Ex Parte McKeon et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 22, 201713361292 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/361,292 01/30/2012 John McKEON 2566-524 8413 6449 7590 03/24/2017 ROTHWELL, FIGG, ERNST & MANBECK, P.C. 607 14th Street, N.W. SUITE 800 WASHINGTON, DC 20005 EXAMINER SHRESTHA, BIJENDRA K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3691 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/24/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTO-PAT-Email @rfem. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOHN MCKEON, FRANK TRANI, and JIM GRANDE Appeal 2014-0087331 Application 13/361,2922 Technology Center 3600 Before ANTON W. FETTING, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed February 26, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 5, 2014), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 5, 2014) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed May 20, 2013). 2 Appellants identify ITG Software Solutions, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2014-008733 Application 13/361,292 CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants’ claimed invention “relates generally to the field of financial systems and financial trading displays” and, more specifically, “to methodologies for placing, cancelling and replacing electronic trade orders being worked by various brokers at various electronic trading venues from a trader’s electronic trading system” (Spec. 11). Claims 1,11, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative: 1. A computer implemented method for electronic trading, comprising the steps of: providing a graphical user interface that is displayed directly with an electronic order blotter executing on a computer, features regarding electronic trade orders; providing a first button within said graphical user interface that lists current properties of a selected one of the electronic trade orders being currently displayed in the electronic order blotter on a display device; and providing a second button within said graphical user interface that lists a change that can be made to the current properties of the selected electronic trade order and that is available for user interaction. REJECTION Claims 1—17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lutnick (US 7,865,422 B2, iss. Jan. 4, 2011), Kedia (US 2007/0005481 Al, pub. Jan. 4, 2007), and Back (US 2003/0220853 Al, pub. Nov. 27, 2003).3 3 We treat the Examiner’s reference to canceled claim 18 as inadvertent error. See Final Act. 3. 2 Appeal 2014-008733 Application 13/361,292 ANALYSIS Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 2—10 We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Lutnick, on which the Examiner relies, fails to disclose or suggest a first button listing current properties of an electronic trading order and a second button listing a change that can be made to the current properties of an electronic order, where the two buttons are provided on the same display as an electronic order blotter, i.e., providing a first button within said graphical user interface that lists current properties of a selected one of the electronic trade orders being currently displayed in the electronic order blotter on a display device; and providing a second button within said graphical user interface that lists a change that can be made to the current properties of the selected electronic trade order and that is available for user interaction[,] as recited in claim 1 (Reply Br. 5—6). In rejecting claim 1 under § 103(a), the Examiner ostensibly equates “default” button 314 and “Key Tab 1” 312 in Figure 3 of Lutnick to the claimed first button and second button, respectively (Final Act. 4 (citing Lutnick, col. 4,11. 34-41 and 56—62; Figs. 2-4)). However, we find nothing in the cited portions of Lutnick that discloses or suggests that these buttons list current properties of a selected electronic order and/or list changes that can be made to the current properties, as called for in claim 1. Instead, the buttons merely allow a user to select a particular saved keyboard configuration (see Lutnick, col. 4,11. 34-45, 56—62). We also cannot agree with the Examiner that button 602 in Figure 6 and button 702 in Figure 7 can constitute the first and second buttons, as 3 Appeal 2014-008733 Application 13/361,292 recited in claim 1 (Ans. 3). As Appellants observe, Lutnick discloses that button 602 is displayed on display screen 600 and that, when button 602 is selected, the user navigates to a different display, i.e., display screen 700, which includes button 702 (Reply Br. 5—6 (citing Lutnick, col. 6,11. 25—32)). In other words, buttons 602 and 702 are not provided on the same display as an electronic order blotter, as called for in claim 1. In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2—10. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”). Independent Claims 11 and 16 and Dependent Claims 12—15, 17, 19, and 20 Independent claims 11 and 16 include language substantially similar to the language of claim 1, and stand rejected based on the same rationale applied with respect to claim 1 (see Final Act. 9, 12; Ans. 3). Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of independent claims 11 and 16, and claims 12—15, 17, 19, and 20, which depend therefrom, for the same reasons set forth above with respect to independent claim 1. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed. REVERSED 4 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation