FAINOR, Judith A. et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 4, 20202018008054 (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/036,716 09/25/2013 Judith A. FAINOR 16-30095-US 6866 98804 7590 05/04/2020 Reed Smith LLP P.O. Box 488 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 EXAMINER SCHEUNEMANN, RICHARD N ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3624 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/04/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): gdonovan@reedsmith.com ptoipinbox@reedsmith.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JUDITH A. FAINOR, DINA LARESCH, and DAVID J. HARTMANN ____________ Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,7161 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–34. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sparta Systems, Inc. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 2 THE INVENTION Appellant states the claims relate to “methods, systems, and computer-readable media storing instructions for bi-directional quality management systems.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A computer-implemented method for electronic networkbased quality management, the method comprising: receiving, over an electronic network, a first electronic communication from a first party computer system, the first electronic communication including an indication of a current state or current activity of a custom quality management workflow executing on the first party computer system, wherein the custom quality management workflow includes a plurality of custom states and a plurality of custom activities; advancing a standard quality management workflow executing on a second party computer system from a first state or activity to a second state or activity based at least in part on the first electronic communication, wherein the standard quality management workflow includes a plurality of standard states and a plurality of standard activities which are incompatible with the custom quality management workflow; determining a state or activity of the custom quality management workflow corresponding to the current state or current activity of the standard quality management workflow based on a map between the standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management workflow, wherein the map comprises mapping data representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality management workflow; advancing the custom quality management workflow to the determined state or activity; and Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 3 sending, over the electronic network, a second electronic communication to the first party computer system, the second electronic communication including information associated with the determined state or activity of the custom quality management workflow. Appeal Br. 40 (Claims App.). THE REJECTION The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Waldorf US 2002/0038228 A1 Mar. 28, 2002 Saran US 2003/0055668 A1 Mar. 20, 2003 Greenstein US 2009/0012832 A1 Jan. 8, 2009 Guller US 2009/0299784 A1 Dec. 3, 2009 Sears US 2013/0013454 A1 Jan. 10, 2013 The following rejections are before us for review.2 Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 1, 2, 4, 22–25, and 30, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Waldolf. Claims 5 and 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Sears and Guller. Claims 6 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Sears and Saran. 2 The following rejections have been withdrawn by the Examiner (Answer 4–5): Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–24 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph. Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–34 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph. Claims 31 and 34 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) for being anticipated by Greenstein. Claim 32 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Waldorf. Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 4 Claims 7, 21, 28, and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Sears. FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 5–6 in the Final Office Action3 and on pages 5–8 in the Examiner’s Answer, concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We will affirm the rejection of claims 1–2, 4–7, and 21–34 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 21 as a group. (Appeal Br. 19). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and so the remaining claims including the dependent claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo 3 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action mailed on July 3, 2017. Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 5 and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 6 protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency 4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 7 management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. 5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54– 55. Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 8 Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). The Specification states: A medical device producer can use an on-premises EQMS [(Enterprise Quality Management Systems)] to keep track of the manufacture of a particular medical device. Each step of a process of creating that device may be accompanied by the storage or manipulation of data in the EQMS. This enables auditing, record-keeping, compliance with Federal requirements, storage of relevant documents or data, and the like. Spec. ¶ 2. Separate systems are used to manage the quality of a manufacturer’s suppliers. For example, a supplier may want to inform the manufacturer about a potential defect or problem with an item provided to the manufacturer. This may include sending the manufacturer a document, images, test results, a proposed action plan, or other data. The manufacturer may receive the information about the defect or problem from a variety of different sources - such as email, faxes, or telephone Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 9 calls - and store the information in the appropriate supplier system. These supplier systems also enable the manufacturer to keep track of issue resolution using a different workflow, but at the expense of reconciling information between the EQMS systems and the supplier systems. Properly tracking issue resolution requires manual exchange of information between EQMS systems and supplier systems. This is time-consuming, cumbersome, and hinders audit processes. Spec. ¶ 4. The preamble states claim 1 is for network–based quality management. Claim 1 recites in pertinent part, . . . receiving, . . . a first . . . communication from a first party . . . , the first . . . communication including an indication of a current state or current activity of a custom quality management workflow . . . , wherein the custom quality management workflow includes a plurality of custom states and a plurality of custom activities; advancing a standard quality management workflow . . . from a first state or activity to a second state or activity based at least in part on the first . . . communication, wherein the standard quality management workflow includes a plurality of standard states and a plurality of standard activities which are incompatible with the custom quality management workflow; determining a state or activity of the custom quality management workflow corresponding to the current state or current activity of the standard quality management workflow based on a map between the standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management workflow, wherein the map comprises mapping data representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality management workflow; advancing the custom quality management workflow to the determined state or activity; and sending, . . . a second . . . communication to the first party . . . , the second electronic communication including information associated with the determined state or activity of the custom quality management workflow. Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 10 The Examiner found that claim 1 is directed to “determining a state or activity of a workflow based on a map,” and, as such, “an idea of itself.” (Final Act. 5). All this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a state or activity of a custom quality management workflow corresponding to the current state or current activity of a standard quality management workflow based on a map between the standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management workflow which is an idea itself. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination. Claim terms such as, “mapping data representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality management workflow,” “the custom quality management workflow includes a plurality of custom states and a plurality of custom activities,” and “the standard quality management workflow includes a plurality of standard states and a plurality of standard activities which are incompatible with the custom quality management workflow,” are ideas as such. That is, the data defining standard/custom states and standard/custom activity is information, and as such, is an intangible. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Also, the step of mapping data is a thought process involving determinations. See e.g., Spec. ¶ 70. Collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying results from certain results of the collection and analysis are abstract ideas. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC, 830 F.3d 1350. Concepts Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 11 performed in the human mind are mental processes because the steps of receiving, transmitting, storing, and analyzing data mimic human thought processes of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only generically requires “an electronic network,” “a first party computer system,” and “a second party computer system.” These components are described in the specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 26, 31, 45, 46 and Figs. 1, 2. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). Thus, we find that claim 1 recites the judicial exception of an idea as Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 12 such that is not integrated into a practical application. That the claim does not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to quality management workflow, does not make it any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claim must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72–73). Concerning this step the Examiner found the following: The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the claims do not recite an improvement to another technology or technical field, nor do they recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself. The claims require no more than a generic computer (a computer implemented method using a data processing system in claim 1) to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry. The use of a computer to manipulate data and report the result is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Final Act. 6. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 13 Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to receive, execute, determine, advance, send, and apply decision criteria to data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval— one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC., 830 F.3d 1354; see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the claim does not affect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 26, 31, 45, 46, and Figs. 1, 2). Thus, claim 1 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (receive, Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 14 execute, determine, advance, send, and apply decision criteria to data) and storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant have submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 14–23, Reply Br. 1–7). We find that our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same. Appellant argues: “As shown above, the Examiner points to a single limitation in independent claim 1 when analyzing whether the claim is directed to an abstract idea. This is clearly improper and abdicates the Examiner's responsibility to consider the claim ‘as a whole.’” (Appeal Br. 16). We disagree with Appellant because first, an abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Second, although we agree with Appellant that the claims must be read, as a whole (Appeal Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 15 Br. 16–18), we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 1 is directed to the idea of a state or activity of a custom quality management workflow corresponding to the current state or current activity of a standard quality management workflow based on a map between the standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management workflow for the reasons specified above with respect to our “directed to” findings. As found supra, claim 1 only includes the following generically recited device limitations: “an electronic network,” “a first party computer system,” and “a second party computer system.” What remains in the claim after disregarding these device limitations are abstractions, i.e., “mapping data representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality management workflow,” “the custom quality management workflow includes a plurality of custom states and a plurality of custom activities,” and “the standard quality management workflow includes a plurality of standard states and a plurality of standard activities which are incompatible with the custom quality management workflow.” “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90). Appellant next argues, the problem with prior art systems is that a response communication transmitted over a network from a second party computer system to a first party computer system that is executing a different workflow than the second party computer system will not interpretable by the workflow executing on the first party computer system. See, e.g., Application, ¶¶ 3–4. The claims of the present application solve this problem by Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 16 essentially . . . executing on the first party computer system and then sending a response to the first party that is based on the determined state of that emulated workflow. This is accomplished by maintaining a copy of both the standard and custom workflows. See, e.g., Application, ¶ 41 (‘Workflow module 205A may also maintain a customer workflow in addition to the standard workflow explained above’). (Appeal Br. 20). We disagree with Appellant. The concept of “emulating” is an abstraction because it is a form of imitation which is mental perception, and practice of maintaining a copy is a form of remembering which itself is a mental process. In other words, the asserted improvement is, at best, an improvement to the abstract idea. But “[n]o matter how much of an advance in the . . . field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Even taking the copy as a hard copy, it is well settled that storing data mimics human thought processes, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 611. Also, in light of the breadth of the claim, the Appellant’s argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection. Nowhere in claim 1 is the word “emulating” recited. Appellant’s claim 1 simply recites, “determining a state or activity of the custom quality management workflow corresponding to the current state or current activity of the standard quality management workflow based on a map between the standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management workflow.” (Appeal Br. 40). Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 17 It is not apparent and Appellant does not show how mapping between the standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management workflow equates to “emulating.” Likewise unpersuasive are Appellant’s analogies of the appealed claims to those in Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Appeal Br. 21, 23). In Amdocs, the court adopted the district court’s interpretation of the claim term “enhance,” stating, it approved “reading the ‘in a distributed fashion’ and the ‘close to the source’ of network information requirements into the term ‘enhance.’” Id. at 1300. The court then went on to find the claim’s “enhancing” limitation necessarily required that the generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. Id. at 1300–1301. In this way, the claims of Amdocs are inconsistent with those before us on appeal here in that in the latter, there are no specific technologic modifications required to solve a problem or improve the functioning of a known system generally to produce patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., DDR Holdings., 773 F.3d 1245 ; McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant contends its use of “a map between a standard workflow and the custom workflow and a current state of the standard workflow,” constitutes “an unconventional technological solution,” (Appeal Br. 21), but fails to show how mapping data is unconventional in the technincal field. We further fail to see the similarities asserted by Appellant (Appeal Br. 23–25) between the claims on appeal here and those adjudicated in DDR Holdings. (Appeal Br. 21–22). In DDR Holdings, the court evaluated the Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 18 eligibility of claims “address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d. at 1257. There, the court found that the claims were patent eligible because they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. In contrast, Appellant seeks equivalents between a generically recited “mapping data structure” and the transformative hyperlink in DDR Holdings. (App. Br. 21–22). Unlike the hyperlink claimed in DDR, which performed a system function in the claim, “mapping data” does not cause a system function to occur in a particular way in the claim. Moreover, here, the limitations do not recite implementation details. Instead, they recite functional results to be achieved. In other words, claim 1 does not recite “a particular way of programming or designing the software . . . , but instead merely the abstract concept of “determin[e] a state or activity of the custom quality management workflow.” Accordingly, we disagree with Appellant that the generically recited claim term “mapping data structure” is the equivalent of the transformative hyperlink in DDR Holdings accordingly. Appellant argues, the claims recite features which reconcile the execution of incompatible workflows executing on disparate computing systems that must communicate with each other over a network in order to advance each of their respective workflows. These features constitute an improvement to computer technology and are ‘significantly more’ than merely determining a state or activity of a workflow based on a map. Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 19 (Appeal Br. 23). We disagree with Appellant because as found above, reconciling the execution of incompatible workflows is an abstraction and “[i]t has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech. LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now- superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility- related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”))). Accordingly, we will sustain the rejection of claim 1, and thus also of claims 2, 4–7, and 21–34, under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION Each of independent claims 1 and 23 recites in pertinent part, determining a state or activity of the custom quality management workflow corresponding to the current state or current activity of the standard quality management workflow based on a map between the standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management workflow, wherein the map comprises mapping data representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality management workflow. The Examiner found concerning this limitation, that Greenstein at paragraph 472 discloses this limitation reasoning, “service element Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 20 localization assumes that for each component used in one geography, its equivalents in all other geographies are known. A component translation table can be built for composition and replacement of components using the translation tablet.” (Final Act. 13). Appellant argues, the Examiner’s mapping appears to equate the recited ‘map’ with the disclosure of a component mapping table in Greenstein. However, Greenstein discloses that the component mapping table maps components between different geographies, whereas the claim recites that ‘the map comprises mapping data representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality managementworkflow.’ See Greenstein at ¶ 472. There is no disclosure in this or any other section of Green[stein] of a map between states and activities of incompatible workflows. (Appeal Br. 34). We agree with Appellant. Our review of Greenstein indicates that the disclosed translation table holds raw data which comprises: “projected sales volumes, sales time period, required minimum profit margin, target maximum price, and/or target relative availability date.” Greenstein ¶ 454. The claimed subject matter on the other hand requires state or activity of the custom quality management workflow data. As such, the content of the mapping data in the claims on appeal is functional in that it must function to show “correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality management workflow.” In contrast, Greenstein at paragraph 472 discloses in its geographic equivalents table, raw data set forth above, which is not functional in the sense that the data Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 21 itself does not reflect correspondence between two difference states, i.e., a standard state and a custom state. Thus, the differnce in data charaterisitics between that found in the Greenstein table and that of the claimed map is determinative. The Examiner does not explain and it is not apparent how this difference is taught under 35 U.S.C. § 103 analysis. Accordingly, we will not sustain the rejection of in claims 1 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The rejection of the dependent claims based on references in addition to Greenstein and Waldorf does not remedy the noted sortfalls of Greenstein. Since claims 2, 4–7, 21, 22, and 24–30 depend from one of claims 1 and 23, and since we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 23, the rejection of the dependent claims likewise cannot be sustained. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–2, 4–7, and 21–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We conclude the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21– 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–2, 4–7, 21–30 101 Eligibility 1–2, 4–7, 21–34 1, 2, 4–7, 21–30 103 Waldorf, Greenstein, Guller, Sears, Saran 1, 2, 4–7, 21–30 Overall Outcome 1–2, 4–7, 21–34 Appeal 2018-008054 Application 14/036,716 22 DECISION Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation