Ex Parte Ramer et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 29, 201611347826 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 111347,826 0210312006 130011 7590 08/02/2016 Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, (AOL Inc.) Intellectual Property Department 2555 Grand Blvd. Kansas City, MO 64108-2613 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Jorey Ramer UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. AOLI.246011 3760 EXAMINER AKINTOLA, OLABODE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3691 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/02/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): IPDOCKET@SHB.COM IPRCDKT@SHB.COM kspringer@shb.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOREY RAMER, ADAM SOROCA, and DENNIS DOUGHTY Appeal2014-003553 Application 11/34 7 ,826 1 Technology Center 3600 Before HUBERT C. LORIN, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, Administrative Patent Judges. LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Jorey Ramer, et al. (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 47, 53, 54, and 57. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002). SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM. 1 The Appellants identify Jumptap, Inc as the real party in interest. Br. 2. Appeal2014-003553 Application 11/34 7 ,826 THE INVENTION Claim 47, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 4 7. A system for protecting advertisers from fraudulent costs, the system comprising a computer having a computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions which, when executed by a processor of the computer, causes the processor to perform the steps of: authorizing a mobile communication facility to interact with sponsored content; tracking sponsored content interactions from the mobile communication facility operated by a user; and comparing the frequency of the interactions with the sponsored content by the user against an expected behavior of the user to determine suspected fraudulent interaction traffic, wherein the expected behavior is based at least in part on a stored summary of the user's interaction with other sponsored content. THE REJECTION The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: York Jain US 2005/0108178 Al US 2007/0011078 Al The following rejection is before us for review: May 19, 2005 Jan 11, 2007 Claims 47, 53, 54, and 57 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Jain and York. 2 Appeal2014-003553 Application 11/34 7 ,826 ISSUE Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 47, 53, 54, and 57 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Jain and York? FINDINGS OF FACT We rely on the Examiner's factual findings stated in the Answer. Additional findings of fact may appear in the Analysis below. ANALYSIS The Appellants argued claims 47, 53, 54, and 57 as a group (Br. 3-5). We select claim 4 7 as the representative claim for this group, and the remaining claims 53, 54, and 57 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2013). Claim 4 7 calls for a processor to perform (a) an authorization for a mobile device to interact with a type of information, (b) tracking the interactions from the mobile device operated by a user; and ( c) comparing the frequency of the interactions by the user against an expected behavior of the user to determine suspected fraudulent interaction traffic, wherein the expected behavior is based at least in part on a stored summary of the user's interaction with another type of information. The Examiner's position is that Jain discloses all that is claimed but for the last step [ ( c)] for which York is relied upon. See Final Act. 3--4. According to the Examiner, "[i]t would have been obvious to combine the teachings of York to Jain in this way for the purpose of identifying potential fraud as discusse[d] in York." Final Act. 4. 3 Appeal2014-003553 Application 11/34 7 ,826 The Appellants argue that the Jain publication then fails to disclose the response or behavior of the viewer, or user, upon receipt of the ad. This is in contrast to the second step of independent claim 4 7 that recites a user interacting with (e.g., engaging, clicking) the sponsored content on the mobile communication facility and then tracking that interaction. Br. 3--4. The argument is unpersuasive as to error in the rejection. In the background of the invention, Jain discloses "monitoring the rapidity or regularity with which the ads are selected or clicked, these machine learning systems differentiate selections made by interested users from instances of selection fraud or 'click fraud.'" Para. 12. This disclosure indicates that it was known to click on ads and, in "monitoring the rapidity or regularity with which the ads are selected or clicked," to track their interaction. (Id.) While Jain does not mention doing so "on [a] mobile communication facility" as claimed, Jain does indicate that said process applies to a computer-based environment (see para. 1), which as is notoriously well known would include mobile devices. It would have been reasonably obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to design the computer- based click and monitor process to perform on a mobile device. Cf Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed.Cir. 2007). The Appellants also point out that "[t]he final step of claim 47 also requires that an expected behavior of the user is used to determine fraudulent interaction traffic." Br. 4. But Jain discloses "machine learning systems differentiate selections made by interested users from instances of selection 4 Appeal2014-003553 Application 11/34 7 ,826 fraud or 'click fraud.'" Para. 12. If a machine learning system is differentiating between selections made by interested users and selection fraud, the machine is necessarily determining fraudulent interaction traffic based on differentiating expected behaviors. There is an implication that the machine expects a particular behavior on the part of interested users as well as those performing click fraud. The Appellants argue that the Jain publication teaches that the interactions with the sponsored content are associated with the competitor, and equates the competitor with the user required by claim 4 7. The "competitor" disclosed in paragraph [0028] of the Jain publication acts "to both invoke a showing of the ad and select the ad." The user in claim 4 7 is not required to purposefully invoke a viewing of the ad. Br. 4. It is true that Jain associates click-fraud with competitors, but the "user" in claim 47 does not exclude a competitor who purposefully invokes a viewing of the ad as Jain discloses. Claim 47 is broad, reasonably broadly covering Jain's competitor in the role of the user. The Appellants further argue that "[t]he expected behavior of a competitor [as in Jain], however, is already anticipated to be fraudulent in the Jain publication. Therefore, a competitor is not analogous to a user." Br. 4. But that presumes the "expected behavior" recited in claim 4 7 is limited to non-fraudulent interactions. Claim 4 7 has not been drafted to limit the scope to that extent. The "expected behavior" recited in claim 4 7 reasonably broadly covers any type of expected behavior "to determine suspected fraudulent interaction traffic" (claim 4 7), which covers the expected fraudulent behavior of a competitor as disclosed in Jain. The Appellants also challenged the Examiner's reliance on York. "York sets forth a software product that detects fraud based on credit card 5 Appeal2014-003553 Application 11/34 7 ,826 purchases and atypical behavior associated with the credit card holder, not a mobile device user. Furthermore, York fails to disclose user interactions with mobile ads." Br. 4. The argument is unpersuasive. The Examiner stated that "York, using the same problem solving technique, discloses using a user's historical data of usage patterns as criteria to identify potential fraud (See York [para.] [0022])." Final Act. 4. We agree that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jain in light of York so that the expected behavior is based on "a stored summary of the user's interaction with other sponsored content" (claim 4 7). In disclosing "machine learning systems differentiate selections made by interested users from instances of selection fraud or 'click fraud.'" (para. 12), the systems necessarily know what to expect when click fraud occurs. Information pre- exists so that the systems can determine whether the click frequency meets the definition of click-fraud or not. Given York's disclosure of comparing "the typical behavior of an individual," one of ordinary skill in the art would have been reasonably led to provide said information in the form of "a stored summary of the user's interaction with other sponsored content" (claim 4 7). The Appellants also cite law on the question of anticipation. Br. 4. But we do not have a question of anticipation before us. The remaining arguments are unpersuasive. The rejection is sustained. 6 Appeal2014-003553 Application 11/34 7 ,826 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 4 7, 5 3, 54, and 5 7 is affirmed. AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation