Ex Parte Lindqvist et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 17, 2014

11482414 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 17, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ANDERS LINDQVIST and PETER NILSSON
____________

Appeal 2011-013034
Application 11/482,414
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, EDWARD A. BROWN, and
FRANCES L. IPPOLITO, Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2011-013034
Application 11/482,414

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Anders Lindqvist and Peter Nilsson (Appellants) appeal under 35
U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s decision rejecting under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, and 24 as
unpatentable over Hackl (US 6,386,645 B2, issued May 14, 2002) and
Huther (US 2004/0164610 A1, published Aug. 26, 2004); claims 3, 4, 9, 10,
14, 15, 21, and 22 as unpatentable over Hackl, Huther, and Kawaguchi (US
2004/0150261 A1, published Aug. 5, 2004); claims 6, 12, 18, 25-28, 31, and
32 as unpatentable over Hackl, Huther, and Dietrich (US 6,318,513 B1,
issued Nov. 20, 2001); and claims 29 and 30 as unpatentable over Hackl,
Huther, Dietrich, and Kawaguchi. We have jurisdiction over this appeal
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

INVENTION
Appellants’ invention relates to “a system for supplying electric
power to various components of a vehicle’s brake system in the event of a
failure of the primary power source.” Spec. 1, para. [0002].
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed invention and reads as follows:
1. A brake system, comprising:
at least one power supply;
a plurality of brake units electrically connected to said at least
one power supply such that said brake units receive power therefrom;
a plurality of brake unit capacitors electrically connected to said
at least one power supply such that said brake unit capacitors receive
power therefrom and store it as auxiliary power;
at least one electronic control unit electrically connected to said
at least one power supply; and
at least one electronic control unit capacitor electrically
connected to said at least one power supply such that said at least one
Appeal 2011-013034
Application 11/482,414

3
electronic control unit capacitor receives power therefrom and stores
it as auxiliary power;
wherein said brake unit capacitors are electrically connected to
said plurality of brake units for supplying auxiliary power thereto;
wherein said at least one electronic control unit capacitor is
electrically connected to said at least one electronic control unit for
supplying auxiliary power thereto; and
wherein said brake unit capacitors continuously receive power
directly from said at least one power supply; and
wherein each of said brake units receives auxiliary power from
a different one of said brake unit capacitors than at least one other of
said brake units and than said at least one electronic control unit.

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

ANALYSIS
Appellants argue that: (1) Hackl cannot be modified with the capacitor
of Huther because it would render Hackl unsatisfactory for its intended
purpose (see App. Br. 10-12) and (2) because the braking system of Huther
is a normally applied braking system, the capacitor of Huther cannot be used
with the normally open braking system of Hackl (see App. Br. 13-14).

Appellants’ First Argument
According to Appellants, because the capacitor of Huther is charged
during normal operation of the power supply, if the power supply in the
system of Hackl as modified by Huther fails, “the brake control units will
draw power from the capacitor” and thus, “negates the purpose of control
unit 5 [of Hackl] activating the brake control units in steps.” App. Br. 12.
Appeal 2011-013034
Application 11/482,414

4
In other words, Appellants take the position that “the combination of Hackl
and Huther, renders the control unit 5 of Hackl useless.” Id.
In response, the Examiner opines that “the use of capacitors would be
beneficial as they would at least provide an additional layer of protection in
case a power malfunction occurs, thereby allowing emergency braking if
needed.” Ans. 10.
As found by the Examiner, Hackl discloses an electromechanical
brake system and Huther discloses the use of a capacitor to store auxiliary
electric power “capable of continuing to provide the brake control with
energy for a predetermined time to carry out a braking procedure.” Ans. 5-6
and 10 (citing to Huther, para. [0017]). Thus, to provide the
electromechanical brake system of Hackl with capacitors, as proposed by the
Examiner, would improve Hackl’s brake system in the same manner as the
capacitor improves Huther’s brake system, namely, to provide for additional
auxiliary electric power for allowing brake function in case of a power
malfunction. See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)
(stating “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
application is beyond his or her skill”).
Although we appreciate Appellants’ position that the power rationing
system of Hackl and the capacitor of Huther both provide emergency
braking in case of a power malfunction, nonetheless, we agree with the
Examiner that “there is no reason to believe that one of ordinary skill in the
art cannot use both Hackl’s method and [Huther’s] capacitor[] for coping
with a power malfunction.” Ans. 11. Appellants have not provided any
Appeal 2011-013034
Application 11/482,414

5
evidence or technical reasoning to show that building redundancy in a
braking system is beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. We further
agree with the Examiner that using both Hackl’s power rationing method
and capacitors, as taught by Huther, “could only prolong the duration in
which emergency braking can occur before the power malfunction must be
repaired,” thus providing for increased safety of the vehicle’s operator. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Hackl fails to disclose
failure in a capacitor (see Reply Br. 3-41) because attorney argument cannot
take the place of evidence in the record. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An assertion of what seems to follow from common
experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that
is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.”)(citations omitted).

Appellants’ Second Argument
Appellants note that there are two types of brakes, namely, normally
open brakes and normally applied brakes2. Reply Br. 5. Appellants then
argue that because Huther only mentions spring brakes, i.e., normally
applied brakes, “a capacitor would provide no additional protection as the
capacitor would prevent the brakes from being activated in an emergency
situation as power would still be present” and thus “would prevent the
vehicle from being stopped.” App. Br. 13-14 (citing to Huther, para.

1 Appellants did not provide page numbers on the Reply Brief.
However, for ease of referring to Appellants’ arguments, we have assigned
page numbers 1 through 7 to the Reply Brief.
2 In the normally open brake system, “[w]hen the brake pedal is pushed,
the brake is actuated to stop the vehicle,” whereas in the normally applied
brake system “[w]hen a user pushes on the brake pedal, the brake system
releases the brake unit . . . [for] applying the brake.” Reply Br. 5.
Appeal 2011-013034
Application 11/482,414

6
[0003]); see also Reply Br. 5-6. Hence, according to Appellants, “there is
nothing in Huther that teaches anything other than a normally applied
braking system.” Reply Br. 7.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that Huther is limited
to a normally applied braking system because such a system does not require
a capacitor to store auxiliary electric power in order “to carry out a braking
procedure.” See Huther, para. [0017]. Specifically, when the power supply
malfunctions in a normally applied brake system, the brake system merely
releases the brake to stop the vehicle. In contrast, if a normally applied
braking system includes a capacitor, as taught by Huther, the brakes would
not be released and thus, braking would not occur, which is contrary to the
disclosure of Huther. The disclosures of a prior art reference are presumed
to be enabled. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As such, capacitor 28 would be detrimental in
“carry[ing] out a braking procedure” when wheel brakes 10, 12 are part of a
normally applied brake system.
However, if the braking system of Huther is a normally open brake
system, as the Examiner proposes, in case of a power malfunction, capacitor
28 is capable to store energy “to carry out a braking procedure,” which is
consistent with the disclosure of Huther. As such, we agree with the
Examiner that Huther discloses “[a] brake can be actuated
electromagnetically,” that is, a normally open brake. See Ans. 11.
Lastly, we note that Huther discerns between a spring brake, where
“the spring performs the braking procedure” and an electromagnetic brake,
where the brake is “actuat[ed] . . . electromagnetically.” Huther, paras.
[0003] and [0004]. While the former constitutes a normally applied brake,
Appeal 2011-013034
Application 11/482,414

7
like the Examiner, we find that the latter constitutes a normally open brake.
See Ans. 11-12.
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hackl and Huther.
Appellants rely on the same arguments presented supra in arguing the
rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, and 24. App. Br. 15.
For the same reasons, we likewise sustain the rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, 8,
11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, and 24 over the combined teachings of Hackl and
Huther.
With respect to the rejections of claims 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18,
21, 22, and 25-32, Appellants do not make any other substantive arguments
separate from the arguments presented supra. App. Br. 15-18. Accordingly,
we also sustain the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 3, 4, 9, 10,
14, 15, 21, and 22 as unpatentable over Hackl, Huther, and Kawaguchi; of
claims 6, 12, 18, 25-28, 31, and 32 as unpatentable over Hackl, Huther, and
Dietrich; and of claims 29 and 30 as unpatentable over Hackl, Huther,
Dietrich, and Kawaguchi.

SUMMARY
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-32 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

llw