Ex Parte Grider et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 22, 2015

12493514 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/493,514 06/29/2009 Duane M. Grider 81178615 9495
28395 7590 01/22/2015
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
CARTER, WILLIAM JOSEPH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2875
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/22/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DUANE M. GRIDER and BALA CHANDER
____________

Appeal 2013-003930
Application 12/493,514
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before CHARLES F. WARREN, PETER F. KRATZ, and
ELIZABETH M. ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judges.

ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Decision of the
Primary Examiner finally rejecting claims 1–20, as follows: claims 1, 2, and
4–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Austin
(US 2011/0175569 Al, July 21, 2011) and claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Austin. App. Br. 2–4; Ans. 4–7. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 According to Appellants, the Real Party in Interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2013-003930
Application 12/493,514

2
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is set
forth below:
1. An automotive vehicle capable of receiving power
from an electrical power grid, the vehicle comprising:
a battery charger; and
an exterior lamp assembly including (i) an illumination
source and (ii) an electrical port configured to be electrically
connected with the electrical power grid, wherein the electrical
port is electrically connected with the battery charger.

OPINION
We agree with Appellants that the Examiner erred in finding as a
matter of fact that Austin describes to one skilled in the art an automotive
vehicle comprising an exterior lamp assembly including an electrical port
configured to be electrically connected with an electrical power grid. Ans.
4–8; App. Br. 2–3; Reply Br. 2. We determine that the claim language, “an
exterior lamp assembly including . . . an electrical port . . .” requires that an
electrical port be included as part of an exterior lamp assembly of an
automotive vehicle. Our construction is supported by the plain language of
independent claims 1, 9 and 17, as well as the portions of the Specification
cited in support of the relevant claim limitation. App. Br. 1–2; Spec. Fig. 2
(automotive tail lamp assembly 10 including an electrical port 18); Fig. 3
(lamp assembly 110 including charge port 118); see also id. at 5:3–9, 6:22–
33 (description of Figs. 2 and 3). See, e.g., In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603
F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (PTO “construction [must] be
‘consistent with the specification, . . . and . . . claim language should be read
Appeal 2013-003930
Application 12/493,514

3
in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill
in the art”’) (citation omitted); In re Baker Hughes, Inc., 215 F.3d 1297,
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the PTO cannot adopt a construction that is “beyond
that which was reasonable in light of the totality of the written description”);
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054–55 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he PTO applies
to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of
the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.”).
The Examiner finds that Austin teaches an automotive vehicle
comprising an exterior lamp assembly, in the form of front surface 172,
which includes an electrical port 170. Ans. 4, 7 (citing Austin Figs. 22, 23).
According to the Examiner, the front surface 172 of Austin is an exterior
device, which includes a headlamp/illumination source, therefore reading on
an exterior lamp assembly. Id. at 8 (citing Austin Fig. 22). Appellants, on
the other hand, contend that Austin’s front surface 172 is not an exterior
lamp assembly or part of such an assembly. App. Br. 3; Reply Br. 2.
We determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports
Appellants’ position. Austin discloses a vehicle having one or more
electrical connectors 170 located in a front surface 172 of the vehicle or in a
rear surface 174 of the vehicle. Austin, Figs. 20–23, ¶¶ 155, 156, 159, 161.
Although Figures 20 and 22 of Austin show a headlamp adjacent to
electrical connector 170, there is no disclosure in Austin, either in the
Figures or description, that an electrical port be included as part of an
exterior lamp assembly of an automotive vehicle, as required by Appellants’
Appeal 2013-003930
Application 12/493,514

4
claims. The Examiner does not direct us to any disclosure in Austin that
teaches that front surface 172 or rear surface 174 is part of an exterior lamp
assembly. Nor does the Examiner direct us to evidence in Appellants’
Specification or elsewhere in the intrinsic or extrinsic record that would
support a construction of “exterior lamp assembly” that is broad enough to
encompass either front surface 172 or rear surface 174 in Austin’s Figures
20–23.
Accordingly, in the absence of a prima facie case of anticipation of
independent claims 1, 9 and 17, and of claims 2, 4–8, and 18–20 dependent
thereon, we reverse the rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
over Austin. Furthermore, because the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 is
based on the same factual findings regarding Austin, Ans. 7, we reverse the
rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Austin for the same
reasons.
The decision of the Primary Examiner is reversed.
REVERSED

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