Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 27, 1951

93 N.L.R.B. 981 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY 981
is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the Act.
4. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices by discharging
David Mingo or by refusing to reinstate him.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY and E. CARL RHODUS
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WARE-
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, OVER-THE-ROAD AND CITY
TRANSFER DRIVERS, HELPERS, DOCKMEN AND WAREHOUSEMEN, LOCAL
UNION No. 41, A. F. L. and E. CARL RHODUS. Cases Nos,
17-CA-247 and 17-CB-18. March 27, 1951
Decision and Order
On September 25, 1950, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway
issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, find-
ing that the Respondents had not engaged in the unfair labor prac-
tices alleged in the Complaint,' and recommending that the complaint
be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. The General Counsel and the Respondent
Union thereafter filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and sup-
porting briefs. The Respondent Union also requested oral argument.
This request is denied as the record and briefs, in our opinion, ade-
quately present the issues and the positions of the parties.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions
and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the
extent that they are consistent with this Decision and Order.
1. The Trial Examiner found that the Employer did not violate
Section 8 (a) (1) or (3) of the Act, and the Union did not violate
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) or (2) of the Act, in connection with employee
Rhodus' reduction in seniority about November 10, 1949, and his
consequent transfer and discharge. We agree with the Trial Exam-
iner's result, but not with his reasoning.
As found in the Intermediate Report, on September 1, 1949, the Em-
ployer and the Union executed a lawful contract requiring, inter alia,
1 The complaint alleged violations of Section 8 (a) (1), 8 (a) (3), 8 (b ) (1) (A), and
8 (b) (2) of the Act as amended.
93 NLRB No. 161.
982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
membership in "good standing" as a condition of employment on and
after 30 days. The contract further provided that "seniority rights
shall prevail if employee is qualified," and that any controversy over
seniority should be settled by the Union alone. About November 9,
1949, while charging employee Rhodus was in arrears in his dues and
therefore not a member in "good standing," 2 the Union advised the
Employer that Rhodus had lost his seniority for nonpayment of dues.
Rhodus was one of the most senior employees at that time, having been
employed since 1943. About 2 days later, the Employer accordingly
advised Rhodus that he had been dropped to the bottom of the senior-
ity list. Rhodus thereafter tendered, and the Union accepted, his back
dues: As a result of his earlier reduction in seniority, however,
Rhodus was later transferred to another department, and was sub-
sequently laid off in a plant-wide reduction in force. He would not
have been either transferred or laid off but for his reduction in
seniority. -
The principal issue before us is whether the joint action of the
Union and the Employer in reducing Rhodus' standing on the senior-
ity list was in itself a violation of the Act. Rhodus' reduction in
seniority was of course a discrimination in regard to a condition of
his employment, and thus would constitute a violation of the Act, be-
cause grounded on the membership requirement as to the payment of
dues, unless the provisos to Section 8 (a) (3) and the terms of Section
8 (b) (2) protect the discrimination. If this discrimination is pro-
tected, the subsequent transfer and layoff of Rhodus were not unlaw-
ful, but merely resulted from a nondiscriminatory application of his
reduction in seniority.
It is clear that at the time Rhodus was reduced in seniority the
existing contract contained a union-security provision that required
him to maintain his membership in good standing as a condition of
employment. Thus, Rhodus could then have been discharged for
losing his good standing because of nonpayment of dues, if the union-
security provision was permitted by the Act. True, the Union de-
manded a lesser discrimination than the union-security clause entitled
it to demand : it actually requested only that Rhodus be dropped to
the bottom of the seniority list. But this leniency on the part of the
Union cannot reasonably be said to have detracted from the otherwise
meritable position of either the Union or the Employer; nor should
it enhance Rhodus' Claim to protection.
On these facts, and viewed in this posture, the only question to be
resolved is whether the union-security provision of the contract was
lawful.
2 The Union 's bylaws provide : "to be in continuous good standing, a member must pay
his dues on or before the first of the month, in advance."
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY 983
The Act, although generally prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment to encourage membership in a union, nonetheless sanctions such
discrimination within certain narrow limits. The limits are set forth
in the provisos to Section 8 (a) (3) and in Section 8 (b) (2). In
general, there must be a union-shop election, then an agreement requir-
ing membership in the union as a condition of employment on or after
30 days, and finally a denial or termination of the "membership" of
the complaining employee for nonpayment of dues. These standards
were all met in this case at the time Rhodus was discriminated against
by being reduced in seniority.
We believe, and find, that Congress intended by the word "member-
ship" to permit a requirement of membership in good standing. - The
proviso to the original Wagner Act was couched, insofar as here rele-
vant, in precisely the same terms as is the proviso to the amended Act :
It permitted an agreement to require as a condition of employment
"membership" in a union. The word "membership" in that proviso
was consistently construed in Wagner Act cases, in accordance with
established contractual practice in the field of labor relations ,3 as sanc-
tioning contracts requiring membership "in good standing." 4 For
example, in the Diamond T case, discharges were held proper as to
employees who were "no longer member[s] in good standing," under
the provisions of a contract requiring employees to "remain members
in good standing in the Union." The amended Act, with its amended
provisos, does not change the type of membership permitted to be
made a condition of employment, although it permits a discharge for
loss of "membership" only when such membership is lost for failure to
tender periodic dues or initiation fees. Thus, the substantial altera-
tions made by the amendments limit the grounds on which good-stand-
ing membership must be lost in order to legalize discrimination, but do
not change the kind of membership that must be lost.' Congress, when
it repeated the precise phraseology of the original Act in this respect,
was apparently satisfied with the Board's consistent construction of
the original proviso as permitting a requirement of membership in
good standing. As the Supreme Court said in an analogous situ-
ation, "In the course of adopting the 1947 amendments Congress con-
sidered in great detail the provisions of the earlier legislation as they
had been applied by the Board. Under these circumstances it is a
fair assumption that by reenacting without pertinent modification
8.See, for example , the definition of maintenance of membership in Casselman, Labor
Dictionary , pp. 274-275 : "A clause or provision in a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween an employer and a union , whereby all employees . . . must remain members en
good standing of the union . . . as a condition of remaining employed ." [ Emphasis
supplied.]
'Diamond T Motor Car Company, 64 NLRB 1225 ; Public Service Corporation of New
-Jersey, 77 NLRB 153; Durasteel Company, 73 NLRB 941.
6 See Pressed Steel Car Company, Inc., 89 NLRB 276; The Electric Auto -Lite Company,
92 NLRB 1073.
984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the provision with which we here deal, Congress accepted the con-
struction placed thereon by the Board...." r
As employee Rhodus had lost his "membership in good standing"
because of nonpayment of dues when his seniority was reduced, we
find that discrimination against him under the valid union-security
contract was protected by the provisions of the Act.
Rhodus' subsequent payment of his back dues cannot retroactively
affect the legality of his reduction in seniority, for at the time of the
reduction he was not in good standing within the meaning of the Act.
2. The General Counsel has excepted to the Trial Examiner's failure
to find that the seniority provision of the contract between the Em-
ployer and the Union in itself violated the Act. We find no merit in
this exception. The seniority provision, although permitting the
Union to control seniority to some extent, does not on its face provide
that the Union should do so because of union affiliation.7
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint against the Re-
spondents be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
Mr. Wtlliam J. Scott, for the General Counsel.
Mr. Harold Mull, of Akron, Ohio, for the Respondent Employer.
Mr. John J. Manning, of Kansas City, Mo., for the Respondent Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed on December 5, 1949, by E. Carl Rhodus , an individual,
in Case No . 17-CA-247 against Firestone Tire and Rubber Company , herein
called the Employer, and in Case No 17-CB-1S against International Brother-
hood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Over-
the-Road and City Transfer Drivers, Helpers , Dockmen and Warehousemen,
Local Union No. 41, A. F. L, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board, herein respectively called the General
Counsel and the Board , by the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region,
consolidated the cases for hearing and issued his complaint , dated June 30, 1950,
alleging that the Employer had engaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 ( a) (1) and ( 3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136 , herein called the Act, and that the
Union had engaged in , and was engaging in, unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A ) and (2) of the Act , all affecting commerce
e N L. R B V. Gitllett Gin Co , 340 U. S 361 (U. S S. Ct, Jan 15, 1951), 27 LRRM
2231 , involving another section of the Act that remained unchanged in pertinent part after
the amendments to the Act.
7 Pacife American Shipowners Association, 90 NLRB 1099 . Member Reynolds concurs
in this finding on the basis of the valid union -security provision in the contract between the
Employer and the Union.
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY 985
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. Copies of the charges,
the order consolidating the cases, the complaint, and notice of hearing were duly
served on the Employer and the Union.
With respect to unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance
that the Union has been the bargaining representative for a unit of the Em-
ployer's employees since 1946; that in 1947 the employees duly authorized the
Union to enter into a union-shop contract ; that the Union and Employer en-
tered into a contract containing a union-shop clause, a provision for seniority,
and a provision that any controversy over the seniority standing of any em-
ployee should be referred to the Union for settlement ; that the bylaws of the
Union contained a provision that any member who was delinquent in his dues
on the second day of the second month would lose his seniority rights ; that
the October 1949 dues of employee-member E. Carl Rhodus became in arrears
while he was on vacation ; that on about November 11 the Union notified the
Employer that pursuant to the union bylaws said Rhodus had forefeited all
his seniority rights because of his failure to pay his dues; that on November
14, 1949, Rhodus paid his October dues to the Union and on November 15, 1949,
he paid his November dues; that on the latter date the Union presented to the
Employer and the latter accepted a new seniority list with the name of said
Rhodus appearing at the bottom of the list; that as a result of this new list-
ing, Rhodus, who had previously been the third oldest employee, was assigned
to a job that was inferior and less desirable than the one he had held ; that
on December 2, 1949, in a reduction in force, Rhodus was laid off, and that
such layoff would not have taken place except for his new seniority listing.
The answer of the Employer, dated July 7, 1950, denied the foregoing al-
legations for want of sufficient information, and denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices. The answer of the Union, dated July 12, 1950, ad-
mitted the allegations of fact but denied that they constituted unfair labor
practices by either the Employer or the Union.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Kansas City, Missouri, on July
18 and 19, 1930, before me, the duly designated Trial Examiner. All parties,
represented by counsel, participated in the hearing and were afforded op-
portunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence
pertinent to the issues. At the opening of the bearing the Union moved to
amend its answer to admit certain jurisdictional allegations of the complaint
and the motion was granted The Union at the same time moved to dismiss
the complaint for the reason that, under the constitution of the International
Union, Rhodus was under obligation to exhaust his remedies under such con-
stitution before proceeding before any court or other tribunal. Ruling was
reserved thereon but is now denied.' Thereafter the Employer moved to amend
its answer to admit all allegations of fact with the exception of that which
stated that the job to which Rhodus was transferred was inferior and less de-
sirable. The motion was granted. The Employer then moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it did not state facts constituting any unfair
labor practice. Ruling was reserved on this motion and it was renewed later
in combination with a motion to dismiss on the evidence. Following the Em-
ployer's motion to amend, the Union moved to amend its answer to deny that
Rhodus was assigned to a job which was inferior and less desirable than the
one he had held. The motion was granted. At the close of the General Coun-
sel's; case, the Employer and the Union moved to dismiss, but their motions
were denied at that time. At the close of all the evidence, the Employer and
I See Durasteel Company , 73 NLRB 941; Mai lboro Cotton Mills, 53 NLRB 965 ; Merrimac
Manufacturing Company, 31 NLRB 900.
986 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state,
and the evidence failed to show, the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tice. Ruling thereon was reserved and the motions are now granted for the
reasons hereinafter stated. At the close of the hearing the parties argued
orally. Upon request the undersigned set a date for the filing of briefs. The
Union alone filed a brief.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Employer is an Ohio corporation engaged generally in the manufacture
and sale of tires and rubber products and it operates plants and warehouses
throughout the United States. The instant case involves its warehouse in
North Kansas City, Missouri. At this warehouse the Employer annually re-
ceives tires, tubes, and other merchandise of a value in excess of $100,000, of
which more than 50 percent is shipped to it from points outside the State of
Missouri.. From the same warehouse, the Employer annually distributes tires,
tubes, and other merchandise of a value in excess of $100,000, of which more
than 25 percent is shipped to points outside the State of Missouri? I find that the
operations of the Employer affect commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, Over-the-Road and City Transfer Drivers, Helpers, Dock-
men and Warehousemen, Local Union No 41, affiliated with the American Fed-
eration of Labor, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees
of the Employer. There is no question raised as to the Union's character.
It is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The collective bargaining agi cement and the Union's bylaws
Representing the Employer's employees, the Union, on September 1, 1949, en-
tered into a collective bargaining contract with the Employer for a term of
1 year. The paragraph thereof covering seniority rights of employees, so far
as pertinent, reads :
Seniority rights shall prevail if employee is qualified. A list of employees
arranged in the order of their seniority shall be posted in a conspicuous
place on the job. Any controversy over the seniority standing of any
employee on this list shall be referred to the Union for settlement . . .
Pursuant to prior authorization, the Union and the Employer in an addendum
to this contract, of even date, agreed to a union shop with the usual require-
ment of membership in the Union and the requirement that the Employer dis-
charge any employee losing membership by reason of failure to pay initiation fees
or membership dues.
2 These findings are made on the basis of the allegations of the complaint admitted
by the answer of the Employer Although the answer of the Union denied most of these
allegations , counsel for the Union orally admitted these allegations after an off -the-record
discussion.
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY 987
The local Union at all times material thereto had a bylaw providing for
automatic suspension from membership when 3 months in arrears in payment
of dues and one providing that any member who was 1 month in arrears for
dues should forfeit all seniority rights. A member was defined to be in arrears
for nonpayment of dues on the second day of the second month.
B. Loss of seniority of Rhodus
Carl Rhodus was employed by the Employer on August 17, 1943. He served
a period of time in the tire department, where he unloaded and stacked tires
and filled tire orders. Later he served most of his time in the shipping depart-
ment where he also performed physical work. On occasions, however, he was
transferred, when needed, to the tire department for temporary duty. It was
the custom of the Employer to transfer to the tire department for such temporary
duty the employees with the least seniority. After 1947 Rhodus was high enough
on the seniority list so that he was no longer transferred back to the tire depart-
ment until after his seniority was taken away, as hereinafter related. In the
spring of 1949 the warehouse superintendent designated Rhodus as assistant
shipping clerk. This was apparently an informal title, not carried as a classi-
fication by the Employer, and it involved no increase in pay, but it gave Rhodus,
to his preference, more clerical work than he had before and it gave him more
responsibility. At that time he had the greatest seniority in his department.
Rhodus joined the Union in July 19463 and remained to the time of the hearing,
a member in good standing. In August 1949 Rhodus paid his August and Sep-
tember dues to the Union. During the second week of October, when the busi-
ness agent collected for the current dues, Rhodus was off on a week's vacation.
He took another week's vacation during the second week of November. Through
oversight or confusion on his part as to how many months' dues he had paid in
advance, he did not pay his October dues before November 2, when they became
in arrears.
On about November 9, when O. B. Enloe, the Union's business agent, was
collecting November dues, and while Rhodus was away on vacation, the union
steward informed Ralph Sexton, foreman of the warehouse, that Rhodus had
lost his seniority as a result of nonpayment of dues. About 2 days later, Sexton
reached Rhodus by telephone and told him that he had been dropped to the
bottom in seniority and should get the matter straightened out. The next day,
Saturday, Rhodus went to the Union's office but found no one there He returned
on Monday, November 14, and paid his October dues before going back to work.
The next day, while at work, he paid his November dues to Enloe.
At about this time, Enloe brought a newly typed seniority list with him, show-
ing Rhodus' name at the bottom of the list. In Sexton's' presence, Enloe took
down the old seniority list and posted the new one. Rhodus' name had been
about the fourth from the top in the old list.
Around the end of the same week or beginning of the next week of November,
Rhodus was transferred from the shipping to the tire department and another
employee, who had been employed for a shorter time than Rhodus, took over
Rhodus' former duties. On December 2, 1949, in a reduction in force for economic
reasons, Rhodus was laid off. Had his seniority not been disturbed he would
have been neither transferred nor laid off.
8 The first contract between the Union and the Employer was dated August 14, 1946.
988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Arguments and conclusions
It is argued by the General Counsel that an employer and union have no right
under the Act to enter into an agreement which affects seniority in event of
nonpayment of dues, and that an employer may not lawfully delegate to a union
the unilateral power to forfeit seniority, especially when, at the time, the em-
ployee involved could not have been deprived of membership.
I deem it unnecessary to determine what a union or employer might do by
contract to deprive employees of seniority rights for nonpayment of clues, be-
cause, as I had the contract, it makes no provision for such forfeiture. It is
claimed by the Union that the contract clause referring "any controversy over
seniority standing of any employee . . . to the Union for settlement" gave
it the right, through bylaws, to cause a forfeiture of seniority for nonpayment of
dues. As defined in Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Fifth Edition) "contro-
versy" is : "A discussion of a controverted matter or controversial issue ; dis-
pute ; debate ; sometimes, quarrel." The word "controvert" is defined : "To op-
pose with arguments; deny; contradict; also to refuse to accept or hold, as a
doctrine." There is no pretense here that a dispute arose concerning Rhodus'
seniority standing before the forfeiture thereof by the application of the bylaw.
Consequently there was no dispute or controversy which could, by the terms of
the contract, be "referred to the Union for settlement " Counsel for the Union,
in his oral argument, contended that the bylaw was "part of the contract." If
that were true, there would need to be no reference to the.Union for "settle-
ment," as the forfeiture would be automatic as a result of the contract provision.
"Settlement" contemplates a composure of doubts or differences which would
not exist if the contract operated automatically.
As the contract, itself, then, does not here authorize a forfeiture of seniority,
the question of law presented is not whether an employer and a union might
lawfully contract that nonpayment of union dues would result in a forfeiture of
seniority ; rather it is whether it is an unfair labor practice for a union and em-
ployer, having a union-shop contract with no provision therein for forfeiture
of an employee's seniority for nonpayment of union dues, to work such •a for-
feiture. There is no question of personal animous. The Union and Employer
in this case acted through careless misunderstanding of .the language of the
contract but without bad faith. Rhodus' transfer and subsequent layoff were
purely incidental to the seniority status given him and are not considered as
unfair labor practices independently of the deprivation of his seniority. If the
General Counsel's argument were put in the form of a syllogism it would read :
Any discrimination by an employer against an employee, other than dis-
charge for failure to pay dues to a union having a valid contract which re-
quires membership therein as a condition of employment, is an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Rhodus, an employee, was discriminated against by his Employer by being
deprived of his seniority (and not by being discharged for failure to pay
dues to the Union, which had a valid contract requiring membership as a
condition of employment).
Therefore the Employer discriminated against Rhodus within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
The major premise, however, omits the words of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act,
"to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization."
The problem, therefore, is, granting that Rhodus or any other employee would
be discriminated against by being deprived of his seniority, does such dis-
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY 1 989
cruuination in the circumstances of this case tend to encourage or discourage
membership in a labor organization? In the absence of the valid union-shop
contract here there would be no room for doubt. But how can employees who,
have no choice under the contract but to become and remain union members
or lose their employment be said to be encouraged to become or remain union
members by the threat of loss of seniority for nonpayment of dues? Even if it
be urged that under the Act an employee might retain employment without
union membership by payment of the periodic dues, the dues would still have,
to be paid under the requirements of the contract, and the compulsion here,
exerted by the Employer was for the payment of dues rather than for main-
tenance of membership in general. It might be argued that if an employee
chose to pay dues but not join the Union, the union bylaws would not be binding
upon him and therefore the Employer could not have deprived him of seniority
pursuant to such a bylaw. I am not considering what justification the employer
might or might not have independently of the Act. As the contract here reads I
find that the Employer had as little justification for depriving Rhodus of his
seniority as if there had been no union bylaw providing therefore. But this
lack of justification does not mean that an unfair labor practice has been com-
initted Unless the Employer's conduct is such as to encourage or discourage
membei ship in a labor organization, the Employer has not violated Section 8
(a) (3). Encouragement or discouragement can operate to influence only a free
choice. None existed here for employees required by the collective bargaining
contract to pay dues to the Union. It is not enough to invoke the processes of the,
Board that an employee has been wronged. That wrong must be unfair labor
practice I find none here on the part of the Employer. A fortiori, if the
Employer's conduct would not be a violation of Section 8 (a) (3), the Union
could not have caused or attempted to cause the Employer to violate Section
8 (a) (3). Therefore the Union has not violated Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
Likewise, in view of the union-shop provisions of the collective bargaining con-
tract, the Union's conduct here was not a violation of 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
The only right guaranteed by Section 7 in respect to which the Union may be
said to have coerced Rhodus was the right-to refrain from being a member or
paying dues to the Union, and this right was effectively and lawfully waived
by the union-shop provisions of the contract; so the coercion here is not a
coercion in respect to an existing right No evidence was offered of any inde-
pendent violation by the Employer of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act and I find
none
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I
make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, has not violated'
Section 8 (a) (1) or (8) (a) (3) of the Act by depriving E. Carl Rhodus of his
seniority, or by subsequently transferring him to inferior and less desirable work,
or by thereafter laying him off
2. The Respondent, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Over-the-Road and City Transfer
Drivers, Helpers, Dockmen and Warehousemen, Local Union No. 41, A. F. L., has
not violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) or 8 (b) (2) of the Act by coercing Rhodus in.
the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act or by causing the Em-
ployer to deprive Rhodus of his seniority as alleged in the complaint.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume