Ex Parte Ramirez

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 12, 2013

11438945 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/438,945 05/22/2006 Ed Ramirez RAMI-00100 3936
7590 08/13/2013
Jonathan O. Owens
HAVERSTOCK & OWENS LLP
162 North Wolfe Road
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
EXAMINER
BAKER, LORI LYNN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3751
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/13/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

____________

Ex parte ED RAMIREZ
____________

Appeal 2011-008335
Application 11/438,945
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before GAY ANN SPAHN, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
ADAM V. FLOYD, Administrative Patent Judges.

FLOYD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
decision finally rejecting claims 1, 4-9, 12, and 19-22. Appellant has
cancelled claim 2, and the Examiner has withdrawn claims 3, 10, 11, 13-18,
23, and 24. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 7, 19, and 21 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1
is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and recites:
1. A mat for attenuating reflective spray during use of a
urinal, comprising:
a. a body configured for placement within a urinal, the
body including a sheet-like substrate having a plurality of drain
holes formed therethrough and an upper surface including a
first urine impingement region that includes a plurality of
upstanding, flexible bristles, each configured to flex when
struck by a typical stream of urine, wherein adjacent bristles are
separated from one another by a distance such that the typical
stream of urine contacting a bristle and causing the bristle to
flex will also contact at least two adjacent bristles and cause
them to flex as well; and
b. a cap structure configured to accept a urinal cake, the
cap structure comprising a lid surface and a lower edge,
wherein the lid surface includes a plurality of drain holes
formed therethrough and a second urine impingement region
that includes a second plurality of upstanding, flexible bristles,
each bristle configured to flex when struck by a typical stream
of urine, wherein adjacent bristles are separated from one
another by a distance such that the typical stream of urine
contacting a bristle and causing it to flex will also contact at
least two adjacent bristles and cause them to flex as well,
wherein the drain holes formed through the lid surface take up
less than a majority of the area within the boundary of the lid
surface, and wherein the lower edge is configured to mate with
a urinal cake retention region on the upper surface of the body,
thereby permitting retention of a urinal cake therebetween.

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1 and 19-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly
claim the subject matter which Appellant regards as the invention.1
Claims 7-9, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Wager2 (US 5,774,905, issued Jul. 7, 1998).
Claims 7-9, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Wager and Luedtke (US 5,313,672, issued May 24, 1994).
Claims 1, 4-9, 12, and 19-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Leavitt (US 3,597,772, issued Aug. 10, 1971) and Wager.
Claims 1, 4-9, 12, and 19-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Leavitt, Wager, and Luedtke.

1 The Examiner determined that claims 1 and 19 are indefinite with
respect to “a separation distance based upon ‘the typical stream of
urine’ which causes a bristle to ‘flex,’” (Final Rej. 2-3) and claims 19-
22 are indefinite for mixing method and apparatus (Final Rej. 3-4).
With respect to the rejection of claims 1 and 19, Appellant separately
argued the claim language of “typical stream of urine” (App. Br. 7-8),
and “upstanding, flexible bristles” (App. Br. 8). Although the Final
Rejection states that “beyond being stated baldly as ‘flexible’, the
material of the bristles does not appear to be defined by the instant
disclosure,” the Examiner withdrew the rejection as to “upstanding,
flexible bristles” to the extent that there was any indefiniteness rejection
of that claim language. Final Rej. 2-3; Ans. 3.
2 The Certificate of Correction attached to Wager indicates that the first
named inventor’s last name is actually “Wagner.” To avoid confusion
in the record, we will continue referring to the reference as Wager.
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ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 1 and 19 as indefinite for reciting “a typical stream
of urine.”
The Examiner determines that claims 1 and 19 are indefinite as the
metes and bounds of the recitation of “a separation distance based upon ‘the
typical stream of urine’ which causes a bristle to ‘flex’” cannot be
ascertained, because “the ‘[typical] stream of urine’ has not been defined by
the instant disclosure.” Final Rej. 2-3. Appellant argues that a typical
stream of urine “has long been recognized as a standard for diagnosing
lower urinary tract obstructions in males” and has a flow rate of
approximately 10-20 ml/sec, is initially about 6 mm across, and breaks up
into drops about 10-20 cm after exiting the meatus,3 and after breaking into
drops, the average drop size is about 0.61 cm in diameter with a velocity of
about 200 cm/sec. App. Br. 7 (citing MedlinePlus®, Uroflowmetry,
http://www.nlm.nih. gov/medlinplus/ency/article/003325.htm, Updated by
David C. Dugdale III, MD Sept. 7, 2008, Copyright 1997-2010 (“Medline
Paper”); Henry Gray, Anatomy of the Human Body, Section 3b.4 The Male
Urethra, 1918, http:www.bartleby.com/107/256.html (“Gray’s Anatomy”);
R.C. Ritter, A.M. Sterling, and N. R. Zinner, Physical Information in the
External Urinary Stream of the Normal and Obstructed Adult Male, British
Journal Of Urology, 49, 293-302, 293 (1977) (“1977 Ritter Article”); and
R.C. Ritter, N. R. Zinner, A.M. Sterling, Analysis of Drop Intervals in Jets
Modelling [sic] Obstruction of the Urinary Tract, Phys. Med. Biol. vol. 19,
No. 2, 161-170 (1974) (“1974 Ritter Article)). Appellant concludes that:

3 “Urinary meatus” is the opening of the urethra through which urine is
discharged. The Free Dictionary (http://medical-dictionary.
thefreedictionary. com/urinary+meatus).
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the phrase “a typical stream of urine” is definite to persons of ordinary skill
in the art of urinal-related product design; the typical stream has been
characterized in urological publications since the 1970’s; and the typical
stream can be characterized without undue experimentation. App. Br. 8.
We have reviewed the four articles cited by Appellant and find no
reference to the phrase “a typical stream of urine.”4 Moreover, the 1977
Ritter Article states that a “normal young adult male” has a flow rate
between 15 and 30 ml/sec when averaged over the entire voiding (i.e.,
emptying of the bladder). 1977 Ritter Article, p. 294 (emphasis added).
Thus, there exists a 100% variance in the averaged flow rate for a normal
male adult from one voiding to another. In addition, during any single
voiding the flow rate begins and ends near zero. Id., p. 300, Fig. 7, upper
two graphs. It is unclear whether “a typical stream of urine” is intended to
encompass all phases of a normal young adult male voiding his bladder (i.e.,
encompassing flow rates from near zero to a peak value exceeding 30
ml/sec) or a flow rate averaged over the voiding (i.e. ,encompassing flow
rates 15-30 ml/sec). Also unclear is why “a typical stream of urine” would
be limited to that of normal young adult males. The Medline Paper indicates
flow rate will vary by age and if boys and elderly men are included, the
averaged normal flow rate may be as low 9 ml/sec. 5 While Appellant

4 While the 1974 Ritter Article does state that the number of urine drops
in “typical human voidings” is 2900-8800, it does not mention “a
typical stream of urine.” 1974 Ritter Article, 165. Likewise, the
Medline paper lists normal flow rates by gender and age, but does not
mention “a typical stream of urine.” Medline Paper, 1-2.
5 While the claim is also silent as to whether the “typical stream of urine”
is limited to males, given that the claimed invention is for a urinal, we
assume it to be so limited.
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contends that the 15-30 ml/sec flow rate is applicable to “healthy male[s] in
the age range of 4 years to 80 years,” we find no support for this contention
as the 1977 Ritter Article states the measurements came from “normal young
adult males.” Compare App. Br. 7 to 1977 Ritter Article, p. 294.
In addition to ambiguities related to whether the flow rate is averaged
or age limited, one must make similar considerations with respect to the
diameter, velocity, and other applicable properties of the urine stream.
While Appellant argues that a “typical stream [of urine] of a healthy male in
the age range of 4 years to 80 years . . . is initially about 6 mm across,” the
citation to Gray’s Anatomy does not support Appellant’s contention. App.
Br. 7. The citation merely states the urethra in the body of a penis measures
about 6 mm in diameter. Gray’s Anatomy, p. 2. Not only is there an
absence of the age range argued by Appellant, Appellant is concluding
without support that the stream of urine exiting the urethra will be of the
same diameter (i.e., that the urethra will not expand during urination and the
urine stream will not expand after exiting the urethra).
Moreover, Appellant notes that according to the 1977 Ritter Article,
the stream of urine breaks into drops some 10 to 20 cm from the meatus.
App. Br. 7. However, the claim recites a “stream” creating another
ambiguity as to whether the stream once broken into drops is intended to be
included in the limitation — “a typical stream of urine.” Further, if “a
typical stream of urine” is intended to encompass the stream even after it
breaks up into drops, the parameters of said “typical” drops are unknown.
Appellant argues that the average drop size is about 0.61 cm in diameter.
App. Br. 7 (citing 1977 Ritter Article). However, the 1977 Ritter Article
states, “we found that the average drop volume is 0.12 ml (excluding small
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‘satellites’ less than 0.02 ml) corresponding to a spherical drop of 0.61 cm
diameter.” 1977 Ritter Article, p. 294 (emphasis added). Assuming “a
typical stream of urine” includes the drops, Appellant offers no explanation
for excluding the smaller 0.02 ml (i.e., 0.06 cm) drops from the definition.
Furthermore, the average drop volume shows considerable variation for
three subjects with actual drop volumes ranging from about 0.8 ml6 to 1.7
ml. 1977 Ritter Article, p. 297, Fig. 4. This creates yet another ambiguity as
“a typical stream of urine” could be based upon an averaged drop size or the
entire range of drop sizes.
The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is
whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the
claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted). In other words, “the definiteness of the language employed must
be analyzed — not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the
prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would be
interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.”
In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (CCPA 1971). Here, Appellant has
offered no nexus between medical urological publications and urinal product
design. While they both relate to urine, Appellant presents no evidence that
one of ordinary skill in the art of urinal-related product design would have
knowledge of medical urological references. Further, none of the urology
references provide a definition for “a typical stream of urine.”

6 We note there appears to be an error on the numbering of the vertical
axis of Figure 4.
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In claims 1 and 19, the precise definition of “a typical stream of urine”
is of particular importance as the claims define the upstanding, flexible
bristles as being “configured to flex when struck by a typical stream of
urine,” and a bristle separation “distance such that the typical stream of urine
contacting a bristle and causing the bristle to flex will also contact at least
two adjacent bristles and cause them to flex.” As the Examiner correctly
points out, the width of a widely variable stream of urine does not provide
the public with fair notice of what is and is not covered by the claim.
Ans. 4. We agree that the claim read in the light of the Specification fails to
“reasonably apprise[] those of skill in the art of its scope.” In re
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994).7 Thus, the rejection of
claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite is
sustained.

The rejection of claims 19-22 as indefinite for reciting two statutory classes
The Examiner rejected claims 19-22 under § 112, second paragraph,
as indefinite “for attempting to embrace two statutory classes.” Ans. 4.
Specifically, the Examiner found that the claims recite methods, but the
body of the claims “inject[] product/apparatus structure.” Id. Appellant
argues that there is no per se prohibition to including structure in a method
claim. App. Br. 9. We agree that a method claim may reference structure
and thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 19-22 under 35 U.S.C.

7 Appellant’s argument that a typical stream can be characterized without
undue experimentation (App. Br. 8) fails to use the appropriate legal
standard for indefiniteness. Undue experimentation relates to
enablement under § 112, first paragraph, not indefiniteness under § 112,
second paragraph.
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§ 112, second paragraph, as indefinite for reciting both method steps and
product/apparatus structure.

The rejection of claims 7-9, 21, and 22 as unpatentable over Wager
The Examiner finds that Wager discloses “a plurality of upstanding,
flexible bristles,” because the bristles appear to be made in one-piece with
the mat and the mat is flexible. Final Rej. 5 (citing col. 4, ll. 8-10 and
Fig. 3). The Examiner also finds that Wager’s disclosure that rigid urinal
devices are prone to splashing further suggests the use of flexible bristles.
Final Rej. 5-6 (citing Wager, col. 1, ll. 31-34). Appellant argues that just
because Wager’s mat is flexible it does not follow that the bristles (i.e., pin
members 6) are flexible. App. Br. 10. Specifically, Appellant argues that
the flexibility of the bristles/pins is dependent upon the ratio of the length of
the bristle/pin to its diameter and that Wager is silent on these dimensions.
Id. Appellant also argues that Wager’s disclosure that “prior devices
typically present a smooth and hard surface which is prone to splashing,” is
a statement regarding just the pad not the bristles. App. Br. 11 (citing
Wager, col. 1, ll. 25-34).
We agree with the Examiner’s reading of Wager as disclosing flexible
bristles/pins. Wager discloses a flexible mat of “flexibly resilient material
such as plastic or rubber” which conforms to surface of the urinal (Wager,
col. 4, ll. 8-17), and the cross-section in figure 3 supports the Examiner’s
finding that pin members 6 are made of the same material. We disagree with
Appellant’s reading of Wager, column 1, lines 25-34 to be limited to a
suggestion to make only the mat flexible not the bristles. Id. The import of
the passage is that smooth and hard surfaces are prone to splashing which
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further supports the Examiner’s finding that the pins in Wager are flexible
rather than hard or rigid. Ans. 4. Thus, it was reasonable and supported by
a preponderance of the evidence for the Examiner to find that Wager’s pin
members constitute “flexible bristles” within the meaning of claim 7. This is
especially true since claim 7 contains no boundary of how flexible the
bristles must be.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner admitted in the Final
Rejection that the bristles of Wager “may not be flexible.” App. Br. 11
(quoting Final Rej. 7, ll. 1-2). Appellant is taking the Examiner’s statement
out of context. The Examiner clearly finds in the Final Rejection that Wager
teaches flexible bristles (Final Rej. 5-6), a position that was maintained on
appeal (Ans. 4, 8). The statement Appellant relied upon is a statement
leading into an alternative argument (i.e., to the extent Wager doesn’t
disclose flexible bristles, Luedtke does). Final Rej. 7. The Examiner makes
a similar statement (“[t]o the extent the bristles taught by Wager are not
flexible” those of Luedtke are) in the same Final Rejection on page 9. Thus,
the Examiner did not alter the finding regarding Wager’s bristles being
flexible, but rather argued in the alternative.
Appellant further argues that Wager’s pin members are designed to
deflect the direction of urine and are therefore rigid. App. Br. 11. First, the
passage Appellant relies upon states that the function is “deflecting liquid
and limiting splashing.” Wager, col. 2, ll. 61-62 (emphasis added); see also
col. 1, ll. 52-54; col. 2, ll. 47-52; and col. 4, ll. 23-25. Second, as the
Examiner properly finds, Appellant offers no evidence or explanation of
why a flexible bristle would not also deflect liquid, especially where the
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claim is silent on the amounts of flexibility and deflection required. Final
Rej. 6.
Lastly, Appellant argues that “[n]othing in Wager suggests that the
pin members should be flexible,” and “[t]he only suggestion or motivation to
provide flexible bristles is improperly taken from the presently claimed
invention.” App. Br. 11-12. The Examiner concludes that one of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that producing splash reducing bristles would
depend upon several “factors such as geometry, size, surface configuration,
flexibility, pattern density, etc.,” and that an “artisan would be free to choose
from these variables.” Final Rej. 6. Appellant fails to address the
Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness with respect to a routine design
choice. App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 10. We agree with the Examiner that the
selection of the thickness, height, and spacing of the bristles are routine
design choices and thus, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s rejection
relies on an impermissible hindsight reconstruction as argued by Appellant.
We sustain the rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wager.
With respect to the rejection of claims 8, 9, 21, and 22, Appellant does
not make any other arguments separate from those made with respect to the
rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Wager.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth supra, we likewise sustain the
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 8, 9, 21, and 22 as unpatentable
over Wager.

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The rejection of claims 7-9, 21, and 22 as unpatentable over Wager and
Luedtke
We also agree with the Examiner that to the extent Wager’s pins 6 are
not “flexible bristles” within the meaning of claim 7, Luedtke clearly
discloses flexible bristles. Ans. 5. In addition to arguments already
addressed, Appellant argues that there is no motivation to combine Wager
and Luedtke and doing so would render both references unsatisfactory for
their intended purpose. App. Br. 12. Appellant argues that the purpose of
Wager is to deflect the stream of urine while that of Luedtke is to decelerate
the urine thereby reducing splashing. Id. (citing Luedtke, Abstract; col. 2, ll.
5-10). As addressed above, Appellant is ignoring that Wager’s stated
purpose of the pins is “deflecting liquid and limiting splashing.” Wager,
col. 2, ll. 61-62 (emphasis added). Likewise, as Appellant acknowledges,
Luedtke’s purpose was to limit splashing. Thus, we agree with the
Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art to modify the pin members of Wager as taught by Luedtke so
as to facilitate deflection and reduce splashing — a goal stated by both
references. Ans. 9. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 7 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wager and Luedtke.
With respect to the rejection of claims 8, 9, 21, and 22, Appellant does
not make any other arguments separate from those made with respect to the
rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Wager
and Luedtke. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth supra, we likewise
sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 8, 9, 21, and 22 as
unpatentable over Wager and Luedtke.

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The rejections of: claims 1, 4-9, 12, and 19-22 as unpatentable over Leavitt
and Wager; and claims 1, 4-9, 12, and 19-22 as unpatentable over Leavitt,
Wager, and Luedtke
For the reasons explained in addressing the indefiniteness of claims 1
and 19 supra, “our analysis of [those] claims leaves us in a quandary as to
what in fact is covered by them.” In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA
1962). This uncertainty extends to claims 2-6 and 20 which depend from
claims 1 and 19, respectively. Speculations and assumptions would be
required to decide the meaning of “a typical stream of urine” employed in
the claims and the scope of the claims. Therefore, we conclude that the
indefiniteness of claims 1 and 19, prevents us from reaching the issue of
obviousness. Consequently, we reverse the obviousness rejections of claims
1, 4-6, 19, and 20. We emphasize that our reversal is based on procedure
rather than on the merits of the obviousness rejections. The reversal does
not mean that we consider the claims to be patentable as presently drawn.
Thus, we limit our examination of the two obviousness rejections based
upon the primary reference Leavitt to claims 7-9, 12, 21, and 22.
Examiner relies upon Leavitt’s disclosure of drain holes and a
hollowed volume used for holding a urinal deodorant cake. Ans. 5.
Appellant repeats its arguments with respect to alleged shortcomings of
Wager. These have already been addressed supra. In addition, Appellant
argues that the combination would render Leavitt and Wager unsuitable for
their intended purposes. App. Br. 13. Specifically, Appellant argues that the
purpose of Leavitt’s cake holder with drain holes is to allow water and urine
to contact the urinal cake and that by adding Wager’s pin member one would
reduce the total area of the apertures and render Leavitt unsatisfactory for its
intended purpose. App. Br. 14. Similarly, Appellant argues that modifying
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Wager to include Leavitt’s drain holes would reduce the number of pin
members rendering it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose of deflecting
urine. Id. The Examiner correctly points out that test for obviousness does
not require bodily incorporation of features from one reference to another,
but rather what the combined teaching of the two references would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. Ans. 10; see also In re Keller,
642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). The Examiner finds that it would have
been obvious to associate flexible bristles with the Leavitt mat to facilitate
urine deflection and limit splashing. Ans. 10-11. We agree. Appellant’s
argument that Leavitt would not continue to drain adequately when
combined with Wager’s pin members is not persuasive because while the
lessening of the apertures might lessen drainage there is no explanation of
why it would lessen it to a degree that would render Leavitt unsatisfactory
for its intended purpose.
Lastly, Appellant argues that the Leavitt and Wager combination does
not disclose that the drain holes in the lid comprise less than the majority of
the lid surface area. App. Br. 15. Due to the sustaining of the § 112, second
paragraph, indefiniteness rejection, this argument is no longer commensurate
with the scope of the claims being examined (i.e., claims 7-9, 12, 21, and
22). Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 7-9, 12, 21, and 22 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Leavitt and Wager.
The Examiner entered an alternative rejection of claims 7-9, 12, 21,
and 22 citing to Luedtke. Ans. 5. Specifically, the Examiner adds Luedtke
to Leavitt and Wager, and relies upon Luedtke’s disclosure of flexible pins.
Id. Appellant repeats the arguments already addressed in conjunction with
the § 103(a) rejection of claims 7-9, 21, and 22 over Wager and Luedtke.
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App. Br. 15. Thus, for the reasons already stated supra, we sustain the
rejection of claims 7-9, 12, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Leavitt, Wager, and Luedtke.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as indefinite due to the phrase “a typical stream of urine;”
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 19-22 as indefinite for reciting
two statutory classes;
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 7-9, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Wager.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 7-9, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Wager and Luedtke.
We REVERSE the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of: claims 1,
4-6, 19, and 20 as unpatentable over Leavitt and Wager; and claims 1, 4-6,
19, and 20 as unpatentable over Leavitt, Wager, and Luedtke.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 7-9, 12, 21, and 22 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Leavitt and Wager.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 7-9, 12, 21, and 22 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Leavitt, Wager, and Luedtke.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

Klh