Ex Parte Reilly

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 24, 2017

13936503 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/936,503 07/08/2013 Tristram T. Reilly GB920120021US1 5678
77212 7590 10/26/2017
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EXAMINER
20 Church Street EDWARDS, CAROLYN R
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Hartford, CT 06103 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/26/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TRISTRAM T. REILLY1
Appeal 2017-002570
Application 13/936,503
Technology Center 2600
Before LARRY J. HUME, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19, and 20, which are
all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief and
Reply Brief, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments. We are
persuaded by Appellant’s contention that the Examiner erred in rejecting
1 Appellant identifies International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-002570
Application 13/936,503
independent claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Black2
does not teach or suggest the emphasized portion of the limitation
based on detecting an absence of the continuous touch contact at
the location on the touch screen display, disabling the display of
the sensitive data, wherein disabling the display of the sensitive
data places the device into a protected state,
as recited in claims 1,9, and 17.3 App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 2.
The Examiner finds Black teaches a handheld palm computer with a
plurality of fingerprint and palm sensors on the side and rear of the device.
Ans. 2—3 (citing Black Figs. 1A, IB, 4B). The Examiner also finds Black
teaches the sensors “enable a continual authentication of the identity of the
user with requests] to access highly sensitive information.” Id. at 3 (citing
Brown Fig. 6,158). According to the Examiner, paragraph 58 of Black
“teaches that continuous contact is required by the user.” Id. (emphasis
omitted). The Examiner further finds Brown teaches “there is a continual[]
monitoring of the user’s identify.” Id. (citing Fig. 6, H 66, 67).
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments the Examiner
erred. Appellant argues, and we agree, paragraph 58 of Brown does
not teach that the user’s biometric data is captured “continuously,” but
instead teaches it is captured “prior to each request for data access” or,
alternatively, “during predetermined intervals” to authenticate the
user. See Reply Br. 2 (citing Brown 158). Appellant also argues, and
2 Black (US 2012/0027265 Al; published Feb. 2, 2012).
3 Appellant also argues that neither Bandyopadhyay (US 2012/0071149 Al;
pub. Mar. 22, 2012) nor Aspelin (US 2012/0127179 Al; pub. May 24, 2012)
cure this deficiency. See App. Br. 6. In that regard, we note the Examiner
cites Aspelin only for teaching that the fingerprint sensor is on the display.
See Ans. 3^4.
2
Appeal 2017-002570
Application 13/936,503
we agree, in the claimed system, “[t]he monitoring for the touch is
continuous during the operation of the device and it is not limited to
predetermined intervals.” Id. Because Brown does not teach that
continuous touch contact is required by the user, we agree with
Appellant that Brown does not teach or suggest “detecting an absence
of the continuous touch contact,” as required by the limitation at issue.
Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 1, 9,
and 17. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent
claims 3—8, 11—16, 19, and 20.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19,
and 20.
REVERSED
3