Ex Parte Woods et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 9, 2016

12727998 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
121727,998 03/19/2010 Harold Woods
56436 7590 03/11/2016
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
3404 E. Harmony Road
Mail Stop 79
Fort Collins, CO 80528
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
82261286 4422
EXAMINER
PEREZ-VELEZ, ROCIO DEL MAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2132
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/11/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
hpe.ip.mail@hpe.com
mkraft@hpe.com
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HAROLD WOODS and BRADLEY CUL TER
Appeal2014-004841
Application 12/727 ,998
Technology Center 2100
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, AMBER L. HAGY, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal2014-004841
Application 12/727,998
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8-23. Claims 3, 6, and 7 were canceled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
THE INVENTION
The application is directed to "[ n ]on-disruptive disk ownership change
in a distributed storage system." (Abstract.) Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative:
1. A method for non-disruptive disk ownership change in a dis-
tributed storage system, the distributed storage system having a
first storage controller for managing a first storage pool, and a
second storage controller, the method comprising:
entering a preparation phase to transfer control of the first
storage pool from the first storage controller to the second stor-
age controller wherein normal I/O operations continue to be pro-
cessed at the first storage controller during the preparation phase;
after the preparation phase, momentarily suspending writing
new I/O requests to the first storage pool and holding at the first
storage controller any suspended I/O for the first storage pool;
and rejecting the suspended I/O held by the first storage con-
troller after the second storage controller assumes ownership of
the first storage pool.
1 Appellants identify Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP as the
real party in interest. (See App. Br. 2.)
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Application 12/727,998
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Bramhall et al.
Voigt et al.
Ramany et al.
N eemidge et al.
US 6,675,258 Bl
US 2005/0172073 Al
US 2006/0112247 Al
US 2009/0292834 Al
THE REJECTIONS
Jan. 6, 2004
Aug. 4, 2005
May 25, 2006
Nov. 26, 2009
1. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
as failing to comply with the written description requirement. (Final Act. 4.)
2. Claims 1, 2, 5, 10-12, 14, 15, and 21 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Voigt. (Final Act. 5.)
3. Claims 4, 16-20, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Voigt and Bramhall. (Final Act. 11.)
4. Claims 8, 9, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Voigt and Neemidge. (Final Act. 18.)
5. Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Voigt and Ramany. (Final Act. 18.)
APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS
Appellants argue that the rejections were improper for the following
reasons:
1. With respect to the Section 112 rejection of claim 21, "there is
support for the claim recitation that the preparation phase completes moving
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Application 12/727,998
ownership" because "ownership is acknowledged during the preparation
phase." (App. Br. 6.)
2. With respect to the anticipation rejection, "Voigt discloses
queuing at the switches and not 'holding at the first storage controller any
suspended 1/0 for the first storage pool' as recited in the claim." (App. Br.
7.)
3. Also with respect to the anticipation rejection, "Voigt does not
disclose that the queued commands are being flushed" because "the
commands being flushed in Voigt are not the same commands that were
queued (in the intelligent switches 112)." (App. Br. 8.)
4. With respect to the anticipation rejection of claim 21, Voigt
does not teach "wherein the preparation phase completes moving ownership
of the first storage pool from the first storage controller to the second storage
controller." (App. Br. 8.)
5. With respect to the anticipation rejection of claim 23, Neemidge
does "not disclose the actual claim recitations wherein the I/O rejected by
the first storage controller completes to the second storage controller based
on metadata" because "metadata is not an error message" and "[ m ]oreover,
there is no disclosure of rejected I/O completing to a second storage
controller on this basis." (App. Br. 11-12.)
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Application 12/727,998
ANALYSIS
First Rejection: Section 112
The Examiner rejected claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, finding no support in the specification for "wherein the
preparation phase completes moving ownership of the first storage pool
from the first storage controller to the second storage controller." (Final
Act. 4.) Appellants argue as follows:
Paragraph [0043] of the specification as originally filed states "It
is noted that the preparation phase described above can be 'suf-
ficiently long' (but as short in duration as possible within the
command timeouts) to allow the current and new controller pairs
to minimize any performance impact, and only suspend normal
I/O while dirty data is transferred and ownership is acknowl-
edged." Clearly, if ownership is acknowledged during the prep-
aration phase there is support for the claim recitation that the
preparation phase completes moving ownership.
(App. Br. 5---6.) The Examiner responds that "[t]he preparation phase occurs
'in preparation of transferring the ownership; and does not complete
moving ownership" and that "'acknowledging ownership' is not equivalent
to, [and does not provide] support for, 'moving ownership."' (Ans. 2, 3.)
We agree with the Examiner. Claim 1 recites that I/Os are suspended
and held "after the preparation phase." Fig. 4 and the associated text (Spec.
i-f 3 8--45) show that writing is suspended and new I/Os are held at steps 468
and 470. This means the "preparation phase" must be performed before
steps 468 and 470, while the transfer of ownership is not "completed" until
step 478, when, after being asked to assume ownership at step 474,
"controller 420b accepts ownership of storage pool 430a." (Spec. i-f 45.)
Because the specification does not describe "the preparation phase
complet[ing] moving ownership of the first storage pool from the first
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Application 12/727,998
storage controller to the second storage controller," the rejection under
Section 112, first paragraph is sustained, and we do not reach Appellants'
remaining arguments alleging error in rejecting this claim.
Second Rejection: Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 5, 10--12, 14, 15, and 21
"momentarily suspending writing new 110 requests to the
first storage pool and holding at the first storage controller
any suspended 110 for the first storage pool"
Appellants argue as follows:
The Examiner is interpreting "queueing" a class of commands
(i.e., those that affect or modify metadata) as the claim recitation
"suspending writing new I/O requests." But Voigt makes it clear
in para. [0041] that "commands can be queued at the level of the
intelligent switches 112 shown in FIG. 1." Thus, Voigt discloses
queuing at the switches and not "holding at the first storage
controller any suspended 1/0 for the first storage pool" as
recited in the claim.
(App. Br. 7.) The Examiner responds by finding "the claimed and argued
suspension of I/O is taught by the queuing [0041] and holding [0045] of the
commands in Voigt." (Ans. 4.)
The subject limitation requires (a) "momentarily suspending writing
new I/O requests to the first storage pool" and (b) "holding at the first
storage controller any suspended I/O for the first storage pool." We agree
with the Examiner's finding that Voigt discloses (a), as it discloses in i-f 41
that "[t]he system begins to queue a class of commands at a level in the
system that is sufficiently high in the network fabric to enable the commands
to be re-routed to a new location of the storage device group 404." While
this describes queuing at the level of the intelligent switches, the claim does
not require that the momentary suspension take place at the level of the
storage controller. As to (b ), Voigt discloses in i-f 45 that "[ c ]ommands not
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Application 12/727,998
blocked in the re-routing action 404 are flushed from the controller that
previously managed the storage group as part of the redirection." We agree
with the Examiner's finding that this teaches that commands not blocked (in
the queuing 404) are held at the storage controller (making them "suspended
I/Os") until they are flushed. (See Final Act. 7.)
"rejecting the suspended 110 held by the first storage
controller after the second storage controller assumes
ownership of the first storage pool"
Appellants argue that "Voigt does not disclose that the queued
commands are being flushed" because "Voigt discloses that the commands
were queued at the intelligent switches 112 shown in FIG. I-not in the
controller 102 shown in FIG. l," such that the commands being flushed in
Voigt are not the same commands that were queued. (App. Br. 8, emphasis
omitted.)
We find Appellants' argument unpersuasive and, instead, agree with
the Examiner because; in the Examiner's analysis; the suspended I/Os are
those that were not blocked at the switches. (Ans. 4--5.) In particular, Voigt
teaches that those I/Os are "flushed from [i.e., "rejected" by] the controller
that previously managed the storage group as part of the redirection." (Voigt
i-f 45.) Therefore, we agree with the Examiner in finding Voigt teaches
rejecting the suspended I/Os held by the first storage controller. (Id.)
For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102, as well as the§ 102 rejections of claims 2, 5, 10-12, 14, 15, and 21,
for which no additional arguments have been offered.
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Third Rejection: Obviousness of Claims 4, 16-20, and 22
Claims 4, 16-20, and 22 are argued to be patentable only by virtue of
the reasons asserted to distinguish claim 1. (See App. Br. 9.) These
rejections are, therefore, sustained for the reasons identified in connection
with claim 1.
Fourth Rejection: Obviousness of Claims 8, 9, and 23
Claims 8 and 9 are argued to be patentable only by virtue of the
reasons asserted to distinguish claim 10, which are the same reasons asserted
to distinguish claim 1. (See App. Br. 9, 11.) These rejections are, therefore,
sustained for the reasons identified in connection with claim 1.
Regarding claim 23, Appellants argue that the combination of Voigt
and Neemidge does not render obvious the limitation "wherein the I/O
rejected by the first storage controller completes to the second storage
controller based on metadata" received by an I/O initiator from the first
storage controller because "metadata is not an error message." (App. Br.
12.) The Examiner responds that "the claimed metadata is not taught by the
error message, as alleged by Appellant[s], but by the list of LUN
associations with controllers" and that "[t]his list is then used to update the
LUN associations with controllers, which would allow for completion of the
I/O rejected by the first storage controller." (Ans. 6.)
In Voigt, "flushed commands are redirected ... to the destination
locations of the storage device move." (Voigt i-f 45.) As explained in the
Final Action, the host ofNeemidge is an I/O initiator and would receive,
from a storage controller, metadata regarding current ownership, namely in
the "list of LUN associations with controllers 255." (See Final Act. 20; Ans.
6.) In light of these teachings, we agree that it would have been obvious for
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the flushed commands of Voigt to be redirected ("completed to") the second
controller based on metadata received by an I/O initiator from the first
storage controller. We thus sustain the § 103 rejection of claim 23.
Fifth Rejection: Obviousness of Claim 13
Claim 13 is argued to be patentable only by virtue of the reasons
asserted to distinguish claim 1. (See App. Br. 13.) This rejection is,
therefore, sustained for the reasons identified in connection with claim 1.
DECISION
The rejections of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8-23 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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