Ex Parte Leymann et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 10, 2016

11610525 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
111610,525 12/14/2006 Frank Leymann
87048 7590 03/14/2016
Jordan IP Law (IBM-RSW)
12501 Prosperity Dr., Suite 401
Silver Spring, MD 20904
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
DE920050079US 1 2896
EXAMINER
JARRETT, SCOTT L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/14/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FRANK LEYMANN,
SIMON MOSER, and
FRIEDEMANN SCHWENKREIS
Appeal2013-002722 1
Application 11/610,5252
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. PETTING, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
MATTHEWS. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final
rejection of claims 1---6, 10-13, and 17-19. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Our decision references Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.," filed
September 17, 2012) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed December 17,
2012), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed October 17, 2012) and
Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed May 16, 2012).
2 Appellants identify International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3).
Appeal2013-002722
Application 11/610,525
We REVERSE.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants' claimed invention is directed generally to managing
workflow operations by determining when preparation activities need to be
executed during a business process (Spec. i-fi-f l, 15).
Claim 1, reproduced below with added bracketed notations, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method for operating a workflow system wherein
the workflow comprises a given sequence of activities executed
by a computer processor, comprising:
[a] automatically identifying a pair of a primary activity
and an associated preparation activity required to be done before
executing the primary activity;
[b] navigating through a process template of underlying
workflow, and calculating a probability at a subset of nodes of
the process template that said primary activity will be reached for
a current process instance;
[ c J pre-executing said preparation activity, by the
computer processor, in parallel to said given sequence of
activities when said probability exceeds a predetermined
threshold stored in a computer storage device, wherein the
predetermined threshold is determined by current system load
and the workflow system's capacity, and wherein the process
template of underlying workflow is unaltered; and
[ d] performing a next scheduled process step of the
process template of underlying workflow when the probability
does not exceed the predetermined threshold, and wherein
determining the predetermined threshold includes utilizing
measured workflow system and system load performance data
obtained during runtime to dynamically update the calculating of
the probability and dynamically set the predetermined threshold.
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Application 11/610,525
REJECTION
Claims 1---6, 10-13, and 17-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Preining (US 5,958,003, iss. Sept. 28, 1999) and Rowe
(US 7,721,331 Bl, iss. May 18, 2010).
ANALYSIS
We are persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1, 10, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because
Preining, on which the Examiner relies, does not disclose or suggest,
"performing a next scheduled process step of the process template of
underlying workflow when the probability does not exceed the
predetermined threshold," as recited in part by limitation [ d] of claim 1, and
similarly recited by independent claims 10 and 19 (Appeal Br. 11-13; Reply
Br. 5---6). More particularly, Appellants argue that "a predetermined
threshold, as described in claim 1, is not the same as either a probability that
a session is to be started, or the probability that a MT [mini-task] will be
executed next" (Appeal Br. 12).
The Examiner maintains the rejection is proper and directs us to
Preining at column 1, lines 51---66; column 3 lines 10-15, 37--42; column 5,
lines 50-55; column 6, lines 7-14, 57---60; column 7, lines 1-3, 10-14, 43-
49, 58---65; column 8, lines 8-11; column 9, lines 15-20; and column 10,
lines 65---68, as disclosing the argued limitation (Ans. 4; see also Final Act.
8).
Preining is directed to a "Services Supercharger" which is able to start
tasks in parallel and "prepare the execution environment for one or more
user sessions and actions within such user sessions, and after session
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Application 11/610,525
termination, performs epilogue actions only when appropriate" (Preining
col. 1, 11. 49-55). More particularly, Preining discloses that its
"supercharger layer uses some pre-information that is accumulated in the
processing system about the probability that specific sessions will be
started" (id. at col. 1, 11. 55---60).
Preining discloses "[t]he amount of pre-executing prologues and
postponing the execution of epilogues depends on the available total system
resources that can be bound for projected future mini-tasks, and on the
available idle time of the processor to perform such preparatory functions for
mini-tasks projected for the future" (id. col. 3, 11. 28-33). Preining further
discloses that "[t]he workflow process is represented as a process model and
contains complete information about which activities are to be executed in
the process, and about the decision points where more than one successor
activity could alternatively be executed after a navigation decision" (id. at
col. 5; 11. 51-56). Preining also discloses that it "executes those prologues
that are required with the highest probability, and executes epilogues for
those mini-tasks that have the lowest probability, or which have to be
executed in order to free system resources needed for the execution of mini-
tasks with high probability for execution" (id. at 7, 11. 42--49). In this regard,
Preining discloses that its Next Mini-Tasks Table (NMTT) contains
all MTs that might be executed during a particular session. For
each MT an execution probability is computed that indicates the
probability that this MT will be executed next. This probability
depends on the current state of the session. The probability of a
MT is computed by multiplying the probability of the previous
MT with the probability that the MT in question is executed after
the previous MT. These probabilities are shown in FIG. 1.
Consequently the first MT to be executed always has a
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Application 11/610,525
probability of 1. The probability of the following MTs 1s
decreasing.
(Id. at col. 9, 11. 15-25).
We have reviewed the cited portions of Preining, on which the
Examiner relies, and agree with Appellants that nothing in the portions of
Preining relied on by the Examiner discloses or suggests "performing a next
scheduled process step of the process template of underlying workflow when
the probability does not exceed the predetermined threshold," as recited in
part by limitation [ d] of exemplary claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 11-13; see also
Reply Br. 5---6). Although Preining discloses determining the probability
that a session will be started or the probability that a mini-task will be
executed next, the Examiner does not adequately explain, and we fail to see,
where the probabilities, disclosed in Preining, are evaluated against any
"predetermined threshold," much less one that triggers performance of "a
next scheduled process step of the process template of underlying workflow
when the probability does not exceed the predetermined threshold,'' as
required by limitation [ d].
In the Response to Arguments section of the Answer, the Examiner
appears to equate "performing a next scheduled process step of the process
template of the underlying workflow if the probability does not exceed the
predetermined threshold" to "not pre-executing steps with probability of
zero" (see Ans. 4). The difficulty with the Examiner's current position,
however, is Preining describes that a probability of zero indicates only that a
resource is no longer needed (Preining col. 10, 11. 4--5) or that its epilogue
has not been executed because "the predicted next MTs use the same
resources as the already executed ones" (id. col. 9, 11. 59---65), but Preining
does not disclose or suggest that a probability of zero triggers performance
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Application 11/610,525
of "a next scheduled process step of the process template of underlying
workflow when the probability does not exceed the predetermined
threshold," as required by limitation [d]. Instead, Preining discloses that
"the first MT to be executed always has a probability of 1. The probability
of the following MTs is decreasing" (id. col. 9, 11. 22-25). We note that the
Examiner does not rely on Rowe to disclose the argued limitation (see Final
Act. 8; see also Ans. 4).
On this record, the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case
ofunpatentability. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of
independent claims 1, 10, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same
reasons, we also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2---6, 11-13,
17, and 18. Cf In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which
they depend are nonobvious").
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1---6, 10-13, and 17-19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
REVERSED
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