Ex Parte Kuwabara et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 15, 2017

13392855 (P.T.A.B. May. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/392,855 02/27/2012 Megumi Kuwabara 005000-K00021 5217
78198 7590 05/17/2017
StiiHehaker & Rraokett PP EXAMINER
8255 Greensboro Drive JANSEN II, MICHAEL J
Suite 300
Tysons, VA 22102 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/17/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MEGUMI KUWABARA, KENJI KONO,
TOMOTAKE AONO, and JUN TAKEDA
Appeal 2017-002272
Application 13/392,855
Technology Center 2600
Before JOHN A. EVANS, KIMBERLY McGRAW, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Non-Final Action rejection of Claims 1—14, which constitute all
the claims pending in this application. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.1
1 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Aug. 16, 2016, “App. Br.”), the Reply Brief
(filed Dec. 5, 2016, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed Oct. 5,
2016, “Ans.”), the Non-Final Action (mailed Mar. 17, 2016, “Non-Final
Act.”), and the Specification (filed Feb. 27, 2012[Jan.23, 2014], “Spec.”) for
Appeal 2017-002272
Application 13/392,855
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to a tactile sensation producing apparatus. See
Abstract.
Invention
Claims 1, 7, 8, and 14 are independent. An understanding of the
invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1, which is reproduced
below with some formatting added:
1. A tactile sensation providing apparatus comprising:
a touch sensor configured to detect a touch input;
a load detection unit configured to detect a pressure load
on a touch face of the touch sensor;
a tactile sensation providing unit configured to vibrate the
touch face; and
a control unit configured to control drive of the tactile
sensation providing unit based on a pushed position, when the
pressure load detected by the load detection unit satisfies a
standard to provide a tactile sensation, such that the tactile
sensation is provided to an object pressing the touch face by
vibration with constant amplitude,
wherein the constant amplitude is same independent of the
pushed position.
Reference and Rejection
Claims 1—14 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Fukumoto (Fukumoto, et al., US 2002/0149561 Al, Oct. 17,
2002). Non-Final Act. 5—14.
their respective details.
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Appeal 2017-002272
Application 13/392,855
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1—14 in light of
Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. We are persuaded of error.
Claims 1,7, 8, and 14: Anticipation by Fukumoto
Appellants argue these claims as a group in view of the limitations of
Claim 1. App. Br. 5.
Independent Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “such that the tactile sensation
is provided to an object pressing the touch face by vibration with constant
amplitude, wherein the constant amplitude is same independent of the
pushed position.” Independent Claims 7, 8, and 14 recite commensurate
limitations.
The Examiner finds Fukumoto anticipates this limitation by disclosing
a “CPU 904 calculates the phase of a drive signal to be applied to each of the
oscillatory actuators 115a to 115d so that the amplitude of the vibration at
each touched position becomes the greatest due to mutual interference of
oscillatory waves generated from each of the oscillatory actuators.” Non-
Final Act. 6—7 (quoting Fukumoto 1349).
Appellants contend Fukumoto discloses an apparatus that vibrates “so
that the amplitude of vibration becomes the greatest,” rather than vibrating
with a constant amplitude that is independent of position, as claimed. App.
Br. 5.
The Examiner interprets the claimed “constant amplitude” as the
“vibratory sensation felt by the user.” Ans. 4. “Constant amplitude” means
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Appeal 2017-002272
Application 13/392,855
the user will feel the same vibration anywhere on the touch screen when in
contact with the surface. Id. The Examiner finds Fukumoto anticipates the
disputed limitation by disclosing a device that provides the user uniform,
i.e., same amplitude, feedback over the entire device. Id. at 5. The
Examiner finds, thus, the user experiences a “greatest vibratory’ sensation at
any touch location.” Id. at 6. The Examiner finds this explicitly discloses
“the constant amplitude is same independent of the pushed position. ” Id.
Appellants cite their disclosure that “describes adjusting voltage
based on distance from the center of the touch screen because the physics of
a vibrated beam causes the maximum or greatest possible amplitude of
vibration to vary with distance from the center, and such adjustment to
increase voltage with distance from the center of the touch screen is
necessary to provide the recited ‘vibration with constant amplitude, wherein
the constant amplitude is same independent of the pushed position’.” Reply
Br. 5 (citing Spec. 143). Appellants argue Fukumoto discloses a greatest
amplitude, not the claimed “constant amplitude.” Id. at 6 (quoting
Fukumoto 1349 “CPU 904 calculates the phase of a drive signal to be
applied to each of the oscillatory actuators 115a to 115d so that the
amplitude of the vibration at each touched position becomes the greatest due
to mutual interference of oscillatory waves generated from each of the
oscillatory actuators.”).
Appellants’ claims recite “constant amplitude,” whereas Fukumoto’s
disclosure recites a greatest amplitude. See Fukumoto 1349. However,
“[t]he prior art reference - in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102- must
not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four comers of the
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Application 13/392,855
document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’”
NetMoneyln v. Verisign, (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The Examiner has not established
that the “greatest amplitude,” as disclosed by Fukumoto, is the same as
“constant amplitude,” as claimed. “The identical invention must be shown
in as complete detail as is contained in the . . . claim.” Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989). It is not clear from the
Record that “greatest amplitude” inherently describes “constant amplitude.”
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the
claims is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art
reference, and arranged as required by the claim.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “To establish
inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing
descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the
reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.
Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.
The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of
circumstances is not sufficient’.” In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581—82
(CCPA 1981).
On the Record before us, the Examiner has not established that
Fukumoto anticipates each limitation recited in the independent claims.
Therefore, we decline to sustain the rejection of independent claims 1, 7, 8,
and 14.
Dependent Claims 2-6 and 9-13: Anticipation By Fukumoto
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Application 13/392,855
In view of the foregoing discussion, we decline to sustain the rejection
of the dependent claims. See Trintec Industries, Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp.,
295 F.3d 1292, 12967 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that if an independent claim
is not anticipated by prior art, then its dependent claims, which necessarily
include the limitations of the independent claim, are not anticipated either).
DECISION
The rejection of Claims 1—14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is REVERSED.
REVERSED
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