Ex Parte McCartie et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 20, 201712014942 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/014,942 01/16/2008 Jonathan Paul McCartie QLXX.P0331US/11301232 1483 15757 7590 12/22/2017 Qualcomm /Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP 2200 Ross Avenue Suite 3600 Dallas, TX 75201-7932 EXAMINER ELFERVIG, TAYLOR A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2445 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/22/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com doipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JONATHAN PAUL McCARTIE, GEORGE ALLEN ROTHROCK, and NICHOLAS ANDREW GLASSMAN Appeal 2017-007480 Application 12/014,9421 Technology Center 2400 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ERIC S. FRAHM, and SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection of claims 1—4, 6—11, 13—18, 20—23, 25—27, 29—32, and 34^45, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application. Claims 5, 12, 19, 24, 28, and 33 have been cancelled. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify Qualcomm Incorporated as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2017-007480 Application 12/014,942 THE INVENTION The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to collaborative data repurposing. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for providing collaborative data repurposing, comprising: discovering, at a first client device, other client devices within close proximity; identifying one or more data streams for rendering, wherein a single data stream of the one or more data streams includes data that serves a dual purpose of presenting information to a user on the first client device and enabling an interactive and collaborative experience between the first client device and one or more of the other client devices; rendering same dual purpose data in an identified single data stream differently by the first client device than is rendered by at least one of the other client devices at substantially the same time by rendering, at the first client device, a first view corresponding to the data and rendering, at substantially the same time, at the at least one of the other client devices, a second view, different from the first view, but corresponding to the same data used to render the first view at the first client device; and collaborating with at least one of the other client devices to create an aggregated rendering of content when dual purpose data is rendered by the first client device for an interactive and collaborative experience. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Takahashi et al. Gell Muncaster et al. US 2003/0099457 Al May 29, 2003 US 6,577,858 B1 June 10, 2003 US 2004/0082383 Al Apr. 29, 2004 2 Appeal 2017-007480 Application 12/014,942 Vernon et al. Apostolopoulos Brant et al. US 2004/0252185 Al Dec. 16, 2004 US 2005/0080894 Al Apr. 14, 2005 US 2006/0173619 Al Aug. 3, 2006 REJECTIONS2 Claims 1—4, 6—11, 13—18, 20—23, 25—27, 29—32, and 34-40 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muncaster in view of Vernon, Apostolopoulos, and Takahashi. Final Act. 7-28. Claim 41 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muncaster in view of Vernon, Apostolopoulos, Takahashi, and Gell. Final Act. 28—29 Claims 42-45 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muncaster in view of Vernon, Apostolopoulos, Takahashi, and Brant. Final Act. 29—32. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments regarding the pending claims. Appellants argue the Examiner erred in construing (1) a ‘“single data stream’” [as recited in claim 1] to refer to a multitude of streams that are 2 In addition to the identified rejections, the Examiner also rejected all of the pending claims under 25 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as being indefinite. Final Act. 5—6. The Examiner withdrew the section 112 rejection in the Answer. Ans. 3—5. 3 Appeal 2017-007480 Application 12/014,942 ‘multiplexed’ together” and (2) that “the ‘same dual purpose data in an identified single data stream’ [as recited in claim 1] to refer to ‘all data within the multiplex stream.’” App. Br. 9. Appellants further argue that the Examiner’s allegedly incorrect claim constructions “are the source of the flaws in the rejections of claim 1 based on the combination of Muncaster, Vernon, Apos, and Takahashi.” Id. We address the two alleged claim construction errors sequentially. First, Appellants argue the Examiner’s construction of single data stream “is unequivocally contrary to a proper interpretation of claim 1.” Id. at 8. According to Appellants, “[cjlaim 1 makes clear that the data stream that includes the dual purpose data is a single data stream, not two or more distinct or different data streams multiplexed together to form a multiplexed data stream, as alleged in the rejection of record.” Id. Appellants further argue that merely because the Specification discloses other aspects of the invention describing multiple data streams in addition to the aspect of the invention specifically recited in claim 1 does not mean that the claims may be given an interpretation wholly contrary to what is explicitly recited in the claims, even under a broadest reasonable interpretation standard. Id. The Examiner explains that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “the phrase ‘single data stream’ . . . encompass[es] a single multiplexed data stream.” Ans. 4; see also id. at 4—5; Final Act. 3—5. More specifically, the Examiner finds the Specification “is silent as to what a ‘single data stream’ actually encompasses.” Ans. 4. The Examiner determines that “there is nothing [in the phrasing of the claim] to suggest that multiple multiplexed streams cannot be utilized.” Id. at 5. The Examiner further determines 4 Appeal 2017-007480 Application 12/014,942 “[multiplexing is the taking of one or more data streams and intertwining them into a single data stream to be transmitted over a network” and, based on the Specification, a single multiplexed stream is a single stream. Id. at 5 (citing Spec. 135). During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). There is a presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). An applicant may rebut this presumption, however, by acting as his own lexicographer, providing a definition of the term in the specification with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be read from the specification into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). “[Although the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments. . . . [CJlaims may embrace ‘different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification.’” Phillips v. AWHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (enbanc) (citations omitted). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred. To the contrary, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s claim construction. There is nothing in the claim language that precludes a single multiplex data stream. Nor have Appellants identified any language in the 5 Appeal 2017-007480 Application 12/014,942 Specification that would require such a limitation. Instead, as the Examiner determined, the Specification is silent as to a definition of a single data stream (Spec. 129) and discusses a transmission containing multiple data streams {id. 135). Second, Appellants argue “there is no justification for interpreting ‘same dual purpose data in an identified single data stream’ as recited in claim 1 to refer to ‘all data within the multiplex stream,’ and such an interpretation is improper.” App. Br. 9. According to Appellants, “the Specification discloses in numerous locations that it is the ‘same data’ in a single stream that can serve a dual purpose so as to be rendered ‘differently by the first client device than is rendered by at least one of the other client devices,’ as recited in claim 1.” Id. (citing Spec. Abst., || 26, 29, 46, 53). The Examiner concludes “[t]he sections provided by Appellants] do not limit or construe the meaning of a ‘same data’ [or] ‘rendered differently’.” Ans. 6. Instead, the Examiner concludes “same data” as recited in the claim “encompasses any information within the same single multiplexed data stream. Said another way, any information within the single multiplexed data stream is construed as being ‘same . . . data’ within an identified [multiplexed] data stream because the same stream is being used to render content.” Id. The Examiner further concludes, “[g]iven the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification, Examiner interpreted the phrase ‘rendered differently’ as one that could mean ‘rendered different resolutions’.” Id. at 7 (citing Spec. 1 53). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred. To the contrary, we agree with the Examiner that none of the sections of the Specification cited by Appellants require the Appellants’ narrow 6 Appeal 2017-007480 Application 12/014,942 claim construction. Accordingly, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s claim construction. Appellants’ arguments regarding the teachings of the various prior art references are dependent on claim constructions that we did not adopt. See App. Br. 9-10; Reply Br. 2. Because Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the claims, they are unpersuasive. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, along with the rejections of claims 8, 15, 22, and 25, for which Appellants rely on the same arguments, and dependent claims 2—4, 6, 7, 9—11, 13, 14, 16—18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29-32, and 34-45, which are not argued separately. See App. Br. 11. DECISION For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decisions rejecting claims 1^1, 6-11, 13-18, 20-23, 25-27, 29-32, and 3A45. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation