Ex Parte Richman et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 23, 2016

13794222 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
131794,222 03/11/2013 Steven Martin Richman
36738 7590 11/28/2016
ROGITZ & AS SOCIA TES
750B STREET
SUITE 3120
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
SA130023-US-NP 3610
EXAMINER
MONSHI, SAMIRA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2422
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/28/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN MARTIN RICHMAN, BRANT CANDELORE,
GRAHAM CLIFT, KAZUMOTO KONDO,
and FREDERICK J. ZUST AK 1
Appeal2015-004721
Application 13/794,222
Technology Center 2400
Before JOHN F. HORVATH, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 14--19, which constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART. We designate affirmance as NEW
GROUNDS OF REJECTION pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Sony Corp. (App. Br. 2.)
Appeal2015-004721
Application 13/794,222
Introduction
Appellants state their "application relates generally to managing extra
space on ultra high definition (UHD) displays when the UHD displays
present high definition (HD) video." (Spec i-f 1.)
Claim 14 is exemplary:
14. An ultra high definition (UHD) display device (UHDDD)
compnsmg:
a UHD display configured for presenting first and second
video contents in respective first and second windows of the
display; and
a processor configured for controlling the UHD display
to present demanded images, the processor configured for:
receiving a user command to launch an application for
presentation on the UHDDD;
comparing the command against a set of presentation
rules to determine if an application window representing the
application can be added to the UHDDD without violating one
or more of the presentation rules;
responsive to a determination that the application
window representing the application can be added to the display
without violating one or more of the presentation rules,
presenting on the UHDDD the application window; and
responsive to a determination that the application
window cannot be added to those already being presented on
the UHDDD without violating one or more presentation rules,
accessing the presentation rules to determine an alternate
action.
(App. Br. 8 (App'x A).)
Rejections
Claims 14--16 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Putterman et al. (US 2012/0169934 Al; July 5, 2012) and
Hwang et al. (2011/0289438 Al; Nov. 24, 2011). (Final Act. 16-19.)
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Claims 17 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Putterman, Hwang, and Zaika et al. (US 2004/0056894 Al; Mar. 25,
2004). (Final Act. 19--20.)
ANALYSIS
Claim 14
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding Hwang teaches the
limitations recited after "the processor [is] configured for:" in claim 14.
(App. Br. 4--5.) Appellants specifically contend the disclosure relied on by
the Examiner for "receiving a user command to launch an application ... "
(i.e., Hwang i-fi-172-78; see Final Act. 17, Ans. 10) is not tied to the
disclosure relied on for "comparing the command ... to determine if an
application window representing the application can be added ... "(i.e.,
Hwang i194; see Final Act. 17, Ans. 11-12). (App. Br. 4--5.) We agree.
Hwang paragraphs 72-78 teach a user interface for establishing rules
for the display of contact objects. The Examiner finds this teaches launching
a "setting application." (See Ans. 10.) Hwang paragraph 94 teaches using
the rules established by the setting application to manage the display of
contact objects. We agree with Appellants that, vis-a-vis the recited
"receiving" and "comparing" limitations, Hwang's setting application is
unrelated to managing the display of contact objects. (See App. Br. 4--5.) It
is improper for the Examiner to rely on the setting application for claim 14' s
"an application" and then a different application, i.e., an application for the
display of a contact object, for the subsequently recited "the application."
Nevertheless, we find and conclude that the combination of Putterman
and Hwang teaches or suggests all limitations of claim 14. As the Examiner
correctly finds, Putterman teaches the recited "UHD display configured for
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presenting first and second video contents in respective first and second
windows of the display" (see Final Act. 16 (citing Puttennan Figs. 5A-5D, 6
(step 625), i-fi-172-75, 80) and "processor configured for controlling the UHD
display to present demanded images" (id. (citing Putterman Fig. 7 (processor
710))). We note Hwang also teaches a processor to control a display for
presenting demanded images (Fig. 1 (control unit 500), i-f 14).
As the Examiner also correctly finds, Hwang teaches the recited
"receiving a user command to launch an application for presentation on the
UHDDD" (see Final Act. 17 (citing Hwang i-fi-172-78)). While the Examiner
identifies a "setting application" as discussed above, Hwang teaches
receiving commands to launch various other applications for presentation on
the display, such as an application for displaying a contact object. (Hwang
,-r,-r 72-84.)
We find the combination of Hwang and Putterman teaches or suggests
the recited "comparing the command [to launch the application] against a set
of presentation rules to determine if an application window representing the
application can be added to the UHDDD without violating one or more of
the presentation rules" limitation. Specifically, with the application being
an application to display a contact object, Hwang discloses managing the
display of the contact object according to presentation rules. (Hwang i-fi-180-
95 (discussing Figs. 6, 7).) Putterman teaches presenting different types of
data (e.g., application or television data) on different ones of multiple
windows on a high definition display. (Putterman i-fi-19-10.) It would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill at the time of Appellants' invention to
combine these teachings of Hwang and Putterman, because the skilled
artisan would have been motivated to use the flexible and efficient rules-
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Application 13/794,222
based teachings of Hwang for flexible and user-friendly management of the
plurality of application-containing windows in Putterman.
Regarding motivation to combine, Appellants argue the Examiner errs
in combining the teachings of Putterman and Hwang because "Hwang ...
bears zero relevance to Putterman" (App. Br. 5; see also id. at 3--4). We
disagree. A reason to combine teachings from the prior art "may be found in
explicit or implicit teachings within the references themselves, from the
ordinary knowledge of those skilled in the art, or from the nature of the
problem to be solved." WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'! Game Tech., 184 F.3d
1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
Putterman is directed to "display[ing] a broad spectrum of media
content in separate windows" on a television (Putterman i-f 2), including
display output from applications other than traditional television media (id.
i-fi-17-8) such as applications that use HTML (HyperText Markup Language)
(id. i-f 72). Hwang is directed to techniques for providing "event-triggered
contact information" (Hwang i-f 3) with an interface for displaying multiple
"contact objects" (id. i-f 8) including on televisions and other large format
displays (id. i-f 44). We disagree with Appellants that Putterman and Hwang
bear no relevance to each other, as both are directed to displaying
information in a plurality of windows on digital television screens.
Moreover, Appellants provide no evidence to show combining Hwang's
"contact object" display management features with Putterman's display of
"application windows" was "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art." See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
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485F.3d1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citingKSRint? Co. v. T'elejlex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)).
Regarding the remaining requirements of claim 14, the Examiner
finds Hwang i-f 94 teaches claim 14' s "responsive to ... " limitations (Final
Act. 17-19). While we agree with Appellants that Hwang teaches using
presentation rules for managing display of contact objects rather than
application windows (see App. Br. 4--5), we find the combination of this
disclosure from Hwang with Putterman's teachings for displaying
application windows, as discussed above, teaches or suggests both of the
recited "responsive to ... " requirements. In other words, it would have been
obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan to combine Putterman's application
windows with Hwang's presentation rules to make a presentation rules-
based determination of whether to add an application window to the display,
or else to take an alternate action, as recited.
Thus, we conclude claim 14 is obvious, and, accordingly, we sustain
its rejection. Because we rely on findings and reasons that differ from those
of the Examiner, we designate this as a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Claims 15, 16, and 18
Claim 15 depends from claim 14 and adds, inter alia, a requirement
that "the application window is grouped with application windows
representing existing applications in the same category as the first
application." The Examiner relies on Hwang i-f 94 for teaching this
requirement. Appellants argue the Examiner errs because "[ n Jo categories
exist in paragraph 94." (App. Br. 6.) We agree, and accordingly do not
sustain the rejection of claim 15.
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Claim 16 depends from claim 14 and adds a requirement "wherein the
alternate action is presenting on a user interface (UI) an option for a user to
override the rules." Appellants argue the Examiner errs by failing to point to
any disclosure in Hwang that teaches this requirement. (App. Br. 6.) We
agree, and accordingly do not sustain the rejection of claim 16.
Claim 18 depends from claim 14 and adds a requirement "wherein the
alternate action is presenting the application window in a way that replaces,
according to the presentation rules, one or more existing application
windows." Appellants summarily argue the Examiner errs "for the reasons
discussed above." We note this is not a proper separate argument for
patentability. See 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(l)(iv), In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We also note Hwang teaches an alternative action of
replacing the display of contact objects according to presentation rules (see
i-f 94 ("In case that the field is set to the value 'replace' as shown
in part 601 of FIG. 6, the control unit 500 determines that it is possible to
replace the one of the contact objects with a new contact object.")). We find
the combination of this teaching from Hwang with Putterman's teachings of
display of application windows, as discussed above, teaches the added
requirements of claim 18. Accordingly, we conclude claim 18 is obvious,
which we designate as a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b).
Claims 17 and 19
Claim 1 7 depends from claim 14 and recites "wherein the alternate
action is presenting the application window in a way that overlays,
according to the presentation rules, one or more existing application
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windows." Claim 19 similarly recites a requirement for resizing one or more
windows.
Appellants argue claims 17 and 19 together, contending the Examiner
errs because "[ t ]he portions of Zaika relied on do not teach overlaying
windows but rather relate to rearranging objects within a window" as recited
by claim 17. (App. Br. 7.) The Examiner answers by finding "the UI layout
rules disclosed by Zaika include a number of options for laying out UI
elements within each UI window. For example, the 'overlap' layout rules
... provide[] the capability to overlap one or more UI items in a UI
window." (Ans. 13; Final Act. 19 (citing Zaikia i-fi-17, 8, 57, 126-28, 136).)
We agree with and adopt the Examiner's findings that Zaika teaches
resizing and overlapping of frames within windows. We also note Zaika
specifically teaches that frames within windows can themselves be windows
(i-f 125). We accordingly sustain the rejection of claims 17 and 19 as
obvious. Because the rejection of these dependent claims rely on the new
ground of rejection for their parent claim, we designate this as a new ground
of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the rejection of claims 14 and 17-19,
and we reverse the rejection of claims 15 and 16. We designate our
affirmance of the rejection of claims 14 and 17-19 as new grounds of
rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), which provides "[a] new ground
of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for
judicial review." Section 41.50(b) also provides:
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the
appellant, within two months from the date of the decision,
must exercise one of the following two options with respect to
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Application 13/794,222
the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal
as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution
will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of
rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or
new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the
opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of
rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner
reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board
pursuant to this subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record.
The request for rehearing must address any new ground of
rejection and state with particularity the points believed to
have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new
ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which
rehearing is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure§ 1214.01.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
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