Ex Parte Hitomi et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 20, 201714024584 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/024,584 09/11/2013 Arthur S. Hitomi 33PG-172200 6669 69849 7590 12/22/2017 SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 379 Lytton Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301 EXAMINER BUI, JONATHAN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2448 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/22/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): svpatents @ sheppardmullin.com S heppardMullin_Pair @ firsttofile. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ARTHUR S. HITOMI, DAI KOBAYASHI, DOUG PFIFFNER, and OSMAN KENT1 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 Technology Center 2400 Before JUSTIN BUSCH, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge JOHN P. PINKERTON. Opinion Concurring filed by Administrative Patent Judge JUSTIN BUSCH. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection of claims 1 and 3—21, which constitute all of the claims pending in the application. Claim 2 is canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify Numecent Holdings, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellants describe the disclosed and claimed invention as follows: Systems and methods for pixel streaming a stream-enabled application to a client device that is executed on an intermediary client device virtualization system. Portions of a stream-enabled application are used to begin execution of the stream-enabled application on the client device virtualization system. The output of the beginning of execution of the stream-enabled application are used to generate a pixel based stream-enabled application stream. The pixel-based stream-enabled application stream is sent to the client device. User interactions in response to the display of the stream are represented in user interaction data. The user interaction is determined from the user interaction data and application execution commands are determined based on the determined user interaction. Continued execution of the stream- enabled application occurs based on the application execution commands. The pixel-based stream-enabled application stream is modified according to the continued execution of the stream- enabled application. Abstract.2 Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and reproduced below (with the disputed limitations emphasized)'. 1. A method comprising: receiving portions of a stream-enabled application, at a client device virtualization system; 2 Our Decision refers to the Final Action mailed Apr. 19, 2016 (“Final Act.”); Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed Sept. 19, 2016 (“App. Br.”) and Reply Brief filed Feb. 1, 2017 (“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed Dec. 1, 2016 (“Ans.”); and, the original Specification filed Sept. 11, 2013 (“Spec.”). 2 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 beginning execution of the stream-enabled application at the client device virtualization system; generating a pixel-based stream-enabled application stream based on a beginning output of the beginning execution of the stream-enabled application; sending the pixel-based stream-enabled application stream to a client device; receiving user interaction data based on a user of the client device interacting with a display of the pixel-based stream- enabled application stream; determining a user interaction from the user interaction data; determining application execution commands based on the determined user interaction; continuing execution of the stream-enabled application at the client device virtualization system based on the determined application execution commands; modifying the pixel-based stream-enabled application stream based on a continued output of the continuing execution of the stream-enabled application; sending the modified pixel-based stream-enabled application stream to the client device. App. Br. 26 (Claims App’x). Rejections on Appeal Claims 12—21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventors regard as the invention. Claims 1,9, 11, 12, 19, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Duggal (US 2012/0297311 Al; published Nov. 22, 2012). 3 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 Claims 3, 5, 6, 13, 15, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Duggal and Schwarz et al. (US 2006/0083308 Al; published Apr. 20, 2006) (“Schwarz”). Claims 4, 10, 14, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Duggal and He (US 2014/0169471 Al; published June 19, 2014). Claims 7 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Duggal and Deever et al. (US 2008/0165280 Al; published July 10, 2008) (“Deever”). Claims 8 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Duggal and Bhaskar et al. (US 7,522,664 Bl; issued Apr. 21, 2009) (“Bhaskar”). ANALYSIS Rejection of Claims 12—21 under § 112, second paragraph The Examiner concludes that the claim 12 limitation of “a client device virtualization system configured to . . .” invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Final Act. 3. The Examiner finds the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material or acts for the claimed function and therefore, concludes that claim 12 is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Id. Appellants contend, inter alia, the limitation “a client device virtualization system” fails to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. App. Br. 8—9; Reply Br. 2—3. In particular, Appellants argue the limitation does not use the term “means” and, therefore, the rebuttable presumption that the limitation does not invoke § 112, sixth paragraph, is triggered. App. 4 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 Br. 8 (citing MPEP § 2182 (Nov. 2015)). Appellants also argue that the presumption is not overcome because Appellants’ Specification “explicitly defines the ‘client device virtualization system’ as including definite structure.” App. Br. 9 (citing Spec. 126). Appellants further argue “the Specification does limit the ‘client device virtualization system’ to hardware.” Reply Br. 2 (citing Spec. 132). There is a rebuttable presumption that claim terms lacking the word “means” do not invoke § 112, paragraph 6. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (enbanc). “[MJerely because an element does not include the word ‘means’ does not automatically prevent that element from being construed as a means-plus-fimction element.” Id. at 1348 (quoting Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id. at 1349 (quoting Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo— Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In undertaking this [means-plus-fimction] analysis, we ask if the claim language, read in light of the specification, recites sufficiently definite structure to avoid § 112,16”) (quoting Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. Because the limitation at issue — “a client device virtualization system configured to ...” — does not use the word “means,” we agree with Appellants there is a rebuttable presumption that § 112, paragraph 6, does not apply. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. We also agree with Appellants’ 5 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 argument that the claimed “client device virtualization system” recites definite structure. In that regard, paragraph 26 of the Specification states this system “can be implemented as a computer system or parts of a computer system or a plurality of computer systems. ... In general, a computer system will include a processor, memory, non-volatile storage, and an interface.” The Examiner finds this description to be “exemplary in nature and clearly not limiting a ‘client device virtualization system’ as structural.” Ans. 4. Although paragraph 26 uses the phrase “can be implemented,” each example identified is a computer system or part thereof. Thus, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art, considering the claim limitation and paragraph 26 of the Specification, would understand “client device virtualization system” to be the name for structure—a computer system, comprising a computer. Because the limitation “client device virtualization system” denotes structure, it is not necessary that it identify or call to mind a single well-defined computer structure. Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583 (“What is important is . . . that the term, as the name for structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art”); see also Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Inti, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]e require only that the claim term be used in common parlance or by ordinarily skilled artisans to designate sufficiently definite structure, even if the term covers a broad class of structures”) (internal citation omitted). Thus, the presumption that § 112, paragraph 6, does not apply is not overcome because the limitation at issue recites definite structure. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12 as indefinite under § 112, paragraph 2, because § 112, paragraph 6, does not 6 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 apply to the limitation “a client device virtualization system.” For the same reason, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 13-21. Rejection of Claims 1, 9, 11, 12, 19, and 21 under § 102(e)3 The Examiner finds that Duggal anticipates claim 1. Final Act. 5—7. Appellants contend that the Examiner has failed to show that Duggal anticipates claim 1. App. Br. 10—15; Reply Br. 3—8. In particular, Appellants argue that, “[i]n teaching a remote host where an entire remote application resides,” Duggal fails to disclose “receiving portions of a stream-enabled application at a client device virtualization system.” App. Br. 13 (citing Duggal Fig. 3). According to Appellants, “the remote application used as part of providing the virtual computer service, as taught by Duggal, resides in its entirety at the interconnected servers” and, therefore, Duggal does not disclose “receiving portions of a stream- enabled application, at a client device virtualization system.” Reply Br. 4— 5 (citing Duggal Fig. 3,138). Appellants also argue Duggal fails to disclose “a pixel-based stream-enabled application stream.” App. Br. 13—14; Reply Br. 6—8. According to Appellants, the word “pixel” does not appear in Duggal and, by merely citing a display at a client device, the Examiner has 3 Appellants argue the rejection of claims 1,9, 11, 12, 19, and 21 as a group. See App. Br. 10-18; Reply Br. 3—8. Appellants focus on independent claims 1 and 12, and present substantially the same arguments for both claims. Id. We consider claim 1 to be representative and, therefore, we review the rejection of these claims on the basis of representative claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). 7 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 not shown that Duggal discloses “actual creation of a pixel-based stream- enabled application stream.” Id. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. First, regarding the limitation “receiving portions of a stream-enabled application at a client device virtualization system,” the Examiner finds: As previously shown by the examiner, Duggal teaches a virtual computing service including several servers and controlled by a central grid that determines when and where to retrieve aspects of the virtual computing service when requested by a user device in paragraph [0038]. As an example, the service enables the central grid of servers to identify a remote application and streaming portions of the application to the user (see paragraph [0042]). Furthermore, FIG. 1 clearly shows that the application repository and virtual computing system are separate, thus showing that the application is received as claimed. Ans. 4—5. For the reasons stated by the Examiner, we agree with the Examiner’s findings. Contrary to Appellants’ argument that the application used as part of providing the virtual computer service “resides in its entirety at the interconnected servers,” Figure 1 shows, as the Examiner finds, the application repository 132 and the virtual computing system 100 are separate. See Duggal Fig. 1. Appellants did not respond to the above findings of the Examiner in the Reply Brief. Thus, we find the preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that Duggal discloses “receiving portions of a stream-enabled application at a client device virtualization system,” as recited in claim 1. Second, regarding the limitation “a pixel-based stream-enabled application stream,” the Examiner finds: 8 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 The examiner notes that the Duggal disclosure references known application streaming software, such as “AppStream” or “Softricity” (see paragraph [0214]). Softricity’s application streaming, at the time Duggal was published, was known to be pixel based, and therefore [] Duggal’s application streaming, which may use Softricity’s streaming software, is also pixel based. Evidence that Softricity’s application streaming was pixel based is found in Softricity’s patent Pub. No. US 2005/0010670 A1 . . . . Ans. 5. In response, Appellants argue that the cited portion of Softricity’s published application referred to above by the Examiner, which Appellants refer to as Greschler,4 “relates to assessing requirements to execute an application at a client device” and, therefore, “the Examiner has not shown how Greschler remedies the deficiencies of Duggal with respect to teaching pixel streaming.” Reply Br. 7—8. This argument is not persuasive, however, because it fails to address the Examiner’s findings that Duggal discloses application streaming can be accomplished with Softricity software that “at the time Duggal was published, was known to be pixel based.” Ans. 5 (citing Duggal 1214). Thus, we find the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Duggal discloses “a pixel-based stream-enabled application stream,” as recited in claim l.5 4 Greschler et al., US 2005/0010670 Al, published Jan. 13, 2005. 5 For the same reasons, we find Duggal discloses “the pixel-based stream- enabled application stream” in the other limitations of claim 1 that are identified by Appellants, but not separately argued. See App. Br. 14; Reply Br. 8. We note that the mere reference to these other limitations amounts to no more than reciting the claim language and alleging the cited prior art is deficient, which does not constitute a separate argument for patentability of the claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“A statement which merely 9 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 For the foregoing reasons, and based on a preponderance of the evidence, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Duggal discloses the disputed limitations of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). For the same reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection under § 102(e) of independent claim 12, as well as claims 9, 11, 19, and 21, which depend variously from claims 1 and 12, and are not separately argued. Remaining Claims As indicated above, claims 3—8, 10, 13—18, and 20 are rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on the combination of Duggal with one of Schwarz, He, Deever, and Bhaskar. Appellants argue claims 3—8, 10, 13—18, and 20 are patentable over Duggal in view of these secondary references because the secondary references do not cure the asserted deficiencies of Duggal as argued with respect to claim 1, which also apply to claim 12. See App. Br. 18—24. For the reasons discussed above regarding claim 1, we are not persuaded there are any deficiencies in the disclosure of Duggal with respect to the arguments raised by Appellants as to claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3—8, 10, 13—18, and 20 under § 103(a). DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12—21 under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph. points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 10 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1,9, 11, 12, 19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 3—8, 10, 13—18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal maybe extended. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 11 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ARTHUR S. HITOMI, DAI KOBAYASHI, DOUG PFIFFNER, and OSMAN KENT Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 Technology Center 2400 Before JUSTIN BUSCH, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge, CONCURRING. I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the majority’s opinion that claims 12—21 do not invoke 35U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. In particular, I believe the record supports the Examiner’s finding that the recited “client device virtualization system” invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, notwithstanding the fact that the term does not recite the word “means.” The majority has succinctly laid out the legal framework, so I will not repeat it in its entirety; rather, I will focus on the areas of disagreement. My opinion differs from the majority’s in that I believe the recited “client device virtualization system” would not be “understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure” that is capable of carrying out the recited functions. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citing Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). More specifically, I would find the presumption against applying § 112, sixth paragraph, is overcome because the claim merely “recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id. (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). As in Williamson, the claim limitation in question is not the “client device virtualization system” by itself; it includes all six of the functions that it is “configured to” perform. See id. at 1350. Thus, similar to Williamson, the claims here do not recite the term “means,” but “the limitation is drafted in the same format as a traditional means-plus-fimction limitation, and merely replaces the term ‘means’ with ‘nonce’ word [system], thereby connoting a generic ‘black box’ for performing the recited functions.” Id. The term “system” in this context is used as a generic term tantamount to reciting a means because “system” provides no indication of the structure necessary to perform the recited functions. Similarly, the prefix “client device virtualization” provides no insight to one of ordinary skill in the art regarding the structure necessary to perform the recited functions. Here, as in Williamson, even if one of ordinary skill in the art would be capable of programming a computer to perform the recited functions, it is not sufficient to create the structure not otherwise disclosed. Id. at 1351. Furthermore, I agree with the Examiner that the Specification’s disclosure that a client device virtualization system “can be implemented as a computer system or parts of a computer system or a plurality of computer systems” and “[i]n general, a computer system will include a processor, memory, non-volatile storage, and an interface” is exemplary language and does not limit the client virtualization to a computer system, a part of a 2 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 computer system, or a plurality of computer systems. Spec. 126. More importantly, even assuming the Specification limits the recited client device virtualization system to include a computer system having a processor and memory, I disagree that such a disclosure is sufficient structure to avoid invoking § 112, sixth paragraph. The identified generic computer components, without specific programming are not capable of performing each of the recited functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350-51 (finding the presumption against invoking §112, sixth paragraph, is overcome because the recitation of a “distributed learning control module” connotes insufficient structure for carrying out the recited functions). Appellants provide no reason for me to believe otherwise. Thus, even if the claim recited a computer system configured to perform the recited functions, I would still find the claim “recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function,’” because an off-the-shelf computer system is unable to perform at least some of the recited functions without specific programming. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1339. Even prior to Williamson overruling previous cases holding the presumption that § 112, sixth paragraph, is not invoked if the claim does not recite the term “means” is “strong,” 792 F.3d at 1349, the Board provided guidance on the issue before us. For example, the Board found the recitation of a generic processor configured to perform functions that would require special programming invoked § 112, sixth paragraph. Ex parte Lakkala, Appeal No. 2011- 001526, 2013 WL 1341108, at *6 (BPAI March 11, 2013) (informative). Similarly, the Board found a claim that recited, in part, “a processor adapted to” perform various functions invoked § 112, sixth paragraph, and explained 3 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 that “[t]o see whether the presumption is overcome, we look to how a skilled artisan would understand ‘processor,’ whether the limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts for achieving the recited functions, and whether the term ‘processor’ is modified by functional language.” Ex parte Erol, Appeal No. 2011-001143, 2013 WL 1341107, at *8-9 (PTAB March 11, 2013) (informative); accord Ex parte Smith, Appeal No. 2012-007631, 2013 WL 1341109, at *6—8 (PTAB March 12, 2013) (informative). The PTAB further explained that “[t]o confirm whether the presumption against such a substitution is overcome, we look to determine whether the functions performed by the processor are typical functions found in a commercially, available off-the-shelf processor, which would weigh against invoking § 112, sixth paragraph.” Erol, 2013 WL 1341107, at *8. Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the majority that the recited “client device virtualization system configured to” perform various functions fails to invoke § 112, sixth paragraph. Next, I would review the Specification to determine whether there is sufficient structure to support the recited functions. For similar reasons, I agree with the Examiner that the Specification’s disclosure that a client device virtualization system may comprise a computer system, part of a computer system, or a plurality of computer systems does not disclose sufficient structure for performing at least some of the recited functions attributed to the client device virtualization system. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed.Cir.2008) (holding “a means-plus- function claim element for which the only disclosed structure is a general purpose computer is invalid if the specification fails to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function”). 4 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 Although a general purpose computer may provide sufficient structure to perform functions that do not require special programming, the same general purpose computer is insufficient structure for performing specific functions that require special programming. In re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In such cases where a specific function is recited, the corresponding structure may be sufficiently disclosed in the form of an algorithm. “A general purpose computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm creates ‘a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.’” IVMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Appellants argue the flowcharts depicted in Figures 5 and 6 and the accompanying description disclose “an algorithm corresponding to the structure of claim 12.” Reply Br. 3. However, neither the flowcharts nor the Figures provide any algorithm or details regarding how the function is performed. Spec. Tflf 75—86, Figs. 5, 6. The board has held that “[m]ere reference to a general purpose computer or processor with appropriate programming without providing an explanation of the appropriate programming or to ‘software’ without providing detail about the means to accomplish the software function is not an adequate disclosure.” Ex parte Cadarso, Appeal No. 2010-008797, 2013 WL 1870808, at *8 (PTAB April 1, 2013) (informative); accord Erol, 2013 WL 1341107, at *7. Moreover, simply reciting the claimed function in the specification, while saying nothing about how the computer or processor ensures that those functions are performed, is not a sufficient disclosure for an algorithm which, by 5 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 definition, must contain a sequence of steps.” Cadarso, 2013 WL 1870808, at *8; accordErol, 2013 WL 1341107, at *7. Similar to the claims found indefinite in Katz, at least the claimed function of “determin[ing] application execution commands based on the determined user interaction” is broad enough to cover any relationship between an application execution command and the determined user interaction. Katz, 639 F.3d at 1315. Appellants’ claims, therefore, to a generic computer system “programmed to perform a specialized function without disclosing the internal structure of that processor in the form of an algorithm” “fail to fulfill the ‘public notice function’ of35U.S.C. § 112^2 by ‘particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming’ the invention” and “exhibit the ‘overbreadth inherent in open-ended functional claims.” Id. (citing Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008); quoting Halliburton Energy Servs. v. M—ILLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1256 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). For the above reasons, I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s ultimate reversal of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12—21 under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. However, I would reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12—21 as anticipated or obvious under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 because, without knowing what the corresponding structure (or its equivalents) of a “client device virtualization system” is, applying the art would require speculation, in which I would not engage. Finally, I agree with the majority’s findings and conclusions regarding the rejection of claims 1 and 3—11. In sum, I would affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 3—11, reverse the art rejections of claims 12—21, and affirm the rejection of claims 12—21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second 6 Appeal 2017-006392 Application 14/024,584 paragraph. Accordingly, because I agree with the majority’s affirmance of each appealed claim on at least one ground of rejection, I concur in the result. 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation