Ex Parte Vinyard

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 5, 2018

11210141 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 5, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
11/210,141 08/23/2005
23460 7590 09/07/2018
LEYDIG VOIT & MA YER, LTD
TWO PRUDENTIAL PLAZA, SUITE 4900
180 NORTH STETSON A VENUE
CHICAGO, IL 60601-6731
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Elizabeth Vinyard
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
233909 2790
EXAMINER
VYAS, ABHISHEK
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/07/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Chgpatent@leydig.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ELIZABETH VINYARD
Appeal2017-006879
Application 11/210, 141
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 15-17, 20-24, and 46-63, i.e., all pending claims. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as American International
Group, Inc. Br. 1.
Appeal2017-006879
Application 11/210, 141
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the invention "relates generally to
reinsurance, and in particular to a computer-assisted method and system for
processing reinsurance transactions." Spec. ,r 1. 2 The Specification explains
that "[t]he computer-assisted transaction processing integrates applicable
obligatory treaties and facultative obligatory treaties in the risk evaluation
process, and allows the user to select and apply treaties to the reinsurance
calculations." Id. ,r 8, Abstract.
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 15 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as
follows (with formatting added for clarity):
15. A system for a cedent to process reinsurance transactions
for a risk, comprising:
a communication network;
a computer server connected to the communication
network;
a database containing data representing risks, treaties and
facultative reinsurance, the database connected to the computer
server through the communication network;
a user interface device connected to the computer server
through the communication network;
a physical, non-transitory computer-readable-medium
bearing computer-executable instructions including a
reinsurance module,
2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: "Spec." for the
Specification, filed August 23, 2005; "Final Act." for the Final Office
Action, mailed March 10, 2016; "Br." for the Appeal Brief, filed October 10,
2016; and "Ans." for the Examiner's Answer, mailed January 31, 2017.
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Application 11/210, 141
the computer server being configured to execute the
reinsurance module,
the reinsurance module being programmed to perform
steps of
identifying a list of existing treaties potentially
applicable to the risk by applying at least one filter to a
pool of available treaties,
presenting through the user interface device the list
of treaties in a worksheet to a user for selecting treaties to
be applied to the risk,
automatically selecting each obligatory treaty in
the list of treaties to apply to the risk,
receiving through the user interface device the
user's selection of any facultative obligatory treaties in
the list of treaties to apply to the risk,
generating layoff allocation data for the risk based
upon the selected treaties, and
displaying through the user interface device the
layoff allocation data according to a plurality of layers
associated with the risk in a layoff allocation table
summarizing the layoff allocation for each layer of the
risk.
Br. 19 (Claims App.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence ofunpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a), the
Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Steinmann US 2003/0083908 Al May 1, 2003
Scannell US 2005/0192881 Al Sept. 1, 2005
(filed Feb. 3, 2005)
Klaus US 7,080,020 B 1 July 18, 2006
(filed Jan. 4, 2000)
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Application 11/210, 141
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 15-17, 20-24, and 46-63 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3-15.
Claims 15-17, 20-24, and 46-63 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Klaus, Scannell, and Steinmann. Final
Act. 16-27.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections in light of Appellant's arguments
that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we concur with
the Examiner's conclusions concerning ineligibility under§ 101 and
unpatentability under§ 103(a). We adopt the Examiner's findings and
reasoning in the Final Office Action (Final Act. 3-27) and Answer
(Ans. 2-11). We add the following to address and emphasize specific
findings and arguments.
The§ 101 Rejection of Claims 15-17, 20-24, and 46-63
INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter broadly:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. In Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012), and Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014), the Supreme
Court explained that § 101 "contains an important implicit exception" for
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Diamond v.
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Application 11/210, 141
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981 ). In Mayo and Alice, the Court set forth a
two-step analytical framework for evaluating patent-eligible subject matter:
First, "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to" a patent-
ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If so,
"consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered
combination' to determine whether the additional elements" add enough to
transform the "nature of the claim" into "significantly more" than a patent-
ineligible concept. Id. at 2355, 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79); see
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Step one in the Mayol Alice framework involves looking at the "focus"
of the claims at issue and their "character as a whole." Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Step two involves
the search for an "inventive concept." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; Elec. Power
Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353. An "inventive concept" requires more than "well-
understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in" by the
relevant community. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F .3d
1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79-80). But "an
inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic
arrangement of known, conventional pieces." BASCOM Global Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Under step two, "an inventive concept must be evident in the claims."
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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Application 11/210, 141
MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea, i.e., "performing reinsurance transaction processing for a risk" and
"generating layoff allocation data based on selected treaties for reinsuring
risk." Final Act. 6 ( citing Spec. ,r,r 2-3); Ans. 3--4 ( citing Spec. ,r,r 2-3).
The Examiner explains that (1) "applying treaties for reinsuring risk [is] a
fundamental economic practice of creating an agreement between people or
parties for reinsurance" and (2) "the claims also encompass organizing a
human activity, such as managing an insurance policy ... and generating
rules based tasks for processing" reinsurance arrangements. Final Act. 7,
13; Ans. 2, 4. The Examiner additionally determines that a human could
accomplish the abstract idea "by hand or thinking." Final Act. 9, 14--15;
Ans. 6, 8.
Appellant asserts that "[ w ]ithout acquiescing in any way to the
conclusion ... that the claims are directed to 'an abstract idea of performing
reinsurance transaction processing for a risk,"' the claims include
"additional features that ensure the claims are more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize an abstract idea." Br. 5. But Appellant makes no
arguments that the Examiner erred under Mayo/Alice step one. Id. at 4--9.
MAYO/ALICE STEP Two
The Examiner determines that the additional elements in the claims
"each execute in a manner routinely and conventionally expected of these
elements" and in combination "do not offer substantially more than" when
considered individually because they "undertake their roles in performance
of their activities according to their generic functionalities which are well-
understood, routine and conventional." Final Act. 11; Ans. 6-7. The
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Application 11/210, 141
Examiner finds that the claims do not recite an "improvement to the
functioning of the computer system itself' or an "improvement to another
technology or another technical field." Final Act. 10-11, 13-14; Ans. 6-8.
Accordingly, the Examiner reasons that the claims lack an "inventive
concept" sufficient to transform them into significantly more than a patent-
ineligible abstract idea. Final Act. 10-15; Ans. 2-8.
Appellant asserts that independent claims 15 and 50 include an
"inventive concept" because the "the applied references fail to render" the
claims "unpatentable and do not teach or suggest" the claimed subject
matter. Br. 7, 9. Appellant's assertions do not persuade us of Examiner
error because a claim's alleged novelty and nonobviousness fail to provide
an "inventive concept" needed to satisfy Mayo/Alice step two.
"The search for a § 101 inventive concept is ... distinct from
demonstrating§ 102 novelty." Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89; Two-
Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc 'ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d
1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("Symantec") (same for obviousness). "[U]nder
the Mayol Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of
nature ( or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of
that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility."
Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
" [A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea." Synopsys,
839 F.3d at 1151. Further, the Federal Circuit has expressly rejected the
notion that "abstract ideas remain patent-eligible under § 101 as long as they
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are new ideas, not previously well known, and not routine activity."
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Appellant contends that claim 15 "provides a specially-programmed
machine" and claim 50 "require[ s] a particularly-programmed machine."
Br. 6, 8. Appellant's contentions do not persuade us of Examiner error. In
Alice, "[ a ]11 of the claims [ we ]re implemented using a computer," and the
resulting specially or particularly "programmed machine" failed to suffice
for patent eligibility. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2353, 2358---60. The recitation of
generic computer-system components "cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. at 2358. Here, the
computer-system components in claims 15 and 50 operate generically
according to their well-understood, routine, and conventional functions.
Final Act. 8-9, 11-12, 14; Ans. 5-7.
Further, claims 15 and 50 cover data collection, manipulation, and
display. Br. 19, 21 (Claims App.). Court decisions have recognized that
generic computer-system components operating to collect, manipulate, and
display data are well understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled
artisan. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1164---65 & n.1, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Symantec, 838 F.3d
at 1318-20; Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,793 F.3d 1306, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16; buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cybeifone Sys., LLC v.
CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App'x 988, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Similarly, the Examiner explains that "courts have recognized the
following computer functions to be well-understood, routine, and
conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner":
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Application 11/210, 141
(1) "performing repetitive calculations"; (2) "receiving, processing, and
storing data"; (3) "electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical
document"; (4) "electronic recordkeeping"; (5) "automating mental tasks";
and (6) "receiving or transmitting data over a network." Final Act. 9, 14;
Ans. 5. Appellant does not address any of those court decisions. See
Br. 4--9.
Appellant notes that the claims require a "physical" computer-
readable medium. Br. 6. But implementing an abstract idea using a
"physical" device does not suffice for patent eligibility. See Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 84. "[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes
the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry." In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC Patent
Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (deciding that the claims failed to
satisfy § 101 even though they recited telephone units and servers).
Appellant argues that the claims improve upon existing technology
because they provide a computer-implemented tool that "simplif[ies] and
streamline[ s] the processing of reinsurance transactions to assist a
reinsurance underwriter to navigate through the rather complicated
reinsurance transaction processing and to improve the quality and accuracy
of the results of the processing." Br. 6, 8-9 (quoting Spec. ,r 3). Appellant's
arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because the claims
automate steps for selecting "obligatory treaties" and "facultative obligatory
treaties" and then generating "layoff allocations" for reinsurance
arrangements. See, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 7-9, 32-33, 36-37, 41--42, 46, 49, 55, 62;
see also Br. 19, 21 (Claims App.). For example, the Specification explains
that "the invention provides a great degree of system automation to calculate
automatically reinsurance premium distribution and liability allocation based
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Application 11/210, 141
on treaty rules and negotiated facultative reinsurance items." Spec. ,r 8. But
the "mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute" an "inventive concept" sufficient to satisfy Mayo/Alice step two.
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1047, 1055
(Fed. Cir. 2017). Consistent with this, the Examiner finds that
"[ r ]einsurance treaties are not a technological challenge, rather a business
process, traditionally conducted by hand." Final Act. 13; Ans. 2.
Appellant contends that the claims include "unconventional steps and
limitations" that "confine the claims to a particular useful application."
Br. 7, 9. Appellant's contentions do not persuade us of Examiner error
because "limiting an abstract idea to one field of use" does not impart patent
eligibility. See Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010); see also Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589--90 (1978); SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1169; Affinity
Labs, 838 F.3d at 1259.
Appellant asserts that the "system of claim 15 improves the operation
of the recited 'database' by 'displaying through the user interface device the
layoff allocation data according to a plurality of layers associated with the
risk in a layoff allocation table summarizing the layoff allocation for each
layer of the risk."' Br. 7. But manipulating input data to generate and
display allegedly advantageous output data does not correspond to improved
database functionality. A conventional database or memory may support
those actions.
Appellant does not direct us to any part of the Specification allegedly
supporting the assertion concerning improved database functionality. Br. 7.
Also, Appellant does not describe an advance in database technology that,
for example, causes a database itself to operate faster or more efficiently.
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See id.; see also Spec. ,r,r 1, 3-9, 29-51, Abstract. Further, as the Examiner
correctly finds, the claim does not recite an improvement in database
functionality, and the "type of data stored does not make it an improved
database." Final Act. 13-14; Ans. 7. "[A]n improvement to the information
stored by a database is not equivalent to an improvement in the database's
functionality." See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., No. 2017-1980,
2018 WL 3862646, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 2018). In claim 15, the
database and the other conventional computer-system components provide a
generic environment for carrying out the abstract idea. See TL! Commc 'ns,
823 F.3d at 611.
SUMMARY
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant's arguments have not
persuaded us of any error in the Examiner's findings or conclusions under
Mayo/Alice step one or step two. Hence, we sustain the§ 101 rejection of
claims 15 and 50.
Claims 16, 17, 20-24, and 46-49 depend directly or indirectly from
claim 15, while claims 51---63 depend directly or indirectly from claim 50.
Appellant does not argue patent eligibility separately for these dependent
claims. Br. 4--9. Thus, we sustain the § 101 rejection of these dependent
claims for the same reasons as the independent claims. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
The§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims 15-17, 20-24, and 46-63
INDEPENDENT CLAIM 15: MOTIVATION TO COMBINE
Initially, Appellant contends that:
the ordinary artisan, having no prior knowledge of applicant's
invention, would not have a credible reason for modifying
Klaus' system of selling reinsurance with any of the features of
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Scannell's computer-based transaction system or Steinmann's
system for reinsurance placement in such a way as to arrive at
the system recited in claim 15.
Br. 11. Appellant also contends that "the applied references do not
otherwise provide a credible reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to
modify" the references to achieve a system according to claim 15. Id. at 15.
Appellant's contentions do not persuade us of Examiner error because
they do not identify any deficiencies in the Examiner's explanations why a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Klaus, Scannell, and
Steinmann. See Final Act. 17-20. The applicable rules require that the
arguments in an appeal brief "explain why the examiner erred as to each
ground of rejection contested by appellant." 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv); see
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir 2011) (recognizing "the Board's
practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner's
rejections").
The Examiner explains that a person of ordinary skill would have
combined Klaus and Steinmann "to include allocation organized by layers to
proportionally account for different risks through different rates." Final
Act. 17-18 (citing Steinmann ,r,r 19, 50, 53, 56, 62---63, 86,224). Appellant
does not address the advantage resulting from the Klaus-Steinmann
combination. See Br. 10-17.
The Examiner explains that a person of ordinary skill would have
combined Klaus and Scannell to modify manual treaty selection as disclosed
in Klaus with automatic selection of treaties or treaty provisions as disclosed
in Scannell. Final Act. 18-20 (citing Klaus 1:19-56, 2:56---67, 6:34--40,
6:56---60, 11:44--56; Scannell i-fi-f 6, 9-11, 17, 99, 101-103, 114--116). The
Examiner finds that the Klaus-Scannell combination would more "accurately
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identify [the] terms and conditions applicable to a reinsurance contract or
proposal and reinsurance agreement." Id. at 19. Appellant does not address
the advantage resulting from the Klaus-Scannell combination. See
Br. 10-17.
Accordingly, the Examiner provides articulated reasoning with a
rational underpinning why a person of ordinary skill would have combined
Klaus, Scannell, and Steinmann, including identifying various advantages.
Final Act. 11-14. "[T]he law does not require that the references be
combined for the reasons contemplated by the inventor." In re Beattie,
974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see Outdry Techs. Corp. v. Geox
Sp.A., 859 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). "[A]nyneed or problem
known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the
patent can provide a reason for combining" references. KSR Int 'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
In addition, the Examiner explains that the analysis "takes into
account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the
time the claimed invention was made." Ans. 8-9 ( citing In re McLaughlin,
443 F.2d 1392 (CCPA 1971)). An explicit analysis "whether there was an
apparent reason to combine" references reduces "the risk of ... patent
examiners falling prey to hindsight bias." See KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. at 418,
421. Here, the Examiner's explicit analysis of the reasons to combine the
references demonstrates that the Examiner did not rely on hindsight
reasoning. See Final Act. 17-20.
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INDEPENDENT CLAIM 15: "REINSURANCE MODULE
BEING PROGRAMMED TO PERFORM STEPS"
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15
because "Klaus fails to teach or suggest a system for a cedent to identify a
list of existing treaties potentially applicable to the risk by applying at least
one filter to a pool of available treaties, as recited in claim 15," and thus fails
to teach or suggest the subsequent steps referring to "the list of treaties."
Br. 13. Appellant argues that "Klaus also fails to teach or suggest"
claim 15's "displaying" step. Id. In addition, Appellant contends that
"Scannell fails to teach or suggest" claim 15 's "identifying" and
"generating" steps. Id. at 15. Further, Appellant asserts that "Steinmann
fails to teach or suggest" claim 15 's "identifying" and "receiving" steps. Id.
Appellant's arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because
they attack the references individually, while the Examiner relies on the
combined disclosures in Klaus, Scannell, and Steinmann to teach or suggest
the steps performed by claim 15 's "reinsurance module." See Final Act. 16-
20, 26-27; Ans. 9--11. Where a rejection rests on a combination of
references, an appellant cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the
references individually. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
As an example, the Examiner relies on Klaus for the "receiving" step,
and Appellant disputes that Steinmann teaches or suggests that step. See
Final Act. 16; Br. 15. As another example, the Examiner relies on
Steinmann for the "displaying" step, and Appellant disputes that Klaus
teaches or suggests that step. See Final Act. 17; Br. 13. As a further
example, the Examiner relies on Klaus for the "generating" step, and
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Appellant disputes that Scannell teaches or suggests that step. See Final
Act. 17; Br. 15.
The Examiner correctly determines that the combined disclosures in
Klaus, Scannell, and Steinmann teach or suggest the steps performed by
claim 15's "reinsurance module." See Final Act. 16-20, 26-27; Ans. 9--11.
For instance, for claim 15 's "identifying" step, the Examiner correctly finds
that Scannell discloses (1) storing treaty clauses that form treaties;
(2) storing business rules that define treaties; (3) receiving business-
initiating data from a client, e.g., a cedent; (4) in response to receiving
business-initiating data, identifying appropriate treaty clauses by applying
the business rules; and ( 5) generating treaties from the identified treaty
clauses. See Scannell ,r,r 8-11, 17, 98, 102-103; Final Act. 18-20, 26-27;
Ans. 10. The Examiner reasons that the business rules correspond to filters
applied to "a pool of available treaties, wherein the pool of available treaties
are the treaty clauses from the data store." Final Act. 27; see Ans. 10.
Further, the Examiner correctly finds that Klaus generates cedent-
specific proposals, "provides a listing of each of the proposals currently
available for consideration by the specific cedent," and presents the cedent-
specific proposal list "in a table format." Ans. 9 (citing Klaus 8:7-31); see
Klaus 5:9-11, 8:7-16, Fig. 3. Klaus's Figure 3 is reproduced below:
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3
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Figure 3 illustrates a cedent-specific proposal list in a table format. Klaus's
list of cedent-specific proposals teaches or suggests identifying a list of
potentially applicable treaties. See Ans. 9-10; Klaus 5:9-11, 7:45-8:32,
11: 14-17, Fig. 3. We note that Appellant did not file a Reply Brief to rebut
the Examiner's findings in the Answer.
Appellant seeks to distinguish Klaus from claim 15 because Klaus
concerns "selling reinsurance to a cedent" and the claimed invention
concerns selling risk to a reinsurer. See Br. 13. But those actions just
constitute different sides of the same transaction. A sale of reinsurance by a
reinsurer to a cedent corresponds to a sale of risk by a cedent to a reinsurer.
Also, claim 15 does not recite a system for selling risk to a reinsurer. Br. 19
(Claims App.). Instead, it recites a "system for a cedent to process
reinsurance transactions for a risk." Id. Those "reinsurance transactions"
encompass a cedent selling risk to a reinsurer and a cedent buying
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Application 11/210, 141
reinsurance for a reinsurer. Klaus discloses a system that allows a cedent to
review one or more reinsurance proposals and accept one or more proposals
by manipulating selection buttons or icons associated with the proposals.
See, e.g., Klaus 5:9--11, 7:45-8:32, 11:14--17, Fig. 3. Hence, Klaus
discloses a "system for a cedent to process reinsurance transactions for a
risk" according to claim 15.
Steinmann also discloses a "system for a cedent to process reinsurance
transactions for a risk." See, e.g., Steinmann ,r,r 148-161, Fig. 3.
Steinmann's system provides a unified platform for cedent reinsurance-
placement processes for both obligatory reinsurance placement and
facultative reinsurance placement. See, e.g., id. ,r,r 13-19, 43--44, 62-63,
148-161, Fig. 3.
Because the combined disclosures in Klaus, Scannell, and Steinmann
teach or suggest the steps performed by claim 15 's "reinsurance module,"
we sustain the§ 103(a) rejection of claim 15.
INDEPENDENT CLAIM 50
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 50
because Klaus and Scannell fail to teach or suggest claim 50' s "identifying"
step. Br. 17. For the reasons discussed above regarding claim 15's
"identifying" step, we consider those arguments unpersuasive. Thus, we
sustain the§ 103(a) rejection of claim 50.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 16, 17, 20-24, 46--49, AND 51---63
Appellant does not argue patentability separately for dependent
claims 16, 17, 20-24, 46--49, and 51---63. Br. 10-17. Thus, we sustain the
§ 103(a) rejection of these dependent claims for the same reasons as the
independent claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Application 11/210, 141
DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 15-17, 20-24, and 46-63 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the rejection of claims 15-17, 20-24, and 46-63 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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