Ex Parte McKeon et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 22, 2017

13361292 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/361,292 01/30/2012 John McKEON 2566-524 8413
6449 7590 03/24/2017
ROTHWELL, FIGG, ERNST & MANBECK, P.C.
607 14th Street, N.W.
SUITE 800
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
SHRESTHA, BIJENDRA K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/24/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO-PAT-Email @rfem. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN MCKEON, FRANK TRANI, and JIM GRANDE
Appeal 2014-0087331
Application 13/361,2922
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. FETTING, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We REVERSE.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
February 26, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 5, 2014), and
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 5, 2014) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed May 20, 2013).
2 Appellants identify ITG Software Solutions, Inc. as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2014-008733
Application 13/361,292
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention “relates generally to the field of
financial systems and financial trading displays” and, more specifically, “to
methodologies for placing, cancelling and replacing electronic trade orders
being worked by various brokers at various electronic trading venues from a
trader’s electronic trading system” (Spec. 11).
Claims 1,11, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative:
1. A computer implemented method for electronic
trading, comprising the steps of:
providing a graphical user interface that is displayed
directly with an electronic order blotter executing on a computer,
features regarding electronic trade orders;
providing a first button within said graphical user interface
that lists current properties of a selected one of the electronic
trade orders being currently displayed in the electronic order
blotter on a display device; and
providing a second button within said graphical user
interface that lists a change that can be made to the current
properties of the selected electronic trade order and that is
available for user interaction.
REJECTION
Claims 1—17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Lutnick (US 7,865,422 B2, iss. Jan. 4, 2011), Kedia
(US 2007/0005481 Al, pub. Jan. 4, 2007), and Back (US 2003/0220853 Al,
pub. Nov. 27, 2003).3
3 We treat the Examiner’s reference to canceled claim 18 as inadvertent
error. See Final Act. 3.
2
Appeal 2014-008733
Application 13/361,292
ANALYSIS
Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 2—10
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Lutnick, on
which the Examiner relies, fails to disclose or suggest a first button listing
current properties of an electronic trading order and a second button listing a
change that can be made to the current properties of an electronic order,
where the two buttons are provided on the same display as an electronic
order blotter, i.e.,
providing a first button within said graphical user interface that
lists current properties of a selected one of the electronic trade
orders being currently displayed in the electronic order blotter
on a display device; and providing a second button within said
graphical user interface that lists a change that can be made to
the current properties of the selected electronic trade order and
that is available for user interaction[,]
as recited in claim 1 (Reply Br. 5—6).
In rejecting claim 1 under § 103(a), the Examiner ostensibly equates
“default” button 314 and “Key Tab 1” 312 in Figure 3 of Lutnick to the
claimed first button and second button, respectively (Final Act. 4 (citing
Lutnick, col. 4,11. 34-41 and 56—62; Figs. 2-4)). However, we find nothing
in the cited portions of Lutnick that discloses or suggests that these buttons
list current properties of a selected electronic order and/or list changes that
can be made to the current properties, as called for in claim 1. Instead, the
buttons merely allow a user to select a particular saved keyboard
configuration (see Lutnick, col. 4,11. 34-45, 56—62).
We also cannot agree with the Examiner that button 602 in Figure 6
and button 702 in Figure 7 can constitute the first and second buttons, as
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Appeal 2014-008733
Application 13/361,292
recited in claim 1 (Ans. 3). As Appellants observe, Lutnick discloses that
button 602 is displayed on display screen 600 and that, when button 602 is
selected, the user navigates to a different display, i.e., display screen 700,
which includes button 702 (Reply Br. 5—6 (citing Lutnick, col. 6,11. 25—32)).
In other words, buttons 602 and 702 are not provided on the same display as
an electronic order blotter, as called for in claim 1.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we
also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2—10. Cf. In re Fritch,
972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if
the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”).
Independent Claims 11 and 16 and Dependent Claims 12—15, 17, 19, and 20
Independent claims 11 and 16 include language substantially similar
to the language of claim 1, and stand rejected based on the same rationale
applied with respect to claim 1 (see Final Act. 9, 12; Ans. 3). Therefore, we
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of
independent claims 11 and 16, and claims 12—15, 17, 19, and 20, which
depend therefrom, for the same reasons set forth above with respect to
independent claim 1.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) is reversed.
REVERSED
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