Fannie MaeDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 2, 20212020004871 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/179,012 02/12/2014 Weifeng Wu 880417-0133-US00 7615 134795 7590 03/02/2021 MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP (DC) 790 N WATER ST SUITE 2500 MILWAUKEE, WI 53202 EXAMINER YOUNG, MICHAEL C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3689 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): DCipdocket@michaelbest.com nbenjamin@michaelbest.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte WEIFENG WU, ZACHARY DAWSON, FOTIS GAVRIIL, ERIC ROSENBLATT, and JOHN TREADWELL ____________ Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, AMEE A. SHAH, and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–11, 14, 15, and 17–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM. THE INVENTION Appellant claims a method for computer modeling for real estate comparables selection. (Spec. ¶ 2). Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal. Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 2 1. A method for automatically identifying comparable properties, the method comprising: accessing, by a computing device, property data corresponding to a geographical area; identifying a subject property having a location and property characteristics; accessing, by the computing device, initial filter settings including an initial geographic filter setting and initial property characteristic filter settings, the initial geographic filter setting defining an initial geographic area covering the location of the subject property, the initial property characteristic filter settings being configured to identify properties that most closely match the subject property based upon similarity to the property characteristics of the subject property, wherein the initial property characteristics filter settings comprise respective value ranges for each of the property characteristics; iteratively relaxing, by the computing device, individual settings for respective ones of the property characteristic filter settings from the initial filter settings until either the number of comparable properties meets a predetermined threshold or all of the property characteristic filter settings are at a predetermined most relaxed setting; expanding the geographic filter setting to provide a revised geographic area that is larger than the initial geographic area and resetting the property characteristic filter settings to their initial filter settings when said iteratively relaxing the individual settings for the property characteristic filter settings does not result in the number of comparable properties meeting the predetermined threshold; repeating said iteratively relaxing the individual settings for the property characteristic filter settings after at least a first instance of said expanding of the geographic filter setting until the number of comparable properties meets the predetermined threshold, to arrive at a resolved set of comparable properties; once the updated number of comparable properties meets the predetermined threshold, weighting the resolved set of Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 3 comparable properties based upon the appropriateness of each of the resolved set of comparable properties as comparables for the subject property, the weighting being based upon one or more of the economic distance from the subject property, geographic distance from the subject property, and age of transaction; and updating and displaying a map image corresponding to the resolved set of comparable properties, the map image displaying locations of at least some of the resolved set of comparable properties and corresponding property grid data for the displayed comparable properties. THE REJECTION Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–11, 14, 15, and 17–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–11, 14, 15, and 17–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Spieckerman (US 2014/0164260 A1, pub. June 12, 2014), Robbins (US 2001/0039506 A1, pub. Nov. 8, 2001) Dupray (US 2010/0063829 A1, pub. Mar. 11, 2010), Foretich (US 2003/0191723 A1, pub. Oct. 9, 2003). ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We will sustain the rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–11, 14, 15, and 17–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. . . . If so, . . . then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” . . . To answer that question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 4 ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent- eligible application. . . . [The Court] described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-218 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)) (citations omitted). To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. In so doing we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 FR 50, 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019). The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to comparable property selection system and method. The Examiner determines that the method claimed is a certain method of organizing human activity specifically legal interaction such as agreements in the form of contracts. Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 5 (Final Act. 3–4). The Examiner finds that the instant application fails to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because the instant application merely recites words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception or merely includes instructions to implement the identified method of organizing human activity of commercial and legal interactions such as advertising and marketing by generically claimed computer structure. (Final Act. 6). The Specification discloses that it is generally known to use computer modeling for real estate comparables selection. However, sometimes a subject property still presents significant difficulties to comparables selection that current comparable sales models do not overcome. (Spec. ¶ 2). The instant invention is a comparable selection system and method that employs dynamic gating in selection of comparable properties. The claimed method and system loosens and tightens property search filters iteratively to expand and shrink the size of the local geographic and economic market to locate comparables that have property characteristics that most closely reflect the real estate market considerations a buyer would evaluate in a heterogeneous market. As such, the Specification discloses that the instant invention relates to a method for valuing real estate property which relates to sale of real estate. Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites “accessing. . . property data,” “identifying a subject property having a location and property characteristics,” “accessing. . . initial filter settings including an initial geographic filter setting and initial property characteristic filter settings,” “iteratively relaxing. . . individual settings for respective ones of the property characteristic filter settings. . .,” “expanding the geographic filter Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 6 setting. . . ,” “repeating said iteratively relaxing the individual settings for the property characteristic filter settings . . .” and “updating and displaying a map image corresponding to the resolved set of comparable properties.” Therefore, the recitations in claim 1 also support the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is directed to a comparable property selection system and method. We thus agree with the Examiner’s findings that the claims are directed to controlling the behavior of persons concerning the valuation of real estate by using comparables. It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), in particular, that the claims at issue here recite a judicial exception. Controlling the behavior of persons concerning exercising judgment in assigning monetary value to properties is a method of organizing human behavior, which is not eligible subject matter. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–56 Also, we find the steps of accessing property data, identifying a subject property having a location and property characteristics, accessing filter settings, iteratively relaxing individual settings, expanding filter settings are all data gathering and data analysis steps that constitute “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to certain arrangements involving contractual relations are directed to abstract ideas); Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 F. Appx. 950, 954–56 (Fed Cir. 2018) (claims directed to “a method of searching for real estate using a Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 7 computer” were directed to an abstract idea). . Thus, we find that claim 1 recites the judicial exceptions of a method of organizing human activity and in the alternative a mental process. Turning to the second prong of the “directed to test,” claim 1 requires a “computing device.” The recitation of a computing device does not impose “a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke any inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 8 In this regard, the recitation does not effect an improvement in the functioning of the computing device, does not recite a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claims, and does not transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing. Id. Thus, claim 1 is directed to judicial exceptions that are not integrated into a practical application and thus to “abstract ideas.” Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas, claim 1 must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)). The introduction of a computing device into the claims does not alter the analysis at Alice step two. [T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 9 Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Instead, “the relevant question is whether claim 1 here does more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract ideas . . . on a generic computer.” Id. at 225. It does not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computing device at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the trading industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Considered as an ordered combination, the computing device of Appellant’s claim 1 adds nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis- access/display is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 10 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computing device itself. As we stated above, claim 1 does not effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification discloses that the computing device may be any conventional computing device. (See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 58). Thus, claim 1 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the recited abstract ideas of information access using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent- eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 13–26; Reply Br. 3–10) Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of emphasis, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same. We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 recites a practical application because the claimed features provide a technical solution to improve upon the automated Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 11 determination of a suitable composed pools of comparable properties and then to render map images with corresponding results. (Appeal Br. 12). We agree with the Examiner that the steps of the claims consist primarily of the abstract ideas and leave only the computing device as an element that is considered in a determination of whether the claims recites a practical application of the abstract ideas recited. We also agree with the Examiner’s response to this argument found on pages 20–21 of the Answer and adopt same as our own. Specifically, we agree that the improvements touted by Appellant related to the determination of suitable composed pools of comparable properties and rendering a map are not in a technical field or technology used but in the identification of comparable properties which is the abstract idea itself. It appears that Appellant conflates the conventionality of the steps being performed by a processor and the conventionality of the computer functions required to implement the steps. We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by Appellant’s argument that the claims are not directed to a method of organizing human activity such as commercial or legal interactions such as marketing and advertising because claim 1 recites a very detailed and specific computer implemented technology not merely something as general as marketing and advertising. This argument demonstrates that Appellant characterizes what the claimed subject matter is directed to at a level of abstraction different than what the Examiner has characterized it to be directed to. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”). The claimed abstract idea could be described as the Examiner has done or in a more detailed way as the Appellant has done. It could be Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 12 described in other ways as well. But its abstract nature remains the same regardless of the level of abstraction used to describe the invention. In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the rejection as it is directed to claim 1. We will also sustain the rejection as it is directed to the remaining claims because Appellant has not argued the separate eligibility of the remaining claims. REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103 As an initial matter, we agree with the Examiner’s findings of fact regarding the teachings of the prior art found on pages 10–23 of the Final Action and the response to Appellant’s arguments found on pages 4–6 of the Answer and adopt same as our own. We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by Appellant’s argument that are directed to the individual teachings of the prior art such as the arguments that (1) Spieckerman never suggest relaxing property characteristic settings in order to expand the potential pool of comparable properties or (2) resetting the property characteristic filter settings to their initial filter setting and (3) Robbins does not disclose the iteractive process recited in claim 1. (Appeal Br. 6–8). Such arguments are not convincing because attacking the references individually is unpersuasive. The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art; one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097–98 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). In this regard, the Examiner relies on Robbins for teaching filtering properties based on Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 13 property characteristics, the Examiner relies on Dupray for teaching resetting property characteristic filter settings to their initial filter setting, and the Examiner relies on Spiekerman for teaching the iterative process. Appellant has not addressed the combined teachings of the references. In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. §103. We will also sustain the rejection as it is directed to the remaining claims because Appellant does not argue the separate patentability of these claims. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–11, 14, 15, and 17–20 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 101. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–11, 14, 15, and 17–20 is affirmed. Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 5, 6, 8-11, 14, 15, 17-20 101 Eligibility 1, 2, 5, 6, 8-11, 14, 15, 17-20 1, 2, 5, 6, 8-11, 14, 15, 17-20 103 Spieckerman, Robbins, Dupray, Foretich 1, 2, 5, 6, 8-11, 14, 15, 17-20 Overall Outcome 1, 2, 5, 6, 8-11, 14, 15, 17-20 Appeal 2020-004871 Application 14/179,012 14 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation