Ex Parte Gross et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 28, 201411713387 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte PAUL GROSS and ED N. JONES ____________ Appeal 2012-0059051 Application 11/713,3872 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, HUBERT C. LORIN, and JAMES A. WORTH, Administrative Patent Judges. WORTH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–48. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Our decision refers to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Oct. 7, 2011) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 6, 2012) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 20, 2011). 2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Code Blue, LLC (App. Br. 2). Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 2 Introduction Appellants’ disclosure relates to a system, method, and computer- implemented method for processing and monitoring insurance claims (Spec. ¶32). Claims 1, 10, 17, and 35 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A computer-implemented method for expediting a contractor’s arrival at an insured property to thereby mitigate water damage to the insured property, comprising: receiving a start date and time comprising one of the following: a date and time that a notice of loss reporting water damage to the insured property is received from a claimant, and a date and time that a contractor is dispatched to the insured property; receiving a stop date and time comprising one of the following: a date and time that the contractor arrives at the insured property, and a date and time that the contractor completes a description of water damage to the insured property; transmitting at least one automated reminder message to the contractor if the stop date and time is not received within a specified period of time from the start date and time; and presenting a web page that displays the start date and time and the stop date and time for a plurality of users. App. Br. 24, Claims App. Prior Art Relied Upon Uchida US 2002/0077879 A1 June 20, 2002 Hansan US 2006/0116913 A1 June 1, 2006 Fillmann US 2008/0040075 Al Feb. 14, 2008 Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 3 Rejections on Appeal 1) Claims 1–6, 10–13, 17–30, and 35–44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hansan and Fillmann; and 2) Claims 7–9, 14–16, 31–34, and 45–48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hansan, Fillmann, and Uchida. OPINION Independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–5, 7, and 9 Appellants argue that the Examiner failed to articulate valid reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill would have combined Hansan and Fillmann (App. Br. 13). The Examiner finds that both insurance processes include substantially overlapping processes, including similar methods of filing a claim (Ans. 6). We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner failed to articulate valid reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the teachings of Hansan and Fillmann. The response to the filing of insurance claims would have improved the provision of water insurance in a similar way to the provision of health insurance within the skill of the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”) Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 4 Second, Appellants argue that Hansan fails to disclose “receiving a start date and time comprising one of the following: a date and time that a notice of loss reporting water damage to the insured property is received from a claimant, and a date and time that a contractor is dispatched to the insured property,” as recited by claim 1 (App. Br. 13). Appellants assert that Hansan (¶ 86 and step 302 of Fig. 3) discloses receiving injury details rather than the date and time that a notice of loss reporting water damage was received. The Examiner relies on paragraph 86 of Hansan and step 302 of Figure 3 for the start date and time (Ans. 5). We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument. Figure 16 of Hansan shows that the audit trail contains a date and time stamp for each action taken on the computer system. See also Hansan ¶ 6 (discussing audit trail). Thus, when Hansan paragraph 86 discloses that the computer contains a log of the incident report, this computer log contains a date and time stamp for the report (i.e., the start date and time). The rejection is based on modifying Hansan in view of Fillmann, such that the start date and time in the reference as modified relates to a report of water damage. Third, Appellants argue that Hansan fails to disclose “receiving a stop date and time comprising one of the following: a date and time that the contractor arrives at the insured property, and a date and time that the contractor completes a description of water damage to the insured property,” as recited by claim 1 (App. Br. 14). Specifically, Appellants assert that Hansan (¶ 8 and step 308 of Fig. 3) discloses actions taken by a medical claim reviewer rather than actions taken by a service provider such as a contractor. Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 5 The Examiner relies on paragraph 8 of Hansan and step 308 of Figure 3 for the stop date and time (Ans. 5, 13). We agree with the Examiner that Hansan discloses this limitation. As above, Figure 16 of Hansan shows that the audit trail contains a date and time stamp for each action taken on the computer system. See also Hansan ¶ 6. Thus, when Hansan (¶ 8) discloses that notification is sent indicating approval by the reviewer, or other performance, the computer log contains a date and time stamp for the performance (i.e., stop date and time). The rejection is based on modifying Hansan in view of Fillmann, such that the start date and time in the reference as modified relates to performance by the insurance contractor for water damage (rather than authorization by the reviewer of medical claims). Fourth, Appellants argue that Hansan fails to disclose “transmitting at least one automated reminder message to the contractor if the stop date and time is not received within a specified period of time from the start date and time,” as recited by claim 1 (App. Br. 14–15). Appellants assert that Hansan (¶¶ 42 and 52) discloses uniform platforms for inter-operability and business process management software rather than transmission of a reminder message if the stop date and time is not received within a specified period from the start date and time. The Examiner finds that paragraphs 42 and 52 disclose the reminder limitation (Ans. 5, 14). We agree. Hansan (¶ 52) discloses that the system may send an automatic reminder for required tasks and Hansan (¶ 8) explains that information may be presented for a determination within a specified period of time. Fifth, Appellants argue that Hansan fails to disclose “presenting a web page that displays the start date and time and the stop date and time for a Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 6 plurality of users,” as recited by claim 1 (App. Br. 15–16). The Examiner finds that Hansan (¶¶ 86, 44, and 55) discloses this limitation (Ans. 5). Appellants assert that paragraphs 86 and 55 of Hansan disclose the main window of business process management software that displays report details but not a start date and time (App. Br. 15). We agree with the Examiner. Hansan (¶ 44) discloses that items are archived as a business record with the history available for business intelligence and reporting needs. See Hansan Figure 16 (date and time stamp on display for archive items). We, therefore, sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants do not argue for the patentability of claims 2–5, 7, and 9 separately from their arguments as to claim 1, from which they depend (See App. Br. 10–16). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2– 5, 7, and 9 for the same reasons as for claim 1. Dependent claim 6 Appellants argue that Hansan fails to disclose “wherein a contractor arrival code is provided to a claimant, and wherein a date and time that the contractor arrival code is received from the claimant is utilized to verify the stop date and time,” as recited by claim 6 (App. Br. 16–17). The Examiner states that Hansan (¶ 150) discloses a barcode which is evidence of the contractor code used to verify date and time (Ans. 6). Appellants assert that Hansan (¶ 150) discloses that the folder of a medical claim may be routed to a Deputy Chief Surgeon for review and Hansan (¶ 151) discloses a list of services for approval but Hansan does not disclose verification of a stop date and time based on receipt of a contractor arrival code (id. at 17). Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 7 We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument. Appellants recognize that the Examiner is referring to the barcode in paragraph 151 of Hansan (rather than paragraph 150). Appellants, therefore, have received sufficient notice of the rejection. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Hansan (¶ 151) discloses that when a reviewer approves an action, a barcode is generated with an Authorization Number. As disclosed in Hansan’s Figure 16, the approval action would be archived with a date and time stamp. We agree with the Examiner that this authorization action provides a verification of the stop date and time of the insurance action, which in Hansan occurs upon action of the reviewer. As with claim 1, from which claim 6 depends, the rejection is based on the modification of Hansan with Fillmann to apply the insurance methods to water damage insurance. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent claim 8 Appellants argue that the prior art cited by the Examiner fails to disclose “wherein the automated reminder message comprises a textual or audio alert of one or more of the following: an alert notifying the contractor of an obligation to arrive at the insured property, and an alert notifying the contractor of an obligation to complete the description of damage to the insured property,” as recited by claim 8 (App. Br. 17–18). Appellants argue that Hansan does not disclose a textual or audio alert and that Uchida (¶ 151) discloses an email textual alert but does not disclose the remainder of the limitation (id.) . The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to modify the method of Hansan and Fillmann, as applied to claim 1, to use an email as Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 8 a reminder message, as described in Uchida, because emails were old and well known in the art (Ans. 9, 10). We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument. While Uchida’s reminder email is not used in Uchida for insurance contractors, the rejection is based on the combination of Hansan and Fillmann, as applied to claim 1 above, with Uchida (Ans. 9). We agree with the Examiner that it would have been obvious to combine the reminder of Hansan and Fillmann with the email reminder of Uchida as a well-known way of providing a message. We therefore sustain the rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Independent claim 17 and dependent claims 18–31, 33, and 34 Appellants argue that the prior art cited by the Examiner fails to disclose the “start indicator” and “stop indicator” as recited by claim 17 (App. Br. 19–20). Appellants assert that the “start indicator” and “stop indicator” are broader terms than “start date and time” and “stop date and time,” recited by claim 1 (App. Br. 19). Appellants argue that claim 17 is patentable “for the same reasons” as for claim 1 (id). The Examiner relies on the same references for the “start indicator” and “stop indicator” limitations of claim 17 as for the “start date and time” and “stop date and time” limitations claim 1 (Ans. 7). We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument. Even if the terms of claim 17 are broader than claim 1, Appellants do not explain how that would create a patentable distinction over the prior art. Indeed, Appellants argue for patentability based on “the same reasons” as for claim 1. We, therefore, sustain the rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2012-005905 Application 11/713,387 9 Appellants do not argue for the patentability of claims 18–31, 33, and 34 separately from arguments as to claim 17, from which they depend. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 18–31, 33, and 34 for the same reasons as for claim 17. Independent claims 10 and 35 and dependent claims 11–16, 32, and 36–48 Appellants do not argue for the patentability of independent claims 10 and 35 and dependent claims 11–16, 32, and 36–48 separately from their arguments as to claims 1, 6, 8, and 17 (See App. Br. 18–19, 20–22). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claims 10 and 35 and dependent claims 11–16, 32, and 36–48 for similar reasons, as above. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–48 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED llw Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation