Florin Pop

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2021

2020005208 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/833,087 12/06/2017 Florin Pop 0381.0003US1(POP01-003-
US
8782
107992 7590 09/30/2021
HoustonHogle LLP
1666 Massachusetts Avenue
Suite 12
Lexington, MA 02420
EXAMINER
GEE, ALEXANDER
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2425
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@houstonllp.com
grant.houston@houstonllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FLORIN POP
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
Technology Center 2400
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ST. JOHN COURTENAY, III, and
JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judges.

MCKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–21. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Florin Pop.
Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “system for providing automatic lighting
and warning during maintenance for electrical switchgear cabinetry.” Spec.
1.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A sensing and alert system for a plurality of electrical
switchgear cabinets, each switchgear cabinet including at least
one high-voltage circuit breaker, and each switchgear cabinet in
communication with a central programmable logic controller
(PLC) configured to activate and deactivate the high-voltage
circuit breaker in the corresponding switchgear cabinet, the
sensing and alert system comprising:
a time of flight (ToF) sensor arranged to capture real-time
image data;
a lighting module affixed to an inside portion of the
switchgear cabinet;
a processor operatively coupled to the ToF sensor and to
the lighting module;
the sensing and alert system affixed to an inside portion of
each switchgear cabinet so that the ToF sensor is in direct line-
of-sight of an inside portion of a door of the cabinet, and the
lighting module is positioned so as to illuminate an inside portion
of the cabinet when activated;
the processor configured to receive the real-time image
data from the ToF sensor and compare the real-time image data
with stored calibration image data, wherein if the real-time image
data differs from the stored calibration image data by more than
a predetermined amount, the processor transmits an alarm signal
to the central PLC, and activates the lighting module; and
wherein, the central PLC, upon receipt of the alarm signal
from the processor, deactivates the at least one high-voltage
circuit breaker in the corresponding switchgear cabinet.
.
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
3
REFERENCE(S)
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Hill US 2007/0121265 A1 May 31, 2007
Ball US 7,738,008 B1 Jun. 15,2010
Meinherz US 2012/0095575 A1 Apr. 19, 2012
Evanitsky US 2014/0307087 A1 Oct. 16, 2014
Latorre US 2014/0347441 A1 Nov. 27, 2014
Kagan US 2015/0070507 A1 Mar. 12, 2015
Boyd US 2015/0097666 A1 Apr. 9, 2015
Doettling US 2016/0104046 A1 Apr. 14, 2016
Ware US 2016/0327611 A1 Nov. 10, 2016
Kennedy US 2017/0256934 A1 Sep. 7, 2017
Seaman US 2018/0178797 A1 Jun. 28, 2018
Fitzgibbon US 10,156,634 B2 Dec. 18, 2018

REJECTION(S)
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 8–11, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Kagan and Boyd. Final Act. 3–11.
The Examiner rejected claims 2 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kagan, Boyd, and Latorre. Final Act. 11–12.
The Examiner rejected claims 3 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kagan, Boyd, and Fitzgibbon. Final Act. 12.
The Examiner rejected claims 4 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kagan, Boyd, and Hill. Final Act. 12–13.
The Examiner rejected claims 5 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kagan, Boyd, and Evanitsky. Final Act. 13–14.
The Examiner rejected claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kagan, Boyd, Ware, and Kennedy. Final Act. 14–15.
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
4
The Examiner rejected claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kagan, Boyd, and Doettling. Final Act. 15–16.
The Examiner rejected claims 16 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kagan, Boyd, and Ball. Final Act. 16.
The Examiner rejected claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kagan, Boyd, and Seaman. Final Act. 17.
The Examiner rejected claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kagan, Boyd, and Meinherz. Final Act. 17–18.
OPINION
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION BASED ON KAGAN AND BOYD
Claims 1, 8–11, 18, and 19
Appellant argues that Kagan fails to teach or suggest “the sensing and
alert system is affixed to an inside portion of each of a plurality of
switchgear cabinets so that the [time of flight] sensor is in direct line-of-
sight of an inside portion of a door of the switchgear cabinet.” Appeal Br. 9;
see also Reply Br. 2. Appellant contends that Kagan fails to disclose the
claimed switchgear cabinet (Appeal Br. 14) and is directed to a different
problem, namely detecting an arc flash and tripping a circuit breaker when
an arc flash is detected. Appeal Br. 11. According to Appellant, Kagan only
teaches placing infrared sensors, not image sensors, in or near an electrical
apparatus. Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant further asserts that the Examiner
incorrectly relies on design choice to support the recited placement of the
time of flight sensor in direct line-of-sight of an inside portion of a door of
the switchgear cabinet. Reply Br. 3–6. Specifically, Appellant argues
Kagan suggests that placing the meter “on or near” an
electrical apparatus would be beneficial for detecting hot spots.
However, in this context, it seems rather unlikely that one would
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
5
make the “design choice” to affix an infrared sensor for detecting
hot spots in direct line of sight to an inside portion of the
switchgear cabinet, as required by claim 1. Instead, the infrared
sensor would face internal components of the electrical
apparatus.
Reply Br. 4.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Kagan is directed to an
“intelligent electronic device (IED) includ[ing] an image capture module
configured for capturing images or video in a location of the IED.” Kagan,
Abstract. Kagan describes a meter 100B including include one or more
image sensors (Kagan ¶ 92) and that meter 100B, which includes the image
sensors, may be placed on or near an electrical apparatus. Kagan ¶ 94.
Although Kagan notes the infrared sensors as an example, Kagan’s teaching
as a whole at least suggests placing the entire meter, including image
sensors, on or near the electrical apparatus. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are also not commensurate with the scope of
the claim. Namely, the claimed invention merely recites that the time of
flight sensor is “in direct line-of-sight of an inside portion of a door” or
viewable from the inside portion of the door. The claimed invention does
not require the time of flight sensor to be facing or directed towards the
door. We find Kagan’s teaching of positioning a meter on or near the
electrical apparatus and further teaching that the electrical apparatus may be
housed in an equipment room, substation, circuit breaker room, etc. at least
suggests to a skilled artisan placing Kagan’s image sensors in direct line-of-
sight of an inside portion of a cabinet door. For example, we find Kagan at
least suggests placing the sensors in direct line of site from the inside portion
of the door of an equipment room or substation.
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
6
We also agree with the Examiner the positioning of the time of flight
sensor is a design choice. As the Examiner explains, in view of Kagan’s
teaching of the sensor being on or near the electrical apparatus,
[t]he location of the image sensor affixed to an inside portion of
each switchgear in direct line-of-sight of an inside portion of a
door of the cabinet is a design choice that would be implicitly
taught by Kagan since the image sensor disclosed in Kagan may
be affixed on the electrical equipment, wherever it may be
located, such as inside a building, cabinet, etc.

Ans. 20. Boyd similarly teaches positioning sensors in various locations.
See, e.g., Boyd ¶ 64 (teaching that a sensing device may be attached to a
wall or ceiling of a home or structure).
Moreover, altering a position of a component in a device does not
render the device patentable when operation of the device would not thereby
be modified. See In re Japikse, 181 F.2d 1019, 1023 (CCPA 1950) (specific
positioning of a starting switch of a hydraulic power press held unpatentable
because shifting the position of the starting switch would not have modified
the operation of the device); In re Kuhle, 526 F.2d 553, 555 (CCPA 1975)
(holding that the particular placement of a contact in a conductivity
measuring device was an obvious matter of design choice within the skill in
the art). Design choices that do not “result in a difference in function or give
unexpected results . . . are no more than obvious variations consistent with
the principles known in the art.” In re Rice, 341 F.2d 309, 314 (CCPA
1965).
Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
determination that Kagan and Boyd combined teach or suggest the claimed
sensing and alert system affixed to an inside portion of each of a plurality of
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
7
switchgear cabinets so that the time of flight sensor is in direct line-of-sight
of an inside portion of a door of the switchgear cabinet.
Appellant argues that Kagan lacks a time of flight sensor, a processor
coupled to the time of flight sensor and a lighting module, and activating the
lighting module based on the real time image data from the time of flight
sensor. Appeal Br. 10–11. The Examiner, however, relies on Boyd as
teaching these limitations in combination with Kagan. Final Act. 3–5;
Ans. 21–22. Similarly, Appellant argues that Boyd fails to teach or suggest
the claimed electrical switchgear cabinet or comparing real-time image data
from a time of flight sensor. Appeal Br. 13–14. The Examiner, however,
relies on Kagan for these limitations. Final Act. 3–5; Ans. 21–22. One
cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the
rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellant next argues that the Examiner has not sufficiently supported
the combination of Kagan with Boyd. Appeal Br. 18–19. In particular,
Appellant asserts
the Final Action argues that it would have been obvious to
apply a ToF sensor allegedly taught by Boyd to the meter and
image sensor taught by Kagan, because “it is common to use
TOF sensors in order to sense minute movements within a
particular environment.” This statement is actually factually
incorrect. Time of flight sensors generally have inadequate
resolution to detect minute movements.
Moreover, nothing in Kagan suggests a need to “sense
minute movements within a particular environment.” Instead,
Kagan only seems to discuss detecting arc flashes and heat in the
context of switchgear. It is not clear how the smart-home
applications of the Boyd hazard detector provide any insight as
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
8
to why such minute movements need to be sensed in the context
of electrical switchgear.
Appeal Br. 19.
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s combination. Both
Kagan and Boyd are directed to systems for detecting hazardous conditions.
See, e.g., Kagan Abstract; Boyd Abstract. As the Examiner finds and
explains,
Kagan teaches the use of a simple imaging sensor for
detecting a certain condition with relation to electrical switchgear
by comparing captured real-time images with stored calibration
images, while Boyd is simply brought in to show that the sensor
may further comprise a time-of-flight sensor including a lighting
module attached to the sensor, and thus, configured to
illuminated a portion of the location for which the sensor is
located, such as on the wall of a structure. The combination is
still reasonable because the purpose of ToF sensors is for
sensing/tracking minute movements within a particular
environment by resolving the distance between the camera and
the subject for each point of the image, by measuring the round
trip time of an artificial light signal. Further the use of a lighting
device is common in order to illuminate any potential hazardous
conditions that a person inspecting the equipment may need to
inspect.
Ans. 21–22. Moreover, we note that Boyd expressly teaches using a
presence detector, or motion detector such as a time of flight sensor, “to
enable lighting to allow a user to see in the vicinity of hazard detector.”
Boyd ¶ 44. As such, a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have
recognized the benefit to modify Kagan to include Boyd’s motion detecting
and illuminating system.
Appellant advances similar arguments with respect to claims 9 and 19,
each of which recite the sensing and alert system is affixed external to the
electrical switchgear cabinet in a position proximal to the electrical
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
9
switchgear cabinet or affixed external to an area to be monitored. See, e.g.,
Appeal Br. 16–21. For the reasons discussed above, we find these
arguments unpersuasive.
Accordingly, based on the record before us, we sustain the rejection of
1, 8–11, 18, and 19 as unpatentable over Kagan and Boyd.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION BASED ON KAGAN, BOYD, AND SEAMAN
Claim 20
Claim 20 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the ToF sensor
provides data for determining if the door of the switchgear cabinet is open or
closed.” Appeal Br., Claims App’x. The Examiner combines Kagan and
Boyd with Seaman to teach this limitation. Final Act. 17. According to the
Examiner,
It would have been obvious before the effective filing date
of the claimed invention to apply the method taught in Seaman
to Kagan in view of Boyd to disclose wherein the ToF sensor
provides data for determining if the door of the switchgear
cabinet is open or closed because it is common to use proximity
sensors to determine whether certain events have occurred such
as the opening/closing of a door.
Final Act. 17.
Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to sufficient support the
modification of Kagan and Boyd with Seaman. Appeal Br. 22. Appellant
asserts that neither Kagan nor Boyd disclose cabinet doors and “one skilled
in the art would not even look to Seaman, which concerns cargo
transportation units (CTU) such as trucks and bears no relevance to the
claimed invention.” Appeal Br. 22–23. Additionally, Appellant point out “
It is not clear how ‘proximity sensors’ are relevant to the claimed ToF sensor
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
10
providing data for determining if the door of the switchgear cabinet is open
or closed.” Reply Br. 14–15.
We agree. Seaman is directed to a controller for a cargo
transportation unit that receives information from various sensors, such as a
door status sensor that indicates whether a cargo unit door is opened or
closed. Seaman, Abstract, ¶ 33. Based on the record before us, it is unclear
why a skilled artisan would incorporate Seaman’s cargo unit door sensor
with the combined hazard alert system of Kagan and Boyd. As such, we are
persuaded of error and reverse the rejection of claim 20.

THE REMAINING OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
Claims 2–7, 12–17, and 21
Appellant does not present separate arguments of patentability for
dependent claims 2–7, 12–17, and 21, and instead relies on the arguments
presented for claims 1, 9, and 19. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 21. For the reasons
discussed above, we are similarly not persuaded or error in the rejection of
these dependent claims and, therefore, we sustain the rejections of claims 2–
7, 12–17, and 21 as unpatentable over the cited combinations of prior art.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–19 and 21 are affirmed, but the
rejection of claim 20 is reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
Appeal 2020-005208
Application 15/833,087
11
1, 8–11, 18,
19
103 Kagan, Boyd 1, 8–11, 18,
19

2, 12 103 Kagan, Boyd,
Latorre
2, 12
3, 13 103 Kagan, Boyd,
Fitzgibbon
3, 13
4, 14 103 Kagan, Boyd, Hill 4, 14
5, 15 103 Kagan, Boyd,
Evanitsky
5, 15
6 103 Kagan, Boyd,
Ware, Kennedy
6
7 103 Kagan, Boyd,
Doettling
7
16, 17 103 Kagan, Boyd, Ball 16, 17
20 103 Kagan, Boyd,
Seaman
20
21 103 Kagan, Boyd,
Meinherz
21
Overall
Outcome
1–19, 21 20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART