Ex Parte Kapadia et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 31, 2017

13608125 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
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Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/608,125 09/10/2012 Kaushal Kiran Kapadia IN920110216US1 5721
63400 7590
IBM CORP. (DHJ)
c/o DAVID H. JUDSON
15950 DALLAS PARKWAY
SUITE 225
DALLAS, TX 75248
09/05/2017 EXAMINER
PATEL, ASHOKKUMAR B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/05/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mail@davidjudson.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte NITIN BAHADUR and KIREETI KOMPELLA
Appeal 2015-005751
Application 13/608,125
Technology Center 2400
Before JUSTIN BUSCH, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.
BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the rejection
of claims 1—22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
Appeal 2015-005751
Application 13/608,125
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 8, 15, and 22 are independent claims. The claims relate
generally to identity context-based access control, and more specifically to
“an identity context-driven approach to control whether users are permitted
access to enterprise resources.” Spec. 1:1—7. An identity context is
generated based on commonality of identity data between users. Id. at
19:11—20:20. Exemplary identity data for users includes location, names,
and designation. Id. at 19:15—21. “[Combinations or permutations of the
attributes are then processed to create additional possible identity contexts,”
resulting in an identity context where users have multiple attributes in
common. Id. at 20:14—18. An expression representing an identity context is
then used in place of a role to define access in an access control policy. Id.
at 21:8—14. Claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. An access control method, comprising:
generating at least one identity context by identifying
combinations of a set of attributes common to a cluster of users;
replacing at least one role in an access policy with an
expression associated with the at least one identity context to
generate an identity context-based access policy; and
in response to an access request, applying the identity-
based access policy to control access to a resource;
wherein at least one of the generating, replacing and
applying steps are carried out in software executing in a hardware
element.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
in view of Thomas (US 2009/0300002 Al; Apr. 12, 2009) and Hildebrand
(US 2008/0288330 Al; Dec. 28, 2008). Final Act. 5-15.
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Application 13/608,125
OPINION
The Examiner rejects independent claims 1, 8, 15, and 22 as obvious
in view of the combined teachings of Thomas and Hildebrand. Regarding
the replacing step, the Examiner finds Hildebrand discloses “an access risk
evaluation is utilized to replace a previous access role,” and the access risk
“evaluation is an identity context for the users within the group and that risk
evaluation generates a new access policy.” Final Act. 6. The Examiner
further explains “that the risk scores such as baseline access ri[s]k score,
compensating access risk factor scores, and the composite access risk scores
are the expressions that are utilized to replace the roles of a user with an
expression of their various risks.” Id. at 2—3 (citing Hildebrand 1 55). In the
Answer, the Examiner states the access risk score is used “to active
compensating controls which are policies and security features,” and
Hildebrand teaches “replacing” because “the combined scores are used to
determine an individual’s access rights instead of using that user’s
predetermined role.” Ans. 15.
Appellants argue Hildebrand does not teach the recited replacing step
because Hildebrand does not teach an expression associated with an identity
context and “in Hildebrand, there is nothing replaced - as the claim element
requires.” Ap. Br. 10.1 In particular, Appellants contend Hildebrand’s
access risk scores, which the Examiner equates to the claimed expression
associated with the identity context, “do not replace anything, let alone a
‘role’ set forth [in] an actual ‘access policy.’” Id. at 11; see also Reply Br. 6
(“The Examiner’s read here is mere hindsight that ignores (i) the word
1 Appellants present other arguments, which we do not address because this
issue is dispositive of the Appeal.
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Application 13/608,125
‘replacing,’ (ii) that what is replaced in the access policy is the ‘role,’ and
(iii) that the role is replaced with the expression itself (and not any particular
result of applying the expression).”).
Appellants have persuaded us the Examiner erred. Even assuming the
Examiner’s finding that Hildebrand’s access score teaches an expression
associated with an identity context is correct, we find nothing in Hildebrand
suggesting replacing a role in an access policy with the computed access
score, as required by the independent claims.
Hildebrand discloses identifying various risks associated with a user,
where those risks may be based on various factors including a user’s role(s),
attribute(s), entitlements (such as rights to access specific resources), and
responsibilities. Hildebrand 62—74. Hildebrand may also identify access
risk associated with system resources. Id. 97—61. Hildebrand also
considers compensating controls that a system may have in place, which
may mitigate certain access risks associated with resources or users. Id.
H 75—77. After identifying the access risks in the system (i.e., risk
associated with users, resources, and compensating controls), Hildebrand
calculates risk scores. Id. 79-93. Hildebrand also discloses optionally
combining the risk access scores of individual users to generate a combined
score for a group of users, where the group may be defined in various ways,
including by department or geographic location. Id. H 15, 93, 94.
Hildebrand discloses “[sjystems and methods for measuring access
risk associated with an enterprise.” Hildebrand Abstract. As cited above,
Hildebrand may take into account various properties of users, resources, and
policies in determining risk level and risk scores. Hildebrand’s risk
assessment system provides an organization with a monitoring and analysis
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Appeal 2015-005751
Application 13/608,125
tool to evaluate access risk for individuals or groups of individuals.
Moreover, Hildebrand at least suggests that an organization may use the
generated information to modify or control user access to resources to suit
an organization’s level of access risk tolerance.
Hildebrand lacks, however, any suggestion of “replacing at least one
role in an access policy with” the access risk scores. We find no evidentiary
support for the Examiner’s statements to the contrary. Specifically, as
discussed above, the Examiner finds Hildebrand discloses using the
composite risk scores to replace user’s roles “with an expression of their
various risks” and “to determine an individual’s access rights instead of
using that user’s predetermined role.” Final Act. 2—3 (citing Hildebrand
155); Ans. 15.
The only support the Examiner cites is paragraph 55 of Hildebrand,
which simply describes an aspect of calculating access risk scores from the
identified access risks. We find nothing in Hildebrand suggesting that the
calculated risk score replaces a user’s access rights or “role in an access
policy,” as recited in the claims.
The Examiner also states that “[a]t-risk individual wills have their
access modified by the system’s compensating controls thereby ‘replacing’
their role with their access risk score.” Id. at 15—16. As discussed above,
Hildebrand’s compensating controls relate to “procedures, security features,
etc. which enterprise 100 may have implemented to manage various access
risk.” Hildebrand 175. These compensating controls are described as being
a part of the access policy, separate from user’s roles. Id. 75—77.
Moreover, Hildebrand discloses considering existing compensating controls
when calculating the individual user’s access risk scores. Id. Tflf 79, 80, 85,
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Application 13/608,125
89-94. Thus, although it is true that Hildebrand discloses compensating
controls may alter user’s access to resources, neither the compensating
controls nor the access risk score replaces a “role in an access policy.”
For the reasons discussed above, we determine the Examiner’s finding
that Hildebrand teaches or suggests the recited replacing limitation is not
supported by substantial evidence. Each rejection on appeal relies on
Hildebrand for teaching or suggesting the replacing limitation. For us to
sustain the Examiner’s rejections, we would need to resort to impermissible
speculation or unfounded assumptions to cure the aforementioned deficiency
in the factual bases of the rejections. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017
(CCPA 1967). We decline to engage in such speculation.
Constrained by this record, Appellants have persuaded us the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1, 8, 15, and 22, which each
recite the disputed replacing limitation, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
in view of the combined teachings of Thomas and Hildebrand. Dependent
claims 2—7, 9—14, and 16—21 depend directly from and incorporate the
limitations recited in independent claims 1, 8, and 15, respectively.
Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed with respect to the independent
claims, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claims
2—7, 9-15, and 16—21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the Examiner’s decision
to reject claims 1—22.
REVERSED
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