Ex Parte Zhang et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 15, 201412391862 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 15, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/391,862 02/24/2009 YILU ZHANG P000136-RD-MJL 7793 65798 7590 09/16/2014 MILLER IP GROUP, PLC GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION 42690 WOODWARD AVENUE SUITE 300 BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48304 EXAMINER FABULA, MICHAEL A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3645 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/16/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte YILU ZHANG, MARK J. RYCHLINSKI, NATHAN D. AMPUNAN, YUEN-KWOK CHIN, KRISHNARAJ INBARAJAN, MUTASIM A. SALMAN, PAUL W. LOEWER, MARK E. GILBERT, and SHIRLEY B. DOST ____________________ Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, EDWARD A. BROWN, and MICHAEL L. WOODS, Administrative Patent Judges. WOODS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Yilu Zhang et al. (“Appellantsâ€) seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1–12, 15–17, 20, and 21. Appeal Br. 3 and Claims App. Claims 13, 14, 18, and 19 have been cancelled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The Appellants’ invention is directed to a system and method for monitoring the state of health of vehicle components. Spec. 1, para. 1. Independent claims 1 and 10 are illustrative and are reproduced below with emphasis on the contested claim limitations. 1. A method for collecting and storing data concerning vehicle parts, said method comprising: collecting data relating to the vehicle parts on a vehicle; collecting data relating to the vehicle parts at a remote data center; running state of health algorithms on the collected data to provide state of health analysis of the vehicle parts both on the vehicle and at the remote data center; storing information about the vehicle parts and their state of health at the remote data center; and using the stored information to accept or reject warranty claims about the vehicle parts. 10. A method for collecting and storing data concerning vehicle parts, said method comprising: collecting data relating to the vehicle parts on a vehicle; running state of health algorithms on the collected data on the vehicle; telematically broadcasting the collected data and a state of health analysis of the vehicle parts; receiving and storing the collected data and the state of health analysis information at a remote data center; running state of health algorithms on the data received at the remote data center; and providing the information stored at the remote data center to a customer, a dealership or an OEM, wherein the OEM uses the information for warranty screening purposes so as to determine whether to accept or reject a part replacement. Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 3 THE REJECTIONS The Examiner has rejected (see Answer 4–11): (i) claims 1–12, 15–17, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huber (US 2008/0021605 A1, published Jan. 24, 2008); (ii) claims 1, 2, 10, 15, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chou (US 6,330,499 B1, issued Dec. 11, 2001); and (iii) claim 10 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting over claim 1 of the ’550 Patent (US 7,480,550 B2, issued Jan. 20, 2009). ANALYSIS Claims 1–12, 15–17, 20, and 21 as Unpatentable Over Huber Claims 1, 7–10, and 15 The Appellants have not presented arguments for the patentability of claims 7–10 and 15 apart from claim 1. See Appeal Br. 8–15. Therefore, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011), we select claim 1 as the representative claim to decide the appeal of the rejection of these claims, with claims 7–10 and 15 standing or falling with claim 1. The Examiner found that Huber discloses, inter alia, accessing vehicle data using a telematics unit of a vehicle and that vehicle data is information that includes vehicle component information. See Answer 4 (citing Huber, paras. 5 and 21). The Examiner also takes official notice “that it is well known in the art that the term, ‘vehicle component’ is synonymous with [the claimed term] ‘vehicle part.’†See id. The Examiner further determined that Huber et al. furthermore disclose vehicle diagnostic and other information obtained from the vehicle as being retrievable for warranty analysis and other evaluations ([0032]) but do not specifically state that this information is used to accept or Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 4 reject warranty claims about the vehicle parts. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made that since the invention of Huber et al. both provides vehicle diagnostic results, as well as, vehicle maintenance information and owner account information to the dealership and OEM, that it is inherently capable of evaluating a customer's warranty claims. Id. at 5 (citing Huber, para. 32) (emphasis added). The Appellants contend that “Huber does not inherently, i.e., necessarily, teach a method that includes collecting and storing data concerning vehicle parts, where the stored information is used to accept or reject warranty claims about the vehicle parts.†Appeal Br. 10–11. In response to the Appellants’ inherency argument, the Examiner explains that the rejection “was not drawn to the reference of Huber inherently teaching ‘a method of warranty evaluations.’†See Answer 12. The Examiner further explains that [t]he rejection was made under 35 U.S.C. 103 as a prima facie case of obviousness, wherein, the teachings from the prior art of Huber were shown to be enabling of the claimed subject matter of collecting and storing vehicle parts data and running state of health algorithms for the obvious and optional purpose of warranty evaluations. Id. at 12–13. The Examiner’s further explanation of the rejection confirms that “the Appellant has misinterpreted the [obviousness rejection],†and that the “Examiner was presenting a prima facie case of obviousness [and] not an argument of inherency†for the relevant claim limitation “using the stored information to accept or reject warranty claims about the vehicle parts.†Id. at 14; see also id. at 11–14 and Final Action, pp. 2–3. Accordingly, the Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 5 Appellants’ arguments concerning inherency are not germane to the rejection made by the Examiner. The Appellants also argue that “the Examiner is utilizing impermissible hindsight in rejecting the independent claims [and that] the Examiner has not identified ‘[a] reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field to combine the elements in a way the claimed new invention does.’†Appeal Br. 11–12 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). In response to the Appellants’ argument, the Examiner explains that Huber discloses, “servicing of vehicles for maintenance or to address diagnostic issues, for which the dealer can schedule service and provide pricing information to the customer.†Answer 15 (citing Huber, para. 49). The Examiner further finds that “[i]t is well known in the art that the dealership will check to see if a vehicle or vehicle part is under warranty in order to provide pricing information to the customer requesting servicing.†Id. The Examiner then reasons that “[t]herefore, it would have been obvious to provide the collected and stored vehicle part data which had state of health algorithms run on it to the dealership or OEM for warranty screening purposes, so as, to provide the customer with the correct pricing information for servicing.†Id. Notably, the Appellants do not challenge the Examiner’s finding or identify any flaw in the Examiner’s reasoning, which articulates an apparent reason why it would have been obvious to use Huber’s vehicle diagnostic results, vehicle maintenance information, and owner account information to accept or reject warranty claims as part of its warranty analysis. See id. at Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 6 12; see also Huber, para. 32. Therefore, we do not find that the Examiner used impermissible hindsight. For these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the rejection of claim 1 and sustain the rejection, as well as the rejection to claims 7–10 and 15, which fall with claim 1, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huber. Claims 2, 20, and 21 Claim 2 recites, “wherein the state of health analysis of the vehicle parts is performed both on the vehicle and at the remote data center to determine if problems that are detected can be resolved without requiring a vehicle owner to take the vehicle to a dealership.†Appeal Br., Claims App. Claims 20 and 21, which depend from independent claims 10 and 15, respectively, recite similar language. See id. In supporting this rejection, the Examiner found that Huber discloses, “a diagnostic result being further defined as either specific or general information, wherein the general diagnostic indicates whether some action is required by the vehicle operator and the importance or severity of the vehicle condition.†Answer 5 (citing Huber, para. 21). The Examiner also determined that “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art that knowing both the importance/severity of a vehicle part condition and whether action is required would allow an operator to determine if it is necessary to take the vehicle to a dealership for servicing.†Id. In the Reply Brief, the Appellants argue that While paragraph [0021] of Huber discloses diagnostic results as a graphical indicator, Appellant maintains that paragraph [0021] of Huber does not teach that the state of health analysis of vehicle parts is performed both on the vehicle Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 7 and at a remote data center to determine if problems that are detected can be resolved without requiring a vehicle owner to take the vehicle to a dealership. Reply Br. 2 (italicized emphasis added). We agree with the Appellants and find nothing in paragraph 21 of Huber that would have rendered obvious the step of determining “if problems that are detected can be resolved without requiring a vehicle owner to take the vehicle to a dealership,†as recited in claim 2. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the Examiner’s reasoning to support this rejection. The indication of whether the severity or importance of vehicle condition is such that action/resolution is required does not address the claim limitation of determining if detected problems can be resolved without requiring the vehicle to be taken to a dealership. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 2, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Huber. Claim 3 Claim 3 recites, “wherein the stored information at the remote data center is made available to a vehicle owner.†Appeal Br., Claims App. In rejecting this claim, the Examiner found that Huber teaches, “a user configurable website to request email notification messages be sent to the user/vehicle owner thereby providing them access to stored information at a single remote database.†Answer 17 (citing Huber, paras. 24–31). In response, the Appellants argue that “[because r]eceiving an email is different from accessing information at a data center . . . claim 3 is clearly not obvious.†Appeal Br. 14. As explained supra, we are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that “[r]eceiving an email is different from accessing information Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 8 at a data center†and instead agree with the Examiner’s finding that Huber’s email notifications, which include “dynamic vehicle information from the vehicle data upload system,†meet the limitation of claim 3. See Answer 17; see also Appeal Br., Claims App. (emphasis added). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Huber. Claims 4, 11, and 16 The Appellants have not presented separate arguments for the patentability of claims 11 and 16 apart from claim 4. See Appeal Br. 14. Therefore, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011), we select claim 4 as the representative claim to decide the appeal of the rejection of these claims, with claims 11 and 16 standing or falling with claim 4. Claim 4 recites, “wherein the vehicle owner can request information about a vehicle part from the remote data center.†Appeal Br., Claims App. The Examiner found that “[s]ince Huber teaches the vehicle owner requesting information including the state of health of specific components (DTCs [or diagnostic trouble codes])†that the limitation of claims 4, 11, and 16 is met. Answer 18. The Appellants contend that “[a]lthough the vehicle owner in Huber may receive email notifications, . . . receiving email notifications is different from having the opportunity to request information generally, and more specifically is different from having the opportunity to request information about a specific vehicle part.†Appeal Br. 14. We are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument and agree with the Examiner’s finding that Huber’s disclosure of e-mailing vehicle information—including vehicle diagnostic trouble codes—to vehicle owners Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 9 meets the limitations of these claims. See Answer 17–18. Before receiving the e-mail notifications, the vehicle owner first “enrolls†in the notification service. See, e.g., Huber, paras. 15–17, 24, 45, 54, 56, 57, and 59; see also Huber, Figs. 3–5. By choosing to enroll in the service for receiving e-mail notifications pertaining to vehicle information—including vehicle diagnostic trouble codes—the vehicle owner requests “information about a vehicle part from the remote data center,†as recited in claim 4. For these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the rejection of claim 4 and sustain the rejection, as well as the rejection to claims 11 and 16, which fall with claim 4, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huber. Claims 5, 6, 12, and 17 The Appellants have not presented separate arguments for the patentability of claims 12 and 17 apart from claim 5. See Appeal Br. 14–15. Therefore, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011), we select claim 5 as the representative claim to decide the appeal of the rejection of these claims, with claims 12 and 17 standing or falling with claim 5. Claim 5 recites, “performing remote maintenance service on the vehicle part based on a customer’s request.†Appeal Br., Claims App. Claim 6 depends from claim 5 and further recites, “wherein the remote maintenance service remotely starts the vehicle to charge the battery.†Id. The Examiner found that “Huber discloses that it is well known in the art that ‘roadside assistance’ can be provided remotely via wireless telecommunication with the vehicle through existing cellular network facilities and that a phone call from the vehicle operator . . . can be used to electronically unlock vehicle doors.†Answer 18 (citing Huber, para. 3). Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 10 The Examiner further found that “Huber teaches a telematics unit connected to one or more vehicle system modules [VSMs] wherein the ‘telematics unit includes the vehicle’s wireless communication module and this unit provides communication and interactivity with the driver and with various remote locations . . . [and that] one VSM can be used for controlling engine operation.’†Id. at 18–19 (citing Huber, para. 33) (emphasis added). The Examiner determined that “it would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art that Huber teaches a system capable of remotely servicing a vehicle part at the vehicle owner’s request, including remote starting to charge the battery.†Id. at 19. The teachings of Huber relied upon by the Examiner provide more than ample support for the Examiner’s determination that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that Huber’s system is capable of remotely servicing a vehicle at the owner’s request, and, further, render obvious the performance of such servicing. With respect to claim 6, the Appellants contend that “Huber does not teach performing remote maintenance on a vehicle part based on a customer’s request [and that] nothing in Huber discloses remote maintenance service that remotely starts the vehicle to charge a battery.†Appeal Br. 15. This argument is not persuasive, because the Examiner did not find that Huber teaches remotely starting the vehicle to charge a battery. See Answer 18–19. Rather, the Examiner determined that such servicing would have been obvious in view of Huber’s teaching that a VSM can be used for controlling engine operation. Id. For these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the rejection of claims 5 and 6 and we sustain the rejection of these claims, as well as claims Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 11 12 and 17, which fall with claim 5, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huber. Claims 1, 2, 10, 15, 20, and 21 as Unpatentable over Chou Claims 1, 10, and 15 The Appellants have not presented arguments for the patentability of claims 10 and 15 apart from claim 1. See Appeal Br. 15–19. Therefore, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011), we select claim 1 as the representative claim to decide the appeal of the rejection of these claims, with claims 10 and 15 standing or falling with claim 1. In rejecting these claims, the Examiner found that Chou teaches, inter alia, “a method of extracting information provided by a vehicle’s internal monitoring systems and transferring the information to a remote service center in order to provide a comparison and analysis of the information,†which is “then provided to the driver of the vehicle.†Answer 7 (citing Chou, col. 1, ll. 33–41.) The Examiner further found that “[w]hile it is clear that Chou et al. intend for the health checkup and diagnostics to be run at the remote data center, they do not explicitly state that the same process can be run on the vehicle.†Id. at 8. The Examiner determined that [I]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, to use the capability of the client computer’s processor to run the state of health algorithms for several well-known reasons. First, it would provide the customer with an immediate vehicle analysis, rather than a timely process that requires data to be sent to the remote data center, analyzed and then reported back to the vehicle. Second, if the customer/owner/driver is at a location where telematic communications are unavailable, a state of health report could not be provided. Finally, while computer processing power limits the ability of the vehicle to run the algorithms, it becomes increasingly more affordable and sizeable for use in individual Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 12 vehicles with time; it would have, therefore, been obvious that the client computer has the capability to run the algorithms on the vehicle. Id. at 8–9. The Appellants contend “that the Examiner is asserting that Chou inherently discloses a method for collecting and storing data concerning vehicle parts that includes using the stored information to accept or reject warranty claims about the vehicle parts.†Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis added). In response to the Appellants’ inherency argument, the Examiner explains that the rejection was based on a prima facie case of obviousness and not an argument of inherency. See Answer 19. We agree with the Examiner that the rejection is not based on inherency. Accordingly, the Appellants’ inherency argument is not probative of any error with respect to this rejection. The Appellants also contend “that the Examiner is utilizing impermissible hindsight in rejecting Appellant’s claimed invention because . . . Chou does not necessarily teach a method for collecting and storing data specifically concerning vehicle parts, where the stored information is used to accept or reject warranty claims about the vehicle parts.†Appeal Br. 18 (first emphasis added). The Appellants further argue that “the Examiner has not identified ‘[a] reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field to combine the elements in a way the claimed new invention does.†Id. at 19. In supporting this rejection, the Examiner finds that Chou’s data repository contains information related to the vehicle, including history, diagnostics, service, failure mode data, and warranty information. Answer 9 (citing Chou, col. 5, ll. 34-39). The Examiner explains that Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 13 Since Chou teaches an analogous invention to Appellant's claimed invention, apart from specifically declaring that the provided vehicle part data and warranty information is used to accept or reject warranty claims, Examiner made a prima facie case of obviousness. Chou provides the vehicle part information to the dealership or OEM which could then be used by the dealership or OEM in this capacity and would therefore be “obviousâ€. The only logical reasoning behind providing the information to the OEM would be for warranty evaluation. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to accept or reject warranty claims using the vehicle data disclosed as supplied with warranty information. Id. at 20. We agree with the Examiner that “[t]he only logical reasoning behind providing the [vehicle part data and warranty] information to the OEM would be for warranty evaluation.†Id. We also agree with the Examiner’s determination that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to accept or reject warranty claims using the vehicle data disclosed as supplied with warranty information.†Id. For these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the rejection of claim 1 and we sustain the rejection of this claim, including claims 10 and 15, which fall with claim 1, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chou. Claims 2, 20, and 21 The Appellants have not presented arguments for the patentability of claims 20 and 21 apart from claim 2. See Appeal Br. 19–20. Therefore, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011), we select claim 2 as the representative claim to decide the appeal of the rejection of these claims, with claims 20 and 21 standing or falling with claim 2. Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 14 As stated supra, claim 2 recites, “wherein the state of health analysis of the vehicle parts is performed both on the vehicle and at the remote data center to determine if problems that are detected can be resolved without requiring a vehicle owner to take the vehicle to a dealership.†Appeal Br., Claims App. The Examiner finds that Chou discloses: [D]iagnostic trouble codes and vehicle information such as health checkups and fault diagnosis are sent to the service center. The user is then able to receive communications such as the severity and description of a problem, and additionally the proper recommended action to take. The actions include “go to a service station immediately†and “contact the service center for further help.†Answer 21 (citing Chou, col. 4, ll. 39–53) (emphasis added). The Examiner explains that “if the vehicle owner was told to contact the service center for further help, the service center would be capable of informing the vehicle owner as to whether or not it is required to bring the vehicle into the dealership based on the information stored on its database.†Id. The Appellants contend that because Chou “merely describe[es] a problem notification system that alerts a driver whether they can make it to a service station such as a dealership, or if they must stop the vehicle immediately,†dependent claims 2, 20, and 21 are “not fairly taught by Chou.†Appeal Br. 20. We are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument and instead agree with the Examiner’s finding that Chou’s disclosure of recommended actions, including “go to a service station immediately†and “contact the service center for further help,†teach the limitations of dependent claims 2, 20, and 21. See Answer 21–22. For example, if in response to a “detected Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 15 problem,†the vehicle’s computer device sends a diagnostic trouble code to the remote service center, thereby causing the vehicle owner to receive a recommended action of “go to a service station immediately,†a determination was made that the detected problem “can be resolved without requiring a vehicle owner to take the vehicle to a dealership,†as recited in claim 2, as the detected problem will instead be resolved at a service station. See Chou, col. 4, ll. 39–53 (emphasis added). For these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the rejection of claim 2 and we sustain the rejection of these claims, including claims 20 and 21, which fall with claim 2, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chou. Claim 10 as Rejected Under Nonstatutory Double Patenting The Examiner rejected claim 10 as an obvious variation of claim 1 of the ’550 Patent. See Answer 10–11. In response to the rejection, the Appellants argue that [T]he Examiner has not properly established, by clear evidence, why each element of claim 10 is an obvious variation of claim 1 of the ’550 Patent. For example, the Examiner has not clearly articulated how the 550’ Patent claims that information stored at the remote data center is used by an OEM for warranty screening purposes so as to determine whether to accept or reject a part placement. Appeal Br. 22 (italicized emphasis added). In response to the Appellants’ argument, the Examiner explains that [C]laim 10 of the Appellants invention states “providing the information stored at the remote data center to a customer, a dealership or an OEM, wherein the OEM uses the information for warranty screening purposes so as to determine whether to accept or reject a part replacement.†Since the Appellant phrases the limitation as an alternative between the customer, a Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 16 dealership or an OEM, the Examiner elected the customer. Therefore, Examiner proposes that it is not necessary to provide evidence that the ’550 Patent claims an OEM accepting or rejecting warranty claims. Answer 22–23 (italicized emphasis added). The Appellants do not identify with any specificity any other limitations not claimed or rendered obvious by claim 1 of the ’550 Patent. We agree with the Examiner’s explanation and find that the Appellants’ argument appears to be based on a claim construction premised on entry of an unentered Amendment. See id.; Appeal Br. 22–23; see also Amendment dated Sept. 26, 2011. In this Amendment, the Appellants sought to amend claim 10 from “a customer, a dealership or an OEM†to “a customer, or a dealership and an OEM.†See id. at 3 and 4. As part of the Appellants’ appeal of this rejection, the Appellants requested the Board to enter the proposed Amendment. Appeal Br. 22–23. In an Advisory Action dated October 3, 2011, the Examiner refused to enter the Amendment, as the Examiner determined that it raised new issues that would require further consideration and/or search. See Adv. Act. dated Oct. 3, 2011. Refusal by the Examiner to enter an amendment is a petitionable matter, not an appealable matter, and is not within the jurisdiction of the Board. See In re Mindick, 371 F.2d 892, 894 (CCPA 1967) (holding that the refusal of an examiner to enter an amendment of claims is reviewable by petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181, and not by appeal to the Board). For the above reasons, we do not review the Examiner’s decision to deny entry of the afore-mentioned Amendment, and we affirm the Appeal 2012-008527 Application 12/391,862 17 Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 under the ground of obviousness-type double patenting as an obvious variation of claim 1 of the ’550 Patent. SUMMARY The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–12, and 15–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huber is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 2, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huber is reversed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 10, 15, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chou is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 10 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting over claim 1 of the ’550 Patent is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED mls Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation