Ex Parte Lee et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 22, 2018

14064039 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 22, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/064,039 10/25/2013 Lawrence C. Lee
35699 7590 10/24/2018
PVF--PARC
c/o PARK, VAUGHAN, FLEMING & DOWLER LLP
2820 FIFTH STREET
DAVIS, CA 95618-7759
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
PARC-20130571US01 1070
EXAMINER
SHELDEN, BION A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/24/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
sy _incoming@parklegal.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LAWRENCE C. LEE,
OLIVER BRDICZKA,
FRANCISCO E. TORRES,
CHRIS HOLMES,
JAMES D. GLASNAPP,
MICHAEL C. NASH,
and ANDREW J. PERELSON
Appeal2017---001727
Application 14/064,039
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. PETTING, AMEE A. SHAH, and
MATTHEWS. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
PETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
Lawrence C. Lee, Oliver Brdiczka, Francisco E. Torres, Chris Holmes,
James D. Glasnapp, Michael C. Nash, and Andrew J. Perelson (Appellants)
1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App.
Br.," filed April 22, 2016) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed November 9,
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seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a non-final rejection of claims 1-5,
9-13, 17-21, and 28-32, the only claims pending in the application on
appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The Appellants invented a way of precise targeting and delivery of local
offers from merchants. Specification para. 1.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
1. A computer-executable method for delivering an offer to a
mobile computing device associated with a potential customer,
compnsmg:
[ 1] determining, by a processor, a public-transit route
used by the potential customer associated with the mobile
computing device;
[2] obtaining public transit schedule data
from a public transit agency server for the public-transit
route;
[3] determining,
based on the public transit schedule data received
from the public transit agency server,
that there is an upcoming delay in the public-transit route
during which the potential customer can redeem an
offer by a merchant;
2016), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed September 9, 2016), and
Non-Final Action ("Non-Final Act.," mailed December 11, 2015).
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[ 4] selecting,
based on the potential customer's geolocation and
upcoming delay,
an offer
which the potential customer can redeem in the
vicinity of his geolocation,
wherein the offer is valid during the upcoming
delay;
[5] sending the selected offer with a message indicating the
upcoming delay
to the potential customer's mobile computing device.
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Greene US 2009/0222344 Al
Agulnek US 2012/0197690 Al
deKozan US 2014/0156396 Al
Sept. 3, 2009
Aug.2,2012
June 5, 2014
Claims 1-5, 9-13, 17-21, and 28-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 2, 10, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking
a supporting written description within the original disclosure.
Claims 4, 12, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as failing
to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.
Claims 1-5, 9-13, 17-21, and 30-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as unpatentable over Agulnek and deKozan.
Claims 28 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Agulnek, deKozan, and Greene.
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ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter tum primarily on whether the claims
recite more than abstract conceptual advice of what a computer is to provide
without implementation details.
There are no issues with regard to written description and indefiniteness,
as these are uncontested.
The issues of obviousness tum primarily on whether the art describes an
upcoming delay rather than an extant delay.
FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Facts Related to the Prior Art
Agulnek
01.Agulnek is directed to operating a navigation system, and
providing advertisements to a mobile device. Agulnek para. 1.
02. Agulnek describes operating a navigation system to provide an
advertisement. The method obtains a desired arrival time at a
destination and selects the advertisement from an advertisement
database. The advertisement includes an incentive to visit a point
of interest associated with the advertisement to obtain a product or
a service. The method determines a travel time from a current
location of the navigation system to the destination including
traveling to the point of interest to obtain the product or the
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service. The method determines a new arrival time as a current
time plus the determined travel time. If the new arrival time is
before the desired arrival time, the advertisement is provided.
Agulnek para. 5.
03 .Agulnek describes determining the travel time to the destination
with a visit to the point of interest associated with the
advertisement from the current position of the mobile device. To
compute the travel time, the advertising program uses data from
the geographic database to compute a new route from the current
position to the location of the point of interest and from the
location of the point of interest to the destination. For the new
route, the point of interest associated with the advertisement is
now a waypoint between the current location and the destination.
Data from the geographic database representing the length and
speed limit of the road segments of the new route may be used to
determine the travel time. Additionally, real-time traffic
information may be used to identify delays along the new route
and provide a more accurate estimate of the travel time to the
destination including a stop at the point of interest associated with
the advertisement. Moreover, historic traffic information may be
used to estimate the travel time to the destination. Furthermore,
the advertising program obtains the transaction time associated
with the incentive of the advertisement from the advertisement
database. Agulnek para. 55.
04.Agulnek describes requesting an advertisement with an incentive
having a transaction time less than or equal to the spare time. The
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request includes the computed spare time and the current position
of the mobile device. The advertising program evaluates the
transaction time data of the advertisement data records to identify
the advertisement and the incentive to include in the advertisement
message that is less than or equal to the spare time. Agulnek
para. 66.
deKozan
05.deKozan is directed to generating a request for an advertisement
based on an identified ridership pattern of a user of a transit
system. deKozan para. 6.
06. deKozan describes fare information, schedule information, delay
update information, and other transit related information being
processed at the computer server and communicated to the various
other machines in the transit system. deKozan para. 54.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1-5, 9-13, 17-21, and 28-32 rejected under 35 USC§ 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter
Method claim 1 recites determining route data, obtaining schedule data,
determining upcoming delay data, selecting an off er based on location and
delay data, and sending the offer. Thus, claim 1 recites receiving, analyzing,
and transmitting data. None of the limitations recite implementation details
for any of these steps, but instead recite functional results to be achieved by
any and all possible means. Data reception, analysis and modification, and
transmission are all generic, conventional data processing operations to the
point they are themselves concepts awaiting implementation details. The
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sequence of data reception-analysis-transmission is equally generic and
conventional. The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and
conventional. The remaining claims merely describe process parameters,
with no implementation details.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, []
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. [] If so, we then ask, "[ w ]hat
else is there in the claims before us?" [] To answer that
question, [] consider the elements of each claim both
individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine
whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the
claim" into a patent-eligible application. [The Court] described
step two of this analysis as a search for an "'inventive
concept'"-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
"sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself."
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Intl, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)
( citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012)).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Examiner finds the claims
are directed to targeted advertising based on public-transit delays. Non-
Final Act. 4.
Although the Court in Alice made a determination as to what the claims
were directed to, we find that this case's claims and the Specification
provide enough information to inform one as to what they are directed to.
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The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for delivering an offer
to a mobile computing device associated with a potential customer. The
steps in claim 1 result in sending a selected offer with a message indicating
an upcoming delay to a mobile computing device. The Specification at
paragraph 1 recites that the invention relates to precise targeting and delivery
of local offers from merchants. Thus, all this evidence shows that claim 1 is
directed to delivering an offer, i.e. advertising and promotion. This is
consistent with the Examiner's finding.
It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Bilski (Bilski v Kappas,
561 U.S. 593 (2010)) in particular, that the claims at issue here are directed
to an abstract idea. Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of
advertising and promotion is a fundamental business practice long prevalent
in our system of commerce. The use of advertising and promotion is also a
building block of ingenuity in marketing. See Affinity Labs v Amazon, 83 8
F.3d at 1271 (customizing a user interface to have targeted advertising based
on user information), and Personalized Media Commc 'ns, LLC v.
Amazon.Com, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 3d 325, 338 (D. Del. 2015), affd sub nom.,
671 F. App'x 777 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (providing personalized
recommendations). Thus, advertising and promotion, like hedging, is an
"abstract idea" beyond the scope of§ 101. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2356.
As in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction
between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of advertising
and promotion at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract
ideas" as the Court has used that term. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2357.
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Further, claims involving data collection, analysis, and display are
directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class
of claims 'directed to' a patent ineligible concept"); see also In re TL!
Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses
generic computer technology to perform data retrieval, analysis, and
transmission and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer
technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314--15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because
they "focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation").
As such, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of receiving, analyzing, and
transmitting data.
The remaining claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude
that the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis
at Mayo step two.
the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it"' is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."'
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a
computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to "implement[t]" an abstract
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idea "on ... a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of "additional
feature[ e ]" that provides any "practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [ abstract idea] itself."
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted).
"[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2359. They do not.
Taking the elements of claim 1 separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to receive, analyze, and transmit data amounts to electronic data
query and retrieval----one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of
these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom
S.A., supra. Also see In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)("Absent a possible
narrower construction of the terms "processing, ""receiving," and "storing,"
. . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer
without special programming"). In short, each step does no more than
require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the
data operated upon, "even if a process of collecting and analyzing
information is 'limited to particular content' or a particular 'source,' that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract."
SAP America Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
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Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants' method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
transmission is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be
abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display,
allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display,
and transmission), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications,
LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)(sequence of processing, routing,
controlling, and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary
and conventional.
Viewed as a whole, Appellants' method claims simply recite the concept
of advertising and promotion as performed by a generic computer. To be
sure, the claims recite doing so by advising one to present an ad based on
location and upcoming transit delay. But this is no more than abstract
conceptual advice on the parameters for such advertising and promotion and
the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and
do not recite any particular implementation.
The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in
any other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out
different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this
concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail
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based on the concept of advertising and promotion under different scenarios.
They do not describe any particular improvement in the manner of computer
functions. Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more
than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of advertising and promotion
using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not
enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2360.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long "warn[ ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in
ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the
draftsman's art."'
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2360.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the claims are
analogous to those in Enfzsh. Reply Br. 8-10. The claims differ from those
found patent eligible in Enfzsh, where the claims were "specifically
directed to a self-referential table for a computer database." 822 F .3d 13 2 7,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims thus were "directed to a specific
improvement to the way computers operate" rather than an abstract idea
implemented on a computer. Id. at 1336. Here, by contrast, the claims
are not directed to an improvement in the way computers operate.
Though the claims purport to accelerate and improve the precision of the
process of delivering an ad, our reviewing court has held that speed and
accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general
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purpose computer "do[] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the
claimed subject matter." Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Can. (US.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Instead, the claims
are more analogous to those in FairWarning, wherein claims reciting "a
few possible rules to analyze audit log data" were found directed to an
abstract idea because they asked "the same questions (though perhaps
phrased with different words) that humans in analogous situations
detecting fraud have asked for decades." 839 F.3d at 1094, 1095. The
instant claims ask the same question of when is a good time to send an ad to
a customer that has been at the heart of the advertising industry. At bottom,
the claims do no more than elicit data matching some criterion to answer this
question.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that "the Examiner
considers targeted advertising to be a fundamental economic practice but the
courts have not." Reply Br. 11-12. The United States District Court, C.D.
California, found that "targeted advertising is just such a concept, insofar as
matching consumers with a given product or service "has been practiced as
long as markets have been in operation." Morsa v. Facebook, 77 F. Supp.
3d 1007, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2014). The Federal Circuit affirmed. Morsa v.
Facebook, 622 Fed.Appx. 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Although non-precedential,
this does show that the Federal Circuit considers targeted advertising to be a
fundamental practice and idea.
And although Appellants contend that the claims in Ultramercial, supra,
are not directed to targeted advertising (Reply Br. 12), the Ultramercial
claims targeted ads to those desiring "access to the media product without
charge to the consumer on the precondition that the consumer views the
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sponsor message." Ultramercial, 772 F3d at 712 (reciting claim 1 of the
'545 patent). Beyond that, the instant claims are directed to some specific
concept for generating ads absent technological implementation details, and
as such is directed to advertising and promotion.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that "claim 1 recites
sufficient detail for performing the operations to obtain the result, such as
obtaining public transit schedule data and selecting an offer based on
geolocation and an upcoming delay." Reply Br. 12. Claim 1 recites
sufficient detail only in that it provides general advice on how to determine
when to send an ad. The lack of technological implementation details results
in an insufficient amount of detail to recite more than instructing a computer
to perform the functions recited by any and all possible means. Appellants'
examples of obtaining public transit schedule data and selecting an offer
based on geolocation and an upcoming delay are no more than the
conventional operations of retrieving data and making a decision based on
criteria. Aside from how one interprets the data, the operations are the same
as looking up someone's schedule and placing a meeting notice where time
and place are available. But interpretation of data2 is in the mind of the
beholder and given no patentable weight. See In re Bernhart, 41 7 F .2d
1395, 1399 (CCPA 1969).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that SmartGene, Inc. v.
Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App'x 950,951, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
2 Data per se is an arbitrary string of binary digits dependent on encoding
scheme and has no intrinsic meaning unless imposed by some technological
limitation.
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is inapposite. Reply Br. 12-13. Like Morsa, supra, Smartgene is a non-
precedential decision that nevertheless illustrates subjects the Federal Circuit
has found directed to abstract ideas. In holding the Smartgene claims as
directed to an abstract idea, the Court found
Claim 1 does no more than call on a "computing device," with
basic functionality for comparing stored and input data and
rules, to do what doctors do routinely. In three steps, claim 1
defines a "method for guiding the selection of a therapeutic
treatment regimen for a patient with a known disease or medical
condition." '786 patent, col. 17, lines 49-51. The method (1)
"provid[ es] patient information to a computing device" having
routine input, memory, look-up, comparison, and output
capabilities and that (2) "generat[ es] ... a ranked listing of
available therapeutic treatment regimens" and (3) "generat[ es]
... advisory information for one or more therapeutic treatment
regimens in said ranked listing."
Smartgene, 555 Fed.Appx. at 954--955.
Appellants attempt to distinguish the instant claims by contending
that claim 1 does not recite comparing new and stored
information. Instead, claim 1 compares new, dynamic
information such as user geolocation with also new, dynamic
information such as public transit schedule data and delays
associated with the public transit routes. The offers are also
new and dynamically changing since the offers have specific
validity times. In contrast, the SmartGene system only
compares new and stored information such as standard medical
conditions found in a textbook reference.
Reply Br. 13.
First, claim 1 does not recite the data as being dynamic. Second, even if
the data is dynamic, claim 1 recites only determining a route and location,
and schedule delays. Thus, claim 1 recites no more than receiving such data.
Data reception is a conventional operation. Whatever data pre-processing
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required by any particular characteristics (such as dynamism) of the data are
outside the scope of the claims. Finally, the comparison to Smartgene is apt,
as both the Smartgene and instant claims recite data retrieval, analysis, and
transmission. Only the mental interpretation of the data and the nature of the
analytical criteria differ.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the claims alter the
flow of riders. Reply Br. 14--15. The claims do not recite such, and nothing
in the claims would cause such a redirection. Rather, Appellants posit a
potential change in a mental travel plan based on the content of the message.
Just as sending a message to return home immediately is unworthy of
patentable weight, so is an ad that might suggest changing travel plans to
take advantage of an offer.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that "analyzing
geolocation and an upcoming delay for the user is a technical process that
maps the users with merchants, and solves the technical problem of
determining which offers from merchants matches up with different
scenarios." Reply Br. 16. First, this problem of matching ads with scenarios
is a marketing problem present in commerce since the dawn of advertising
rather than a technical problem. Second, as the claims recite no
implementation details for analyzing geolocation and an upcoming delay,
the claims do not solve such analysis, but instead advise one to perform the
analysis. To the extent Appellants contend the result of the analysis is a
good thing, so is the result of much abstract advice. For example, the highly
abstract aphorisms "a stitch in time saves nine" and "an ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure" form the basis of the preventive maintenance
industry.
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We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that "determining when
customers are receptive to receiving and viewing information is a technical
process which may constitute significantly more. This process requires
analyzing the activities of a user and determining when a user may receive
and view the information." Id. Again, this is a marketing rather than
technical process. Given the data inputs that the claims do not recite
implementations for, the remaining portions of the claims may be done
mentally or with paper and pencil. Analysis per se is an abstraction of the
various algorithms used to perform it, and so is an abstract idea.
Claims 2, 10, and 18 rejected under 35 USC§ l 12(a) as lacking a
supporting written description within the original disclosure
We summarily affirm this uncontested rejection.
Claims 4, 12, and 20 rejected under 35 USC§ l 12(b) as failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention
We summarily affirm this uncontested rejection.
Claims 1-5, 9-13, 17-21, and 30-32 rejected under 35 USC§ 103(a) as
unpatentable over Agulnek and deKozan
We are persuaded by Appellants' argument that
One of ordinary skill in the art would not combine the delays
identified in Agulnek with performing a transaction during a
spare time of Agulnek because the delays in Agulnek are
merely additional time spent driving in traffic to a destination.
The delays in the Agulnek reference are not free time that a car
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driver can use to redeem an offer. Examiner confuses the delay
in the Agulnek reference, which is not free time but is time
stuck driving in traffic as indicated by real-time traffic
information, with the delay recited in claim 1, which is free
time because a public transit has not arrived yet.
Reply Br. 19.
In particular, the claim recites an upcoming delay rather than an extant
delay as in Agulnek. The Examiner does not make any determinations why
the combination of the references would suggest altering the descriptions by
substituting an upcoming delay.
Claims 28 and 29 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Agulnek, deKozan, and Green
These claims depend from claim 1.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 1-5, 9-13, 17-21, and 28-32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter is proper.
The rejection of claims 2, 10, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking
a supporting written description within the original disclosure is proper.
The rejection of claims 4, 12, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as failing
to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention is proper.
The rejection of claims 1-5, 9-13, 17-21, and 30-32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Agulnek and deKozan is improper.
The rejection of claims 28 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Agulnek, deKozan, and Green is improper.
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DECISION
The rejection of claims 1-5, 9-13, 17-21, and 28-32 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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