Ex Parte Shintani

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 5, 2019

14015409 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 5, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/015,409 08/30/2013
36738 7590
ROGITZ & AS SOCIA TES
4420 Hotel Circle Court
SUITE 230
SAN DIEGO, CA 92108
06/07/2019
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Peter Shintani
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
201003708.02 8521
EXAMINER
WINTER, JOHN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/07/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
J ohn@rogitz.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PETER SHINTANI
Appeal2018-001724
Application 14/015,409 1
Technology Center 3600
Before BETH Z. SHAW, CARLL. SILVERMAN, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.
SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Non-Final Rejection of claims 16-22 and 24--27, which constitute all
pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 The real party in interest is identified as Sony Corp. App. Br. 2.
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Application 14/015,409
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to tracking activation of licensable components
in audio video devices ("A VD"), such as TVs, using unique product
identifications. Abstract; Spec. 1-2; Figs. 1-3, 9, 10. Claim 16, reproduced
below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added):
16. Audio video device (AVD) comprising:
a licensable component providing a licensable function related
to presentation of audio video information on at least one display; and
at least one computer memory that is not a transitory signal and that
comprises instructions executable by at least one digital processor to
configure the digital processor to:
determine whether the A VD [i] s in a retail demonstration
mode;
present data on the A VD according to the licensable component
without paying a license fee to exploit the licensable function
responsive to a determination that the A VD is in the retail
demonstration mode;
present data on the A VD according to the licensable component
only pursuant to a license fee transaction for the licensable
component post-vending of the AVD;
determine a number of times the retail demonstration mode has
been selected; and
permanently disable the retail demonstration mode responsive
to a determination that the A VD has been powered up and retail
demonstration mode selected more than a threshold number of
times.
App. Br. 20 (Claims Appendix).
THE REJECTIONS
Claims 16-22 and 24--27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Non-
Final Act. 7-8.
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Claims 16-22 and 24--27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
being unpatentable over Houng et al (US 2011/0166968 Al; pub. July 7,
2011) ("Houng"), Hofricter (US 2009/0320062 Al; pub. December 24,
2009), Vadlamani et al. (US 2009/0254482 Al; pub. October 8, 2009)
("Vadlamani"), and Spit et al. (US 2009/0303075 Al; pub. December 10,
2009) ("Spit"). Non-Final Act. 8-12.
Claims 20-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Houng, Hofricter, Spit, and Iwata et al. (US
2010/0013841 Al; pub. January 21, 2010) (Iwata"). Non-Final Act. 12-14.
The§ 1 OJ Rejection
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: "'[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.'" Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int'!, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at217-I8 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77).
In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the
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claim is "directed to." See id. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us
are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third
party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593,
611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic
concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 );
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981 )); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267---68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191-92 ("We
view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
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environment." Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( quotation marks omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77,
(alteration in original)). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention." Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") recently
published revised guidance on the application of§ 101. USPTO, 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) ("Memorandum"). Under that guidance, we first determine whether
the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
"well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner rejected claims 16-22 and 24--27 as being directed to
the abstract idea of "a licensable component providing a licensable function
related to presentation of audio video information on a display." Non-Final
Action. 7. The Examiner determines "[t]he claim(s) do not include
additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than
the judicial exception because the additional computer elements, which are
recited at a high level of generality, provide conventional computer
functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea."
Id. The Examiner states:
Claim 16 recites, in part, providing a licensable function, presenting
data in demonstration mode, presenting data post vending and disabling
demonstration mode. These steps describe the concept of comparing
new and stored info and using rules to identify options, which
corresponds to concepts identified as abstract ideas by the courts, such
as SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., 555 Fed. Appx. 950
(Fed. Cir. 2014) as well as Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. V. CLS Bank Int'l 573
U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). The concept described in claim 16
is not meaningfully different than those concepts found by the courts to
be abstract ideas. As such, the description in claim 16 of a licensable
component providing a licensable function related to presentation of
audio video information on a display is an abstract idea.
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The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the
additional elements when considered both individually and as and as an
ordered combination do not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea. The claim recites the additional limitations of a []
computer memory, an A VD. These additional limitations are recited at
a high level of generality and are recited as performing generic
computer functions routinely used in computer applications. Generic
computer components recited as performing generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities
amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a
computerized system. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not
amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial
exception (the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at
the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the
combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or
improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely
provide conventional computer implementation. Therefore, the
claim(s) are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
Id. at 7-8.
Appellant argues, inter alia, the Examiner errs in not properly
identifying the recited abstract idea and not explaining how the specific
claim limitations set forth in the abstract idea corresponds to a concept that
the courts have identified as an abstract idea. App. Br. 5-6. Appellant
argues the claims do not recite "determining a license mode." Id. at 6.
Appellant argues the claim does not recite "comparing" nor "identifying
options." Id. at 8. Appellant further argues that no court case, to
Appellant's knowledge, has held that "determining a license mode" is an
abstract idea. Id. Appellant argues the Examiner's approach does not
follow the guidance of Enfzsh and Diehr. Id. at 8-9 ( citing Enfzsh, LLC v.
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Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016); "'describing the
claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language
of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule,'
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (cautioning that overgeneralizing
claims, 'if carried to its extreme, make[ s] all inventions unpatentable
because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature
which, once known, make their implementation obvious"').
In the Answer, the Examiner finds that "determine whether the A VD
is in a retail demonstration mode" and the subsequent decision to display
data based upon the comparing is construed as comparing new and stored
info and using rules to identify options." Ans. 3. Regarding whether a court
case has ever held that "determining a license mode" is abstract, the
Examiner states:
Id.
abstract ideas are not limited to ideas that may be characterized as
economic principles; nor are abstract ideas limited to the examples set
forth in Alice, i.e., fundamental economic practices, certain methods of
organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical
relationships or formulae. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2350, 2356.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues SmartGene is not a precedential
case and the present case is not similar to the intermediate financial
settlement in Alice. Reply Br. 1-2. Appellant argues that the alleged
abstract idea of "providing a licensable function, presenting data in
demonstration mode, presenting data post vending and disabling
demonstration mode" is not supported by case law.
As discussed below, we are persuaded by Appellant' arguments.
Applying the current Guidelines (Memorandum), we conclude that
claim 16 does not recite an abstract idea. Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
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I(a), III. In particular, none of the limitations in claim 16 recites (A)
mathematical concepts, (B) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as a fundamental economic practice, commercial or legal interactions,
managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people,
or (C) mental processes.
The claim 16 preamble recites an "[a]udio video device (AVD)"
described in the Specification as a TV. Spec, Field of the Invention, Figs. 1-
3. The limitation "a licensable component providing a licensable function
related to presentation of audio video information on at least one display" is
described in the Specification, for example, as "if the user wishes to
automatically scan the broadcast spectrum to detect channels, in which case
it may be inferred that the ATSC decoder/demodulator 58 and MPEG
decoder 62 will be required and, hence, that licenses to use those
components will be needed" and does not recite (A), (B), or (C). Spec. 7.
Likewise, the limitation "at least one computer memory that is not a
transitory signal and that comprises instructions executable by at least one
digital processor to configure the digital processor to" perform identified
functions does not recite (A), (B), or (C).
We note that none of the claim 16 limitations discussed below recites
(A) or (C).
The limitations "determine whether the A VD [is] in a retail
demonstration mode" and "present data on the A VD according to the
licensable component without paying a license fee to exploit the licensable
function responsive to a determination that the A VD is in the retail
demonstration mode" may be economic in nature, but there is no basis to
support a conclusion that it recites a fundamental economic practice, a
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commercial interaction, interaction between people, or other principle set
forth in (B). Similarly, the limitation "present data on the A VD according to
the licensable component only pursuant to a license fee transaction for the
licensable component post-vending of the A VD" does not recite a
fundamental economic practice, a commercial interaction, interaction
between people, or other principle of (B).
For the same reason, the limitations "determine a number of times the
retail demonstration mode has been selected" and "permanently disable the
retail demonstration mode responsive to a determination that the A VD has
been powered up and retail demonstration mode selected more than a
threshold number of times" do not recite a fundamental economic practice, a
commercial interaction, interaction between people, or other principle of
(B).
Regarding "commercial or legal interactions, managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people" set forth in (B),
claim 16 recites specific steps to determine whether an A VD is in a retail
demonstration mode and, if so, present data on the A VD according to a
licensable component without paying a license fee; present such data only
pursuant to a license fee post-vending of the A VD; determine a number of
times the retail demonstration mode has been selected; and permanently
disable the retail demonstration mode responsive to a determination that the
retail demonstration mode has been powered up and retail demonstration
mode selected more than a threshold number of times. The claim is unlike
the claims of Ultramercial in which the court held a claim describing "only
the abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content"
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is patent ineligible. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed
Cir. 2014); 84 Fed. Reg. 52 (Jan. 7, 2019) n.13.
We note "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest
upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas."
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. As discussed supra, abstract ideas may include,
but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of
organizing human activities, and mathematical formulas or relationships.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-221. Under this guidance, we must therefore
ensure at step one that we articulate what the claims are directed to with
enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful. Id. at
217 ("[W]e tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest
it swallow all of patent law."). Here, the Examiner's rejection is based
on an unreasonably broad claim interpretation without sufficient
consideration of the specific limitations.
As discussed above, because claim 16 does not recite an abstract idea
(a judicial exception), there is no need to consider whether the claim
includes additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Likewise, we need not proceed to analyze the claim
under Alice, step 2.
In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 16, and
dependent claims 17-22.
Independent claims 24--27 are similar to claim 16, discussed supra, to
the extent that none of these claims' limitations recites a fundamental
economic practice, a commercial interaction, interaction between people, or
other principle in (B). For example, claim 24 recites (emphasis added):
24. A device comprising:
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at least one computer memory that is not a transitory signal and
that comprises instructions executable by at least one processor to:
actuate licensable component in an audio video device (AVD) to
provide a presentation on a video display in accordance with a
licensable feature without implementing a license fee payment therefor
at least in part responsive to a determination that audio received by the
A VD indicates that multiple sources of audio are playing the same
audio as each other;
subsequently disable the licensable component at least in part
responsive to a determination that the A VD has been vended.
Here, similar to our claim 16 analysis, supra, there is no basis to
conclude any of these limitations recites a fundamental economic practice or
principle. Likewise, these limitations do not recite "commercial or legal
interactions, managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people"
Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 24--27.
The§ 103 Rejections
Appellant argues, inter alia, that the Examiner errs in finding that the
combination of cited references (Houng, Hofricter, Vadlamani, and Spit)
teaches the claim 16 limitation "present data on the A VD according to the
licensable component without paying a license fee to exploit the licensable
function responsive to a determination that the A VD is in the retail
demonstration mode." App. Br. 11-15; Reply Br. 4--5. According to
Appellant, Houng teaches obtaining an activation code for a tuner, but does
not teach a license fee transaction. App. Br. 12 (citing Houng ,r,r 97, 98,
101 ). Appellant argues that Hofrichter teaches presenting features according
to a script in a retail mode such that the user sees features the manufacturer
wants the user to see, but does not teach this is done without paying a license
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fee. Id. at 14. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in considering "without
paying a license fee" is a negative limitation that need not be expressly
shown.
In the Answer, the Examiner states "that a broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claimed feature of 'present data on the A VD according
to the licensable component only pursuant to a license fee transaction for the
licensable component post-vending of the A VD' merely requires the
presentation of some type of data in conjunction with a licensing transaction
being processed." Ans. 3. The Examiner finds these features are disclosed
by Houng as the activation code of Houng is analogous to a license code,
and Houng presents an interface allowing the code to be activated. Id. at 3-
4 (citing Houng, Figs. 19, 20). The Examiner finds Hofrichter teaches the
limitation "presenting data on an A VD according to the licensable
component without paying a license fee when in a retail demonstration
mode" and notes that "without paying a license fee" is a negative limitation
and is anticipated by any reference that does not expressly disclose paying a
license fee. Id. at 4 ( citing Hofrichter, Fig. 3).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates arguments presented in the
Appeal Brief and argues that the Examiner's "broadest reasonable
interpretation" is unreasonable as it erases terms ("according to the
licensable component"). Reply Br. 4. Regarding "without paying a license
fee," Appellant argues that "[t]he failure to disclose something does not
translate into a teaching of its opposite." Id. at 4--5 (citing Santarus, Inc. v.
Par Phann., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, (Fed. Cir. 2012).
We are persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the Examiner's
claim interpretation is unreasonably broad. In particular, the Examiner's
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interpretation does not properly apply the recited claim terms "according to
the licensable component" and "without paying a license fee." Rather, the
Examiner's interpretation of these elements renders them meaningless.
Claim terms in a patent application are given the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification, as understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
We agree with Appellants that in this case, the limitation "without paying a
license fee" narrows the claim and must be taught by the references. See
Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(limitation "restricted the claims to this preferred use ... [ t ]his exclusion
narrowed the claims, as the patentee is entitled to do."). The Examiner's
claim interpretation (Ans. 3-4) effectively ignores the limitation "without
paying the license fee," which is an unreasonably broad interpretation in
light of the claims and Specification.
In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 16 and
dependent claims 17-22.
Claims 20-22 depend from claim 16 and are separately rejected over
the cited references Houng, Hofricter, Spit, and additionally Iwata
(Vadlamani is not cited in this rejection). Non-Final Act. 12-14. The
Examiner finds Iwata teaches enabling a viewer to establish whether the
audio video device is in the retail demonstration mode and presenting an
option to select the retail demonstration mode. Id. at 13 (citing Iwata, Figs.
4, 6, ,r 91 ). However, the Examiner presents no persuasive evidence that
Iwata teaches the disputed limitations of claim 16, discussed supra. In
particular, there is no showing that Iwata teaches "according to the
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licensable component without paying a license fee." Therefore, we do not
sustain the rejection of claims 20-22 over Houng, Hofricter, Spit, and Iwata.
In the rejection of independent claims 24--27, the Examiner finds
Houng discloses wherein the indication that the A VD has not been vended is
established at least in part by determining that a user input retail mode key
signal has been received indicating the retail demonstration mode responsive
to a prompt presented on the display. Non-Final Act. 10 (citing Houng,
Figs. 6, 7, ,r 107). The Examiner additionally finds:
the claimed feature of "wherein the indication that the A VD has not
been vended is established at least in part by determining that audio
received by the A VD indicates that multiple sources of audio are
playing the same audio as each other [ referring to claim 24] or wherein
the indication that the A VD has not been vended is established at least
in part by determining that other CE devices similar to the A VD are in
an immediate network vicinity to the A VD [referring to claim 25] or
wherein the indication that the A VD has not been vended is established
at least in part by determining that a wireless signal associated with a
retail outlet is detected [referring to claim 26] "is old and well known
in the field of art and thus is no more than the simple substitution of one
known element for another or the mere application of a known
technique to a piece of prior art ready for improvement. Ex parte Smith,
83 USPQ2d 1509 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int).
Examiner further notes that a wherein clause that merely states the
result of the limitations in the claim adds nothing to the patentability or
substance of the claim. (Texas Instruments Inc. v. International Trade
Commission 26, USPQ2d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Griffin v. Bertina, 62
USPQ2d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Amazon.com Inc. v.
Bamesandnoble.com Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1747 (CAFC 2001).
Id. at 10.
Appellant argues the Examiner's findings that the identified features
of claims 24--27 are "old and well known" carries no weight as it is an
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allegation lacking any evidentiary support. App. Br. 16. Appellant argues
the wherein clause in these claims "is not a mere statement of the results of
limitations, but an amplification of how those limitations are effected." Id.
According to Appellant, "[t]he examiner for the first time now clarifies he is
relying on an (unstated) theory of official notice. Suspecting this may have
been the case previously, Applicant has twice previously requested a prior
art showing of the allegedly well known facts under MPEP §2144.03,
without response, implying concession that the allegedly well known facts in
fact cannot be officially noticed away." Id. at 17. Appellant argues that the
Examiner does not address claim 27. Id. at 19.
In the Answer, the Examiner reiterates arguments presented in the
Non-Final Action and that "[c]laim 27 has been rejected in parallel with
claim 16." Ans. 4--5. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates arguments
presented in the Appeal Brief, including that claim 27 is not addressed by
the Examiner. Reply Br. 6.
We are persuaded by Appellant's arguments because, on the record
before us, the Examiner presents insufficient evidence that Houng, and the
other cited references teach the limitations of claims 24--27. In particular,
there is no basis for the Examiner's reliance on "old and well known" and
the "wherein" limitations should be considered. Moreover, regarding claim
27, we find insufficient basis to support the Examiner's assertion that this
claim "has been rejected in parallel with claim 16," and, as discussed supra,
we do not sustain the rejection of claim 16
In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 24--27.
DECISION
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We reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 16-22 and 24--27
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 16-22 and 24--27
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
REVERSED
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