Ex Parte Scholer et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 29, 2016

12909111 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/909,111 10/21/2010 Richard Allen Scholer 83155743 5280
28395 7590 12/01/2016
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER HARRINGTON, MICHAEL P
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/01/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RICHARD ALLEN SCHOLER, DOUGLAS A. OLIVER,
DEREK HARTL, DALE GILMAN, and
PERRY ROBINSON MACNEILLE
Appeal 2014-006491
Application 12/909,1111
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
JAMES A. WORTH, Administrative Patent Judges.
FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1—4, 6, 7, 16, 19, and 20 of the Office Action mailed
on April 24, 2013. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Appellants identify Ford Global Technologies, LLC as the real party in
interest. Br. 2.
Appeal 2014-006491
Application 12/909,111
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
THE INVENTION
Appellants claim “a trip planning system for planning a trip based on
the charge of an electric vehicle battery.” Spec. 2,11. 20-22.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A trip planning system comprising:
one or more computers located remotely from an electric
vehicle, being configured to:
receive a monetary total that a user wishes to spend
charging a vehicle;
receive battery charge status of one or more electric
vehicle battery packs; and
present a projected travelable distance based at least in
part on the charge status and a projected charge resulting from
charging a vehicle in accordance with the monetary total.
Br. Claims App. 1.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Todoriki US 6,864,807 B2 Mar. 8, 2005
Fincham US 2010/0017249 A1 Jan. 21,2010
Hershkovitz US 2010/0094496 A1 Apr. 15,2010
Yamamoto US 2010/0207772 A1 Aug. 19, 2010
Kressner US 2010/0256830 A1 Oct. 7,2010
Hershkovitz US 2010/0094496 A1 Apr. 15,2010
Grossman US 2010/0110077 A1 May 6, 2010
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Application 12/909,111
The following rejections are before us for review.
Claims 6, 7, and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 16, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1 and 2 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Yamamoto in view of Kressner.
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Yamamoto and Kressner and further in view of Hershkovitz.
Claim 4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Yamamoto, Kressner, Hershkovitz, and further in view of Todoriki.
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Yamamoto, Kressner, Grossman, and further in view of Hershkovitz.
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Yamamoto, Kressner, and further in view of Todoriki.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Yamamoto and Grossman.
Claims 16, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Yamamoto, Kressner, in view of Fincham.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 12-28 of
the Final Action.
2. Yamamoto discloses:
The remote module 70 on the information center 7 retrieves
information including the destination and the departure time
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Application 12/909,111
from the car-navigation system 52 via the WAN
communication device 53 and the communication network
12. The remote module 70 calculates the required charge
amount Ctar necessary for a one way trip to the destination
from the charging station 2 or the required charge amount
Ctar necessary for a round trip to the destination from the
charging station 2. The required charge amount Ctar is
calculated based on the retrieved information and information
including route information and/or traffic information stored
in the information center 7. The remote module 70 calculates
the required charge amount Ctar during performing the
charging operation to the battery 42 by connecting the station
side connector 21 and the vehicle side connector 41. Then, the
remote module 70 sends the required charge amount Ctar to
the charge controller 5 via the WAN communication device
53 and the communication network 12. The charge controller
5 calculates and generates the estimated time Tl. The estimated
time Tl is estimated as a time which is considered
necessary to charge the battery 42 to the required charge
amount Ctar by taking the present charge amount Cdet
detected by the charge amount detecting device 51 into
consideration. The remote monitoring system 1 is constructed
so that the charge controller 5 sends the estimated time Tl to the
terminal 6 via the WAN communication device 53 and the
communication network 12.
Para. 54.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 112 REJECTION (first paragraph)
The Examiner rejected claims 6, 7, and 112 under 35 U.S.C. §112
failing to comply with the written description requirement. We will not
sustain this rejection.
2 Claim 11 is cancelled. See Br., Claims App. 2.
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Application 12/909,111
Claim 6 recites in pertinent part, “informing the user of one or
more non-vehicle devices drawing power from a charging network,
including providing an option for a user to defer usage of at least one
of the non-vehicle devices.” Br. Claims App. 1.
Claim 7 recites in pertinent part “the projected charge in
accordance with the monetary total is calculated based on a utility
rate.” Id.
Appellants cite to Specification at page 10, lines 8 to 29 for the basis
of the subject matter of claim 6. Our review of the Specification reveals that
Appellants are correct in stating that it is reasonable to monitor the Electric
Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) to reveal the actual charge rate to
determine the total system load; hence, the logical deduction would be to
enhance charge at the EVSE by cutting down on items other than the EVSE.
For claim 7, the Specification at page 12, lines 3 to 14, explicitly
describe the claimed feature stating, “This rate information may be set by
one or more utility companies.” Spec. 12,11. 9-10.
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
Appellants’ sole argument against the rejection of these claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is:
Claim 16 states “calculating, via a server, a time for
charging the battery in accordance with the monetary total.”
Thus, the claim is tied to a specific machine and is allowable
under §101. Claims 19 and 20 are allowable based on
dependency from allowable claim 16.
Appeal Br. 9.
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We address only Appellants’ arguments to the use of a computer to
calculate the claimed time value, which value absent any argument by
Appellants to the contrary, we find to be the result of a mental process.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis
at Mayo step two.
the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply if” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract
idea “on ... a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea ... on a generic
computer.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2359. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to intake data and compute a result therefrom amounts to
electronic data retrieval and calculation—one of the most basic functions of
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a computer. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry. In short, each step
does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer
functions.
The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field. Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of
calculating a time value using an equation, one of whose variables include a
time value. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 134
S. Ct. at 2360.
35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION
The Appellants argued claims 1 and 2 together as a group.
(Appeal Br. 9). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group,
and the remaining dependent claim standing or falling with claim 1. 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012).
Appellants argue:
Even if this portion of Kressner is considered to teach
“receiving a monetary total that a user wishes to spend charging
a vehicle,” when Kressner is combined with Yamamoto,
elements of the claims are still not present. Yamamoto may
output when a vehicle can travel a predetermined route, but this
is not “present a projected travelable distance based ... on ... a
projected charge resulting from charging a vehicle in
accordance with the monetary total.'1'’ Yamamoto deals with a
charge needed to reach a destination. There is no calculation, in
Yamamoto or Kressner, of “a projected charge resulting from
charging a vehicle in accordance with the vehicle charging
cost.” This is not an actual charge following the charging. This
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Application 12/909,111
is a projection of how much charge will be obtained based on
the input monetary total. Thus, in Applicant’s claims, a user
can say “I want to put $5 of charge in my vehicle.” And the
system can respond “$5 will get you X miles,” because the
claimed system calculates a projected charge based on the
expenditure.
Br. 11.
The Examiner however, citing to paragraph 54 of Yamamoto (FF. 2),
found that “Yamamoto has disclosed a system and method of calculating the
charge necessary to complete a desired trip, and calculating the time needed
to complete the charge.” (Answer 9). The Examiner then concludes that,
... the car navigation system sends the destination to the remote
monitoring station, which calculates the charge necessary for a
one way and round trip to a destination, which the Examiner
notes would be a distance travelled for a charge. The charge
determined for a specific trip would be presented to a user, as
well as the distance reached (to a destination or round trip).
(Answer 10).
We agree with the Examiner’s findings. We find that Yamamoto
discloses determining the required charge based on charge status of the
battery by disclosing, “T1 is estimated as a time which is considered
necessary to charge the battery 42 to the required charge amount Ctar by
taking the present charge amount Cdet detected by the charge amount
detecting device 51 into consideration.” (FF. 2). We further find that
Yamamoto discloses a projected charge resulting from charging a vehicle by
disclosing, “[t]he remote module 70 calculates the required charge amount
Ctar during performing the charging operation to the battery 42... .” (Id.)
While Yamamoto calculates based on a known initial distance, we find no
evidence in the record before us which would contradict our finding here
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known to substitute one
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known variable for another in a given equation to arrive at the value of the
variable whose value is unknown. In the case with Yamamoto, we find one
of ordinary skill in the art would know the price of a charge, e.g., KW/$, and
what he/she is willing to spend. Knowing these variables, taken along with
the capability of the Ctar to calculate distance per charge (FF. 2) and the
known level of battery charge {id.), a projected travelable distance could
have been easily determined. The mere existence of differences between the
prior art and the claims does not establish nonobviousness. Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230 (1976). The issue is “whether the difference
between the prior art and the subject matter in question ‘is a different
sufficient to render the claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in
the applicable art.’” Id. at 228.
We also affirm the rejections of dependent claims 3, 4, 6, and 7 since
Appellants have not challenged such with any reasonable specificity {see In
re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Appellants’ arguments against the rejection of claims 16, 19, and 20
is based on the same perceived deficiencies of Yamamoto as identified for
claim 1. (Appeal Br. 13). Thus, for the same reasons we found for
sustaining the rejection of claim 1, we sustain the rejection of independent
claim 16, and dependent claims 19, and 20.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 6 and 7 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 16, 19, and
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—4, 6, 7,
16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-4, 6, 7, 16, 19, and 20
is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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