Ex Parte Kho et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 15, 2017

12959012 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/959,012 12/02/2010 Nancy Ellen Kho RSW920100138US1 4235
75949 7590
IBM CORPORATION
C/O: Fabian Vancott
215 South State Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
EXAMINER
FLYNN, KEVIN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/17/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents @ fabianvancott.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte NANCY ELLEN KHO,
BILL D. LE,
FANG LU,
and ALAA ABOU MAHMOUD
Appeal 2015-006311
Application 12/959,012
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. FETTING, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Nancy Ellen Kho, Bill D. Le, Fang Lu, and Alaa Abou Mahmoud
(Appellants) seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims
1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.,” filed February 9, 2015) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 11,
2015), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 21, 2015), and
Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed October 14, 2014).
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1—25, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The Appellants invented a way of making a recurring reservation for a
resource. Specification para. 1.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
1. A method for making a recurring reservation for a resource,
the method comprising:
[1] with a physical computing system, receiving a request for a
recurring reservation of a type of resource,
wherein said request specifies the type of resource
requested without specifying a specific resource of that
type,
a specific resource of the type requested to be identified
by the receiving computing system in response to the
request;
[2] with said physical computing system, receiving a preference
associated with said request,
wherein said preference indicates how to utilize alternate
resources within said type of resource in satisfying said
request;
[3] with said physical computing system, determining an
availability of specific resources of said type of resource,
said determining being performed by said physical
computing system;
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[4] with said physical computing system, displaying a proposed
reservation of said specific resources
based in part on said preference and said availability,
said displaying being performed by said physical
computing system.
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Boss ‘409 US 2007/0005409 A1
Boss ‘778 US 2008/0033778 A1
Li US 2009/0055234 A1
Chu US 7,693,736 B1
Jan. 4, 2007
Feb. 7, 2008
Feb. 26, 2009
Apr. 6, 2010
Claims 1—25 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non—
statutory subject matter.
Claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—19, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) as anticipated by Li.
Claims 1—3, 8—10, 15—17, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
102(e) as anticipated by Chu.
Claims 7, 14, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Li.
Claims 4—7, 11—14, and 18—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Chu.
Claims 22—25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Li, Boss ’778, and Boss ’409.
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Claims 22—25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Chu, Boss ’778, and Boss ’409.
ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether creating a
schedule is more than an abstraction. The issues of anticipation and
obviousness turn primarily on whether the art is encompassed within the
scope of the breadth of the claims.
FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Facts Related to Claim Construction
01. The disclosure contains no lexicographic definition of “satisfy.”
02. The ordinary meaning of “satisfy” is to fulfill a need or desire.2 * 4
Facts Related to the Prior Art
Li
03. Li is directed to scheduling meetings given certain resource
constraints. Li para. 1.
04. Li describes scheduling meetings by matching a scheduler-
defined meeting profile against a pool of virtual resources. This
2 American Heritage Dictionary, visited Aug. 1, 2017,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=satisfy
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can include electronically storing data that defines a set of virtual
resources, each resource having associated therewith at least one
property. This also can include generating a meeting profile that
specifies one or more resources required for a meeting based upon
received user input. Additionally, this can include electronically
searching the stored data to match elements of the set of virtual
resources to the one or more resources required for the meeting,
and automatically generating at least one meeting schedule
candidate based upon the match. This further can include
presenting the at least one meeting schedule candidate to a user.
Li para. 7.
05. The meeting profiler module defines the meeting profile, which
in turn specifies different virtual resources needed for a particular
meeting or for a series of related meetings that are to occur at
different intervals over the course of time. The meeting profile
specifies particular properties for each virtual resource. The
meeting scheduler specifies location and time that the meeting is
to take place. The meeting profiler module implements a
predetermined grammar that allows the meeting scheduler to
specify needed or desired virtual resources and their associated
properties. For example, the meeting profiler module can
recognize statements such as “at least five out of the specified
thirteen participants are necessary for the meeting to be valid.”
Similarly, the meeting profiler module can recognize statements
indicating that one or more designated participants “must be
present,” for example. Likewise, for example, the meeting
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profiler module can recognize a statement such as “the meeting
should occur between Tuesday and Friday every three weeks.”
The flexible language used, accordingly, can specify a minimum
numerical value that must be assigned to any property of a
particular virtual resource before the resource can be considered
for inclusion in a mix of resources that will define a particular
meeting schedule candidate. Once the meeting profile has been
defined and generated, the profile-resource matching module
searches the pool of virtual resources electronically stored to
compile a list of identified resources satisfying, at least to some
degree, the preferences and/or requirements defined by the
meeting profile. Li paras. 26—28.
06. Li’s profile-resource matching module generates alternate
meeting schedule candidates, each comprising a different mix of
virtual resources. An arrangement comprising a particular mix of
virtual resources for a meeting may have to meet some minimum
criteria if it is to be included among the list of meeting schedule
candidates. Each of the meeting schedule candidates can be
combined by the profile-resource matching module into a single
list of meeting schedule candidates, each meeting schedule
candidate having an overall score. The different meeting schedule
candidates, accordingly, can be rank ordered based upon their
overall scores. The rank ordered meeting schedule candidates can
be presented to the meeting schedule by the profile-resource
matching module through the user interface. Li paras. 34—35.
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Chu
07. Chu is directed to scheduling of recurring meetings. Chu 1:6—
8.
Boss ’778
01. Boss ’778 is directed to prioritizing calendar events by applying
specified rulesets. Boss ’778 para. 2.
02. Responsive to detecting a scheduling conflict between the first
calendar event and another calendar event, a reschedule procedure
begins by determining whether the scheduling conflict can be
resolved by modifying the specified event time to an another time
within the specified time interval. Responsive to determining that
the scheduling conflict cannot be resolved by changing the
specified event time to another time within the specified time
interval, the specified event priority level of the first calendar
event is compared with event priority level of the conflicting
calendar event to determine scheduling prioritization between the
first calendar event and the conflicting calendar event. If the
system still does not find an available time in which the conflict
can be resolved using event priority level comparisons, the
electronic calendar system compares the job position of the
individual requesting the first calendar event with the job
positions of the conflicting event attendees. If the first calendar
event requester has a hierarchically higher job position than the
conflicting event attendees, the system schedules the first calendar
event and reschedules the conflicting events. Boss ’778 para. 7.
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03. Boss ’778 determines whether or not an event should be
marked to be rescheduled in case the event is subsequently
overridden by a subsequent scheduling or rescheduling entry.
This is performed responsive to determining that calendar the
event is a repeating event and/or with priority information. Boss
’778 para. 44.
04. When Boss ’778 finds a scheduling conflict, the calendar
program either adjusts the schedule information for the presently
entered event or reschedules one or more conflicting events to
resolve the conflict. This employs a prioritization mechanism to
determine the necessary scheduling/rescheduling. Boss ’778 para.
45.
Boss ‘409
05. Boss ’409 is directed to prioritizing calendar events and, when
conflicts arise, applying rules based on context and business
values to automate the process of deciding which meetings are
more important that [sic, than] others. Boss ’409 para. 2.
06. Any meeting that has been placed on the calendar as a result of
an override can be signified in a manner (e.g., a unique color or
font) to assist the calendar owner to understand why their calendar
was updated. Boss ’409 para. 49.
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ANALYSIS
Claims 1—25 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non—statutory
subject matter
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, []
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. [] If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us? [] To answer that question,
[] consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Inti, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)
(citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132
S.Ct. 1289 (2012)).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Examiner finds the claims
directed to organizing human activities for meeting scheduling. Final Act. 5.
While the Court in Alice made a direct finding as to what the claims were
directed to, we find that this case’s claims themselves and the Specification
provide enough information to inform one as to what they are directed to.
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The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for making a recurring
reservation for a resource. The steps in claim 1 result in displaying a
proposed reservation of resources. The Specification at paragraph 1 recites
that the invention relates to making recurring reservations. Thus, all this
evidence shows that claim 1 is directed to reserving some resource, i.e.
scheduling.
It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Bilski in particular, that
the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. Like the risk
hedging in Bilski, the concept of scheduling is a fundamental business
practice long prevalent in our system of commerce. The use of scheduling is
also a building block of societal organization. Thus, scheduling, like
hedging, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of §101. See Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. at 2356.
As in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the “abstract ideas” category in this case. It is enough to
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction
between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of scheduling
at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of “abstract ideas” as the
Court has used that term. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2357.
Further, claims involving data collection, analysis, and display are
directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” are “a familiar class
of claims ‘directed to’ a patent ineligible concept”); see also In re TLI
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Commc ’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093—94 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses
generic computer technology to perform data collection, analysis, and
display and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer
technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314—15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because
they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation”).
As such, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of receiving, analyzing, and
displaying data.
The remaining claims merely describe what is being reserved, or
rescheduling reservations to minimize fragmentation. We conclude that the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis
at Mayo step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply if” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract
idea “on ... a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
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feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2359. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to receive data, determine availability, and display the result
amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic
functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants’ method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. Viewed as a whole, Appellants’ method claims
simply recite the concept of scheduling as performed by a generic computer.
To be sure, the claims recite doing so by advising one to take in a
reservation request for resources, determine availability, and display a
reservation based on availability. But this is no more than abstract
conceptual advice on the parameters for such scheduling and the generic
computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite
any particular implementation.
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The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in
any other technology or technical field. The 13 pages of specification spell
out different types of generic equipment and programming languages that
might be used, different parameters that might be applicable, and the
particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the
concept of creating a schedule based on availability. They do not describe
any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead,
the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction
to apply the abstract idea of scheduling using some unspecified, generic
computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2360.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long “wam[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101“in
ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art.’
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2360.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that reciting a method by
which “a specific resource” of a designated type is identified for each of the
instances of the recurring event. App. Br. 12. As the Examiner finds,
a computed result and output of the result does not amount to
"significantly more" as determined by relevant case law. In the
present case, the two receiving data steps amount to data
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gathering, and the displaying step amounts to data transmission,
all of which are insignificant extra solution activities.
Ans. 3.
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, however, have previously
held that such routine computer activities are insufficient for conferring
patent eligibility. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (“[U]se of a
computer to obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue automated
instructions; all of these computer functions are ‘well understood, routine,
conventional activities] ’ previously known to the industry.”) As such,
merely storing, transmitting, retrieving, and writing data to implement an
abstract idea on a computer does not ‘“transform the nature of the claim’
into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that that the asserted
claims are akin to the claims found patent-eligible in DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Reply Br. 4.
In DDR Holdings, the Court evaluated the eligibility of claims
“address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to
the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol,
would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after
‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” Id. at 1257.
There, the Court found that the claims were patent eligible because they
transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to
resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The
Court cautioned, however, “that not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. For example, in
DDR Holdings the Court distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue
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from claims found patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See id. at 1258—59
(citing Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715—16). As noted there, the
Ultramercial claims were “directed to a specific method of advertising and
content distribution that was previously unknown and never employed on
the Internet before.” Id. at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-
lb). Nevertheless, those claims were patent ineligible because they
“merely recite[d] the abstract idea of ‘offering media content in exchange
for viewing an advertisement,’ along with ‘routine additional steps such as
updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view the
ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet.’” Id.
Appellants’ asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible in
Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR Holdings.
The ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited “providing [a] media product
for sale at an Internet website;” “restricting general public access to said
media product;” “receiving from the consumer a request to view [a]
sponsor message;” and “if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer
access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one
query.” 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellants’ asserted claims recite
receiving data, finding data to satisfy criteria, and displaying data. This is
precisely the type of activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
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Claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—19, and 21 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Li
Appellants initially argue claim 15, similar to claim 1, but directed to a
computer program product performing the claim 1 process, and adding
limitations of indicating how to utilize alternate resources within a type of
resource in satisfying all multiple instances within a request. We are not
persuaded by Appellants' argument that “Li has not been shown to teach or
suggest a preference that indicates how to utilize alternate resources in
satisfying all of the multiple instance of a recurring reservation request.”
App. Br. 15.
Initially, we construe the added “satisfying all of said multiple instances”
limitation. The Specification, at 13 pages, much as in Grams, “does not
bulge with disclosure on those.” In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed Cir
1989). The word “satisfy” does not appear, much less be defined in the
Specification. The ordinary meaning of the word “satisfy” is to fulfill.
Thus, to satisfy multiple instances is to fulfill multiple instances. That is, the
multiple instances are successfully created. This, then is the distinction
between claims 1 and 15.
Li describes accepting a preference in terms of timing, such as the
meeting should occur between Tuesday and Friday every three weeks. Once
the meeting profile has been defined and generated, the profile-resource
matching module searches the pool of virtual resources electronically stored
to compile a list of identified resources satisfying, at least to some degree,
the preferences and/or requirements defined by the meeting profile. Li’s
profile-resource matching module generates alternate meeting schedule
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candidates, each comprising a different mix of virtual resources. An
arrangement comprising a particular mix of virtual resources for a meeting
may have to meet some minimum criteria if it is to be included among the
list of meeting schedule candidates. Each of the meeting schedule
candidates can be combined by the profile-resource matching module into a
single list of meeting schedule candidates, each meeting schedule candidate
having an overall score. The different meeting schedule candidates,
accordingly, can be rank ordered based upon their overall scores. Thus, Li’s
preference describes how to use different days as alternate resources in
satisfying (fulfilling) the request for multiple meeting instances that meet the
preference criteria.
Perhaps sensing this, Appellants go on to contend
Li appears to describe the ability to express preferences that
determine whether and to what extent a particular resource will
match a user's need. However, there is not teaching or
suggestion of "making a recurring reservation for a resource,"
"wherein said preference indicates how to utilize alternate
resources within said type of resource in satisfying all of said
multiple instances within said request."
App. Br. 16. first, this argument is conclusory and is absent a predicate
to support this conclusion. Second, it is a non-sequitur. Preferences that
determine whether and to what extent a particular resource will match a
user's need necessarily describe, at least implicitly, how they will match that
need, which is to say how they are to be utilized to meet that need. To the
extent Appellants are arguing the absence of plural reservations, that is
pervasive in Li’s context. To the extent Appellants argue the satisfaction of
those needs, Li describes satisfaction as we have construed it.
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Appellants argue claim 1 on the basis of claim 15, and the remaining
claims on the basis of the independent claims 1 and 15.
Claims 1—3, 8—10, 15—17, and 21 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
anticipated by Chu
As this rejection is cumulative with Li, we do not reach it.
Claims 7, 14, and 20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Li
Appellants argue these claims on the basis of the independent claims 1
and 15.
Claims 4—7, 11—14, and 18—20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Chu
As this rejection is cumulative with Li, we do not reach it.
Claims 22—25 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Li,
Boss ‘778, and Boss ’409
Clam 22 adjusts a number of reservations to maximize compliance with
preferences associated with a plurality of requests for a recurring reservation
of a type of resource, where each said preference indicates how to utilize
alternate resources within said type of resource in satisfying the
corresponding request. Examiner applies Boss ’778 which looks to see
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whether an event creates a conflict and requires some rescheduling. Final
Act. 19—20. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that
Merely applying priority level to resolve a conflict between two
events is not remotely the same thing as "a defragmentation
function that adjusts a number of reservations to maximize
compliance with preferences associated with a plurality of
requests for a recurring reservation of a type of resource."
(Claim 22). This subject matter is simply beyond the scope and
content of the references as cited.
App. Br. 26. As with the prior argument, this is both conclusory and a
non-sequitur. Resolving a conflict between events is a subset of maximizing
compliance of criteria across those events.
Clam 24 constrains the number of changes in claim 22. Examiner again
applies Boss ’778. Final Act. 20. Appellants contend Boss ’778 fails to
describe this. App. Br. 26. Appellants fail to appreciate that claim 24 itself
does not constrain the nature or implementation of the constraint. Every
computing problem is constrained by its input length. The claim does not
make the constraint independent of the inputs.
Claims 22—25 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chu,
Boss ’778, and Boss ’409
As this rejection is cumulative with Li, we do not reach it.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 1—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non—
statutory subject matter is proper.
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The rejection of claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) as anticipated by Li is proper.
The rejection of claims 1—3, 8—10, 15—17, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. §
102(e) as anticipated by Chu is cumulative and not reached.
The rejection of claims 7, 14, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Li is proper.
The rejection of claims 4—7, 11—14, and 18—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Chu is cumulative and not reached.
The rejection of claims 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Li, Boss ’778, and Boss ’409 is proper.
The rejection of claims 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Chu, Boss ’778, and Boss ’409 is cumulative and not reached.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 1—25 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED
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