Ex Parte KOLLING

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 27, 2018

13622127 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 27, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/622, 127 09/18/2012
23911 7590 07/31/2018
CROWELL & MORING LLP
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP
P.O. BOX 14300
WASHINGTON, DC 20044-4300
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Joachim KOLLING
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
080437.64919US 5469
EXAMINER
TALLMAN, BRIAN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
edocket@crowell.com
tche@crowell.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOACHIM KOLLING
Appeal2017-004500
Application 13/622,127
Technology Center 3600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ERIC B. CHEN, and
HUNG H. BUI, Administrative Patent Judges.
CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal2017-004500
Application 13/622, 127
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § I34(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1, 4--11, and 13. Claims 2, 3, 12, and 14--18 have been cancelled.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention relates to registering an owned vehicle with a
management unit for use as a rental vehicle. (Abstract.)
Claim 1 is exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics:
1. A method for managing usage of a privately-owned
vehicle by persons other than an owner of the vehicle, the method
comprising the acts of:
providing a computer system including:
a data acquisition unit communicatively coupled to a
telematic unit of the vehicle via a telematic interface, a
management unit configured to receive registration information
via a first interface,
an accounting unit configured to manage a financing
account associated with the financing of the vehicle;
receiving, by the management unit, registration information
provided by the owner via the first interface, the registration
information including:
one or more approved persons, each of the approved
persons being authorized by the owner for a temporary use of
the vehicle;
a price model, specified by the owner, for the temporary
use of the vehicle by the approved persons; and
an owner defined operating area indicating where the
vehicle is to be parked by the approved persons after the
temporary use;
respectively assigning a token to each of the approved persons
in response to receiving the registration information, wherein the
token is programmed with personal data of the approved persons and
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is configured to open the vehicle via a keyless-access-and-start system
of the vehicle;
receiving, by the data acquisition unit, trip related data provided
by the telematic unit in connection with the approved persons
operating the vehicle, wherein the trip related data includes a parked
location of the vehicle after the temporary use;
determining, by the accounting unit, a billable amount for the
temporary use of the vehicle by respective approved persons as a
function of:
(a) the trip related data,
(b) the price model for a predefined period of time for the
approved persons, and
( c) whether the parked location is in the operating area; and
automatically applying a credit to the financing account by the
accounting unit, wherein the credit is based on a sum of the billable
amounts respectively determined for the approved persons.
EXAMINER'S REJECTIONS AND REFERENCES
(1) Claims 1, 4--11, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
(2) Claims 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§I03(a) as unpatentable over Zaid (US 2011/0288891 Al; Nov. 24, 2011),
Hall (US 2008/0228643 Al; Sept. 18, 2008), Oesterling (US 2012/0071140
Al; Mar. 22, 2012), and Clark (US 2011/0213629 Al; Sept. 1, 2011).
(3) Claims 4, 6, 8, and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §I03(a)
as unpatentable over Zaid, Hall, Oesterling, Clark, and Vismara
(US 2004/0094622 Al; May 20, 2004).
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ANALYSIS
§ 101 Re} ection
We are unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments (App. Br. 8-13; see
also Reply Br. 4--5) that independent claims 1 and 13 are directed to patent-
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Examiner found that "[ c ]laims 1, 4--11, and 13 are directed to the
abstract idea of managing a privately owned vehicle as a car sharing vehicle
and crediting a financing account of the vehicle owner." (Final Act. 7.) In
particular, the Examiner found that "this abstract idea is similar in concept to
that of 'creating a contractual relationship', which was identified by the
courts as an abstract idea in buySAFE" and "this abstract idea is similar in
concept to that of 'comparing new and stored information and using rules to
identify options', which was identified by the courts as an abstract idea in
SmartGene." (Id. at 8.) The Examiner further found that:
[t]he computers as recited (i.e. computer system, telematics
interface) each represent either a generic computer I general
computer components that performs functions (i.e. data
gathering, assigning equipment (updating data), calculating a
billable amount, applying an account credit) that are well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities previously
known in the industry.
(Id. at 8-9.) We agree with the Examiner's findings and ultimate conclusion
that the claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter.
A patent may be obtained for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has held that this "provision
contains an important implicit exception: [l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
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CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Gottschalkv. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are
the basic tools of scientific and technological work."). Notwithstanding that
a law of nature or an abstract idea, by itself, is not patentable, the application
of these concepts may be deserving of patent protection. Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71-72 (2012).
In Mayo, the Court stated that "to transform an unpatentable law of nature
into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than
simply state the law of nature while adding the words 'apply it."' Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72 (internal citation omitted).
In Alice, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the framework set forth
previously in Mayo "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in
the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts." Id.
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the
second step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims
"individually and 'as an ordered combination'" to determine whether the
additional elements "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). In other words, the
second step is to "search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-
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73). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features'
to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [ abstract idea]."' J d. at 23 57 (brackets in original) ( quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77-78). The prohibition against patenting an abstract
idea "cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment or adding insignificant post-
solution activity." Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court in Alice noted that
"' [ s ]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality,' was not 'enough' [in Mayo] to supply an 'inventive concept."'
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82-83, 77-78, 72-73).
Alice Step One: Are the claims at issue
directed to an abstract idea?
Independent claim 1 is a method claim for "managing usage of a
privately-owned vehicle by persons other than an owner of the vehicle,"
which recites, in part:
receiving ... registration information provided by the owner ...
the registration information including: one or more approved
persons, each of the approved persons being authorized by the
owner for a temporary use of the vehicle; a price model, specified
by the owner, for the temporary use of the vehicle by the
approved persons; and an owner defined operating area
indicating where the vehicle is to be parked by the approved
persons after the temporary use.
Such method steps of claim 1 are directed to an abstract idea of "managing a
privately owned vehicle as a car sharing vehicle" akin to collecting,
analyzing, and storing data. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830
F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("a process of gathering and analyzing
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information of a specified content, then displaying the results" is "directed to
an abstract idea"); Cybeifone Sys. v. CNN Interactive Grp., 558 Fed. Appx.
988,993 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[n]or does the particular configuration of steps-
obtaining, separating, and then sending information----confer patentability");
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[w]ithout additional limitations, a process that
employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to
generate additional information is not patent eligible"); SmartGene, Inc. v.
Advanced Biological Labs., 555 F. App'x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("the
claim at issue here involves a mental process excluded from section 101: the
mental steps of comparing new and stored information and using rules to
identify medical options").
Independent claim 1 further recites the steps of: (i) "respectively
assigning a token to each of the approved persons ... wherein the token is
programmed with personal data of the approved persons and is configured to
open the vehicle via a keyless-access-and-start system of the vehicle"; (ii)
"receiving ... trip related data ... in connection with the approved persons
operating the vehicle, wherein the trip related data includes a parked location
of the vehicle after the temporary use"; (iii) "determining ... a billable
amount for the temporary use of the vehicle by respective approved persons
as a function of: (a) the trip related data, (b) the price model for a predefined
period of time for the approved persons, and ( c) whether the parked location
is in the operating area"; and (iv) "automatically applying a credit ...
wherein the credit is based on a sum of the billable amounts respectively
determined for the approved persons." Such method steps of claim 1 are
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea of creating of a contractual
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relationship between two parties, for example, a driver and a car rental
agency. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (creating a suretyship is an abstract idea).
Accordingly, claim 1 is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
Alice Step Two: An "Inventive Concept"-Is there something
else in the claims that ensures that they are directed to
significantly more than a patent-ineligible concept?
Because claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, the question to be
settled next, according to Alice, is whether this claim recite an element, or
combination of elements, that is enough to ensure that the claim is directed
to significantly more than an abstract idea.
Claim 1 is a method claim, which includes "a computer system"
having "a data acquisition unit," "a telematic unit," "a management unit,"
and "an accounting unit." With respect to the claimed hardware
components, Appellant's Specification discloses the following:
The telematic unit TE is used to transmit predefined data to a
computer system BE. The predefined data include trip related
data for the beginning and the end of a trip by one of the persons
using the vehicle. Such trip related data CD are, for example, a
local position of the vehicle, the route KM that is travelled,
optionally a tank content TF and a license plate number of the
vehicle VIN. The data are transmitted to the computer system
BE not only at the startup of the vehicle but also at the end of a
trip of the vehicle for further processing.
(i-f 32 (emphasis added).)
The computer system BE may be, for example, the computer
system of a vehicle manufacturer. . . . The registration of the
vehicle F as the "private" car sharing vehicle is done over the
interface B2U by means of a management unit VE.
(i134.)
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When one of the persons P approved by the owner is operating
the vehicle, a data acquisition unit EE of the computer system
receives over the telematic interface B2V the trip related data
OK, TF, KM, VIN from the telematic unit TE of the vehicle F. An
accounting unit AE of the computer system BE determines, as a
function of the trip related data OK, TF, KM, VIN and the stored
price model PM for a given period of time for each of the
approved persons P, an amount for the temporary use of the
vehicle F, and bills the persons P this amount.
(i-f 40 ( emphases added).)
The generalized functional terms by which the computer components
are described reasonably indicate that Appellant's Specification discloses:
(i) conventional computer system BE (e.g., the computer system of a vehicle
manufacturer) (i1i132, 34); (ii) conventional data acquisition unit EE
performing the conventional function of collecting trip-related data (i-f 40);
(iii) conventional telematic unit TE performing the conventional function of
transmitting trip-related data to computer system BE (i-f 32); (iv)
conventional management unit VE for registration of a car as shared vehicle
(i-f 34); and (v) conventional accounting unit AE that determines an amount
to bill, based on trip related data (i-f 40).
In view of the Examiner's findings supra, which are consistent with
Appellant's Specification, the claimed hardware components, including "a
computer system" having "a data acquisition unit," "a telematic unit," "a
management unit," and "an accounting unit," reasonably may be determined
to be generic, purely conventional computer elements. Thus, the claims do
no more than require generic computer elements to perform generic
computer functions, rather than improve computer capabilities.
Accordingly, appending a conventional "computer system" having "a
data acquisition unit," "a telematic unit," "a management unit," and "an
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accounting unit," to an abstract idea is not enough to transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 ("[T]he
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.").
Appellant argues that "the claimed innovation here is not the mere
computer-implementation of a preexisting process of 'managing a privately
owned vehicle as a car sharing vehicle and crediting a financing account of
the vehicle owner,' as alleged by the Examiner," but instead, "the claims
provide a technical solution to a problem in the art of computer implemented
car-sharing management systems." (App. Br. 1 O; see also Reply Br. 4--5.)
Similarly, Appellant argues that "the problem and the solution are both
necessarily rooted in computer technology." (App. Br. 13.) However,
Appellant has not adequately explained why the claim "purport[ s] to
improve the functioning of the computer itself' or "any other technology or
technical field." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. In particular, Appellant has not
explained why the "car-sharing management systems," which is a collecting,
analyzing, and storing data, and forming a contractual relationship between
two parties, improves the function of a computer or other technology.
Appellant also argues that "[ u ]nder the second prong of the
Alice/Mayo rubric, the instant claims recite significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea itself for reasons similar to those noted above" and
"there are several claim elements that delineate the claimed invention as an
improvement to computer-implemented car-sharing management systems."
(App. Br. 12.) However, in view of Appellant's Specification, the claimed
hardware components, including "a computer system" having "a data
acquisition unit," "a telematic unit," "a management unit," and "an
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accounting unit," reasonably may be determined to be generic, purely
conventional computer elements.
Appellant further argues that "[t]he Alice/Mayo rubric was established
for one express purpose: as a guide to determining whether the claims
preempt the fundamental building blocks" and "the underlying consideration
of§ 101 is and has always been: if the claims do not preempt fundamental
building blocks, then they are not ineligible under§ 101." (App. Br. 13.)
However, although "preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility."
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Where claims are deemed to recite only patent ineligible subject
matter under the two-step Alice analysis, as they are here, "preemption
concerns are fully addressed and made moot." Id.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed towards
non-statutory subject matter.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Claims 4--11 and 13 depend from independent claim 1. We
sustain the rejection of claims 4--11 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for the
same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 1.
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§ 103 Rejection-Zaid, Hall, Oesterling, and Clark
We are unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments (App. Br. 3-8; see also
Reply Br. 1--4) that the combination of Zaid, Hall, Oesterling, and Clark
would not have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the
limitation "automatically applying a credit to the financing account by the
accounting unit, wherein the credit is based on a sum of the billable amounts
respectively determined for the approved persons."
The Examiner found that the on-demand third party asset rental
platform of Zaid, in which a payment engine collects payment ( e.g., credits)
from the renter and disburses such payment to the owner using a payment
identifier, corresponds to the limitation "wherein the credit is based on a sum
of the billable amounts respectively determined for the approved persons."
(Final Act. 11-12; see also Ans. 4.) The Examiner further found that the
vendor escrow accounts of Hall, into which funds are automatically
deposited, corresponds to the limitations "financing account" and
"automatically applying a credit to the financing account." (Final Act. 12.)
The Examiner also found that "the Hall reference is analogous art" (Ans. 3-
4) and concluded that
[i]t would have been obvious ... to include an account with the
manufacturer/loan provider as taught by Hall in the system of
Zaid, since the claimed invention is merely a combination of old
elements (i.e. managing directed payments, managing directed
payments into a financing account), and in the combination each
element merely would have performed the same function as it
did separately, and one of ordinary skill in the art would have
recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
(Ans. 4.) We agree with the Examiner's findings and conclusions.
Zaid relates to an "on-demand third party asset rental platform."
(Abstract.) Figure 1 of Zaid illustrates an on-demand third party asset rental
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platform which includes Controller 1, Renter Interfaces 2a/2c, and Owner
Interfaces 3a. (i-f 92.) Zaid explains that "the on-demand third party asset
(e.g., vehicle) rental platform includes a web or mobile interface for an
owner to list their vehicle with an associated rental price" and "payment
identifier can correspond to 'credits' that have been pre-paid or earned prior
to the creation of the CRO." (i-f 48.) Zaid further explains that "the on-
demand third party asset rental platform includes a payment engine for
collecting payment from the renter and later disbursing payment to the
owner using the payment identifier." (Id.) Because the third party asset
rental platform of Zaid includes payment engine for collecting payment from
the renter and later disbursing payment to the owner, Zaid teaches the
limitation "wherein the credit is based on a sum of the billable amounts
respectively determined for the approved persons."
Hall relates to "providing consumers a convenient method for
payment for purchased items." (i-f 9.) In particular, Hall explains that "[t]he
consumer establishes a vendor escrow account, [ such that] each vendor
escrow accounts is associated with a specific participating vendor" and
"[a]ppropriate funds are debited from the at least one vendor escrow account
in payment for the purchase made by the consumer from the associated
participating vendor." (i-f 13.) Hall further explains that "[ v ]endor escrow
accounts are preferably established for products and/or services purchased
on a reoccurring basis," such as a car loan/lease payment. (i-f 25.) In one
embodiment, Hall explains that "corresponding funds may be automatically
debited monthly from the employees' paycheck and deposited in the escrow
account." (Id.) Because Hall explains that an example of a vendor escrow
account is car loan or lease payment, Hall teaches the limitation "financing
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account." Moreover, because Hall explains that funds may be automatically
debited from the employee's paycheck and deposited in the escrow account
on behalf of vendors, Hall teaches the limitation "automatically applying a
credit to the financing account by the accounting unit."
The combination of Zaid and Hall is nothing more than incorporating
the known escrow account of Hall, which automatically accepts funds to pay
vendors, with the known third party asset rental platform of Zaid, to yield
predictable results. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416
(2007) ("The combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.").
Such combination would result in the payment engine of Zaid collecting
payment from the renter and distributing such payment to the escrow
account of Hall, which can be designated to pay a car loan provider. Thus,
we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 4) that modifying Zaid to include the
escrow account of Hall, which accepts automatic payments on behalf of
vendors, would have been obvious.
Appellant argues that "Hall is non-analogous art and therefore cannot
properly support the obviousness rejection." (App Br. 3.) In particular,
Appellant argues that
Hall is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention
at least because Hall has nothing to do with computer-
implemented car-sharing management systems. As discussed in
the Specification, the claimed invention relates to improvements
in computer implemented car-sharing management systems -
such improvements enabling and encouraging organic social
networks of participating private owners to develop
independently of a third-party service provider. The claimed
invention does this by inter alia providing the claimed computer
implemented system via which each vehicle's respective
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individual owner - as distinguished from a collective service
provider - is able to set the parameters for and approve the
temporary use of his/her vehicle, as well as via which the
individual user is incentivized to participate in such system.
(Id. at 4 (citations omitted).) However, Appellant's Specification discloses
that "[a] vehicle rental system (so-called 'car sharing') is defined as the
organized joint use of one or more vehicles" such that "it is also possible to
use the vehicle for a short period of time or, more specifically, by the hour."
(i-f 3.) Appellant's Specification further discloses that "[a]number of systems
are used for reserving the vehicles of a car sharing organization," including
"highly complicated computer aided solutions" (i-f 4), for example, Car2go or
DriveNow (i-f 5). Appellant's Specification also discloses that "[t]he billing
is a function of the time, so that a minute price covers the number of
kilometers driven, the insurance and the parking in specifically marked
areas." (i-f 5.) As discussed previously, Hall relates to "providing consumers
a convenient method for payment for purchased items" (i-f 9), for example, a
car lease payment (i-f 25). Because Appellant's Specification generally
discloses car sharing, including computer aided solutions for billing, and
Hall relates to vendor escrow accounts, for example, car lease payments,
Hall is from the same field of endeavor as Appellant's claimed invention of
providing payments for loaned vehicles. Accordingly, Hall is analogous
prior art. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (one test
defining the scope of analogous prior art is "whether the art is from the same
field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed").
Appellant argues that "[i]t is clear from Zaid, that the car-borrower
pays his car-sharing bill to the car-owner" and "[i]t is the owner of the
account [in Hall] who pays his own bills from the account." (App. Br. 6.)
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Accordingly, Appellant argues, "[i]n both of Zaid and Hall, the car-owner's
car loan is never described as being automatically credited the amount of a
car-borrower's car-sharing bill." (Id.; see also Reply Br. 1-2.) Contrary to
Appellant's arguments, the Examiner cited to the on-demand third party
asset rental platform of Zaid, in which a payment engine collects payment
from the renter and distributes such payment to the owner, for teaching the
limitation "wherein the credit is based on a sum of the billable amounts
respectively determined for the approved persons." (Final Act. 11-12.) The
Examiner further cited to the vendor escrow account of Hall for teaching the
limitations "financing account" and "automatically applying a credit to the
financing account." (Final Act. 12.) The rejection of claim 1 is based on the
combination of Zaid and Hall, and Appellant cannot show non-obviousness
by attacking the references individually. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426
(CCPA 1981).
Appellant further argues that "[t]he Examiner fails to explain how one
takes (a) a car-borrower paying his bill to the car-owner (Zaid), and (b) a
car-owner paying his car note from an escrow account (Hall), and arrives at
( c) automatically crediting a car-owner's car note in the amount of a car-
borrower's car-sharing bill" because "the proposed combination of concepts
(a) and (b) naturally suggests that payments received from Zaid's car-
borrower for the rental are dispersed to the car-owner, who puts that money
in an escrow account against which his car loan is paid." (App. Br. 7
(emphasis omitted).) Similarly, Appellant argues that "[n]othing suggests
that adding Hall's escrow account into which the car-owner puts money to
pay his own car note in any way has the effect of providing a convenient
method for the car-borrower of Zaid to pay the car-owner for borrowing the
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car" (id. (emphases omitted)) and "each of these features [in Zaid and Hill]
performing their same individual functions would result in payments
received from Zaid's car-borrower for the rental being dispersed to the car-
owner, who puts that money in an escrow account against which his car loan
is paid" (id. at 8). However, as discussed previously, the combination of
Zaid and Hall is based on combining known elements to achieve predictable
results. Other than providing conclusory statements that the combination of
Zaid and Hall does not teach the limitation "wherein the credit is based on a
sum of the billable amounts respectively determined for the approved
persons," Appellant has not provided any persuasive arguments as to why
the Examiner's articulated reasoning is improper.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Zaid, Hall,
Oesterling, and Clark would have rendered obvious independent claim 1,
which includes the limitation "automatically applying a credit to the
financing account by the accounting unit, wherein the credit is based on a
sum of the billable amounts respectively determined for the approved
persons."
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 depend from claim 1, and
Appellant has not presented any additional substantive arguments with
respect to these claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 5, 7, 9,
11 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the same reasons discussed with
respect to independent claim 1.
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§ 103 Rejection-Zaid, Hall, Oesterling, Clark, and Vismara
Although Appellant nominally argue the rejection of dependent
claims 4, 6, 8, and 10 separately (App. Br. 8), the arguments presented do
not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations of these
dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellant merely
argues that "Vismara does not cure the deficiencies of the rejection of base
claim 1, as detailed above-nor is it alleged to do so." (Id.) We are not
persuaded by these arguments for the reasons discussed with respect to
claim 1, from which claims 4, 6, 8, and 10 depend. Accordingly, we sustain
this rejection.
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 4--11, and 13 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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