Ex Parte McEwan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 28, 2018

14448204 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/448,204 07/31/2014
28395 7590 10/02/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Douglas James McEwan
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83452609 6455
EXAMINER
SMITH, ISAAC G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DOUGLAS JAMES McEWAN,
CHRISTOPHER PAUL GLUGLA,
MICHAEL DAMIAN CZEKALA, and
GARLAN J. HUBERTS
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
Technology Center 3600
Before JEREMY M. PLENZLER, JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ford Global Technologies, LLC ("Appellant") 1 seeks our review
under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Office Action ("Final
Act.") rejecting claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Appellant is the applicant under 37 C.F.R. § 1.46. Appellant is also
identified as the real party in interest. Br. 2.
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
For the reasons explained below, we do not find error in at least one
rejection of each pending claim. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
Claimed Subject Matter
Claims 1, 7, and 14 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below,
illustrates the claimed subject matter.
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive operating environment data from multiple
vehicles;
save and associate the received data with reporting
vehicle repair records;
analyze the saved data with respect to other vehicles
having similar repairs to determine data elements and
corresponding values representing causes of problems
leading to repair based on commonalities between data
from different vehicles; and
save a record of identified data elements and values
as problem causes.
Rejections
I. Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite. Final Act. 8-9.
II. Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-patent eligible subject matter. Final Act. 9-11.
III. Claims 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § I02(a)(2) as anticipated by Cunnings (WO 2014/116197 Al,
published July 31, 2014). Final Act. 12-17.
IV. Claims 1, 2, 4---6, 12, 13, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Cunnings. Final Act. 18-24.
2
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
V. Claims 3, 9, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Cunnings and Ishikawa (US 2011/0029186 Al, published
Feb. 3, 2011). Final Act. 24--26.
DISCUSSION
Rejectionl-35 USC§ 112(b)
The Examiner determines it is unclear if the "saved data" recited in
claim 1 is also included as "data from different vehicles" recited later in the
claim. Final Act. 8. The Examiner further explains that part of the
confusion stems from the various vehicles recited in the claim, specifically
"multiple vehicles," "other vehicles," and "different vehicles." Ans. 3--4.
Appellant argues that, because the term "data from different vehicles"
is recited as part of the step (that a processor is configured to perform) of
analyzing "the saved data," it logically follows that everything determined in
this step "all results from the analysis of the saved data." Br. 5.
In considering claim 1, however, we do not discern how the "data
from different vehicles" is necessarily tied to "the saved data," in part
because "the saved data" is recited in the claim as deriving from data
received "from multiple vehicles," which we understand may not be the
same vehicles as the "data from different vehicles." In other words, the
language of the claim appears to be broad enough to interpret the "data from
different vehicles" to include data that perhaps may have been saved
previously in the same way as the recited "saved data," or it may come from
some other source of data available for analysis. Thus, we do not interpret
the claim as argued by Appellant, but we ultimately agree that the Examiner
has not sufficiently explained how the claim is unclear, rather than merely
3
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
broadly recited. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) and we do not sustain the rejection of dependent
claims 2-6 on the same basis.
For independent claims 7 and 14, the Examiner determines it is
unclear what the recited "saved data element-values" are and how they are
used to identify upcoming problems. Final Act. 8-9. The Examiner
explains that each claim recites saving and receiving data, but the "saved
data" is not used in the "analysis" step, which instead uses "saved data
element-values." Id. at 9.
Appellant contends that the "analysis based on a correlation of saved
data element-values" recited in claims 7 and 14 clearly uses the saved data.
Br. 6. Appellant explains that this description of the "analysis" "was
intended to demonstrate that in the analysis step, elements (of the data)
having values (element-values) were correlated to problem-causing values as
the basis for reporting" to the driver of the vehicle. Id. In other words, the
claims "broadly recite data in one limitation and more narrowly recite an
aspect of the data ( elements, having values, thus element values) in another
limitation" to more clearly describe how the comparison is done. Id.
We are persuaded that Appellant's explanation is sufficient to resolve
the potential ambiguity identified by the Examiner in this case. Although
the Examiner is correct that "the claims do not expressly recite that the
'saved data element-values' are required to be related in any way to the
'saved data,"' Ans. 5, claim limitations may also implicitly relate back to
one another. Here, the Examiner has not explained why one of skill in the
art would not have understood the "saved data element-values" to more
specifically refer to the type of "saved data" used in performing the analysis.
4
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 7 and 14
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) and do not sustain the rejection of dependent
claims 8-13 and 15-20 on the same basis.
Rejection 11-35 USC§ 101
The Examiner determines that claims 1, 7, and 14 are directed to
receiving, saving, comparing and analyzing data for patterns, which is an
idea of itself and therefore an abstract idea. Final Act. 9. The Examiner also
determines the claims do not add significantly more to the abstract idea,
based on the finding that the processor recited in the claims may be a generic
computer. Id. at 9-10.
As noted by Appellant, Br. 6, the Examiner also states in the Final
Office Action that "the prior art of record clearly shows fault analysis
systems and methods which teach all aspects of the claimed invention, and
therefore, no improvement is introduced by the claimed invention." Final
Act. 2. The Examiner's statement was in response to an argument by
Appellant, repeated on appeal, that the claims represent an improvement to
the field of fault analysis. See id.; Br. 7. Appellant argues that "[ t ]he bar for
eligibility to be patented was never whether or not the prior art rendered
obvious the claims." Br. 6. Appellant argues the Examiner's statement is,
therefore, "reversibly erroneous." Id. at 7. Appellant argues the claims
result in an improvement to the field of fault analysis because "[ w ]hether or
not someone else has conceptualized" the concepts recited in the claims, "it
is not a commonly held practice ( or at least has not been shown to be such),
and therefore the claims represent an improvement." Id.
5
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
The Examiner states in the Answer that "the Examiner did not rely on
prior art as the grounds of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101." Ans. 7. In
addition, we agree with the Examiner that Appellant's arguments do not
explain why the Examiner's determination that the claims are directed to an
idea of itself is in error. See id. To further explain the rejection, the
Examiner points to (Ans. 7) the Federal Circuit's decision in Electric Power
Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which involved
"real-time performance monitoring of an electric power grid by collecting
data from multiple data sources, analyzing the data, and displaying the
results." Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1351. There, the court explained
that "the claims do not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and
display of available information in a particular field, stating those functions
in general terms, without limiting them to technical means for performing
the functions that are arguably an advance over conventional computer and
network technology." Id. Although claim 1, for example, in this case
indicates that the saved data is analyzed "with respect to other vehicles
having similar repairs to determine data elements and corresponding values
representing causes of problems leading to repair based on commonalities
between data from different vehicles," this aspect is not a technical means
for performing the analysis, but rather part of the idea of itself of what data
to compare to identify certain problems.
Appellant also argues "the Examiner cannot simply say 'a general
purpose computer can perform the steps' as the basis for a 101 rejection."
Br. 8. As discussed above, however, this does not constitute the entire
analysis of the Examiner on subject matter eligibility. Notably, Appellant
does not appear to contend that anything more than a conventional, general
6
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
purpose computer is needed to perform the steps that the Examiner identifies
as abstract ideas. Therefore, Appellant's argument does not inform us of
error in the Examiner's determination that the claims do not add
significantly more to the abstract idea.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we are not informed of error in the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 7, and
14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the rejection, and, for the same
reasons, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2---6, 8-13, and 15-20,
which are not argued separately.
Rejection III-Anticipation by Cunnings
Claims 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, and 18
Independent claim 7 recites in part that the processor is configured to
receive vehicle data from multiple vehicles, save the data, and "analyze the
saved data by comparison to previously established data values identifying
causes of problems not yet experienced by the reporting vehicle." The
Examiner finds Cunnings discloses this step because vibration sensors
disposed on the vehicle provide data that is compared to repair information
for vehicles that experienced the same vibration pattern. Final Act. 13; see
Cunnings ,r,r 16, 20, 24, 26.
Appellant argues Cunnings' vibration data "is not the cause of any
particular problem, but rather is a result of a problem and, while it may be
indicative of a problem, cannot be reasonably said to be the cause of the
noted problem, namely, muffler mount repair." Br. 8. "Essentially," argues
Appellant, "the data collected in Cunnings is data indicative of a problem
that has already occurred," whereas the claims allow a driver to determine
7
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
"that repeated battering of an undercarriage causes the muffler mount to
need repair." Br. 9. "This is the difference between identifying the cause of
a problem and the result of a problem." Id.
The Examiner, in response, emphasizes Cunnings' teaching that a
vibration pattern "may be an 'early indicator of a maintenance issue but not
an immediate safety concern."' Ans. 12 (quoting Cunnings ,r 20). The
Examiner explains as follows:
[T]he maintenance issue which is not an immediate safety
concern, but which Cunnings can provide an early indicator for,
also encompasses an "upcoming problem" within the scope of
the claim, because the maintenance issue which is an immediate
concern has not yet occurred, but clearly may occur in the future
as indicated by the early indicator.
Ans. 13.
We agree with the Examiner's analysis of claim 7 as it relates to
Cunnings' maintenance issue. One of ordinary skill in the art would
understand from paragraph 20 of Cunnings that a detected vibration pattern
may be a cause of an upcoming problem not yet experienced by the vehicle.
For example, tightening a loose bolt on one part would be a maintenance
action that could prevent damage to other parts of the vehicle if the bolt were
to continue to loosen. In this way, what might be considered a "problem" in
one sense would also be the cause of another problem not yet experienced.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 7 does not preclude such causes from
the scope of "causes of problems not yet experienced by the reporting
vehicle."
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we are not informed of error in the Examiner's rejection of claim 7 as
8
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
anticipated by Cunnings. Thus, we sustain the rejection, and, for the same
reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, and 18,
which were rejected on the same ground and are not argued separately.
Rejection IV - Obviousness over Cunnings
Claims 1, 2, 4-6, 12, 13, 19, and 20
Similar to the arguments presented in support of claim 7, Appellant
argues for claim 1 that "[ n ]othing in Cunnings teaches or suggests that
vibration data is ever the cause of a problem." Br. 10. For the reasons
discussed above for claim 7, however, we agree with the Examiner that
Cunnings' vibration data encompasses causes of other problems that can be
avoided by taking maintenance action. Thus, we are not informed of error in
the rejection of claim 1 on this basis.
Appellant also argues that in claim 1 the data received and analyzed is
"operating environment data," and contends "[ v ]ehicle vibration data is not
fairly or reasonabl[y] characterizable as 'environment data."' Br. 10.
Appellant does not, however, explain why this is so. In view of the
Examiner's further explanation of findings in the Answer, where the
Examiner finds vibrations may be indicative of an operating environment of
a vehicle, such as vibrations caused by the roughness of a road, Ans. 17-18,
we are not informed of error in the rejection based on Appellant's argument.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Cunnings, and, for the same reasons, we
sustain the rejection of claims 2, 4---6, 12, 13, 19, and 20, which were
rejected on the same ground and are not argued separately.
9
Appeal2017-010067
Application 14/448,204
Rejection V - Obviousness over Cunnings and Ishikawa
Claims 3, 9, 16
Appellant does not separately address the rejection of claims 3, 9, and
16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Cunnings and Ishikawa. For
the same reasons as claims 1, 7, and 14, from which claims 3, 9, and 16
depend, respectively, we sustain the rejection of claims 3, 9, and 16 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-20 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b ). We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject: claims 1-20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101; claims 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, and 18 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(2); and claims 1-6, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19, and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
10