First Transit, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jan 26, 2011

28-CA-023017 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 26, 2011)

JD(SF)–03-11
Phoenix, AZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
FIRST TRANSIT, INC.
and Case 28-CA-23017
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION
LOCAL #1433, AFL-CIO
David Kelly, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Frederick C. Miner, Esq., Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
Counsel for the Respondent, Phoenix, Arizona.
DECISION
I. Statement of the Case
LANA PARKE, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to charges filed by Amalgamated
Transit Union Local #1433, AFL-CIO (the Union), the Regional Director for Region 28 of the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued an Order consolidating cases, consolidated
complaint and notice of hearing (the complaint) on May 28, 2010.1 The complaint alleges that
First Transit, Inc. (the Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act). This matter was tried in Phoenix, Arizona on November 8-9.
II. Issues
A. Did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by orally promulgating and
maintaining a rule prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and pay
rates?
B. Did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by orally promulgating and
maintaining an overly broad and discriminatory rule prohibiting employees from
meeting with union representatives at the Respondent’s facility.
C. Did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening its
employees with unspecified reprisals by telling them they were not allowed to
meet with union representatives.
D. Did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening its
employees with unspecified reprisals by telling them that the Respondent would
call the police if union representatives did not leave the Respondent’s facility.

1 By order dated October 29, 2010, the General Counsel severed Case 28-CA-22916 from
Case 28-CA-23017 and withdrew pars. 6 and 8 of the complaint. The conduct alleged in pars. 5
and 7 remains at issue. All dates herein are 2010 unless otherwise specified.
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E. Did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining overly
broad employment rules that interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
III. Jurisdiction
At all material times, the Respondent, a Delaware corporation, has operated a local
passenger bus transit system in Phoenix, Arizona, where it also maintains an office and place of
business. During the 12-month period ending February 24, 2010, the Respondent, in
conducting its business operations derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000 and
purchased and received at the Respondent’s facility goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of Arizona. I find that at all material times the
Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act, and the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
IV. Findings of Fact
Unless otherwise explained, findings of fact herein are based on party admissions,
stipulations, and uncontroverted testimony regarding events occurring during the period of time
relevant to these proceedings. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor
of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the
Respondent, I find the following events occurred in the circumstances described below during
the period relevant to these proceedings:
A. The Respondent’s Business
The Respondent provides municipality transportation services in the United States,
Europe, and Canada. Contracting municipalities provide transit vehicles and physical facilities;
the Respondent provides maintenance and operational labor. On December 3, 2007, the
Respondent began operating the West Transit facility in Phoenix, Arizona. About 400
employees worked at the West Transit facility, 24 of whom were vehicle mechanics.
In addition to mechanics, the Respondent employed drivers, fuelers, and cleaners at the
West Transit facility. The drivers, fuelers, and cleaners were represented by the Union and
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement for the term of July 1, 2008 through June 30,
2011 (the drivers/fuelers/cleaners agreement). Robert Bean (Bean) served as president of the
Union in 2010 and had general responsibility for union oversight and administration of the
drivers/fuelers/cleaners agreement. Dana Kraiza (Kraiza) served as the Union’s recording
secretary,2 and Virginia Mazzone (Mazzone), employed as a bus driver by the Respondent, was
also a union executive officer at the West Transit Facility.3
The West Transit facility was composed of a number of buildings, two of which were the
maintenance shop or garage and the operators’ (drivers) building, separated by about 200 feet.
Each of the two buildings had an employee break room or lounge. The West Transit facility was

2 During 2010, Kraiza was employed by the Union while on a leave of absence from the
Respondent. During her leave of absence, she had no security badge for the facility.
3 Mazzone performed her regular work duties at the facility and also provided liaison
between represented employees and the Union with authority to resolve with management
potential employee grievances arising under the drivers/fuelers/cleaners agreement.
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a secure, fenced property with entry through guarded gates. Security guards provided by the
city of Phoenix patrolled the facility. The Respondent issued security badges to authorized
entrants, including employees. Visitors to the facility who did not possess security badges were
expected to check in through the visitors’ office during the hours of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Certain
areas of the facility, including the visitor and employee parking lots and the area in front of
the administrative building, did not require a security badge for access.4 During July to
November 2009, union representatives had security badges permitting access to the facility.
When the Respondent thereafter deactivated the badges at the request of the city of Phoenix,
union representatives were authorized access to the facility only through the visitors’ office
during business hours.5
The mechanics worked three shifts. The second and third shifts overlapped during the
period of 8:30 p.m. to 4am. During the overlap period, the mechanics had a scheduled meal
break at 1:30 a.m., which they usually took in the mechanics’ lounge.
At all material times the following individuals, holding the positions set forth opposite
their respective names, have been agents of the Respondent within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act:
Marc Perla - General Manager, Phoenix facility
Grant Hansen - General Manager of Maintenance
Cecil Blandon - Maintenance Manager
Fernando Mena - Maintenance supervisor
Beginning in June 2009, the Respondent maintained and issued to employees a written
policy entitled “Freedom of Association,” which stated in pertinent part:
[T]he company supports human rights and the individual rights of its employees,
including an employee’s right to associate themselves with a labor union if they so
choose.
Rights: Though not an exhaustive list, management at [the Respondent] supports an
employee’s right to:
1. Freedom of Association
2. A secret ballot election
3. An informed choice
4. A representative voter turnout
…
[D]uring union organizing campaigns, management shall support the employee’s
individual right to choose whether to vote for or against union representation without
influence or interference from management.
…
Intimidation or harassment of employees or any other unlawful activity is strictly
prohibited.

4 Employee parking areas were set off by a low decorative wall and were otherwise
unguarded.
5 Although Bean testified that he accessed the facility after hours on several occasions after
his security badge was deactivated, there is no evidence his after-hours visits were authorized.
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B. Relevant Written Employee Rules
Since on or about August 24, 2009, the Respondent has maintained the following
employee rules nationally. The rules were set forth in the employee handbook distributed to
employees at the Respondent’s West Transit facility:
9.10 COMPUTER SECURITY AWARENESS AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Employees shall not, without prior written authorization from their senior manager or
director level manager, acquire, use, access, copy, remove, modify, alter, or disclose to
any third parties, any Company information for any purpose other than to perform duties
required in the fulfillment of job responsibilities or in furtherance of expressly stated
Company-sponsored activities, e.g., United Way. Refer to the Company intranet for the
latest version of the Company’s Acceptable Use Policy.6
9.16 REFERENCES
Employees are prohibited from supplying any information in response to requests for
references unless specifically authorized to do so by the HR Department. The
Company’s policy is to only furnish or verify an employee’s name, employment dates
and job title. No other information regarding a current or former employee will be
provided unless the individual first provides written authorization. Employment and
salary information for creditors, lenders, etc. must be obtained from the TALX System
via The Work Number…
10.02 VEHICLE ACCIDENT AND INCIDENTS
[All accidents and collisions, possible claims of accidents, damage to equipment, injury
and possible injury must be reported in writing as set forth in the rule]…Operators must
not make any statements about an accident to anyone except the police or Company
officials.
11.01 STEALING/THEFT
Conducting activities not related to work during working time or using company property
for activities not related to work anytime.
11.01 VIOLENCE/FIGHTING/THREATS
Fighting, violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, horseplay, and other disruptive
behavior in the workplace including oral or written statements, gestures, or expressions
that convey a direct or indirect threat of physical or emotional harm.

6 The Acceptable Use Policy, given to employees who have access to company
computers, provides that “company confidential” information includes “confidential
employee and human resources data (such as salary and benefit information),” “results of
investigations,” “safety information,” and “marketing and sales programs,” “regardless of the
manner or format in which it is recorded . . . whether orally, via hard copy printout, on-
screen, or via other means.”
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11.01 DISLOYALTY
Making false, vicious, or malicious statements concerning the Company or its services, a
client, or another employee.
Participation in outside activities that are detrimental to the company’s image or
reputation, or where a conflict of interest exists.
Conducting oneself during non-working hours in such a manner that the conduct would
be detrimental to the interest or reputation of the Company.
11.02 PERSONAL CONDUCT
Discourteous or inappropriate attitudes or behaviors to passengers, other employees, or
members of the public. Disorderly conduct during working hours.
Profane or abusive language where the language used is uncivil, insulting,
contemptuous, vicious or malicious.
11.02 SECURITY
Being present at a company location while not performing authorized services or without
express permission.
11.03 SELLING GOODS OR SERVICES, AND SOLICITING AND DISTRIBUTION OF
LITERATURE
Selling or offering for sale any good or services to other employees, patrons, or visitors
to a Company location or Company vehicle, except on the authorized bulletin board in
the employee lounge area.
Posting, circulating or distributing written or printed material without authorization from
the manager.
11.04 EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
Poor work habits including loafing, wasting time, loitering, or excessive visiting.
C. Orally Promulgated Employee Rules
On February 10, during the course of a mechanics’ safety meeting, Fernando Mena
( Mena), maintenance supervisor, told the mechanics they were not allowed to meet with the
Union on maintenance property. In response to a mechanic’s question, Mena said that
mechanics could only meet with union representatives off property and on their own time.
Another mechanic asked if it were permissible to meet union representatives off property on
meal breaks, and Mena said it was, so long as the meeting was off property on employees’ own
time.
In March, when Grant Hansen, in his position as general manager of maintenance at the
Respondent’s facility, conducted regular performance reviews with employees, he told them
their wage rates were not open for discussion with other employees.
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D. Union Organization Drive among Mechanics
In February union representatives distributed union authorization cards to mechanics in
the mechanics’ break room at the West Transit Facility during the mechanics’ 1:30 – 2 a.m.
meal break. After obtaining signed authorization cards, the Union filed a petition for election
with the Region and planned a meeting with the mechanics for February 11 at the West Transit
Facility. The union representatives did not obtain prior permission from the Respondent to hold
the meeting on secured facility premises. The meeting was scheduled to coincide with the
mechanics’ 1:30-2 a.m. meal break and was to be held in the operators’ rather than the
mechanics’ break room.7
Shortly before 1:30 a.m., Mazzone utilized her security badge to gain access to the
facility, and Bean, Kraiza, and Mazzone entered the West Transit Facility to wait outside the
maintenance department. When the mechanics took their meal break, the union
representatives directed interested mechanics to follow them to the operators’ break room,
which Mazzone accessed with her security badge. About 15 mechanics joined the union
representatives in the operators’ break room where Bean addressed the group.
Maintenance manager, Cecil Blandon (Blandon) and Mena were both working at the
West Transit Facility in the early hours of February 11. At about 1:30 a.m., Mena told Blandon
that mechanics had left the maintenance building for the operations building. Blandon and
Mena went to the operations building where they found Bean addressing a group of mechanics
while Kraiza and Mazzone watched. Blandon drew Kraiza and Mazzone aside and told them
“you guys” have to leave” and “the Union can’t be on property.”8 Kraiza said he needed to
speak to Bean. Blandon moved to where Bean was talking to the mechanics and said, in the
hearing of all present, “This meeting is finished. You guys gotta leave.”9 Kraiza told Blandon
that she and Mazzone were on the company seniority list and were employees, to which
Blandon did not respond.
Shortly after Blandon told Bean “you guys” have to leave, the mechanics left the
operations break room, saying they were going back to the shop. Bean, Kraiza, and Mazzone
refused to leave. Blandon told Bean that if the Union wanted to talk to the mechanics they could
do so off the property, but they had no authority to conduct that particular

7 Mazzone originally heard the meeting was going to be in the mechanics’ lounge. Kraiza
or Bean thereafter told her that the group would not be allowed to meet there, and the meeting
would take place in the operators’ lounge. The Respondent has no rule prohibiting the
mechanics’ use of or presence in either the mechanics’ or the operators’ lounge.
8 Blandon included Mazzone in the restriction because “she was there for union
business. They were all there for union business, not there as an employee of the
company.”
9 There is little dispute as to this part of the interaction between Blandon and the union
representatives, which is based on an amalgamation of Blandon, Kraiza, and Bean’s
testimonies. Kraiza also described Blandon as saying to Bean, “This meeting is over; you all
have to leave the property.” Bean testified that he asked Blandon if the company were denying
mechanics the right to form and organize a union on their own time, to which Blandon replied,
“That’s really not the issue here right now. Perla wants you off the property.”
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meeting.10 Blandon told Bean that he and Mena would just sit there with the union
representatives until they decided to leave. There followed a 10-minute stand off before the
union representatives left, during which Blandon, in response to a query by Bean, said he would
call the police if they didn’t leave.11
On the following day, according to Kraiza, she met with Perla in his office and asked him
why he had had them removed from the property the preceding day. Perla said it was because
union representatives come into the company and promise employees higher wages and the
union has ruined corporate America. Perla said the Union could meet with the mechanics
anytime, as long as it was off property. Perla testified that although he told her the Union did
not have rights to access the property, he “didn’t think” he had said he was opposed to union
organization among the mechanics, and he did not recall telling her that unions were ruining
corporate America, but as he did joke around with Kraiza, it was “possible it was brought up.” I
accept Krause’s testimony, which was forthright and not clearly contradicted.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
Section 7 of the Act provides that employees have the right to engage in union activities
or other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7.”
The Board utilizes the following framework for evaluating employer rules affecting
employees: it must first be determined if the rule explicitly restricts Section 7 activity, which
renders the rule unlawful. If it does not, the circumstances must be evaluated to determine
whether: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language of the rule to prohibit Section 7
activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to Section 7 activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.12 If the answer to any of the above is
affirmative, the rule infringes on employee rights under the Act and is therefore unlawful unless
the employer articulates and establishes a legitimate and substantial business justification for
the rule that outweighs the infringement on employee rights.13
In considering the lawfulness of employer communications to employees, the Board
applies the “objective standard of whether the remark tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employee rights. The Board does not consider either the motivation behind the remark or its
actual effect.14

10 Blandon said he told Bean he could continue the meeting with employees in “a public
place,” by which Blandon meant to exclude the facility’s parking lots.
11 I found Blandon’s testimony about events occurring after the mechanics left to be clear
and forthright, and I credit it, including testimony that his statement about calling the police was
made outside the mechanics’ presence.
12 Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004), and restated in NLS Group,
352 NLRB 744, 745 (2008), incorporated by reference into 355 NLRB No. 169 (2010).
13 Ibid; see also, e.g., Caesar's Palace, 336 NLRB 271 (2001); Phoenix Transit System, 337
NLRB 510 (2002).
14 Miller Electric Pump & Plumbing, 334 NLRB 824 (2001).
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B. Orally Promulgated Restriction on Meetings with Union Representatives
The complaint alleges that on February 10, the Respondent, through Mena, orally
promulgated and since then has maintained an overly broad and discriminatory rule prohibiting
employees from meeting with union representatives at the Respondent’s facility at any time.
During a February 10 safety meeting, Mena told mechanics they could not meet with the Union
on facility property but were restricted to meeting with union representatives off property and on
their own time.
The Respondent’s off-duty employees are permitted in the facility’s exterior, nonwork
areas such as its parking lots. Mena’s February 10 restriction against employees meeting with
union representatives on facility property was so broad as to include all property including
parking and other nonwork areas. Focusing as it did on meetings with union representatives,
the rule pronounced by Mena explicitly restricted Section 7 activity. Even if it did not,
employees would reasonably construe the restriction to prohibit Section 7 activity in nonwork
areas. The Respondent has presented no legitimate or substantial business justification for
restricting Section 7 activity in the facility’s nonwork areas; accordingly, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Mena promulgated a discriminatory and overly-broad rule
prohibiting employee/union-representative meetings in nonwork areas.
C. The February 11 Meeting
In the early hours of February 11, without having obtained prior permission from the
Respondent to meet with employees on secured facility premises, union representatives, Bean
and Kraiza, facilitated by employee/union-officer Mazzone, surreptitiously entered the secured
area of the facility to meet with the Respondent’s mechanics in the operations break room
during their 1:30-2 a.m. meal break.
Shortly after the meeting began, Blandon interrupted it. After speaking briefly with
Kraiza and Mazzone, Blandon said in the hearing of the assembled mechanics, without
addressing any particular persons, “This meeting is finished. You guys gotta leave” or, as also
recalled, “This meeting is over; you all have to leave the property.” After the mechanics left the
operations break room, Mr. Blandon spoke with the union representatives, including Mazzone,
telling them, inter alia, that he would call the police if they didn’t leave.
The General Counsel correctly acknowledges that the Respondent may have properly
sought to limit Bean’s and Kraiza’s access to the West Transit facility on February 11. The
Supreme Court has held that employers may lawfully deny workplace access to nonemployee
union agents to pursue organizational activities so long as “reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication” would enable them to reach employees
with the union's message.” NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). No party
contends the Union lacked available communication channels to disseminate the Union’s
message to the mechanics outside the workplace or that the Respondent’s restrictions on
nonemployee access to secured areas were discriminatory.15 In the absence, therefore, of a
legally sufficient justification for access by the union representatives, the Respondent had a
right to exclude the unauthorized access of Bean and Kraiza to the secured facility property and

