Ex Parte LiebrandDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 27, 201310491517 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte JELTE LIEBRAND ________________ Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 Technology Center 2400 ________________ Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and TRENTON A. WARD, Administrative Patent Judges. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-13. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 1-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by King (EP 0993165 A2; published Apr. 12, 2000). Ans. 3-11. We affirm. Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention relates to a mobile web browsing device able to download and store content from a web server over a wireless network. Spec. 2:3-4. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the key disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A mobile web browsing device able to download and store content from a web server over a wireless network, wherein the device is programmed to: (a) recognise a useage definition applied to certain downloadable content, in which the definition prohibits discarding that content from a memory in the device; (b) apply a flag to that content and store that content in combination with the flag in the device memory; and (c) not discard that content from the device memory, so that the content can reliably be displayed even when the device is out of network coverage and the device has freed up space in the device memory. PIVOTAL ISSUE Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), has the Examiner erred by finding that King teaches the limitations (i) recognise a useage definition applied to certain downloadable content; and (ii) apply a flag to that content and store that content in combination with the flag in the device memory, as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS We agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claim 1, that King teaches all claim limitations. Ans. 3-5. The Examiner relies on King’s user of the mobile device selecting from certain content channels that they wish to have resident locally on their mobile device for teaching “recognise Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 3 a useage definition applied to certain downloadable content.” Ans. 4 (citing ¶62, ll. 51-52). The Examiner relies on King’s informing the channel manager of the channel specification Universal Resource Identifier (URI) and loading the resources associated with the content channel into the reserved portion of the cache memory for teaching “apply a flag to that content and store that content in combination with the flag in the device memory.” Ans. 4-5 (citing ¶60, ll. 39-41; ¶65; ¶72, ll. 15-18); see also Ans. 11-14. Appellant argues that [t]he initial provisioning of a device with certain content channels is described in paragraphs [0060] to [0065] of King et al. Nowhere in these sections of the description is the presently claimed concept of a “usage definition” mentioned. Furthermore, it is a requirement of present claim 1 that the “usage definition” be applied to “downloadable” content. In other words, the usage definition must be associated with the content prior to download, not after it has been downloaded. In King et al. there is no mention of such an arrangement. App. Br. 7. Appellant further argues that [i]n addition to the above, there is no mention in any of paragraphs [0060] to [0070] regarding the application of flags to, and the storing of flags with, the downloadable content. King et al. teaches the loading of channels into a reserved memory portion of the cache memory (see [0068]). Because the channels, and their associated resources, are loaded into reserved portions of cache memory, where they cannot be deleted, there is no need for a system of flags. In a device embodying the present invention, flags are applied and stored with downloadable content because the memory does not include reserved portions. The device is programmed not to delete content which has flags associated with it. No such Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 4 mechanism is described in paragraphs [0060] to [0070] of King et al. App. Br. 7. Appellant further argues that King’s channel crawling process also does not describe the recited flags applied and stored with downloadable content. App. Br. 7-8. Finally, Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly attempts to negate the known definition of “flag” in computer parlance. In the field of the claimed invention, “flagging” is not the same as reserving a portion of a cache for certain content. It might be argued that the cache memory is “flagged” for use in storing certain kind of content, but that it really the generic use of the term flagging (e.g., “designating”) and not the term as it is ordinarily used in programming. In addition, flagging or designating a cache is not the same as flagging content, as is cl[ai]med. App. Br. 9. In response, the Examiner explains that Marking certain data not to be discarded is the essence of the Appellant’s flagging. Similarly, King et al[.] teach[es] the concept of specifying certain downloaded content into a memory of a wireless device stays protected from discarding and to be available regardless of the availability of the wireless network (abstract). King uses marking (flagging) to indicate what to remove and what not to remove and/or reserving a portion of memory to store data marked for protection against discarding (the resources associated with the content channel are not subjected to removal Para 63)( see abstract and Para 80-82). Ans. 14. We agree with the Examiner. King (¶62, ll. 51-52) states “[d]uring operation, a user of a mobile device is able to select from certain content channels that they wish to have resident locally on their mobile device.” Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 5 King (¶60, ll. 39-41) states “in-the background processing or initial provisioning processing, the resources associated with the content channel are loaded into the reserved portion of the cache memory so that an application can later rapidly retrieve any of the content associated with the content channel.” King (¶65) describes informing the channel manager of the channel specification URI, performing any desired on channel creation notifications, and loading channel contents into cache memory. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that King’s user selecting certain content channels that they wish to have resident locally on their mobile device does not describe the limitation, “recognise a useage definition applied to certain downloadable content,” as recited by claim 1. We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that King’s informing the channel manager of the channel specification URI (flag) and then loading channel content into cache memory does not describe the limitation, “apply a flag to that content and store that content in combination with the flag in the device memory,” as recited by claim 1. The channel specification URI (flag) is necessarily stored in a memory so that the channel manager operates to load channel content into memory. Regarding Appellant’s argument (App. Br. 7) that King does not mention the claimed concept of a “usage definition,” this argument is unavailing because the user’s selections in King are applying a useage definition to certain downloadable content that is recognized by the mobile device. Regarding Appellant’s argument (App. Br. 7) that the usage definition must be associated with the content prior to download, not after it has been Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 6 downloaded, this argument is also unavailing. Even assuming, without deciding, that the definition must be associated with the content prior to download, in King, the user is selecting content that they wish to have resident locally on their mobile device. Thus, the useage definition (user’s selections) is associated with the content prior to download. Appellant argues (App. Br. 7) that King does not teach the application of flags to, and the storing of flags with, the downloadable content, and that King has no need for a system of flags. We find these arguments unpersuasive. The Examiner explains (Ans. 14), and we agree, that King teaches the concept of specifying certain downloaded content to stay protected from discarding and to be available regardless of the availability of the wireless network (Abstract). King’s channel specification URI (flag) is applied and stored in a memory so that King’s channel manager may operate to load channel content into memory. See King, ¶60, ll. 39-41; ¶65. Appellant argues (App. Br. 7-8) that King’s channel crawling process also does not describe the recited flags applied and stored with downloadable content. We find this argument unpersuasive because King’s channel specification URI (flag) is applied and stored in a memory so that King’s channel manager may operate to load channel content into memory. See King, ¶60, ll. 39-41; ¶65. Finally, regarding Appellant’s additional argument (App. Br. 9) that the Examiner improperly attempts to negate the known definition of “flag” in computer parlance, we see no error in the Examiner’s mapping King’s channel specification URI to the recited flag. Ans. 4. Appellant’s Specification does not define the term “flag” but does describe Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 7 [t]he browser on the device is programmed to recognise this definition and to set an appropriate flag against that content; the flag defines how the device uses the content – in particular, defining that the device will not discard that content from memory, even when flushing the cache memory to free up disc space when memory is running low. Spec. 2:20-24. The term “flag” is defined in a computer context quite broadly, in pertinent sense as 1. Broadly, a marker of some type used by a computer in processing or interpreting information; a signal indicating the existence or status of a particular condition. Flags are used in such areas as communications, programming, and information processing. Depending on its use, a flag can be a code, embedded in data, that identities some condition, or it can be one or more bits set internally by hardware or software to indicate an event of some type, such as an error or the result of comparing two values.1 Consistent with the Specification, a broad, but reasonable construction of the term “flag” includes a signal indicating the existence of a condition wherein the device will not discard certain content from memory. With this construction, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on King for teaching “apply a flag to that content and store that content in combination with the flag in the device memory,” as recited by claim 1. King applies a flag (signal indicating the existence of a condition wherein the device will not discard certain content from memory) to the selected content by informing the channel manager of the channel specification URI (flag). King stores the retrieved content in the device 1 MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 216 (5th ed. 2002). Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 8 memory. King also stores the channel specification URI (flag) in the device memory to allow access by the channel manager. We are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred in rejecting claim 1. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 2-10, which are not argued separately. Regarding claims 11-13, the Examiner states “King further teaches the useage definition is downloadable to the device and in which the definition prohibits discarding that content from a memory in the device ‘Typically, the channel specification would be received from a remote server (e.g., a proxy server or a content server).’” Ans. 11 (quoting King, ¶63, ll. 7-8). We agree with the Examiner. Appellant argues [h]owever, as the Examiner will appreciate, in the context of the present invention, the usage definition is information which is downloaded with the downloadable content. It is used by the device in order to decide whether or not content needs to be marked with a flag. In independent claim 11 it is clear that the usage definition is downloaded with the content to the device. There is no disclosure in King et al. of this process. On pages 3 and 4 of the Office Action, the Examiner has referred to paragraph [0063] of King et al. This section of the description simply refers to the downloading of channel specifications. The channel specification describes the content of a channel (page 10, lines 6 to 7 of King et al.) and also the memory requirements of the associated channel. However, nowhere in King et al. is it taught or suggested that the channel specification includes a usage definition which “prohibits discarding” of content from the memory of the device. App. Br. 9-10. King (¶61, ll. 45-46) describes “the resources associated with the content channel are not subjected to removal from the cache memory.” King Appeal 2010-009367 Application 10/491,517 9 (¶60, ll. 42-43) describes “[t]hese resources are able to be rapidly retrieved because they are located locally within the cache memory and thus no external request to a remote server through the wireless network is needed.” See Ans. 5. We are not persuaded that King’s channel specification, which describes the content of a channel selected by the user and is received from a remote server, wherein the resources associated with the content channel are not subjected to removal from the cache memory, does not describe the usage definition is downloadable to the device and prohibits discarding of content from the memory of the device, as recited in claims 11-13. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred in rejecting claims 11-13, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11-13. ORDER The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-13 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010). AFFIRMED babc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation