Ex Parte Tseng et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 23, 201713168598 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/168,598 06/24/2011 Erick Tseng 079894.0291 1345 91230 7590 08/25/2017 Raker Rntts; T T P /Faeehnnk Tne EXAMINER 2001 ROSS AVENUE ZELE, KRISTA MICHELLE SUITE 700 Dallas, TX 75201 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2448 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/25/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ptomaill @bakerbotts.com ptomai!2 @ bakerbotts .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ERICK TSENG and MATTHEW CAHILL Appeal 2017-001913 Application 13/168,598 Technology Center 2400 Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection2 of claims 1, 6—11, and 16—28, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Facebook, Inc. App. Br. 3 2 In response to Appellants’ identification of “an omission of an amended limitation in the final office action mailed September 16, 2015” (Interview Summary by the Examiner dated Sept. 24, 2015), the Examiner mailed a corrected final office action. All references to the final rejection are to the Final Office Action mailed Sept. 24, 2015 (“Final Act.”). Appeal 2017-001913 Application 13/168,598 Introduction Appellants describe their invention as relating “to displaying dynamic contents on the lock screens of mobile computing devices.” Spec. 11. Appellants disclose a method to interact with an item displayed on the locked screen that allows some actions and prevents others while the screen is locked. See Spec. 28—30, Fig. 3. Claim 1 is exemplary: 1. A method comprising: by a computing device, obtaining a plurality of dynamic information items relevant to a user of the computing device; by the computing device, ranking the plurality of dynamic information items based at least in part on one or more social factors of the user stored on a social-networking system; by the computing device, displaying, based at least in part on the ranking, at least one of the plurality of dynamic information items on a locked screen of the computing device; and by the computing device, in response to user input selecting the at least one displayed dynamic information item being received at the computing device, displaying, on the locked screen of the computing device, detailed content associated with the respective dynamic information item and a user-interface component for performing one or more actions with respect to the displayed dynamic information item, the locked screen being configured to: allow the user to perform the actions via the user- interface component if the selected dynamic information item is in a first set of the dynamic information items without unlocking the locked screen; and prevent the user from performing the actions via the user-interface component if the selected dynamic information item is in a second set of the dynamic information items. App. Br. 10-15 (Claims App’x) (disputed requirements emphasized). 2 Appeal 2017-001913 Application 13/168,598 Rejections Claims 1, 8—11, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Aftab (US 2012/0095979 Al; Apr. 19, 2012) and Gao (US 2011/0081889 Al; Apr. 7, 2011). Final Act. 6-10. Claims 6, 7, 16, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Aftab, Gao, and Chaudhri (US 2009/0061837 Al; Mar. 5, 2009). Final Act. 10-12. Claims 21—28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Aftab, Gao, Chaudhri, and Zhuang (US 2008/0070209 Al; Mar. 20, 2008). Final Act. 12-14. ISSUE Based on Appellants’ arguments, the issue before us is whether the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claims 1,11, and 20 by finding Gao teaches the recited requirements (the “disputed requirements”): in response to user input selecting the at least one displayed dynamic information item being received at the computing device, displaying,3 on the locked screen of the computing device, detailed content associated with the respective dynamic information item and a user-interface component for performing one or more actions with respect to the displayed dynamic information item, the locked screen being configured to: allow the user to perform the actions via the user- interface component if the selected dynamic information item is in a first set of the dynamic information items without unlocking the locked screen; and prevent the user from performing the actions via the user-interface component if the selected dynamic 3 Claims 11 and 20 recite “display” rather than “displaying” as recited in claim 1, but otherwise the corresponding recitations are verbatim the same. 3 Appeal 2017-001913 Application 13/168,598 information item is in a second set of the dynamic information items. App. Br. 5—8 (quoting claim 1). ANALYSIS In rejecting claims 1,11, and 20, the Examiner relies upon Gao for teaching the disputed requirements. Final Act. 7—9 (citing Gao Ull, 42— 45, 47, 48, 53, 70, Fig. 4). Appellants argue, inter alia,4 Gao does not teach or suggest displaying anything on the locked screen that corresponds to the recited “detailed content” and “user interface component.” App. Br. 7, Reply Br. 3. Appellants further argue Gao’s mechanism for notifying users while the screen is locked does not describe alternatively allowing or preventing interaction with notifications, and accordingly does not teach or suggest “allowing] the user to perform the actions ... if the selected dynamic information item is in a first set of the dynamic information items without unlocking the locked screen” and “preventing] the user from performing the actions ... if the selected dynamic information item is in a second set of the dynamic information items,” as recited. App. Br. 7, Reply Br. 3^4. We agree with Appellants that Gao’s mechanisms for obtaining user input and notifying users while in lock screen mode does not teach or suggest the recited limitations for displaying both detailed content and a user-interface (UI) component on the locked screen, as set forth in the disputed requirement. While Gao discloses accepting inputs from and providing outputs to a user while a device is in lock screen mode, see Gao 4 Because we reverse the rejection based on the arguments discussed below, we do not address all of Appellants’ arguments. 4 Appeal 2017-001913 Application 13/168,598 H 38—60, Gao teaches this in the context of circumventing interaction with display information on the locked screen, see id. 141 (“Locking of the device effectively prevents the entry or extracting of information from the device other than to enter a password or provide some other predetermined user input to unlock the device recognized by the lock module and enter or provide the predetermined inputs recognized by the notification module.” (ref. nos. omitted)). Gao teaches using LEDs separate from the locked screen as a way to convey information to the user during interaction when in lock screen mode. Gaol 53. Thus, the portions of Gao relied upon by the Examiner do not teach display of both detailed content and a UI component on the locked screen, as recited in the disputed requirement. This does not end our inquiry, however, because each reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Here, the Examiner relies on Aftab, not Gao, for the display of “dynamic information items on a locked screen.” See Final Act. 6. But the Examiner does not explain how Aftab cures the deficiencies of Gao as argued by Appellants. We agree with Appellants that Gao is silent as to the issue of selectively allowing or preventing performance of actions depending upon whether “the selected dynamic information item is in a first set” or “second set of the dynamic information items,” as recited by the disputed requirement. App. Br. 7, Reply Br. 3^4. For this aspect the Examiner 5 Appeal 2017-001913 Application 13/168,598 highlights paragraph 70 of Gao, which discloses that “in yet other embodiments, the notification process may be applied in connection with the locking and unlocking processes when the display screen 112 is not deactivated. In yet further embodiments, the notification process may be applied in the absence of both the locking and unlocking processes of the lock module.” Final Act. 8—9 (also citing Gao Fig. 4,111). This, however, simply teaches that the disclosed user input and notification mechanisms that work while the screen is locked may also work regardless of any screen locking or unlocking process. It is silent as to allowing or preventing performance of actions depending on whether selected information is in one set or another, and, therefore, it does not support the proposition for which the Examiner cites it. The Examiner also does not explain how Gao, in view of Aftab, teaches or suggests selectively allowing or preventing interaction with notifications displayed on the lock screen, as recited. “[Rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006); KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting Kahn). “The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2). Because the Examiner does not provide any technical explanation for how to combine and modify the disparate teachings of Aftab with those of Gao as necessary to achieve the disputed requirement, we find the Examiner does not articulate a sufficient reason for how the skilled artisan would have 6 Appeal 2017-001913 Application 13/168,598 understood the combination of Aftab and Gao to teach or suggest the claimed invention. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1,11, and 20. The Examiner does not find the additional references cited in the rejection of the dependent claims cures the deficiency explained above for the independent claims and, therefore, we also do not sustain the rejection of claims 6—10, 16—19, and 21—28. DECISION We reverse the rejection of claims 1, 6—11, and 16—28. REVERSED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation