber Company,
supra.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1437
InterInediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon separate charges duly filed by Roy E. Bauer, an individual, against Food
Machinery and Chemical Corporation, herein called Respondent Company, and
against International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 93, and
International Association of Machinists, Local Lodge 504, both herein called
Respondent Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
caused the cases to be consolidated and issued a consolidated complaint dated
May 22 , 1951, against Respondent Company and Respondent Union. The com-
plaint alleged that Respondent Company and Union had engaged in and were
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8 (a) . (1)
and (3) ; 8 (b) (1) (A), (2) and (5) ; and 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relation Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the
charges, the consolidated complaint, the order consolidating cases, and notice
of hearing thereon were duly served upon Respondent Company, Respondent
Union, and Bauer.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that (1) on and after February 22, 1951,
Respondent Union required Bauer to pay a discriminatory payment as a condition
precedent to becoming a member ; (2) Respondent Union had caused the Company
to discharge Bauer on or about April 20, after having denied him membership
for reasons other than his failure to tender periodic dues and initiation fees
uniformly required ; further, that membership was not available to Bauer on
the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, and the
Union had required, as a condition precedent to membership, the payment by
Bauer of a discriminatory fee within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5) ; and
(3) on or about April 20, Respondent Company had discharged Bauer because he
was not a member of the Union, although membership in the Union was not avail-
able to him on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other mem-
bers of the Union and membership was denied him for reasons other than his
failure to tender periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required. Respond-
ent Union admitted in its answer that it had sought and obtained the discharge of
Bauer pursuant to its union-security agreement with Respondent Company, but
denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Respondent Company ad-
mitted in its answer that it had discharged Bauer pursuant to a union-security
agreement, but also denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at San Jose, California, from July 10
through 12, 1951, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, Martin S. Bennett.
The General Counsel, Respondent Company, and Respondent Union were repre-
sented by counsel who participated in the hearing and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross- examine witnesses , and to intro-
duce evidence bearing on the issues. After the General Counsel rested, Respond-
ent Union moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that no case
bad been made out by the General Counsel; the motion was denied. At the
close of the hearing, the Union renewed its motion and further moved, in the
event of adverse findings on the merits, that said findings be made solely against
it and not against Respondent Company, which, it alleged had acted in good
faith in this controversy. Respondent Company also moved at the same time
for a dismissal of the complaint on the merits ; ruling was reserved on both
motions and they are disposed of by the findings hereinafter made. A motion by
the General Counsel to conform the pleadings to the proof with respect to purely
1438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
formal matters was granted. All parties were then afforded an opportunity to
argue orally and to file briefs and/or proposed findings and conclusions. Oral
argument was then had and briefs have been received from both Respondents.'
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT COMPANY
Respondent Company, Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation, is a Dela-
ware corporation with principal offices at San Jose, California, where it is
engaged in the manufacture of cannery equipment. During the year 1950,
Respondent Company manufactured and sold finished products valued in excess
of $1,000,000, of which, products valued over $500,000 were shipped to points
outside the State of California. The undersigned finds that Respondent Company
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
International Association of Machinists, Local Lodge 504, and International
Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 93, are labor organizations
admitting to membership employees of Respondent Company.'
M. THE UNFAI$ LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues; introduction
The issues herein are (1) whether Respondent Union required Roy E. Bauer,
an employee of Respondent Company and covered by a union-security clause, to
pay a discriminatory payment as a condition precedent to becoming a member of
Local Lodge 504, and (2) whether Bauer was later discharged by Respondent
Company at the request of Respondent Union pursuant to the union-security
provisions of an agreement between Respondents, but for reasons other than
those permitted by Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
With respect to the first issue, Respondent Union denies that its long-estab-
lished policy concerning initiation fees is in any manner violative of Section
8 (b) (5). As for the second, the parties are in agreement that Bauer was
discharged pursuant to the request of the Union under the authority of a valid
and effective union-security provision. There is dispute only with respect to the
contention of the General Counsel that Bauer.'s discharge was brought about
for a purpose not permitted by the Act, namely, his refusal to pay an allegedly
discriminatory initiation fee.
I The brief of Respondent Union contains a number of proposed findings which are not
itemized or numbered. The undersigned, therefore, does not pass upon them as such ; it
may be stated, however, that some are in effect adopted in the findings that follow and
that the remainder is not.
2 Local Lodge 504 has jurisdiction over the San Jose area and is subordinate to and an
affiliate of District Lodge No. 93 , which in turn is a delegate body having jurisdiction over
several counties of California. Although applicants for membership in the San Jose area
are admitted to Local Lodge 504, the contract with Respondent Company, discussed here-
inafter, is entered into by District Lodge No 93, which actually operates the San Jose office
of Respondent Union. Thus , Franklin Gorham , who devotes his time primarily to the
affairs of Local Lodge 504 and who is in charge of the San Jose office , is actually assistant
business representative of District Lodge No. 93. He policies those contracts entered into
by that organization which are within the geographical jurisdiction of Local 504. It is
clear, and the undersigned finds, that both District Lodge No. 93 and its subordinate, Local
Lodge 504 , are engaged in the representation of the employees of Respondent Company.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1439
B. The discriminatory initiation fee
1. The union-security provisions
As a prerequisite to a finding that Section 8 (b) (5) of the Act has been
violated, the conduct complained of must take place against the background of
a valid union-security agreement. Therefore, the undersigned will initially set
forth the union-security provisions of the contract between Respondents at the
time material herein. Respondent Company, as a member of the Santa Clara
County Machine Shop Employers Association, entered into a contract with Dis-
trict Lodge No. 93 on April 1, 1949, with an expiration date of March 31, 1952.
The agreement contained a union-security clause to be effective upon certifica-
tion by the Board of the authority of the Union to enter into same. A union-
shop election was duly held in Case No. 20-UA-1972, was won by the Union,
and on October 28, 1949, the Board duly certified the Union. The union-security
clause provides, as follows :
All employees covered by this Agreement shall become and shall remain
members in good standing in the Union on or after the thirtieth (30th) day
but not later than the thirty-fifth (35th) day following the beginning of
employment or the effective date of this provision, whichever is the later,
as a condition of employment.
The foregoing history and contract clause demonstrate and the undersigned
finds that a valid union-security clause was in effect between Respondent Com-
pany and Respondent Union at the time material herein, namely, between
February and April 1951.
2. Position of the General Counsel
The General Counsel basically attacks the policy of Respondent Union with
respect to its scale of initiation fees, as applied in the case of Bauer. He con-
tends solely that under the facts to be set forth hereinafter, Bauer was required
to pay, as a condition to becoming a member of Respondent Union, pursuant to
the union-security clause, a fee which was discriminatory. The General Counsel
specifically disavows any contention that the fee levied, which, as will appear,
was $60, was excessive per se; it is claimed only that the fee levied on Bauer,
when compared with fees levied by Respondent Union upon other classes of
applicants for entrance into membership, was discriminatory. As will appear
hereinafter, the policy followed in the case of Bauer did not differ from that
followed with respect to all others who fell into the same class or category. It
is the application of this policy to Bauer which is in this case attacked and no
remedial order is sought with respect to others who have been uniformly treated
in identical fashion.
3. The employment of Bauer
Bauer was hired as a welder by Respondent Company on or about February
23, 1951, and started to work on February 26. He was not at the time a member
of Respondent Union and did not join thereafter. His visits to the office of the
Union and contacts with union employees relative to the acquisition of member-
ship are discussed hereinafter. On April 11, the Union notified the Company
that Bauer and 12 others had not become members, as provided by the union-
security clause set forth above, and asked that the entire group be terminated
unless evidence of membership was presented to the Company prior to April 18.
On or about April 20, Bauer, the only one of the group who had not acquired
membership in the interim, was terminated by C. W. Shockley, personnel manager
of the division in which Bauer worked, pursuant to the request by the Union.
1440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Turning to the actual operation of the union-security clause and Bauer's
contacts with the Union, there is no substantial conflict with respect to the
controlling aspects of the problem. As will appear, there is conflict on other
aspects between the testimony of Bauer and that of Assistant Business Agent
Gorham and Shockley. The latter two were forthright witnesses and in view
of their corroboration by other witnesses, the unimpressive manner in which
Bauer testified, and, to say the least, Bauer's faulty memory, they have been
credited.
On being hired by the Company, Bauer was informed of the existence of the
union-security clause and visited the union office on February 23' There
Bauer signed an application for membership in the Union after it-had,been filled
out by an office clerical on the basis of information supplied by Bauer. He was
also given two copies of a slip to be given to the union steward at the plant, and
to management, respectively. This slip listed his name, address, and social
security number. The copy furnished to the steward as well as his application
for membership in the Union indicated on their respective faces that Bauer was
to pay an initiation fee of $60.
The imposition of this $60 fee, also termed a reinstatement fee, rather than
another and smaller fee, resulted from the following circumstances. Bauer,
on February 23, informed the union office clerical who filled out his application for
membership that he had formerly been a member of another Local of the Inter-
national Association of Machinists, namely, Local 394 in St. Louis. Not being the
holder,of an honorary withdrawal or retiring card from that Local he did not
come within the provisions of article E, section 18, of the constitution of the
International Union which permitted holders of such to be reinstated upon
payment of a nominal fee.' Likewise, as a former member, he was not eligible
for admission at the $30 rate levied upon first-time members, as provided by the
bylaws of Local 504; similarly, he was not a recently discharged veteran which
would have made him eligible for admission without the payment of any initia-
tion fee. Hence, he fell within the provisions of the bylaws establishing an
initiation or reinstatement fee of $60 for former members of the Union.'
4. Initiation fees of the Union ; policy on admission-to membership
There is no question but that the several office clericals in the union office are
authorized to classify applicants and assess initiation fees according to the
S The undersigned rejects the testimony of Bauer that the personnel office of the Com-
pany gave him clearance slips which were to be endorsed or cleared by the Union. The
weight of the evidence leads the undersigned to conclude that Bauer was confused and
actually had in mind slips given him by the Union on February 23. It may further be
noted that the General Counsel specifically disavowed any claim that Respondents operate
an illegal clearance system with a greater degree of union security than is permitted by
the Act ; nor, in view of the initial hiring of Bauer by the Company, is there any credible
evidence of the existence of such a practice.
4It appears that another labor organization defeated Local 394 in an election con-
ducted at Bauer's place of employment in St Louis and that Bauer and others in the
unit permitted their membership in Local 394 to lapse. He requested and was denied
an honorary withdrawal card from that organization, presumably on the ground that he
did not meet the requirement, set forth in the International constitution, that such a card
could be issued, in his case, only if he were leaving the trade or industry.
The latter provision applies both to former members of other locals as well as of
Local 504 ; the only distinction is that a member of the latter Local who has lost his
good standing for nonpayment of dues may be readmitted upon timely application on
payment of a $15 fee.
Membership may also be obtained at a reduced rate during organizing drives. Another
method, at a low fee, is by arrangement with other local labor organizations for transfers
of members . Neither method is germane herein.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1441
category in which applicants fall. Even if a question is raised by the applicant
as to the category into which he is placed, Assistant Business Agent Gorham is
not consulted in the matter. In fact, the applicant is not referred to Gorham
unless he, the applicant, specifically requests it. According to Gorham, there are
but approximately six such requests a year. There is no discretion in the hands
of the union clericals or Gorham as to the amounts levied or the category in which
the applicant is placed. The bylaws of the Local and the provisions of the
International's constitution are controlling and final. In sum, the office clericals
apply union policy and that is dispositive of the matter; this is precisely what
happened in the case of Bauer.
At this point, it may be in order to consider the background of the fee structure.
Since 1941,'the bylaws of Local 504 have provided that members joining for the
first time are to pay an initiation fee of $30 and that former members of the
International Association of Machinists are to pay an initiation or reinstate-
ment fee of $60, save for the instance described above of the Local 504 member
in arrears on dues A similar ratio existed prior to 1941 when first-time members
paid $15 and reinstatement cases were assessed $30. According to Gorham, the
only point raised when the Local increased its dues was the fact that there was
financial need thereof. There is no explanation by the Union of the basis for
the disparity between the $30 and $60 fees.
It is clear and the undersigned finds that Bauer, on reporting to the union
office on February 23, was told that he would be required to pay a $60 initiation
fee and this amount was marked upon his application for membership. This
action was never disavowed and, in fact, Respondent Union steadily contended
and still contends that Bauer falls within this $60 category. Bauer never paid
this sum ; he claimed that on various occasions within the ensuing 30-day period
he indicated to Gorham his willingness to pay the $30 fee required of new
members. Although the undersigned does not deem much of his testimony rel-
ative to this'interim period to be credible, this is not controlling and need not
be detailed herein. The crux of the problem is that he was placed in the $60
category and retained in it; the sole issue for decision is whether the Union
thereby required of Bauer a discriminatory fee within the meaning of Section 8
(b) (5) Ferno Stamping and Manufacturing Co., 93 NLRB 1459. Thus, it be-
comes unimportant to determine whether or not Bauer actually proffered, as he
testified, $30 in cash on March 16 to Gorham which the latter denied, although
the undersigned in view of the credible and corroborated testimony of Gorham
that'he was not in his office that day, believes that such an offer was not made.
Respondents do not contend that Bauer was at any time unwilling to pay a $30
fee; moreover, in view of Bauer's classification on February 23 in the $60 bracket
and his retention therein, any such proffer on his part would be entirely nugatory
for the Union has steadfastly adhered to this position of requiring the $60 fee
which is in reality required by its bylaws and is not discretionary.
The levying of this $60 reinstatement fee upon Bauer was not an isolated
instance. On the contrary, Respondent Union stresses the fact that it has levied
and uniformly levies this fee in a substantial number of reinstatement cases,
including a number of employees at Respondent Company and it introduced evi-
dence of this levy in actual cases. In essence, this aspect of the General Counsel's
case, reduces itself to an attack on the uniform practice of the Union under its
bylaws to charge former members seeking reinstatement a fee double that levied,
upon persons seeking admission for the first time.
1442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. Conclusions
Initially, it may be noted that the General Counsel does not contend that the
fees levied on all applicants for membership must be uniform. He concedes
that a reinstatement fee slightly in excess of an initiation fee may be warranted
on the basis of additional clerical work ; however, no such plea is made by Re-
spondent Union and in fact, as stated above, no reason has been advanced in
support of the disparity of fees. The General Counsel also concedes that dif-
ferent fees may reasonably be established, based upon such nondiscriminatory
factors as experience, classification, or earnings of the individual.
The basic position of the General Counsel is that Respondent Union, in main-
taining a reinstatement fee double the initiation fee, is actually penalizing a .
former member because he has at a prior time exercised the right guaranteed
him under Section 7 of the Act to refrain from engaging in concerted activity.
The undersigned finds merit in this contention, although, as Respondents ably
argue, this result may not tend, at least in the short run, to promote industrial
peace, for it is apparent that an adverse decision herein by the Board would be
disruptive of a long-established practice on the part of Respondent Union, which
appears to have enjoyed an excellent, cordial, and otherwise correct collective
bargaining relationship with Respondent Company! That an adverse decision
may be disruptive of established union regulations or hiring practices is not a
defense, for this argument actually goes to the wisdom of the statutory litrignage.
Of. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, et al, 94 NLRB 1590. The sim-
ple fact is that the only apparent basis for the difference in fees is that one who
has given up his union membership at a prior time when he was under no obliga-
tion to retain it is being assessed a penalty for having exercised such right.
Whether this is a penalty in lieu of dues not paid is unnecessary for determin--
tion ; there is no doubt that it is a penalty for exercising a right guaranteed
by the Act.
Respondent Union vigorously contends that in order to make this finding the
undersigned and the Board must consider, as specified in the second sentence of
Section 8 (b) (5), "the practices and customs of labor organizations in the par-
ticular industry, and the wages currently paid to the employees affected." Re-
spondent Union claims that no such evidence was adduced herein by the General
Counsel and further points out, as evidence of the reasonableness of the $60 levy,
that this fee has remained constant since 1941 despite the fact that the prevailing
wage rate for journeymen in the area has almost doubled since that time. The
General Counsel replies that this sentence in 8 (b) (5) is patently directed to
the ban in that section against "excessive" fees, and that the instant proceeding
attacks only the discriminatory aspect of the fee. However, this question has in
effect already been resolved against Respondent Union by the Board in the Ferro
decision, supra, where in a not dissimilar situation fees were found to be dis-
criminatory and, insofar as the decision indicates, there does not appear to have
been a consideration of the factors stressed herein by Respondent Union. Thus,
the Board squarely held in that decision that a distinction in initiation fees
which was based upon a prior exercise of the statutory right to refrain from
joining a labor organization, was "plainly `discriminatory under all the circum-
stances' within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5)." And the Board has else-
where held that disparate treatment of employees, because of membership or
nonmembership in a labor organization, is the clearest form of discrimination
6 For example, witness the motion, by Respondent Union herein that in the event of an
adverse finding said finding be made solely against the Union.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1443
under the Act. Newark News Dealer Supply Company, 94 NLRB 1667. Cf.
Electric Autolite Co., 92 NLRB 1073.
In sum, pursuant to a valid union-security agreement, Respondent Union
required of Bauer, as a prerequisite to membership, the payment of a $60 rein-
statement fee, which was double that levied upon new members. The Union
adhered to this position throughout the ensuing weeks and hence it is immaterial
whether or not Bauer proffered the lesser sum of $30 within the statutory period.
The simple answer is that he sought membership and that it was not available
to him save on a discriminatory basis. He was under no obligation to submit
to this discrimination. Ferro Stamping and Manufacturing Co., supra, and
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 93 NLRB 1203. While a labor organiza-
tion is permitted under the proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act to pre-
scribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition of membership, this is no
defense where the enforcement of such rules results in a discrimination. Byers
Transportation Co., 94 NLRB 1494.
The undersigned finds that the classification system here used is not reasonable
for it has discriminated against an employee for not belonging to a labor or-
ganization during a period when he was not required to maintain such mem-
bership. That Respondent Union bore no specific malice against Bauer is not
material . This system of different fees has resulted in the exaction of unequal
initiation fees based upon a discriminatory classification and the undersigned
consequently finds that Respondent Union has thereby engaged in conduct viola-
tive of Section 8 (b) (5) of the Act!
0. The discharge of Bauer
1. The facts
The Union wrote to the Company on April 11, 1951, and asked that Bauer be
discharged in the event he did not acquire union membership prior to April 18.
Bauer was told by management on April 12 to straighten out his membership but
failed to do so. On April 18, Personnel Manager Shockley,' being advised that
Bauer had not become a member of the Union, telephoned and asked Bauer to
visit him at the plant. Bauer did so and informed Shockley that the Union was
attempting to assess him a $60 initiation fee, whereas the normal initiation fee
was $30. Bauer related the circumstances of his prior membership in St. Louis
and its termination and informed Shockley that he was willing to pay the $30
fee, but not the larger sum.' Shockley contacted Gorham and was advised that
Bauer had flatly refused to pay the $60 reinstatement fee. He contacted the
Company's industrial relations department for advice and it in turn inspected
the applicable bylaws of Local 504 and ascertained that they provided for fees
of $30 for initiation and $60 for reinstatement, as discussed hereinabove. It
' It is true that Bauer is being penalized for a period when he was not working for
Respondent Company, whereas in the Ferro decision the penalty was directed against
employees of the same company for nonmembership during a prior period when there was
no union-security coverage. In the view of the undersigned this is an immaterial dis-
tinction.
8 Findings herein are based upon the credited testimony of Shockley.
8 Bauer belatedly sent the Union $30 on April 19, intending this to be the payment of
his initiation fee. This was returned on the same date by Gorham who pointed out in
a covering letter that the fee was $60 and that Bauer had been previously so informed.
However, as stated above, the case turns in the view of the undersigned on the flat
position taken by the Union on February 23 and thereafter maintained, namely, its
Insistence upon the $60 fee., In fact, the Union's letter of April 19 demonstrates that
this position was adhered to:, See The Baltimore Transfer Co , et al., 94 NLRB 1680.
1444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was apparent that Bauer was being treated in the same fashion as any other
reinstatement case in the same category , and the Company decided that it had no
alternative but to honor the Union 's request for his discharge Accordingly,
Bauer was discharged on April 20.
2. Conclusions
Turning first to the allegations against the Union , there is no dispute but that
it caused the discharge of Bauer . The question arises whether the Union caused
his discharge for a reason other than his failure to tender "the initiation fees
uniformly required" to obtain membership in the Union. This must be answered
in the affirmative . The phrase "uniformly required" perforce implies that initi-
ation fees must be uniformly required in a nondiscriminatory manner. Having
heretofore found that initiation fees were required in a discriminatory manner, it
follows that this was not the levy of an initiation fee uniformly required and
that as a result the Union , by causing the discharge of Bauer, has engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) (1) (A ) of the Act. Union
Starch & Refining Co., 87 NLRB 779, enfd. 186 F. 2d 1008 ( C. A. 7) and Clara-
Val Packing Co., 87 NLRB 703. Corollary to the above is the simple fact that
the initiation fees are on their face not uniformly required for they act to the
detriment of those who have exercised their right at some prior time to refrain
from engaging in concerted activities. In addition, as found below, the Com-
pany violated Section 8 (a) (3) by honoring the Union's demand for Bauer's dis-
charge. Hence, in these further respects , the conduct of the Union in causing
the discharge of Bauer was violative of Section 8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) (1) (A)
of the Act.
With respect to Respondent Company, the answer must also be that they have
engaged in unfair labor practices by carrying out the discharge of Bauer. In
so deciding, the undersigned is not unaware that the Company tried carefully
and resolutely to live up to the requirements of the Act ; it not only investigated
the Union 's reason for requesting the discharge but also inspected the pertinent
provisions of the bylaws and constitution of the Union. The undersigned ac-
cordingly finds that the Company acted wholly in good faith in attempting to live
up to its contract responsibility . This is recognized by Respondent Union,
which moved at the hearing that in the event of an adverse finding such a find-
ing be made solely against itself. However, the facts herein present necessitate
the denial of the Union 's motion . Squirt Distributing Company, 92 NLRB
1667, Acme Mattress Co., Inc., 91 NLRB 1010, and H. M. Newman Co., 85 NLRB
725.
The Company contends that it had no reasonable ground for believing that
Bauer was the victim of an illegal discrimination . It points to its attempts to.
get to the bottom of the Bauer case and its verification of the reason therefor.
But it is precisely these facts which impel a finding that there has been a violation
of the Act by the Company. It was admittedly on notice that Bauer was being
terminated because of his refusal to submit to a discriminatory initiation fee of
$60 and that he contended he should be treated no differently than applicants,
being admitted to membership for the first time. The Company , with full
knowledge thereof, then acceded to the request for his discharge. Although this
resulted from a good-faith error as to its obligations under the Act, this cannot
constitute a defense . It is true , as the Company argues, that this result places
it in the dilemma of choosing between violating the union-security clause and
committing an unfair labor practice and in effect requires it to decide for itself
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1445
whether the Union's admission policies are violative of the Act. Unfortunately,
this result cannot be avoided.
Hence, the undersigned finds, as a matter of law, that Respondent Company
had reasonable grounds for believing that membership in the Union was not
available to Bauer on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to
other applicants. For the reason that initiation fees were not uniformly re-
quired, as found above, it is further found that Respondent Company had reason-
able grounds for believing that Bauer was denied membership in the Union for
reasons other than his failure to tender initiation fees uniformly required.
The undersigned finds that by discharging Bauer on or about April 20 at the
request of the Union, Respondent Company has engaged in conduct violative of
Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. Union Starch & Ruining Co.,
supra; Clara-Val Packing Co., supra.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondents set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the activities of Respondent Company set forth in Section I,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondents have engaged in and are engaging in
certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that they cease and
desist therefrom and that they take affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent Company has discriminated with respect to
the hire and tenure of Roy E Bauer, it will be recommended that it offer him full
and immediate reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges. See The
Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch,
65 NLRB 827. Having also found that Respondent Union in violation of Section
8 (b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act caused Respondent Company to discharge
Roy E. Bauer, it will be recommended that the Union notify the Company, in
writing, that it has withdrawn its objections to the employment of Bauer and
that it request the Company to offer Bauer full and immediate reinstatement to
his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges.
Inasmuch as it has been found that both the Company and the Union are
responsible for the discrimination suffered by Bauer it will be recommended
that they jointly and severally make Bauer whole for any loss of pay he may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. Squirt Distributing
Company, supra. The liability of the Union for back pay shall terminate 5 days
after it notifies the Company that it has withdrawn its objections to his em-
ployment. Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., 90 NLRB 205. Said
loss of -pay shall be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter
or portion thereof during the period from the date of discriminatory action to
the date of a proper offer of reinstatement or, in the case of the Union, to a
proper withdrawal of objections to employment. The quarterly periods, herein
called "quarters," shall begin with the first day of January, April, July, and
October. Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the
215233-53-92
1446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
back-pay liability for any other quarter. It is also recommended that Respond-
ent Company be ordered to make available to the Board upon request payroll
and other records to facilitate the checking of the amount of back pay due.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Association of Machinists, its District Lodge No. 93 and its
Local Lodge 504 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5)
of the Act.
2. By discriminating with respect to the hire and tenure of Roy E. Bauer,
thereby encouraging membership in Respondent Union, Respondent Company,
Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent Company has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
4. By requiring employees covered by an agreement authorized by Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act to pay discriminatory initiation fees as a condition to becom-
ing members of Respondent Union, Respondent Union has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (5) of the Act.
5. By attempting to cause and causing Respondent Company to discriminate in
violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act against Roy E. Bauer, who was also
denied membership in Respondent Union upon a ground other than his failure
to tender the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring mem-
bership, Respondent Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
6. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent Union has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the
Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify, our employees that :
WE WILL NOT encourage membership in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LoDoE No. 93, or in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MACHINISTS, LOCAL LODGE 504, or in any other labor organization of our
employees, by discriminating against our employees in any manner in regard
to their hire or tenure of employment, except to the extent permitted by
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1447
WE WILL offer to Roy E. BAUER immediate and full reinstatement to his for-
mer or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to any seniority
or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for
any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Employer.
By -------------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated--------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Appendix B
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT
LODGE No. 93, ANDff INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, LOCAL LODGE
504, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, San Jose, California, its officers, agents, successors, or assigns
to discharge because of nonmembership in our organization employees who
have tendered or paid the initiation fees and periodic dues uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership, or to whom
membership is not available on the same terms and conditions generally
applicable to other members, or cause or attempt to cause said company to
discriminate against its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act.
WE WILL NOT require the employees of said company, its successors or
assigns, who are covered by an agreement authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act, to pay discriminatory fees as a condition precedent to becoming a
member of our union.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of said company, its successors
or assigns , in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, except
to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as author-
ized by Section 8 ( a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL make whole Roy E. BAUER for any loss of pay he may have suf-
fered because of the discrimination against him.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
DISTRICT LODGE No. 93,
Labor Organization.
By -----------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
LocAL LODGE 504.
Labor Organization.
By ----------------------------------------------- i
(Representative ) ( Title) -
Date--------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.