Ex Parte Lee et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 27, 2019

13224763 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/224,763 09/02/2011
5514 7590 03/27/2019
VenableLLP
1290 A venue of the Americas
NEW YORK, NY 10104-3800
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
John Lee
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
04138.000200.1 1103
EXAMINER
WONG,ERICTAKWAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/27/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN LEE, TOORAJ NIKZADEH, LUTHER TUPPONCE, and
BRENDAN WALSH
Appeal2017-011740
Application 13/224,763
Technology Center 3600
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., ADAM J. PYONIN, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1-8, 10, 11, and 23-32, which constitute all pending claims. 2 See
Final Act. 1 and App. Br. 11-22 (Claims App'x). We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify Fedbid Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1.
2 Claims 9 and 12-22 are cancelled. See App. Br. 25, 27 (Claims App'x).
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Application 13/224,763
Introduction
Appellants' "invention relates to an auction based procurement
system." Spec. 1 (Field of the Invention). Claim 1 is illustrative, shown
here with certain technological limitations in bold italics:
1. A computer-implemented method for performing
an auction by an auction operator, comprising:
the auction operator receiving, through a network, a
request for an item by a requester,/rom a first device, the
request for the item being issued under a contract vehicle
created by a contract issuing organization;
the auction operator sending, through the network, the
request for the item to a second device;
the auction operator receiving, through the network, a
first bid from a first bidder via the second device, the first bid
corresponding to the request for the item;
the auction operator sending, through the network, the
request for the item to a third device;
the auction operator receiving, through the network, a
second bid from a second bidder via the third device, the
second bid corresponding to the request for the item, wherein
the first bid and the second bid are stored in a memory;
the auction operator maintaining a database of active bids
for the item, the set of active bids including a bid for the item
by a second requester different from the requester;
the auction operator data-mining, using a processor, the
database of active bids;
the auction operator generating, using a processor, a
volume sales opportunity in accordance with results of the data-
mining, wherein the volume sales opportunity includes multiple
requests for the item, wherein the multiple requests includes the
first bid and the second bid for the item;
the auction operator updating at least one of the first bid
and the second bid in the memory, in accordance with the
volume sales opportunity;
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the auction operator calculating an additional transaction
fee for each of the first and second bids, wherein the additional
transaction fee is a contract fee to be paid by the requester for
contract issuing services performed by the contract issuing
organization;
the auction operator ranking the first bid and the second
bid based on a comparison of each bid, the ranking including a
first status indicator for the first bid and a second status
indicator for the second bid, each of the first and second status
indicators indicating one of a leading bid and a lagging bid;
the auction operator initiating a re-bid for each lagging
bid, the re-bid initiation including comparing each leading bid
with a pre-set limit for the sender of the lagging bid; and
the auction operator determining a result of the auction
based on the request for the item, the first bid and the second
bid,
wherein the result of the auction is based on a match
between the request for the item and at least one bid, the at least
one bid being selected from a plurality of received bids, the
plurality of received bids including the first bid and the second
bid, the match including at least one of (i) an exact match
between the request for the item and at least one bid, and (ii) the
at least one bid satisfying the request for the item, and
wherein the contract issuing organization is a separate
entity from the auction operator.
Appeal Br. 23-24 (Claims App 'x).
Rejection
Claims 1-8, 10, 11, and 23-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to an abstract idea, without reciting significantly more. Final
Act. 2-7; see also Ans. 2-14.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellants'
contentions of reversible error. We disagree with Appellants' conclusions.
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Instead, as consistent with our discussion below, we adopt the Examiner's
findings and reasons as set forth in the Final Office Action from which this
appeal is taken and as set forth in the Answer. We highlight the following
for emphasis.
Law and Guidance
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
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such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981) ); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267---68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 ("We
view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook); see also id. at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
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"[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50-57 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 PEG"). Under the 2019 PEG, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). 3
See 2019 PEG at 52, 55-56. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception
and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, does the
office then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
"well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
( 4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 PEG at 56.
The Examiner's Determinations and Conclusions
The Examiner determines the independent claims (1, 10, and 23) "are
directed to facilitating an auction, which is a fundamental economic practice
and therefore an abstract idea." Final Act. 2; see id. at 3 (collecting cases
that "have found concepts relating to managing relationships or transactions
3 All references to the MPEP are to Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
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between people abstract"). Citing to Ultramercial4 and buySAFE, 5 the
Examiner determines that narrowing limitations:
such as those drawn to receiving a request for an item, sending
the request to a second device, receiving bids, generating a
volume sales opportunity, calculating a transaction fee, ranking
the bids, initiating re-bids, and determining a result based on a
match, further describe the abstract idea but do nothing to
render the concept less abstract.
Id. at 4.
The Examiner determines the claims do not recite significantly more
than the abstract idea "because the claims do not include an improvement to
another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of
the computer itself, or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment." Id.
In support of the determination that the claims do not recite (require)
significantly more than the abstract idea, the Examiner identifies Appellants'
Specification:
[I]t will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art that the
described embodiments may be implemented in software,
firmware, and hardware. The actual software code or
specialized control hardware used to implement the present
invention is not limiting of the invention. Thus, the operation
and behavior of the embodiments is described without specific
reference to the actual software code or specialized hardware
components. The absence of such specific references is
feasible, because it is clearly understood that artisans of
ordinary skill would be able to design software and control
hardware to implement the embodiments of the present
invention based on the description herein.
Id. at 6 ( quoting Spec. 42).
4 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
5 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Our Review
The Independent Claims
Alice/Mayo Step One
For the independent claims, Appellants principally argue error based
on the limitations of claim 1. See App. Br. 8-20; see also id. at 14--15, 17,
19 (additionally arguing error in the rejection independent claims 10 and 23
based on their limitations that have no analog to the limitations in claim 1 ).
Appellants contend the Examiner errs by determining the claims are directed
to "facilitating an auction" (Final Act. 2), because that idea is "untethered
from the language of the claims." App. Br. 12 (quoting Eefzsh; 6 also citing
Thales Visionix 7 ( quoting Rapid Litig. 8 for the proposition "it is not enough
to merely identify a patent-ineligible concept underlying the claim; we must
determine whether that patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is
'directed to'") (emphasis by Appellants, without attribution)); see also App.
Br. 13-16 ( arguing distinctions between the independent claims and the
claims at issue in buySAFE and Ultramercial).
As the Federal Circuit has repeatedly cautioned, we "'must be careful
to avoid oversimplifying the claims' by looking at them generally and failing
to account for the specific requirements of the claims." McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting In re TL! Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) ). We, therefore, look to whether: (1) the claims focus on a
specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or (2) the
6 Eefzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
7 Thales Visionix, Inc. v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
8 Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F .3d 1042,
1045 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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claims are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea
and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See Enfish, 822 F .3d at
1335-36. That is, we look to whether the claims are "specifically designed
to achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry
practice." McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316 (emphasis added).
Here, Appellants describe the invention as "relat[ing] to an auction
based procurement." Spec. 1; see also id. at 11, 16, Title. Claim 1 recites a
"method for performing an auction by an auction operator" that sends,
receives, and processes bid-related information, generates a "volume sales
opportunity" for use in bid updates, calculates transaction fees, ranks bids,
initiates re-bidding for lagging bids, and determines "a result of the auction."
Claims 10 and 33 include additional limitations for generating "a trending
model" based on "data mining" of prior purchase information in order to
generate the volume sales opportunity. Although the claims recite
technology-such as a network, a processor, a memory, devices, and data-
mining-we agree with the Examiner that the claims do not focus on (i.e.,
they are not directed to) those technological features. See Final Act. 2-7;
Spec. 42. We consider those technological features at step two of the
Alice/Mayo analysis (and Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 PEG).
Thus, at Alice/Mayo step one, we conclude claim 1 is directed to
facilitating an auction. Final Act. 2. Facilitating an auction by sending,
receiving, updating, processing, ranking, and determining fees for auction
bids is a fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods of
organizing human activity, and thus an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at
219-20; see also 2019 PEG at 53 (listing"[ c ]ertain methods of organizing
human activity-fundamental economic principles or practices" as one of
the "enumerated groupings of abstract ideas"); see also In The Jewelry
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Channel, Inc. USA d/b/a Liquidation Channel v. America's Collectibles
Network, Inc., 2014 WL 5386840 (PTAB 2014) (claims directed to a reverse
auction ineligible under§ 101) (aff'd R. 36, America's Collectibles Network,
Inc. v. Jewelry Channel, Inc., 672 F. App'x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in relying on Ultramercial,
because the independent claims "recite, for instance, data-mining a database
of active bids ... and generating a volume sales opportunity based on the
results of the data-mining," which limitations are "a far cry from" those in
the ineligible claim at issue in Ultramercial. App. Br. 14; see also id. at 14
( contending "[ s ]uch claim features cannot be classified as 'having no
particular concrete or tangible form"' (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at
715)). This argument is unpersuasive. Contrary to Appellants' argument,
the data processing limitations in the independent claims are no more
"concrete or tangible" than the data processing limitations in the claim at
issue in Ultramercial, which recited a variety of detailed requirements such
as accessing an activity log for verification that a sponsor message has been
presented less than a number of transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor,
and basing interaction with a consumer on whether the sponsor message is
or is not an interactive message.
The data processing limitations in the claim at issue in Ultramercial
and in Appellants' independent claims are similar in that they improve no
underlying technology, but instead serve simply to narrow the abstract idea
to which the claim is directed. In such a circumstance, our reviewing court
routinely determines general data processing limitations to be abstract. See
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class of claims
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'directed to' a patent-ineligible concept"); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims
directed to "collecting, displaying, and manipulating data" are abstract).
Here, these abstract data processing limitations are part of the abstract idea
of facilitating an auction and do not render the independent claims non-
abstract RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co. LTD., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Adding one abstract idea ... to another abstract idea ...
does not render the claim non-abstract."). Similarly, the claim limitations
for processing bids and re-bids, calculating fees to be paid by specific
entities, etc. do not improve technology, but instead are part of the claims'
focus on the idea of facilitating an auction.
Appellants also contend the rejection "ignor[ es] various claim features
that simply have no analogy to 'human activity', such as maintaining a
database of active bids, data-mining the database using a processor, and
using the data-mining and a processor to generate a volume sales
opportunity." Reply Br. 3; see also id. at 8 (contending "it is inconceivable
that the combination of these features in order adds 'nothing' compared to
these features taken individually"). This argument is unpersuasive. While
the claims recite technical terms such as a "processor" and "data mining"
that can exclude performance by a human, their functional limitations are
directed to the abstract idea of facilitating an auction, which is an idea for
organizing human activity. The question for any such technological
limitations, which we address below, is whether they recite "significantly
more" than the abstract idea.
Here, at Alice/Mayo step one, we determine the independent claims do
not include limitations that affect how the recited technology components
perform their tasks, rather they simply use those generic components for
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their ordinary purposes for the specific business method of facilitating an
auction. In other words, the claims do not apply the judicial exception with
any particular machine. See MPEP § 2106.0S(b). Appellants do not
persuade us that the independent claims improve the functioning of a
computer or any other technology or technical field, or that they effects a
particular transformation of the recited articles, which are simply used for
their ordinary purposes, or that they add any other meaningful
(technological) limitations, i.e., limitations beyond simply "linking the use"
of the abstract idea to generic technology. See MPEP § 2106.0S(a), (c), (e}-
(f); see also id. at (g}-(h) (use of well-known limitations beyond the
judicially excepted matter constitutes "insignificant extra-solution activity"
(g) and claim limitations "merely indicating a field of use or technological
environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not amount to
significantly more" (h)). Thus, the claims do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
Accordingly, we proceed to step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, and
consider whether, beyond the limitations directed to the abstract idea, the
independent claims recite limitations, individually or in combination, that
are not "well-understood, routine, and conventional." See 2019 PEG at 56
(citing MPEP § 2106.0S(d)).
Alice/Mayo Step Two
Appellants contend the independent claims recite significantly more
than the abstract idea of facilitating an auction because they "recite specific
computing steps." App. Br. 17 ( quoting Enfish for the proposition that "an
invention's ability to run on a general purpose computer does not
automatically doom the claim" under§ 101 (822 F.3d at 1338)). This
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argument is unpersuasive. We note Enfzsh was concerned with Step One of
the Alice Framework. Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1339. In any event, Appellants'
claims are unlike the claims at issue in Enfzsh. The Enfzsh claims recited a
distinct improvement in software technology, without reciting ( or having
any focus on) any business method limitations. See 822 F.3d at 1336
( explaining that the recited means for configuring and indexing data in a
database table was "directed to a specific improvement to the way computers
operate, embodied in the self-referential table"). Here, Appellants' claims,
by contrast, focus on ( are directed to) a business method of facilitating an
auction, and otherwise recite only generic computer-related technology.
Appellants also contend the ordered combination of limitations recited
in the independent claims amounts to significantly more than the abstract
idea according to Examples from the "Subject Matter Eligibility Examples:
Business Methods" (December 2016) ("BM Examples Memo") published by
the PTO. App. Br. 18-19. This argument also is unpersuasive.
Appellants first point to Example 34, which is patterned after the
claim at issue in BASCOM. 9 App. Br. 18. Example 34 adds significantly
more to the abstract idea of "filtering content on the Internet" by reciting a
technology-based solution in the form of a combination of limitations that
"carve out a specific location for the filtering system (a remote ISP server)
and require the filtering system to give users the ability to customize
filtering for their individual network accounts." 827 F.3d at 1352.
Appellants' claims, on the other hand, provide only improved auction
facilitating functionality, i.e., they do not provide any specific technological
improvement akin to the BASCOM claim.
9 BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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Appellants also point to Claim 2 of Example 35 from the BM
Examples Memo. App. Br. 18-19. This analogy also is unpersuasive.
Claim 2 from Example 3 5 recites significantly more than the abstract idea of
"fraud prevention by identity verification before proceeding with a banking
transaction" in the form of limitations for generating and transmitting a
random code to a mobile device, reading an image that includes encrypted
code data generated by the mobile device in response to the random code,
decrypting code data from the image, and then processing the decrypted data
to determine whether a transaction should proceed. Id. In other words,
Example 35 Claim 2 recites a combination of non-generic technological
limitations that are integral to the recited functionality of the business
method. Appellants' claims, on the other hand, include no similar
technological limitations, alone or in combination. Instead, as the Examiner
determines, and we agree:
The use of generic computer components in this manner
does not impose any meaningful limit on the computer
implementation of the abstract idea. Thus, taken alone, the
additional elements do not amount to significantly more than
the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract idea).
Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds
nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements
taken individually. There is no indication that the combination
of elements improves the functioning of a computer or
improves any other technology. Their collective functions
merely provide conventional computer implementation.
Ans. 9-10.
Appellants have not directed our attention to anything in the record
that shows, nor can we find, any specialized computer hardware, technical
processes, or other "inventive" technology components are required. Rather
than reciting additional elements that amount to "significantly more" than
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the abstract idea, the pending claims add only generic technology
components, which does not provide an inventive concept. See, e.g., DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
("[ A ]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Accenture Global
Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344--45 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (claims reciting "generalized software components arranged to
implement an abstract concept ... [of generating insurance-policy-related
tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event] on a
computer" not patent eligible).
Preemption
Appellants also argue the Examiner errs because the independent
claims "do not implicate any preemption concerns that might necessitate a
finding of patent ineligibility under§ 101." App. Br. 16; see also id. at 20.
Preemption, however, is not a concern here. "While preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also CLS Bankint'l v. Alice
Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[B]road claims do not
necessarily raise § 101 preemption concerns and seemingly narrower claims
are not necessarily exempt."); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1362---63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[T]hat the claims do not preempt all
price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-
commerce setting do not make them any less abstract."). "Where a patent's
claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the
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Mayo framework ... preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot." Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 10, and
23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Dependent Claims
Appellants separately argue error in the rejection of dependent claim 7
and of dependent claims 8, 11 and 24. See App. Br. 20-21. From the group
of claims 8, 11, and 24, we select claim 8 as representative. 3 7 C.F .R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants also contend the Examiner's rejection of
dependent claims 2---6 and 25-32 is erroneously conclusory. See App. Br.
21. These arguments are unpersuasive.
Claim 7 recites "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the additional
transaction fee is calculated based upon a look-up table of government
agencies and contract types." Appellants contend claim 7 "further
contributes to the ordered combination of the features set forth in parent
Claim 1, and further eliminates any risk of preemption." App. Br. 20-21.
As the Examiner responds, and we agree, however, claim 7 "may further
limit the calculation of the transaction fee, [but] the claim is still directed to
the abstract idea of facilitating an auction. Further, the calculation is
directed to the use of a generic computing component for routine, well-
understood, and conventional purposes." Ans. 11; see also id. at 12
(explaining "[t]here is no indication that the combination of elements
improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology").
Accordingly, we sustain the§ 101 rejection of claim 7.
Claim 8 adds to claim 1 the step of "displaying the result of the
auction, wherein the additional transaction fee is included in the displayed
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result as a separate line item." Appellants contend this step "commands a
finding that these dependent claims are not directed to ... 'facilitating an
auction', and regardless, amount to 'significantly more' than such alleged
abstract idea under the second Alice step." App. Br. 12. As the Examiner
responds, however, and we agree, adding claim 8' s step of displaying to
claim 1 does not change what the claim is directed to. Ans. 12. As the
precedent of Elec. Power Grp. has made clear, "collecting information,
analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are
"a familiar class of claims 'directed to' a patent-ineligible concept." 830
F.3d at 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d at 1340 ( claims directed to "collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data" are abstract). Appellants do not persuade
us the Examiner errs in determining that claim 8's displaying step, by itself
or in combination with the remaining limitations of claim 1, improves any
technology-we agree with the Examiner that it does no more than "merely
provide conventional computer implementation." Ans. 14. Accordingly, we
sustain the § 101 rejection of claim 8.
Regarding claims 2---6 and 25-32, the Examiner responds in the
Answer with additional explanation for why these claims stand or fall with
their parent independent claims. See Ans. 13-14. We discern no error in the
Examiner's response, to which Appellants offer no challenge. Accordingly,
we sustain the § 101 rejection of claims 2---6 and 25-32.
17
Appeal2017-011740
Application 13/224,763
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1-8,
10, 11, and 23-32.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
18