Ex Parte WebberDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 15, 201412584759 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ANDREW WEBBER ____________ Appeal 2012-008950 Application 12/584,759 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–7 and 9–14, which are all the claims pending in the application. Claim 8 was cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. Invention The claimed invention on appeal relates to a method and apparatus for scheduling the issue of instructions in a multithreaded microprocessor. (Title, Spec. 1). Appeal 2012-008950 Application 12/584,759 2 Illustrative Claim Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the invention: 1. A method for dynamically determining which instructions from a plurality of available instructions to issue in each clock cycle in a multithreaded processor capable of issuing a plurality of instructions in each clock cycle, the method comprising the steps of: determining a highest priority instruction from the plurality of available instructions; determining a compatibility of the highest priority instruction with each of the available instructions; and issuing the highest priority instruction together with other instructions compatible with the highest priority instruction in the same clock cycle, wherein the highest priority instruction cannot be a speculative instruction, the speculative instruction being defined as an instruction fetched and/or issued that may not be necessary because an outcome of an earlier program instruction is not yet known. Rejection Claims 1–7 and 9–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of Aingaran (U.S. Publication No. 2006/0136915 A1) and Witt (EP 0583089 A3). ANALYSIS Issue: Under § 103, did the Examiner err by finding the cited combination of Aingaran and Witt would have collectively taught or suggested the contested limitations of: Appeal 2012-008950 Application 12/584,759 3 wherein the highest priority instruction cannot be a speculative instruction, the speculative instruction being defined as an instruction fetched and/or issued that may not be necessary because an outcome of an earlier program instruction is not yet known, within the meaning of independent claims 1 and 14? Our reviewing court guides it is the Applicant’s burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Applicant must do so by placing such definitions in the Specification with sufficient clarity to provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with clear and precise notice of the meaning that is to be construed. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, Appellant has met the burden of precisely defining the invention regarding the aforementioned contested limitations. We observe Appellant has expressly claimed a definition for “speculative instruction” that we find has literal support in the original Specification: “As used herein, the term 'speculative instruction' means an instruction fetched and/or issued that may not be necessary, because the outcome of an earlier program instruction is not yet known.” (Spec. 2, ll. 26–28). Given this limiting definition of “speculative instruction”, we find Appellant’s contentions regarding the aforementioned contested limitations persuasive for the same reasons articulated in the principal Brief (6–7) and Reply Brief (2–3). After reviewing the evidence of record, and the Examiner’s responsive arguments (8–11), we find the preponderance of evidence supports the following portion of Appellant’s argument regarding the single § 103 rejection before us on appeal: In the present invention, the term, "speculative" is used with a different meaning than in Aingaran. The speculative Appeal 2012-008950 Application 12/584,759 4 instruction in the present invention is defined as an instruction fetched and/or issued that may not be necessary because an outcome of an earlier program instruction is not yet known. Such a definition is fully supported by page 7 of the original specification. Such a meaning for the term, "speculative" is generally accepted in the art of the computer processors. On the other hand, in Aingaran, the instructions in a speculative state are instructions that are stalled because of a cache miss. As described in paragraph [0038], a thread in the wait state transitions to the speculative ready state by speculating when the condition stalling the thread will be cleared, and transitions further to the speculative run state by speculating when the thread would be scheduled for execution. In Aingaran, the system guesses as to when a thread waiting for a cache miss to clear might be able to state again. Instructions are then prioritized based on whether they are in a stalled state or not, and if they are stalled, based on the speculation of when their state is going to change. Thus, Aingaran merely speculates when the condition is cleared or when the thread is scheduled in order to transition to the speculative state, rather than discloses that the highest priority instruction cannot be a speculative instruction. Further, Aingaran does not disclose "speculative instruction" in that the phrase, "speculative instruction" is clearly defined in the present invention, that is, instructions fetched or issued that may not be necessary later. (App. Br. 6–7). The instructions within a thread in a speculative state are not themselves "speculative instructions" as defined by the present claims[.] All of the instructions in Aingaran are ultimately necessary and are fetched and executed regardless of the outcome of any early instructions. The speculative state of the thread is based solely on a speculation about the timing of a stall, not speculation about the outcome of earlier instructions and whether particular subsequent instructions are necessary. (Reply Br. 2). Appeal 2012-008950 Application 12/584,759 5 We note that independent claim 14 recites the identical contested limitations, including the aforementioned express definition for “speculative instruction.” Moreover, we find the negative limitation “wherein the highest priority instruction cannot be a speculative instruction” was recited in original claim 1 (Spec. 13). Accordingly, for the same reasons argued by Appellant (App. Br. 6–7; Reply Brief 2–3), we reverse the § 103 rejection of independent claims 1 and 14 over the combination of Aingaran and Witt. Because we have reversed the Examiner’s rejection of each independent claim on appeal, we also reverse the rejection of each dependent claim. DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–7 and 9–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. REVERSED tkl Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation