Ex Parte Leavitt et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 30, 2018

13649935 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/649,935
109973 7590
Bejin Bieneman PLC
2000 Town Center
Suite 800
Southfield, MI 48075
10/11/2012
05/02/2018
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Dean Michael Leavitt
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
67268-0003 5082
EXAMINER
LEFFALL-ALLEN, NAKIA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket@b2iplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DEAN MICHAEL LEA VITT
and JAMES EDWARD LISTER
Appeal2016-003965
Application 13/649,935 1
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner's
final rejection of claims 1, 3-7, 15, and 17-27. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify Boost Payment Solutions, LLC as the real party in
interest. Br. 2. After the briefing, however, an Assignment to Boost
Payment Solutions, Inc. was recorded at Reel 044828, Frame 0339.
Appeal 2016-003965
Application 13/649,935
THE INVENTION
Appellants claim an "[ e ]lectronic systems for handling various
payments between government, corporate, or institutional (i.e., non-
consumer) customers (also referred to herein as 'buyers'), and their
suppliers, vendors and other payees (all of whom may sometimes be referred
to as 'merchants')" Spec. i-f 2.
Claim 1 reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A method, comprising:
receiving an encrypted payment message from a buyer
relating to a transaction with a merchant;
parsing, in a computing device, the encrypted payment
message to obtain merchant identifying information;
further parsing the encrypted payment message to obtain a
token that has been generated by the buyer and included in the
payment message, wherein the token identifies payment
information including at least a number and an expiration date
for a payment card;
encrypting and submitting the payment information to a
third party settlement processor on behalf of the merchant; and
reporting results of the transaction to at least one of the
merchant and the buyer.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Ostrovsky
Mclsaac
US 2010/0205095 Al
US 2008/0222046 Al
2
Aug. 12, 2010
Sept. 11, 2008
Appeal 2016-003965
Application 13/649,935
The following rejections are before us for review.
Claims 1, 3-7, 15, and 17-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 1, 3-7, 15, and 17-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Claims 15 and 17-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
Claims 1, 3-7, 15, 18-22, and 24--27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).2
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. We adopt the Examiner's findings as set forth on pages 3 and 7 of the
Answer concerning the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) REJECTION
We will not sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3-7, 15, and 17-27 as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
The Examiner found,
Claim 1, recites "encrypting and submitting the
payment information ... " Although, Applicant's
Specification [0054] mentions FTP (file transfer
protocol), Applicant's Specification does not mention
encrypting the FTP before submitting payment
information to third party settlement. Claims 15 and 22
contain similar language.
2 We treat the Examiner's omission of claim 3 in the rejection heading at
page 7 of the Final Office Action as inadvertent in light of the claim's
treatment at page 8.
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(Final Act. 5).
Appellants, however, argue that
the Specification provides more than adequate support for FTP
transfers being secure, i.e., encrypted. For example, paragraph
0017 explains that a "transaction is securely processed on the
supplier's behalf.["] Paragraph 0018 discusses the need to
comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
(PCI DSS). Paragraph 0038 discusses sending and receiving
payment data via encrypted emails. Paragraph 0040 discusses
using secure FTP and other secure protocols.
(App. Br. 7).
Based on our review of the Specification at the sections cited by
Appellants, and in particular paragraph 40, we agree with Appellants that the
Specification explicitly describes using "secure file transfer protocol" (SFTP
or FTPS). Also, paragraph 38 describes email (another data transfer
mechanism), and clearly states, "payment data 110 may be an encrypted
email, and the parsing module 125 may include instructions to parse card
data from the encrypted email."
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) REJECTION
i. We will not sustain the rejection of claims 15 and 22, and their
dependent claims, as failing to set forth the subject matter which the inventor
or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA, the Applicants, regard as their invention.
The Examiner found, "Claims 15 and 22 recite ('a token that has been
generated by the buyer ... '). The steps attempt to claim both a system and
method for using the system. Therefore, as it has been held, that a claim is
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considered indefinite if it does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art
of its scope." (Final Act. 6) (citations omitted).
Appellants argue,
Claims 15 and 22 each recite and [sic] apparatus having a
processor configured to execute certain instructions enumerated
in the claims. One of those instructions in claim 15 is an
instruction to "further parse the encrypted payment message to
obtain a token that has been generated by the buyer." One of
ordinary skill would have been reasonably apprised that to meet
this recitation of the claim it was necessary to execute
instructions in the processor to parse a payment message to
obtain a buyer generated token. There is no mixture of a system
or apparatus claim with a method step.
(Appeal Br. 8).
We agree with Appellants that it is clear from these claims that the
claimed "buyer generated token" is the product of both buyer input and the
program instructions which govern the control of a computer system-an
apparatus.
ii. We will sustain the rejection of claims 22 and 25 and hence,
claims 22-27, under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as failing to set forth the subject
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA, the Applicants,
regard as their invention based on the recitation of "means for" that invokes
35 USC § 112, sixth paragraph (now§ 112(±)).
The Examiner found, "the written description fails to clearly link or
associate the disclosed structure to the claimed function such that one of
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ordinary skill in the art would recognize what structure performs the claimed
function." (Final. Act. 6).
Appellants maintain, "the Specification clearly discloses, e.g., at
paragraph 0024, a portal 120 that 'includes one or more computer servers.'
The Specification further describes the portal 120, including various
modules such as a parsing module 125 performing various functions."
(Appeal Br. 9).
We disagree with Appellants.
When the means-plus-function limitation in a claim is a computer-
enabled means-plus-function limitation, one must set forth in the
specification sufficient description of an algorithm associated with the
function recited in the claim in order to avoid a finding that an Applicants
have failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as
required by the second paragraph of section 112(now§112(b )).
It is certainly true that the sufficiency of the disclosure of
algorithmic structure must be judged in light of what one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the disclosure to
impart. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., 319 F.3d 1357,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (knowledge of a person of ordinary skill
in the art can be used to make clear how to implement a
disclosed algorithm); Atmel Corp., 198 F.3d at 1379 ("[T]he
'one skilled in the art' analysis should apply in determining
whether sufficient structure has been disclosed to support a
means-plus-function limitation."). That principle, however, has
no application here, because in this case there was no algorithm
at all disclosed in the specification. The question thus, is not
whether the algorithm that was disclosed was described with
sufficient specificity, but whether an algorithm was disclosed at
all.
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Aristocrat Techs. Australia Party. Ltd. vs. Int'! Game Tech., 521F.3d1328,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
When there is insufficient description of an algorithm in the
Specification to support a computer-enabled means-plus-function limitation
in a claim, the disclosure will be considered inadequate to explain to one of
ordinary skill in the art what is meant by the claim language.
For computer-implemented means-plus-function claims where
the disclosed structure is a computer programmed to implement
an algorithm, "the disclosed structure is not the general purpose
computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed
to perform the disclosed algorithm." WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'!
Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed.Cir.1999). Thus the
patent must disclose, at least to the satisfaction of one of
ordinary skill in the art, enough of an algorithm to provide the
necessary structure under§ 112, i-f 6. This court permits a
patentee to express that algorithm in any understandable terms
including as a mathematical formula, in prose, see In re
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245--46 (CCPA 1978), or as a flow
chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.
The district court correctly determined that the structure recited
in the '505 specification does not even meet the minimal
disclosure necessary to make the claims definite. Simply
reciting "software" without providing some detail about the
means to accomplish the function is not enough. See Aristocrat
Techs. Aust!. Pty v. Int'! Game Tech., 521F.3d1328, ----
(Fed.Cir.2008) ("For a patentee to claim a means for
performing a particular function and then to disclose only a
general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform
that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Because
general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very
different tasks in very different ways, simply disclosing a
computer as the structure designated to perform a particular
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function does not limit the scope of the claim to 'the
corresponding structure, material, or acts' that perform the
function, as required by section 112 paragraph 6."). This court
does not impose a lofty standard in its indefiniteness cases. See,
e.g., Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,
344 F.3d 1205, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But in this case, the
claims are already quite vague. Without any corresponding
structure, one of skill simply cannot perceive the bounds of the
invention.
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
When a Specification discloses no algorithm corresponding to a
computer-enabled means-plus-function limitation in a claim, an Applicant
has necessarily failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112
(now§ 112(b )). See also Aristocrat, 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("'[t]he corresponding structure for a§ 112 i-f 6 claim for a computer-
implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification.'
[Harris] 417 F.3d at 1249.") (some brackets added); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("'[A] means-plus-
function claim element for which the only disclosed structure is a general
purpose computer is invalid if the specification fails to disclose an algorithm
for performing the claimed function."). See also Blackboard, Inc. v.
Desire2Learn Inc., 574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding Blackboard's
means-plus-function claims indefinite because the patent describes an
undefined component, i.e., a black box, that performs the recited function
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but does not disclose how the component performs the function). See
further Ex parte Catlin, 90 USPQ2d 1603, 1605 (BP AI 2009) (precedential)
(during prosecution, computer-enabled means-plus-function claims will be
held unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being
indefinite if a Specification fails to disclose any algorithm corresponding to
the recited function in the claims).
Our review of the Specification and the sections cited by Appellants
in support the reveals only a general reference to a portal 120 at paragraph
24 and modules 130, 135, 140, and a network 115 with attendant computers.
Modules are nebulous entities and absent a more specific description of how
these modules work to accomplish the recited functions, we find them
insufficient to adequately describe the associated structure sufficient to
satisfy the 112, sixth paragraph (now§ 112(±) requirements. Even taking the
flowchart of Figure 7 into account, the steps of this flowchart merely repeat
those steps of the claims without giving further description into
programming instructions of how the claimed function is performed by a
computer.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION
We will not affirm the rejection of claims 1, 3-7, 15, and 17-27 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Appellants argue, "Ostrovsky discloses at most that ' [ e ]mail
messages may be signed with a secret code or electronic
signature for authentication purposes.' (Ostrovsky, paragraph
0086.) Appellants do not concede that Ostrovsky's 'secret code'
reads on the recited 'token' in any way."
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(Appeal Br. 9).
In the Answer, he Examiner found,
Ostrovsky teaches sending a secure payment e-mail [0039;
0086] (signed using an electronic signature); a token (card
number) [Fig. 12; 0084; 0085]. Because the e-mail in Ostrovsky
may be signed with a secret code, to one of ordinary skill in the
art, this means to encrypt the e-mail. Ostrovsky teaches in
[0017] that communications are encrypted with an electronic
signature to protect "confidentiality and security". Schneier.
Applied Crvptographv. Second Edition Protocols. Algorithms
and Source Code in C, 1996, states "encrypt a document using
your private key, and you have a secure digital signature".
(Answer 7-8).
We agree with Appellants. Independent claims 1, 15, and 22 require
the following in one form or another:
encrypted payment message to obtain a token that has been
generated by the buyer and included in the payment message, wherein
the token identifies payment information including at least a number
and an expiration date for a payment card.
(Emphasis added).
The Examiner found that the card number of Ostrovsky, disclosed in
paragraph 85 and Figure 12, is the "token." (Answer 7). The Specification
defines a token stating, "[a] token is a unique or substantially unique
identifier for ghost card information, e.g., the card account number,
expiration date, etc., and may be used to secure the ghost card information."
Specification i-f 39. Thus, the token must be something other than the card
account number in order to uniquely identify the account number. We
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cannot therefore accept the Examiner's construction that the card number is
one and the same as the claimed token.
Therefore, we will not sustain the rejection of independent claims 1,
15 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Because claims 3-7, 18-21, and 23-27
depend from one of claims 1, 15 and 22, we likewise do not sustain the
rejection of these claims.
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3-7, 15, and 17-27 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, ...
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, "[ w ]hat
else is there in the claims before us?" To answer that question,
. . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and
"as an ordered combination" to determine whether the
additional elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a
patent-eligible application. [The Court] described step two of
this analysis as a search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Banklnt'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73
(2012)).
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To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
Although, the Court in Alice made a direct finding as to what the
claims were directed to, we find that this case's claims themselves and the
Specification provide enough information to inform one as to what they are
directed to.
The steps in claim 1 result in: "encrypting and submitting the
payment information to a third party settlement processor on behalf of the
merchant; and reporting results of the transaction to at least one of the
merchant and the buyer."
The Specification further states,
One present system requires a customer cardholder
wishing to make a payment to its supplier or vendor (to the
extent there is any difference between them, merchants,
suppliers and vendors alike are referred to herein as suppliers)
to notify its issuing bank of its desire to do so. Notice may be
then be provided to the supplier, which must then enter card
data, an amount of the payment, date of payment, invoice
number(s), etc., to which the payment applies, and other
payment-related data that may be required, into a point of sale
terminal, processing software, or other card acceptance system
that has been provided to the supplier by its merchant bank in
order to submit card transactions for processing and ultimate
funding. For a ghost card or a one-time use card, an e-mail
notification may be sent to the supplier identifying invoices to
be paid, the amount of each, and the overall payment amount to
be applied to the card.
Specification i-f 3. The Specification also describes:
In short, the present disclosure includes mechanisms by
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which a buyer-initiated one time use or ghost transaction may
be processed on behalf of a merchant. That is, a transaction may
be proxied, or emulated, on behalf of a supplier in a manner that
yields the same result for a supplier as a transaction in which
the buyer initiates a transaction directly to the merchant (i.e.,
supplier), but with significant efficiencies for the supplier and
greatly reduced risk for all parties (e.g., the card issuer, the
buyer, and the supplier).
Specification i-f 19.
Thus, all this evidence shows that claim 1 is directed to a secured third
party settlement process using an encrypted payment message with a
payment token identifying at least a number and an expiration date for a
payment card. It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) in particular, that the claims at issue here are
directed to an abstract idea. A secured third party settlement process is a
fundamental economic practice of a transaction because ensuring security of
settlement is necessary to protect the payment card data involved in the
transaction. The patent-ineligible end of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 spectrum
includes fundamental economic practices. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.
Ct. at 2355-1257. Thus, a secured third party settlement process is an
"abstract idea" beyond the scope of§ 101.
As in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction
between the concept of an intermediated settlement in Alice and the concept
of a secured third party settlement process, at issue here. Both are squarely
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within the realm of "abstract ideas" as the Court has used that term. That the
claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to a
payment card, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Further, claims involving only data collection, analysis, such as parsing
an encrypted message, are directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp. v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims
reciting only "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class of claims
'directed to' a patent ineligible concept"); see also In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC
Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v.
Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the
analysis at Mayo step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it"' is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."'
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a
computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to "implement[ t ]" an abstract
idea "on ... a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of "additional
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featur[ e ]" that provides any "practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself."
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
"[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea ... on a
generic computer." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2359. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to take in data, compute a result, and return the result to a user
amounts to electronic data query and retrieval-some of the most basic
functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants' method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. Viewed as a whole, Appellants' claims simply
recite the concept of a secured third party settlement process using a token in
an encrypted payment message. The claims do not, for example, purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims
at issue amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to a secured
third party settlement process using a token in an encrypted payment
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message. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at
2360.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long "warn[ ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in
ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the
draftsman's art."'
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct._at 2360 (alterations in original).
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 6-7) that Appellants
have submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us
which stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our analysis
above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments which have
been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellants argue,
The Office has not met that burden in this case. Here, the
Office Action (page 4) simply states that the claims "are
directed towards the concept of making a payment, settling the
transaction and reporting the results to parties involved using a
buyer defined algorithm." The Office does not even address the
specific recitations of the independent claims to explain how
they allegedly fall within this abstract idea, much less does the
Office provide any analysis or evidence to support its
conclusion.
(App. Br. 6).
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We disagree with Appellants.
The Federal Circuit has stated:
all that is required of the office to meet its prima facie burden of
production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection and
the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently
articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice
requirement of§ 132. As the statute itself instructs, the
examiner must 'notify the applicant,' 'stating the reasons for
such rejection,' 'together with such information and references
as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing
prosecution of his application.' 35 U.S.C. § 132.
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356 at 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, the Examiner has
done exactly that-------the final action states, "Claims 1, 3----7, 15, and 17----27
is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is
directed to non-statutory subject matter." (Final Act. 4). The final action
further goes on to identify, "claims is/are directed towards the concept of
making a payment, settling the transaction and reporting the results to parties
involved using a buyer defined algorithm." ld. Thus, we find no en-or with
the Examiner's prima facie case.
Appellants argue, "independent claim 1 recites in part 'parsing the
encrypted payment message to obtain a token that has been generated by the
buyer and included in the payment message, wherein the token identifies
payment information."' (Appeal Br. 6). We disagree with Appellants,
because each of these items has its base in human thought/activity, which is
not subject eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 3
3 Section 101 of Title 35 U.S.C. sets out the subject matter that can be
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The question is whether the claims as a whole "focus on a specific
means or method that improves the relevant technology" or are "directed to
a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic
processes and machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this case, claim 1 as a whole is
focused on "encrypting and submitting the payment information to a third
party settlement processor on behalf of the merchant." That the claims recite
an encrypted message does not make them patent eligible because they do
not recite any specific means constituting an improvement in the technical
field or technology of encryption. See id. Significantly, the claims do not
provide details as to any non-conventional software for enhancing the
financing process. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that "[o]ur law
demands more" than claim language that "provides only a result-oriented
solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it"); see
also Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354 (explaining that claims are directed
to an abstract idea where they do not recite "any particular assertedly
inventive technology for performing [conventional] functions").
patented: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 3-7, 15,
and 17-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 1, 3-7, 15, and
17-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 15 and 17-21
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); and did not err in rejecting claims 22-27 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b ).
We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 1, 3-7, 15, and
17-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 3-7, 15, and 17-27 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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