15 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). Although Perla may have had animus
toward the Union’s organizational efforts among the mechanics, as reflected by his February 12
conversation with Kraiza, his attitude alone cannot turn nondiscriminatory restrictions into
discriminatory ones.
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to warn them that it would seek the assistance of police authorities to have them removed if they
refused to leave.16
The General Counsel argues, however, that Blandon’s communications to the
assembled mechanics and union representatives on February 11 went beyond a legitimate
curtailment of nonemployee access to property. The General Counsel contends that Blandon’s
orders to break up the meeting were so broadly expressed that “they prohibited employees from
meeting with any union representative – employee or non-employee, authorized to be on
property or not – at any time on any part of the West Transit facility.”
The Respondent acknowledges that “as a result of Mr. Blandon's directive to end the
[February 11] meeting, the employees returned to their work area.” The Respondent argues,
however, that Blandon’s statements were not unlawful, as they contained no threats, the
mechanics were familiar with facility-access rules, the application of which Mena had explained
earlier that night, and they demonstrated their understanding of the rules by returning to work
rather than leaving the property.
As explained above, Mena’s February 10 safety-meeting caution to mechanics about not
meeting with the Union on maintenance property was an infringement of their Section 7 right to
meet on exterior or public-accessible areas of the facility. Similarly, Blandon’s February 11
pronouncement that the mechanics’ meeting with union representatives was over and that all
had to leave was overbroad. It is true, as the Respondent points out, that the mechanics did not
think Blandon’s order required them to abandon their work or leave the facility, but that is not the
only consideration here. . Blandon’s all-encompassing announcement would, particularly in
light of Mena’s earlier-announced restrictions, reasonably cause the mechanics to believe they
could not, even in the absence of nonemployee union representatives, continue the meeting in
the operations break room and, further, could not continue the meeting in the facility’s nonwork
areas with union representatives present. Such constraints are impermissible when, as noted,
the Respondent has presented no legitimate or substantial business justification for so
restricting Section 7 activity; accordingly, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
when Blandon disbanded the February 11 meeting.
D. Orally Promulgated Rule Prohibiting Employees from Discussing Wages
In March, Maintenance General Manager Grant Hansen told employees during their
performance reviews that their wage rates were not open for discussion with other employees.
Employees have a protected right to discuss and distribute information regarding wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.17 Hansen’s caution explicitly restricted
employees’ Section 7 right to discuss wages and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

16 See MetFab, Inc., 344 NLRB 215, 221 (2005) (no exceptions filed to ALJ finding that
employer did not violate the Act by calling police to investigate whether union picketing and
handbilling encroached on its private property); North American Pipe Corp., 347 NLRB 836, 847
(2006) (no exceptions filed to ALJ finding that prohibiting union literature-distribution in company
parking lot was unlawful), cited by the General Counsel, is inapposite to this question, as it
involved enforcement of an unlawful access policy.
17 NLS Group at 745 (rule prohibiting disclosure of employment terms including
compensation, to other parties unlawful, as employees “reasonably would construe it to prohibit
activity protected by Section 7”); Mediaone of Greater Florida, Inc., 340 NLRB 277, 281 (2003);
Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 115 fn. 14 (2004); Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532
F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1976) (dissatisfaction with wages and benefits is the “grist” and “sinew”
Continued
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E. Employee Handbook Provisions
The General Counsel argues that the employee-handbook rules maintained by the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) even absent enforcement, as employees would reasonably
construe the rules to prohibit Section 7 activity, which would reasonably tend to chill employees’
exercise of their Section 7 rights. The Respondent contends that a reasonable reading of the
rules, particularly in light of the Respondent’s Freedom of Association policy, could not be
construed to improperly interfere with employees' Section 7 rights.
1. Rule 9.10 - Computer Security Awareness and Confidentiality
Rule 9.10 prohibits disclosure of any company information for any purpose other than to
perform job duties or further company-sponsored activities without written authorization. A
reasonable employee is likely to construe the proscription to include information about terms
and conditions of employment including wage and benefits information, which inclusion the
Respondent’s Acceptable Use Policy clearly contemplates. Moreover, Hansen’s March warning
that wage rates were not to be discussed with other employees could only have emphasized
that the Respondent’s restriction on disclosure of company information included employee
benefit information. Such a restriction violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Mediaone of
Greater Florida, Inc., supra; Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, supra.
2. Rule 9.16 - References
Rule 9.16 prohibits employees from supplying unauthorized information “in response to
requests for references,” and sets forth company policy regarding employment and salary
information the company will furnish to “creditors, lenders, etc.”
The General Counsel argues the rule is ambiguous and overbroad because it may be
reasonably construed to prohibit employees from providing information about their coworkers
even if they are not purporting to speak on Respondent’s behalf. The Respondent contends
that Section 9.16 applies to requests for employment references by prospective employers and
in no way restricts employees' protected rights to discuss or disseminate wage and benefit
information. The Respondent also argues the rule is necessary to avoid tort claims based on
attribution to the company of unauthorized employment references.
Rule 9.16 does not, as the Respondent suggests, specifically limit “requests for
references” to those coming from prospective employers but has a broader thrust. However,
the Board requires the trial judge to give a rule a reasonable reading, to refrain from reading
particular phrases in isolation and to avoid improper presumptions about interference with
employee rights. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, supra at 646. With that caution in mind, it
is appropriate to find that a reasonable employee is likely to understand from Rule 9.16 in its
entirety that the proscription is limited to information sought by an entity regarding a specific
employee for the purpose of granting or withholding some advantage to the employee. Such a
restriction would not impede an employee’s discussion of wages and benefits inter-employee or
with a nonemployee party, such as a labor organization, so long as the information was not
purported to bear the Respondent’s imprimatur. Since the Respondent has articulated a
legitimate and substantial business justification for the rule that outweighs any speculative
_________________________
for concerted action); Mobile Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc., 323 NLRB 1064,1068 (1997),
enfd. 156 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 1998).
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infringement of employee rights, the rule does not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I shall
dismiss that complaint allegation.
3. Rule 10.02 - Vehicle Accident and Incidents
Rule 10.02 sets forth the procedures that employees involved in vehicular accidents
must follow. The rule prohibits operators involved in an accident from “mak[ing] any statements
about an accident to anyone except the police or Company officials.”
The General Counsel argues that the general “gag rule” imposed on making statements
about an accident expressly deters employees from talking to coworkers or union
representatives about accident details and sequelae that may affect employment terms. Since
an accident may result in discipline or otherwise impact employees’ working conditions, the rule
impinges on Section 7 rights. The Respondent argues that all operators are represented by the
Union and covered by the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement that specifically protects
operators' rights to discuss accidents or incidents with their representatives and provides
grievance procedures for infringement of rights. In light of the contractual provision, the
Respondent urges, Rule 10.02 cannot reasonably be read to interfere with employee Section 7
rights.
The Board has found imposition of gag rules on discussion of work conditions, such as
those on wages, to be unlawful restrictions on Section 7 rights. See Ashley Furniture Industries,
353 NLRB 1255 (2008). Even if Rule 10.02 is not an explicit restriction of Section 7 rights, a
reasonable employee is likely to construe the rule as prohibiting protected discussion of
accidents with other employees or union representatives. Cf. NLS Group, supra. As to the
Respondent’s assertion that any ambiguity attaching to Rule 10.02 is effectively resolved by
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, the mere maintenance of such an unlawful
rule serves to inhibit employees from engaging in otherwise protected activity. Lafayette Park
Hotel, 326 NLRB 824 at 825, 827 (1998); Cintas Corp., 344 NLRB 943, 946 (2005). Further, the
existence of lawful provisions does not cure an unlawful rule; rather two facially inconsistent
rules create an ambiguity that must be resolved against the Respondent, as the drafter of the
rule. See Mediaone of Greater Florida, Inc., 340 NLRB 277, fn. 4 (2003). Accordingly, that
portion of Rule 10.02 that prohibits employee statements about an accident to anyone except
the police or company officials violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Rule 11.01 - Stealing/Theft
Rule 11.01 prohibits the use of company property for nonwork activities at any time and
precludes employees from conducting non-work activities only during “working time.” It is well-
settled that an employer may lawfully prohibit non-work activities during working time. See
Stevens Construction Corp., 350 NLRB 132, fn 13 (2007), citing Our Way, 268 NLRB 394
(1983). Further, the Board instructs that employees have no statutory right to use an
employer’s equipment for Section 7 activity. See Guard Publishing Co., 351 NLRB 1110, 1114
(2007). While an employer has a right to impose some restrictions on employees' statutory right
to engage in protected activity, such restrictions must be clearly limited so as not to interfere
with employee rights to engage in protected activities on their own time in nonwork areas. See
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Here, employees may reasonably
construe the words “using company property” to encompass the use of facility areas where
employees may congregate during non-working time and where their right to engage in union or
other protected activities may not be restricted. See Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 NLRB 382, 384
(2008). Accordingly, that portion of Rule 10.02 that prohibits employees from using company
property for nonwork activities anytime violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
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5. 11.01 - Violence/Fighting/Threats
Rule 11.01 prohibits, in part, “fighting, violence, threats, harassment, intimidation,
horseplay, and other disruptive behavior in the workplace including oral or written statements,
gestures, or expressions that convey a direct or indirect threat of physical or emotional harm.”
The General Counsel apparently concedes that the violence/fighting/threats portion of
Rule 11.01 does not explicitly prohibit Section 7 activity but argues that “harassment” and “other
disruptive behavior” are inherently ambiguous and subjective words that may be understood by
employees to encompass enthusiastic union solicitation or vigorous work protests.
I cannot agree with the General Counsel that a reasonable employee would construe
Rule 11.01 to be a restriction on Section 7 activities. The Board has found lawful a rule that
prohibited “any type of conduct, which is or has the effect of being injurious, offensive,
threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfering with fellow [employees] or patrons.” Palms
Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB 1363, 1367 (2005). In doing so, the Board reasoned the rule was
not “so amorphous that reasonable employees would be incapable of grasping the expectation
that they comport themselves with general notions of civility and decorum in the workplace.” Id.
at 1368. Here the words “harassment” and “other disruptive behavior” are set in a context of
prohibited “fighting, violence, threats. . . intimidation, horseplay,” and employees would
reasonably consider the terms “harassment” and “other disruptive behavior” to signify a similar
level of unacceptable behavior. Accordingly, I conclude Rule 11.01 does not violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, and I shall dismiss that complaint allegation.
6. 11.01 – Disloyalty
Rule 11.01 prohibits, in part, (1) making “false, vicious, or malicious statements
concerning the Company or its services, a client, or another employee,” (2) participating “in
outside activities that are detrimental to the company’s image or reputation, or where a conflict
of interest exists,” or (3) conducting “oneself during non-working hours in such a manner that
the conduct would be detrimental to the interest or reputation of the Company.”
The General Counsel argues that each of the “disloyalty” prohibitions in Rule 11.01 is
overbroad and that maintenance of the prohibitions would reasonably discourage employees
from engaging in untrammeled discussion of protected issues, participating in protected
“outside” activities,” or risking protected conduct that the Respondent might perceive to be
detrimental to its interests.
As to the prohibition of “false, vicious, or malicious statements concerning the Company
or its services, a client, or another employee,” the Respondent contends the prohibition covers
only disloyal statements that are malicious or vicious and therefore unprotected by the Act.
However, the proscriptions are expressed in the disjunctive; thus, the Respondent bars vicious
or malicious or merely false statements about the Company. The Board has invalidated similar
provisions on grounds that they prohibited and punished merely “false” statements, as opposed
to maliciously false statements, and were therefore overbroad.18 In Valley Hospital Medical
Center Inc., 351 NLRB 1250 (2007), cited by the Respondent, the Board emphasized that an
employee's public criticism of an employer must evidence “a malicious motive” to lose the Act's

18 American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 NLRB 1126 (1978), enfd. 600 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1979),
followed in Lafayette Park, supra; Cincinnati Suburban Press, 289 NLRB 966 (1988).
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protection as an act of disloyalty,19 and the fact that an employee’s statement is false,
misleading or inaccurate is, alone, insufficient to demonstrate malicious falsity.20 Accordingly,
Rule 11.01’s prohibition against making “false” statements concerning the Respondent is
impermissibly overbroad and violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Respondent argues that Rule 11.01’s prohibition against participating “in outside
activities that are detrimental to the company’s image or reputation, or where a conflict of
interest exists,” is consistent with one approved by the Board in Lafayette Park, supra at 824
and therefore lawful. The Lafayette rule forbade “being uncooperative with supervisors,
employees, guests and/or regulatory agencies or otherwise engaging in conduct that does not
support the [employer’s] goals and objectives.” The Board concluded the rule, set in that
context, addressed the legitimate business concern of uncooperativeness “with supervisors,
employees, guests and/or regulatory agencies.” The Board stated that arguable ambiguity
arose only by viewing the phrase “goals and objectives” in isolation and by attributing to the
employer an intent to interfere with employee rights. The instant rule is different from the
Lafayette rule. Here, no wording provides a context limiting the rule to legitimate business
concerns such as uncooperation with supervisors. Rather, the prohibition bans all outside
activities the Respondent may consider to be detrimental to its image or reputation or to present
a conflict with the Respondent’s interests. It would not be unreasonable for employees to
suppose that such outside activities as public union rallies, informational picketing, or public
expressions of workplace dissatisfaction would, in the Respondent’s view, fall into “detrimental”
or “conflict” of interest categories. Since employees might reasonably view the rule as
restricting protected outside activities, the rule chills participation in Section 7 activity and
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
As to Rule 11.01’s prohibition against conducting “oneself during non-working hours in
such a manner that the conduct would be detrimental to the interest or reputation of the
Company,” the Respondent cites Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp., 335 NLRB 1284 (2001), as
support for its position that the prohibition is lawful. In Ark, the company rules forbade:
(1) conducting oneself unprofessionally or unethically, with the potential of damaging the
reputation or a department of the Company, and (2) participating in any conduct, on or off duty,
that tends to bring discredit to, or reflects adversely on, [the employee], fellow associates, the
Company, or its guests, or that adversely affects job performance or [employees’] ability to
report to work as scheduled.21 The Board noted that the Ark rules were largely identical to
those found lawful in Lafayette Park, which was the appropriate precedent to apply.22 The
instant rule is readily distinguishable from those the Board considered in Lafayette Park and
Ark. The rules in both Lafayette Park and Ark contextually limited the prohibited conduct to
unprotected actions: the Lafayette Park rule related to uncooperative behavior with supervisors
and others; the Ark rules related to unprofessional or unethical behavior or behavior that brings
“discredit to or reflects adversely on” the employee and others. Set in those contexts, the
Lafayette Park and Ark rules clearly contemplated employee conduct that was intrinsically
improper and unprotected. The instant rule prohibiting nonworking conduct that “would be
detrimental to the interest or reputation of the Company,” does not focus on inherently improper
actions. Rather, the rule could reasonably be read to comprise any behavior, however proper

19 Valley Hospital at 1252, citing Richboro Community Mental Health Council, 242 NLRB
1267, 1268 (1979).
20 Valley Hospital at 1252, citing, e.g., Sprint/United Management Co., 339 NLRB 1012,
1018 (2003).
21 Id at 1291.
22 Id at 1285 fn. 2.
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and protected, that the Respondent considered detrimental to its interest or reputation. With the
rule focused on the Respondent’s opinion of the conduct rather than on generally accepted
views of respectable and principled behavior, the rule is overbroad and violates Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
7. 11.02 - Personal Conduct
Rule 11.02 prohibits discourteous or inappropriate attitudes or behaviors to passengers,
other employees, or members of the public, disorderly conduct during working hours, and
profane or abusive language where the language used is uncivil, insulting, contemptuous,
vicious, or malicious.
The General Counsel argues that Rule 11.02 - Personal Conduct is overbroad and
ambiguous and could reasonably be read to prohibit protected activity. I cannot agree with the
General Counsel that a reasonable employee would construe Rule 11.02 as a restriction on
Section 7 activities. The restrictions of Rule 11.02 are comparable to those found lawful in
Palms Hotel & Casino, supra. Given Rule 11.02’s specific description of prohibited behavior,
reasonable employees would, as the Board concluded in Palms Hotel & Casino, understand the
Respondent’s expectation to be that “they comport themselves with general notions of civility
and decorum.” Id. at 1368. Accordingly, I conclude that Rule 11.02 does not violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, and I shall dismiss that complaint allegation.
8. 11.02 - Security
Rule 11.02 prohibits employees from being present at a company location while not
performing authorized services or without express permission.
An employer’s restrictions on employees' statutory right to engage in protected activity
must be clearly limited so as not to interfere with employees' rights to engage in protected
activities on their own time in nonwork areas. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra.
The Board considers that, except where justified by business reasons, a rule that denies off-
duty employees entry to parking lots, gates, and other outside nonworking areas will be found
invalid.23 Here, employees may reasonably construe the words “company location” to
encompass outside nonworking areas where employees may congregate during nonworking
time and where their right to engage in union or other protected activities may not be restricted.
See Crowne Plaza Hotel, supra. Further, a rule that requires employees to secure permission
from their employer before engaging in protected concerted activities on their free time and in
nonwork areas is unlawful. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 333 NLRB 402, 403 (2001). Accordingly,
Rule 11.02, insofar as it prohibits employees from being present at a company location while not
performing authorized services or without express permission, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.

23 Tri-County Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976), followed in Continental Group, Inc.,
353 NLRB 348, 350 (2008).
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9. Rule 11.03 - Selling Goods or Services;
Soliciting and Distribution of Literature
Rule 11.03 prohibits employees from (1) selling or offering for sale any goods or services
to other employees, patrons, or visitors to a company location or company vehicle, except on
the authorized bulletin board in the employee lounge area and (2) posting, circulating or
distributing written or printed material without authorization from the manager.
The General Counsel argues that the second part of Rule 11.03 is a presumptively
invalid no-distribution rule and that the first part of rule 11.03 must be read in context with the
no-distribution rule, rendering it similarly over-broad. However, since the two rules are
functionally and comprehensibly discrete, they are appropriately considered separately.
An employer has a right to limit employees’ proffering of goods or services at the
workplace. There being no evidence the Respondent promulgated part one of rule 11.03 in
response to union or protected activity or has enforced it in a manner calculated to restrict
employees’ protected activity, there is no basis for finding it infringes on employees’ Section 7
rights. See Lafayette Parke, supra at 826 (relying in part on the absence of such evidence to
find a rule did not violate the Act). Accordingly, I conclude that part one of rule 11.03 does not
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I shall dismiss the complaint allegation relating thereto.
As for part two of rule 11.03, while an employer has a right to impose some restrictions
on employees' statutory right to engage in union solicitation and distribution, such restrictions,
must be clearly limited so as not to interfere with employees' right to solicit their coworkers on
their own time or to distribute literature on their own time in nonwork areas. Republic Aviation
Corp. at 803-05; Our Way, Inc., supra. The requirement that employees obtain
preauthorization for the dissemination of any written or printed material clearly infringes on
employees’ right to distribute union or other protected literature on their employer's
premises during nonwork time in nonwork areas.24 Since part two of rule 11.03 interferes
with the exercise of protected employee rights, it is invalid and violates Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
10. Rule 11.04 - Work Rules and Employee Performance
Rule 11.04 prohibits poor work habits including loafing, wasting time, loitering, or
excessive visiting.
The General Counsel argues that the rule is impermissibly vague and may reasonably
be understood to prohibit employees from remaining on the Respondent’s premises during
nonworktimes even when engaging in concerted or union activities. Although the rule is tied to
“work habits,” it is not clear from the language that the prohibitions are limited to employee
conduct during worktime; rather, they could reasonably be seen as extending to nonwork time.
The Board has found the following rules violate Section 8(a)(1): prohibiting employees from
"loitering in company premises before and after working hours,”25 prohibiting “loitering on
company property (the premises) without permission,” which rule would reasonably chill the

24 See Ibid; NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 110–111 (1956); Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972).
25 Palms Hotel & Casino, at 1363 fn. 3.
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exercise of Section 7 rights,26 and “[l]oitering on Company property after working hours.”27 Here,
the undefined and unlimited terms “loafing, wasting time, loitering, or excessive visiting” could
lead employees to conclude they could not engage in protected activities with other employees
even during nonworking time in nonworking areas of the Respondent's property. The
Respondent has presented no legitimate or substantial business justification for such broad
restrictions; accordingly, Rule 11.04 interferes with the exercise of protected employee rights
and violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the following conduct:
(a) Since February 10, 2010, promulgating and maintaining an overly broad and
discriminatory rule prohibiting protected employee/union representative meetings in
exterior nonwork areas of the Respondent’s facility.
(b) On February 11, 2010, restricting union activity by disbanding and otherwise
discouraging a meeting of employees with union representatives.
(c) In March 2010, restricting employees Section 7 right to discuss wages with other
employees.
(d) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits disclosure of
any company information for any purpose other than to perform job duties or further
company-sponsored activities without written authorization.
(e) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from making statements about a work-related accident to anyone except the police
or company officials.
(f) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from using company property for nonwork activities anytime.
(g) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from making “false” statements concerning the Respondent.
(h) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from participating in “outside activities that are detrimental to the company’s image
or reputation, or where a conflict of interest exists.”
(i) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from conducting themselves “during non-working hours in such a manner that the
conduct would be detrimental to the interest or reputation of the Company.”
(j) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from being present at a company location while not performing authorized services
or without express permission.
(k) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from posting, circulating or distributing written or printed material without
authorization from the manager.
(l) Since August 24, 2009, maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees
from “loafing, wasting time, loitering, or excessive visiting.”
4. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

26 Lutheran Heritage Village, supra at 655.
27 Tecumseh Packaging Solutions, Inc., 352 NLRB 694 (2008).
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Remedy
Having found the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it must
be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action, as set forth below,
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Because the Respondent’s employee
handbook is distributed and maintained at its various facilities, a nationwide posting remedy
is appropriate.28
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended29
ORDER
The Respondent, First Transit, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a)Promulgating and maintaining an overly broad and discriminatory rule
prohibiting protected employee/union representative meetings in exterior
nonwork areas of the Respondent’s facility.
(b)Restricting protected activity by disbanding or otherwise discouraging
protected employee meetings during nonwork time and in nonwork areas.
(c) Restricting employees Section 7 right to discuss wages with other
employees.
(d)Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits disclosure of any company
information for any purpose other than to perform job duties or further
company-sponsored activities without written authorization.
(e)Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from making
statements about a work-related accident to anyone except the police or
company officials.
(f) Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from using
company property for nonwork activities anytime.
(g)Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from making “false”
statements concerning the Respondent.
(h)Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from participating in
“outside activities that are detrimental to the company’s image or reputation,
or where a conflict of interest exists.”
(i) Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from conducting
themselves “during non-working hours in such a manner that the conduct
would be detrimental to the interest or reputation of the Company.”
(j) Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from being present
at a company location while not performing authorized services or without
express permission.

28 Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 809, 812 (2005).
29 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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(k)Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from posting,
circulating or distributing written or printed material without authorization from
the manager.
(l) Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits employees from “loafing,
wasting time, loitering, or excessive visiting.”
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the rules set forth in paragraphs 3 (a) and (c) through (l) of the
conclusions of law set forth above and notify employees at all of the
Respondent’s facilities in the United States, in writing, that this has been
done.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Phoenix, Arizona facility
and at all of the Respondent’s facilities in the United States, in writing, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”30 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by Respondent at any time since February 2010.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not specifically found.
Dated: Washington, D.C. January 26, 2011
Lana H. Parke
Administrative Law Judge

30 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words
in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. More particularly,
WE WILL NOT make and/or maintain overly broad rules that restrain employees in the exercise
of the rights set forth above by:
Prohibiting protected employee/union representative meetings in nonwork areas of our
facility.
Restricting employees’ right to discuss wages with other employees.
Prohibiting disclosure of any company information for any purpose, other than to
perform job duties or further company-sponsored activities, without written
authorization.
Prohibiting employees from making statements about work-related accidents to anyone
except the police or company officials.
Prohibiting employees from using company property for non-work activities anytime.
Prohibiting employees from making false statements concerning the company.
Prohibiting employees from participating in “outside activities that are detrimental to the
company’s image or reputation, or where a conflict of interest exists.”
Prohibiting employees from conducting themselves “during non-working hours in such a
manner that the conduct would be detrimental to the interest or reputation of the
company.”
Prohibiting employees from being present at a company location while not performing
authorized services or without express permission.
Prohibiting employees from posting, circulating or distributing written or printed material
without authorization from the manager.
Prohibiting employees from “loafing, wasting time, loitering, or excessive visiting.”
WE WILL NOT disband or otherwise discourage protected employee meetings during nonwork
time and in nonwork areas.
WE WILL NOT In any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL rescind the rules set forth above and notify employees in writing that this has been
done.
FIRST TRANSIT, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
2600 North Central Avenue, Suite 1800
Phoenix, Arizona 85004-3099
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
602-640-2160.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 602-640-2146.