Ex Parte Waltermann et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 22, 2017

13189869 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/189,869 07/25/2011 Rod D. Waltermann RPS920110032USNP(710.170) 1083
58127 7590 03/22/2017
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
EXAMINER
HENNING, MATTHEW T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/22/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROD D. WALTERMANN and DAVID RIVERA
Appeal 2016-006506
Application 13/189,869
Technology Center 2400
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN PINKERTON, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1—8, 10-16, 18, 19, and 21—23. Claims 9, 17, and 20 are
cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
The Invention
The claimed invention relates to “[djevices, methods and products . . .
that provide for remote authentication of mobile information handling
devices.” (Abstract).
Appeal 2016-006506
Application 13/189,869
Representative Claim
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. An information handling device comprising:
one or more processors;
a display device accessible by the one or more processors;
a memory in operative connection with the one or more
processors;
wherein, responsive to execution of program instructions
accessible to the one or more processors operating through a
mobile operating system, the one or more processors:
allow communication with at least one remote
authentication architecture;
deny access to the information handling device responsive
to a device screen lock event; and
[L] grant access to the information handling device screen
responsive to:
utilizing screen lock functionality for remote
authentication in which a device screen unlock event comprises
entry of alphanumeric enterprise network logon credentials
authenticated at the at least one remote authentication
architecture.
(Contested limitation L bracketed and emphasized).
Rejections
A. Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 10-12, 15, 18, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combined teachings and
suggestions of Yeap et al. (US 2005/0216747 Al; Sept. 29, 2005)
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(hereinafter “Yeap”) and Sriraghavan et al. (US 2011/0154444 Al;
June 23, 2011) (hereinafter “Sriraghavan”).
B. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over
the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap, Sriraghavan, and
AAPA (Applicants’ Admitted Prior Art).
C. Claims 5 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap,
Sriraghavan, and Childs et al. (US 2004/0003190 Al; Jan. 1, 2004)
(hereinafter “Childs”).
D. Claims 7 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap,
Sriraghavan, and Bowen et al. (US Patent Application Publication
Number 2011/0254659 Al; Oct. 20, 2011) ((hereinafter “Bowen”).
E. Claims 8, 16, 19, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of
Yeap, Sriraghavan, and McLaren et al. (US 2010/0306858 Al;
Dec. 2, 2010) hereinafter (“McLaren”).
Grouping of Claims
Based on Appellants’ arguments, we decide the appeal of all claims
rejected under rejection A on the basis of representative independent
claim 1. Based on Appellants’ arguments, we decide the appeal of all claims
rejected under rejection E on the basis of representative dependent claim 23.
We address rejections B, C, and D, infra. To the extent Appellants have not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims and/or
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limitations, or other issues, such arguments are considered waived. See 37
C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
ANALYSIS
Rejection A of Independent Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments and any evidence
presented. We disagree with Appellants’ arguments, and we adopt as our
own: (1) the findings and legal conclusions set forth by the Examiner in the
action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the findings, legal
conclusions, and explanations set forth in the Answer in response to
Appellants’ arguments. (Ans. 2—14). However, we highlight and address
specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below.
We decide the following issues presented in this appeal:
Issue 1: Did the Examiner err by improperly combining the Yeap and
Sriraghavan references, because Sriraghavan purportedly “teaches away
from the teachings of Yeap,” as argued by Appellants. (App. Br. 10).
Issue 2\ Under § 103, did the Examiner err by finding the cited
combination of Yeap and Sriraghavan would have taught or suggested
contested limitation L:
grant access to the information handling device screen
responsive to:
utilizing screen lock functionality for remote
authentication in which a device screen unlock event comprises
entry of alphanumeric enterprise network logon credentials
authenticated at the at least one remote authentication
architecture[,] within the meaning of claim 1? 1 (emphasis
added).
1 We give the contested claim limitations the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 111 F.3d
1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Cf Spec. 142 (“although illustrative example
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Regarding issue one, Appellants contend, inter alia:
Sriraghavan specifically teaches away from using the User ID
and password entry of Yeap. See Yeap at [0066] - [0067]. Rather,
Sriraghavan teaches the use of non-text based password methods
and criticizes the use of text-based passwords for being weak or
difficult to remember. See Sriraghavan at [0001] and [0020] -
[0021], Applicants respectfully submit that the Office has failed
to clearly articulate the rationale to support why one skilled in
the art would combine the teachings of Yeap and Sriraghavan, as
is required per MPEP § 2143.
(App. Br. 10-11).
The Examiner disagrees:
First of all, Sriraghavan does not teach away from the use of the
UserlD and password entry of Yeap. As the examiner has already
stated in the rejection, Yeap does not state that the username and
password are text based. Rather, the examiner has relied upon the
common knowledge in the art at the time of invention in
rendering obvious the use of alphanumeric usernames and
passwords.
Second, Sriraghavan explicitly teaches the use of
alphanumeric characters in the passcode, as can be seen in
Paragraph 0047 which recites "a text box 561 can be revealed to
permit the user to enter one or more alphanumeric characters, if
the passcode also includes characters." This falls within the
scope of "alphanumeric logon credentials". In the combination,
since the credentials are used to authenticate to a corporate server
over a network, they fall within the scope of "alphanumeric
enterprise network logon credentials". Further, Sriraghavan
explicitly claimed that part of the passcode is alphanumeric, as
can be seen in Sriraghavan claim 3. Why would Sriraghavan
claim the use of alphanumeric characters in the passcode if
embodiments have been described herein with reference to the
accompanying figures, it is to be understood that this description is not
limiting and that various other changes and modifications may be affected
therein by one skilled in the art without departing from the scope or spirit of
the disclosure.”).
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Sriraghavan was teaching away from the use of such
alphanumeric characters? Rather, Sriraghavan is teaching
combining alphanumeric characters with other credentials in
order to make the passcode more secure. This combined
passcode still falls within the scope of an alphanumeric
credential, as it contains alphanumeric characters. The claims do
not preclude the credentials from including non-alphanumeric
parts.
(Ans. 3—4).
Regarding Appellants’ “teaching away” argument, we find Appellants
ignore Sriraghavan’s alternative teaching (| 47) of user passcode entry. As
found by the Examiner (Ans. 4), Sriraghavan’s alternative embodiment
(147) expressly incorporates alphanumeric textual characters: “a text box
561 can be revealed to permit the user to enter one or more alphanumeric
characters, if the passcode also includes characters.” Therefore, Appellants
have failed to address the Examiner’s specific findings. (Ans. 4).
We note an obviousness inquiry is not limited to the prior art’s
preferred embodiment. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, “[cjombining two embodiments disclosed
adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap of
inventiveness.” Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d
982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Because teaching an alternative or equivalent
method does not teach away from the use of a claimed method, In re Dunn,
349 F.2d 433, 438 (CCPA 1965), on this record, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred by improperly combining Yeap and Sriraghavan under §103.
Contested limitation L of Claim 1
Regarding contested limitation F, we find the Examiner’s legal
conclusion of obviousness is supported by a preponderance of the evidence,
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and we adopt the Examiner’s underlying factual findings in support of the
legal conclusion of obviousness. (Final Act. 6—7; Ans. 2—12). We
particularly note Sriraghavan (153) teaches remote authentication within the
meaning of contested limitation L: “Alternatively, the verification can be
executed by the authentication platform 119, which is maintained by a
service provider. That is, the verification can be performed as part of a
managed service by the service provider.”
Given this evidence {id.), and the teachings of Yeap as cited by the
Examiner (Final Act. 6—7), we find a preponderance of the evidence
supports the Examiner’s underlying factual findings regarding the combined
teachings and suggestions of Yeap and Sriraghavan:
Yeap provides, among other things, teachings of a system
where a user of a client device enters their user name and
password, and this is verified by a remote corporate server in
order to allow access to the corporate server. This can be seen in
Paragraph 0102 of Yeap, for example.
Sriraghavan teaches that mobile devices should lock when
not in use and the user should be verified in order to unlock the
device, and further that remote authentication platforms of
service providers can be used to perform the re-authentication for
unlocking the device. This can be seen in paragraphs 0050-0053
of Sriraghavan.
In the combination of Yeap and Sriraghavan, it would
have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in the art
at the time of invention for the mobile device of Yeap (i.e. the
cell phone) to lock when not in use, and further to require user
authentication in order to unlock the device. It further would
have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in the art
at the time of invention that the authentication verification can
be performed at the corporate server of Yeap.
(Ans. 2-3).
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We additionally note “the question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not
merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc., 874 F. 2d 804,
807-08 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also MPEP § 2123. Moreover, on this record,
we find the Examiner’s proffered combination of the respective teachings of
Yeap and Sriraghavan would have merely yielded predictable results, and
therefore would have been obvious to an artisan possessing an ordinary level
of skill at the time of Appellants’ invention. See KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.”).
This reasoning is applicable here. For at least the aforementioned
reasons, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, Appellants have
not persuaded us the Examiner erred. Accordingly, we sustain rejection A
of representative independent claim 1, and rejection A of the associated
grouped claims, which fall with claim 1. See Grouping of Claims, supra.
Rejections B, C, and D under §103
Because Appellants have not advanced separate and substantive
arguments regarding specific claims that were rejected under rejections B, C,
and D, such arguments are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Rejection E of Dependent Claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Claim 23 recites:
23. The program product of claim 19, wherein the program code
further comprises:
program code that provides a screen lock settings menu including
a numeric pin selection;
a local alphanumeric password selection; and an enterprise logon
selection;
wherein the information handling device screen is locked
according to a selection indicated in the screen lock settings
menu.
(Emphasis added regarding contested limitations).
Regarding the Examiner’s reliance on “Official Notice” to support the
rejection of claim 23, Appellants contend, inter alia: “Even assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the screen lock settings menu of the type claimed
were well known, this fact is not instantly and unquestionably
demonstrable.” (App. Br. 16). Appellants further contend:
even if the notice is taken, the claimed menu content is not taught
by the references. Specifically, the references fail to teach a
"screen lock settings menu including a numeric pin selection; a
local alphanumeric password selection; and an enterprise logon
selection." Claim 23 (emphasis added). None of the references
(i.e., Yeap, Sriraghavan, or McLaren), teach or even make
mention of a screen lock settings menu, let alone a screen lock
settings menu comprising different selections.
(App. Br. 17) (emphasis added).
However, in reviewing the record, we find no unequivocal statement
in Appellants’ Briefs that “<2 screen lock settings menu including a numeric
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pin selection; a local alphanumeric password selection; and an enterprise
logon selection;” (claim 23) were not well known in the art at the time of
Appellants’ invention. Instead, Appellants merely assert the Examiner has
not provided evidence. (App. Br. 16).
To adequately traverse the Examiner’s finding, Appellants must
specifically point out the supposed errors in the Examiner's action, which
would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be
common knowledge or well-known in the art. See MPEP § 2144.03.
Accordingly, because Appellants have not met their burden of showing that
the Examiner erred, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection E of representative
claim 23 as being obvious over the combination of Yeap, Sriraghavan, and
McLaren. (See Final Act. 11—12). Associated grouped claims 8, 16, and 19
fall with claim 23 under rejection E. See Grouping of Claims, supra.
Reply Brief
To the extent Appellants advance new arguments in the Reply Brief
not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, we note
arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or
are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be
considered except for good cause. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).
Conclusion 2
2 In the event of further prosecution, we leave it to the Examiner to
consider whether at least independent claim 18 (and the claims which
depend thereon) should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph,
for lack of enablement. Regarding claim 18, no particular element of the
program product (including a “program code” element) is positively
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For at least the aforementioned reasons, we find a preponderance of
the evidence supports the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and
ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding all contested claims on
appeal.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1—8, 10—16, 18,
19, and 21—23 under § 103(a).
No time for taking any action connected with this appeal may be
extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
recited as performing the recited function of: “utilizing screen lock
functionality for remote authentication in which a device screen unlock
event comprises entry of alphanumeric enterprise logon credentials
authenticated at the at least one remote authentication architecture.'1'’
(emphasis added). Such pure functional claiming broadly covers all
structures, program products, or other means for performing the
recited “utilizing” function. The Specification, however, discloses only
those structures, program products, or means known to Appellants.
Nor does claim 18 positively recite a “user” who performs a step or act of
utilizing the recited screen lock functionality (in which case claim 18 would
be indefinite as a “hybrid” claim) (“A single claim which claims both an
apparatus and the method steps of using the apparatus is indefinite under 35
U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.” MPEP § 2173.05(p)(II) (citing In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citing IP XL Holdings v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2005))). Therefore, we leave it to the Examiner to consider a
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack of an enabling
disclosure commensurate with the scope of the claim (“pure functional
claiming”). Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not
to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02
(9th Ed., Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015).
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