Ex Parte Sullivan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 18, 2018

14049141 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/049,141
78980 7590
LLNL/Zilka-Ko tab
10/08/2013
12/20/2018
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
L-703, P.O. Box 808
Livermore, CA 94551
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Kyle Sullivan
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
LLNLP 124/IL-12716 8882
EXAMINER
MA YES, MEL VIN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1732
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/20/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
llnl-docket@llnl.gov
zk-uspto@zilkakotab.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KYLE SULLIVAN, JOHN M. DENSMORE, ERIC DUOSS,
ALEXANDER E. GASH, JOSHUA KUNTZ, and JOHN VERICELLA
Appeal2017-000318
Application 14/049, 141
Technology Center 1700
Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, JULIA HEANEY, and
JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges.
SNAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 5-14, and 25-28. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 We cite the Specification ("Spec.") filed October 8, 2013; Final Office
Action ("Final Act.") dated October 22, 2015; Appellant's Appeal Brief
("App. Br.") dated March 22, 2016; Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") dated
August 5, 2016; and Appellant's Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") dated September
29, 2016.
2 Appellant is Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, which also is
identified as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2017-000318
Application 14/049, 141
BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to three-dimensional (3D)
printing and fabrication. Spec. ,r 2. Claim I-the sole independent claim on
appeal-is illustrative:
1. A material, comprising
a plurality of particles;
a solvent system; and
one or more stabilizing agents,
wherein the particles are configured to complete a self-
propagating and/ or self-sustaining reaction upon initiation
thereof, and
wherein the solvent system and the one or more
stabilizing agents are present in an amount effective to make the
material structurally self-supporting during deposition of the
material onto a substrate and prior to initiation of the self-
propagating and/ or self-sustaining reaction.
App. Br. 29 (Claims Appendix) (emphasis added to highlight a key claim
element in dispute).
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1--4, 9, and 25-28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(a)(l)
as anticipated by Tappan. 3
II. Claims 1--4, 6, 13, and 25-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I02(a)(l) as anticipated by Badia. 4
3 US 8,048,242 Bl, issued November 1, 2011 ("Tappan").
4 US 3,600,163, issued August 17, 1971 ("Badia").
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Appeal2017-000318
Application 14/049, 141
III. Claims 1--4, 8, 11, and 25-28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I02(a)(l) as anticipated by Bertrand,5 as evidenced by Deeter, 6 Davis,7
and Patel. 8
IV. Claims 1, 3, 4, 13, 14, and 25-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over MacDonald. 9
V. Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Tappan and Okada. 10
VI. Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Tappan in view of Fischer11 or Krylov. 12
VII. Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Tappan in view of Fischer or Krylov, and further in view of Toyoda, 13
Matsumoto, 14 or Tsukahara. 15
VIII. Claims 8 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Tappan.
5 US 3,794,535, issued February 26, 1974 ("Bertrand").
6 US 2012/0141747 Al, published June 7, 2012 ("Deeter").
7 Tenney L. Davis, "Absorption of Moisture by Colloided Smokeless
Powder," pp. 9-12 ("Davis").
8 US 6,051,242, issued April 18, 2000 ("Patel").
9 US 3,325,316, issued June 13, 1967 ("MacDonald").
10 US 2005/0189520 Al, published September 1, 2005 ("Okada").
11 S.H. Fischer and M.C. Grubelich, "A Survey of Combustible Metals,
Thermites, and Intermetallics for Pyrotechnic Applications," July 1996
("Fischer").
12 Yu I. Krylov et al., "Possibilities of Producing Thermite Mixtures Based
on B4C-Metal and SiC-Metal Composites," translated from 12
Poroshkovaya Metallurgiya (197 5), 57---60 ("Krylov").
13 US 2009/0148680 Al, published June 11, 2009 ("Toyoda").
14 US 6,030,755, issued February 29, 2000 ("Matsumoto").
15 US 2003/0230335 Al, published December 18, 2003 ("Tsukahara").
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Appeal2017-000318
Application 14/049, 141
IX. Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Tappan, Sullivan, 16 Cao, 17 and Eluri. 18
OPINION
Each claim on appeal requires that the recited material is "structurally
self-supporting during deposition." Claim 1. In rejecting the claims, the
Examiner takes the position that "any liquid with a measurable viscosity and
surface tension can maintain its shape if properly deposited on an
appropriate substrate." Final Act. 5. Premised solely on that position, the
Examiner finds that the various liquid formulations disclosed in each of
Tappan, Badia, Bertrand, and MacDonald necessarily would have been self-
supporting. Id. at 5, 7, 8, 10.
Appellant persuasively asserts that each of the Rejections on appeal is
deficient because the Examiner has not identified evidence to support a
finding that any of the foregoing references discloses a material that is
"structurally self-supporting," under the broadest reasonable interpretation
of that term. App. Br. 17-26. Although the Examiner is obliged to apply
the broadest reasonable interpretation to claim terms during prosecution,
such an interpretation must remain reasonable in light of the Specification,
and consistent with the interpretation that one of ordinary skill in the art
16 K.T. Sullivan et al., "Electrophoretic Deposition of Thermites onto Micro-
Engineered Electrodes Prepared by Direct-Ink Writing," 117 J. Phys. Chem.
B (2013), 1686-93 ("Sullivan").
17 J. Cao et al., "Joining of TiAl intermetallic by self-propagating high-
temperature synthesis," 41 J. Mater. Sci. (2006), 4720-24 ("Cao").
18 Ravi Eluri and Brian K. Paul, "Silver nanoparticle-assisted diffusion
brazing of 3003 Al alloy for microchannel applications," 36 Materials and
Design (2012), 13-23 ("Eluri").
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Appeal2017-000318
Application 14/049, 141
would reach. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004). The Inventors' Specification is directed to materials
suitable for use in 3D printing and fabrication. Spec. ,r 2. In that context,
the Specification provides that the disclosed materials are "designed to have
internally-provided structural strength," and "can therefore support their own
weight and be printed into three-dimensional objects." Spec. ,r 28. The
Specification further explains that a self-supporting material can be
"deposited vertically onto itself to form a substantially rod-like structure that
would not collapse or deform significantly under its own weight." Id. at
,r 44. Consistent with these disclosures, Appellant points to a dictionary
definition for the term, "self-supporting," which refers to a material that is
capable of supporting its own weight and staying upright without being
supported by something else. App. Br. 9.
We are persuaded that the term, self-supporting, when read in light of
the Specification, would have been understood to require a degree of
structural strength sufficient to self-support the weight of material being
deposited, as would be necessary to achieve the disclosed objective of 3D
printing and fabrication. The Examiner's adopted interpretation would
encompass any material, irrespective of the material's ability to support its
own weight during deposition, and, therefore, incorrectly reads the term
"self-supporting" out of the claims. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc.,
508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions that
render claimed terms superfluous).
For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that each Rejection on
Appeal is premised on an unreasonable interpretation of the term "self-
supporting." The Rejections are not sustained.
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Application 14/049, 141
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 5-14, and 25-28 is
reversed.
REVERSED
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