Ex Parte Yamashita et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 16, 2014

11819404 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
______________

Ex parte JUNICHI YAMASHITA
and KATSUHIDE UCHINO
______________

Appeal 2012-004639
Application 11/819,404
Technology Center 2600
______________

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.

KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–81. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to a pixel circuit.
Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A pixel circuit disposed at an intersection of a scanning
line and a signal line, the pixel circuit comprising:
a sampling transistor, which samples a video signal from
the signal line;
a capacitive part, which holds an input voltage that
includes the sampled video signal;
a drive transistor, which receives the input voltage held
by the capacitive part, the drive transistor supplying an output
current; and
a light-emitting element, which receives the output
current supplied by the drive transistor and emits light with a
luminance dependent upon the video signal,
wherein the input voltage held by the capacitive part is
corrected before an emission period to cancel dependence of the
output current on a carrier mobility of the drive transistor.

The Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1–81 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hunter (US 6,356,029 B1, Mar. 12, 2002) in view of Koo
(US 7,180,236 B2, Feb. 20, 2007). Ans. 4–8.
Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-81 as being obvious
because the references fail to teach or suggest the disputed claim limitations?

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ANALYSIS
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner,
we refer to the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed June 7, 2011, the Answer
(“Ans.”) mailed August 31, 2011, and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed
October 28, 2011, for the respective details. We have considered in this
decision only those arguments Appellants actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments that Appellants could have made but chose not to make in
the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
contentions that the Examiner has erred. The Examiner cited Hunter and
Koo for the disputed limitations. Ans. 5–8. The Examiner finds Hunter
discloses all claim elements except for carrier mobility for which Koo is
cited. Ans. 6.
Further, we have reviewed the Examiner’s response to Appellants’
arguments. The Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to each
argument presented by the Appellants on pages 8 through 10 of the Answer.
We have reviewed this response and concur with the Examiner’s findings
and conclusions. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to
Appellants’ Appeal Brief. Ans. 5–10. We have considered Appellants’
Reply Brief but find it unpersuasive to rebut the Examiner’s findings.
We further note that the Examiner has found teachings in the prior art
and has provided a rationale for the combination (see Ans. 6). The Supreme
Court has held that in analyzing the obviousness of combining elements, a
court need not find specific teachings, but rather may consider “the
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background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the
art” and “the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007). To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions,” id. at 417, and the basis for an obviousness rejection must
include “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we find that the Examiner has
provided adequate rationale for the combination, and accordingly, sufficient
motivation for modifying Hunter with the teachings of Koo.
Although some of the claims appear to be addressed separately by
Appellants, the corresponding allegations are in actuality only conclusory
statements that have little probative value. Mere arguments and conclusory
statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little
probative value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Accordingly,
we conclude Appellants have not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–81.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 1–81 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
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