Ex Parte ReillyDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 24, 201713936503 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/936,503 07/08/2013 Tristram T. Reilly GB920120021US1 5678 77212 7590 10/26/2017 r'antnr Fnlhiirn T T P - TRM FnHiontt EXAMINER 20 Church Street EDWARDS, CAROLYN R 22nd Floor Hartford, CT 06103 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2625 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/26/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): usptopatentmail@cantorcolbum.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TRISTRAM T. REILLY1 Appeal 2017-002570 Application 13/936,503 Technology Center 2600 Before LARRY J. HUME, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judges. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19, and 20, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief and Reply Brief, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments. We are persuaded by Appellant’s contention that the Examiner erred in rejecting 1 Appellant identifies International Business Machines Corporation as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2017-002570 Application 13/936,503 independent claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Black2 does not teach or suggest the emphasized portion of the limitation based on detecting an absence of the continuous touch contact at the location on the touch screen display, disabling the display of the sensitive data, wherein disabling the display of the sensitive data places the device into a protected state, as recited in claims 1,9, and 17.3 App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 2. The Examiner finds Black teaches a handheld palm computer with a plurality of fingerprint and palm sensors on the side and rear of the device. Ans. 2—3 (citing Black Figs. 1A, IB, 4B). The Examiner also finds Black teaches the sensors “enable a continual authentication of the identity of the user with requests] to access highly sensitive information.” Id. at 3 (citing Brown Fig. 6,158). According to the Examiner, paragraph 58 of Black “teaches that continuous contact is required by the user.” Id. (emphasis omitted). The Examiner further finds Brown teaches “there is a continual[] monitoring of the user’s identify.” Id. (citing Fig. 6, H 66, 67). We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments the Examiner erred. Appellant argues, and we agree, paragraph 58 of Brown does not teach that the user’s biometric data is captured “continuously,” but instead teaches it is captured “prior to each request for data access” or, alternatively, “during predetermined intervals” to authenticate the user. See Reply Br. 2 (citing Brown 158). Appellant also argues, and 2 Black (US 2012/0027265 Al; published Feb. 2, 2012). 3 Appellant also argues that neither Bandyopadhyay (US 2012/0071149 Al; pub. Mar. 22, 2012) nor Aspelin (US 2012/0127179 Al; pub. May 24, 2012) cure this deficiency. See App. Br. 6. In that regard, we note the Examiner cites Aspelin only for teaching that the fingerprint sensor is on the display. See Ans. 3^4. 2 Appeal 2017-002570 Application 13/936,503 we agree, in the claimed system, “[t]he monitoring for the touch is continuous during the operation of the device and it is not limited to predetermined intervals.” Id. Because Brown does not teach that continuous touch contact is required by the user, we agree with Appellant that Brown does not teach or suggest “detecting an absence of the continuous touch contact,” as required by the limitation at issue. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 1, 9, and 17. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 3—8, 11—16, 19, and 20. DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19, and 20. REVERSED 3 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation