Ex Parte GHANNAM et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 19, 201814273914 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 19, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/273,914 05/09/2014 28395 7590 09/21/2018 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L 1000 TOWN CENTER 22NDFLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Mahmoud Yousef GHANNAM UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 83438660 8502 EXAMINER EDWARDS, JERRAH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3662 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/21/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MAHMOUD YOUSEF GHANNAM, ABRAHAM G. PHILIP, DAVID JAMES TIPPY, YERUVA SATYA REDDY, JENNIFER DANIELLE SHAW and TANIA VASQUEZ Appeal2018-001055 1 Application 14/273,9142 Technology Center 3600 Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, KENNETH G. SCHOPPER, and BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the decision rejecting claims 1, 2, and 4--20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 Our Decision references Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.," filed May 1, 2017) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Nov. 10, 2017), the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Sept. 11, 2017) and Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed Dec. 2, 2016). 2 Appellants identify "Ford Global Technologies, LLC" as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Claimed Subject Matter Appellants' invention relates to "an integrated sensing system for parking aid and pedestrian impact detection." Spec. ,r 2. Claims 1, 10, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claims 1 and 16, reproduced below, are illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and recite: 1. A vehicle sensing system comprising: a plurality of sensing components, each component including a housing configured to maintain a first sensor and a second sensor; and a parking module configured to receive distance data from the first sensor and transmit a message to a restraint module in response to the data indicating the presence of an object within a predefined proximity to a respective component, the message including instructions to awaken a restraint system controlled by the parking module prior to a detected impact at the vehicle. 16. A vehicle system comprising: a first module coupled to a sensing component within the vehicle and configured to: receive distance data from the sensing component; transmit, to a second module in response to the distance data indicating the presence of an object within a predefined proximity to the vehicle and prior to a detected impact at the vehicle, a message including instructions to awaken a vehicle system controlled by the second module. Appeal Br., Claims App. 2 Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 Rejections3 Claims 1, 2, and 4--20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Claims 1, 2, and 4--15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as being indefinite for insufficient antecedent basis. Claims 1, 2, and 4--15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Reeves, 4 Midorikawa, 5 Takahashi, 6 and Gray. 7 Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Reeves and Gray. Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Reeves, Gray, and Takahashi. ANALYSIS Written Description Requirement The Examiner finds that the subject matter of claims l, 2, and 4-20 is not adequate]y described in the Specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skmed in the relevant art that the inventor at the time the application was filed had possession of it, and, thus, the Examiner rejects the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 4. Citing the l'vianual of Patent Examining Procedure (rvIPEP) § 2161.01, the Examiner asserts that the 3 We interpret the Examiner's lone assertion that "there is no explanation of any dormant or sleep state, so it is unclear what operation is intended to be described by the recited message to awaken the restraint system." (Final Act. 5) as an observation as to the breadth of the claim language. 4 US 2007/0088488 Al, pub. Apr. 19, 2007. 5 US 2003/0015864 Al, pub. Jan. 23, 2003. 6 US 2006/0212201 Al, pub. Sept. 21, 2006. 7 US 5,620,202, iss. Apr. 15, 1997. 3 Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 Specification "must provide 'a disclosure of the computer and algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention including how to program the disclosed computer to perform the claimed function.'" Id. According to the Examiner, Id. the [S]pecification does not provide any explanation of what it means to awaken the restraint system, what function is performed in order to awaken the system, or what specific steps would be taken to awaken the system. There is no explanation of any dormant or sleep state, so it is unclear what operation is intended to be described by the recited awakening. It is also unclear how the undisclosed functions performed during the awakening are determined "prior to a detected impact" or how they relate to the recited data indicating the presence of an object. Alleging error in the rejection, Appellants argue that paragraph 47 of the Specification "provides sufficient support for the [limitation] 'the message including instructions to awaken a restraint system controlled by the parking module prior to a detected impact at the vehicle."' Appeal Br. 4. Appellants' description as filed is presumed to be adequate, unless or until sufficient evidence or reasoning to the contrary has been presented by the Examiner to rebut the presumption. See, e.g., In re Marzocchi, 439 F .2d 220, 224 (CCP A 1971 ). As such, the Examiner has the initial burden of presenting by a preponderance of evidence why a person skilled in the art would not recognize in Appellants' disclosure a description of the invention defined by the claims. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257,263 (CCPA 1976). This initial burden has not been met because the Examiner's mere assertion 4 Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 supra and response 8 to Appellants' argurnent that the Specification does not provide a disclosure of an algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate possession of above contested step does not provide a reasonable basis to challenge the adequacy of the written description. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that "[MPEP] § 2163.04 [subsection] (I)(B) as written is a lawful formulation of the prima facie standard for a lack of written description rejection."). Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § l 12(a) as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Indefiniteness In rejecting claim 1 as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, the Examiner determines there is insufficient antecedent basis for the limitation "the data indicating the presence of an object within a predefined proximity to a respective component ... because it's unclear if the recited 'data indicating a presence of an object' is the previously recited 'distance data,' and it's unclear which component corresponds to the recited 'respective component."' Final Act. 5. In contesting the rejection, 9 Appellants argue that " [ v] arious sensors may indicate a proximity of object, or a proximity of two items with respect 8 See Ans. 4 ("Therefore, the claims, as worded, vaguely invoke a generalized notion of the well-known functionality of known vehicle controllers - preparing to receive data, receiving data, initiating processes - while omitting any explanation of any algorithm, process or steps for awakening or changing state of the specific controller contemplated by the invention, according to knowledge in the possession of the inventor.") 9 Appellants indicate that after Final amendments were submitted in an effort to further prosecution, but the Examiner refused entry in the Advisory Action mailed February 15, 2017. Appeal Br. 5. 5 Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 to one another, with neither of those two items being the sensor supplying the data. That is, distance data from one sensor could include information regarding proximity to the other components." Appeal Br. 5. Whether a claim is indefinite is an issue of law. Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The second paragraph of§ 112, requires that a patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig, Insts., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129-30 (2014). We determine that the term "distance data" provides explicit antecedent basis for "the data" as recited in claim 1. As for the term "to a respective component," the Specification provides that "[t]he sensing components include a housing configured to hold a pair of sensors such as a parking sensor and an impact sensor." Spec. ,r 16. As shown in Figure 2, "the component 105 may include a pair of sensors 120, 125 including a first sensor or a parking sensor 120, corresponding to a parking aid system within the parking aid module 135, and a second sensor or an impact sensor 125, corresponding to the restraint control module 130." Id. ,r 22; id. ,r 27 ("data from the sensors 120, 125 may be transmitted to the modules 130, 135 via the interface 145."). Therefore, a respective component is broadly recited to include any one of the pair of sensors corresponding to the first sensor providing distance data because, as Appellants assert supra, "distance data from one sensor could include information regarding proximity to the other components." Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite for lacking proper antecedent basis. 6 Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 Obviousness Independent claim 16 In contesting the rejection of claim 16 as obvious over Reeves and Gray, Appellants acknowledge that Gray discloses transmitting a "wake up message" in response to an acceleration signal from an accelerometer, but argue that such message is not within the context of the claims. Gray does not transmit the wake up message 'in response to distance data indicating the presence of an object within a predefined proximity to the vehicle,' as claimed, but instead issues a wake up message in response to an impact at the accelerometer. Appeal Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument because Appellants are attacking Gray individually; the rejection is based on the combined teachings of Reeves and Gray, not on any one of them alone. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually when the rejection is based on the teachings of a combination of references). In particular, the Examiner relies upon Reeves for disclosing "transmit[ ting] a message to a second module (Fig. 1, processing unit 50) in response to the data indicating the presence of an object within a predefined proximity to the housing." Final Act. 10 (citing Reeves, Fig. 1, paras. 5, 10-12, 30-34). The Examiner finds that "Reeves does not disclose sending an awaken message to a second control module" and, instead relies on the teachings of Gray to cure this deficiency. Id. Appellants' argument does not address the combined teachings of the references, on which the rejection of record is 7 Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 based upon and, therefore, this argument cannot demonstrate reversible error. Further, Appellants concede that in Gray, "an accelerometer may register a high acceleration and transmit a wake up message in response to that acceleration," but argue that a response to an impact at the accelerometer is "not 'prior to a detected impact at the vehicle.'" Appeal Br. 6. The Examiner determines that the broadest reasonable interpretation of awakening the system "prior to" detected impact clearly corresponds to "arming" the system when "an impending crash" is identified, because the term "impending" indicates that the crash has not yet happened. Gray specifically defines an "impending" crash in a manner that covers the "prior to" language of the claim, especially because Applicant's specification provides no explanation or definition of "awaken" or "prior to a detected impact" that clearly indicates a different meaning of those terms. Gray clearly teaches that the message to arm the system is sent be/ ore the actual crash is detected (when the crash is "impending"), and that the deploy message is sent after the crash is detected; therefore the message to arm (awaken) the system it is sent "prior to a detected impact." Ans. 6-7; see Gray 1 :24--27 ("[W]hen the accelerometer output reaches a given threshold value an impending crash is identified and in response the deployment system is armed"). The Examiner has the better position. Appellants have not meaningfully distinguished the difference between the teachings of Gray and the claimed awakening feature, which as the Examiner observes is not defined in the Specification. The Specification indicates that "[a]n impact sensor may be an accelerometer" (Spec. ,r 26) and "[b]y awakening features of the control module 130, the control module 130 may be prepared to receive impact data." Spec. ,r 47. And as discussed above, the Examiner relies on Reeves for transmitting a message to a second 8 Appeal2018-001055 Application 14/273,914 module in response to data indicating presence of an object within a predefined proximity to the vehicle, and on Gray for the explicit teaching of arming the deployment system when the accelerometer reaches a given threshold. Cf Spec. ,r 49 ("any impact data over a nominal threshold may indicate impact."); Spec. ,r 50 ("the reaction may be to activate or deploy certain pedestrian protection systems. This determination regarding the impacts' severity may be based on at least one of an acceleration, delta velocity, displacement, etc., as indicated by the impact data."). On the record before us, the preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's determination that the combined teachings of Reeves and Gray would have suggested the claimed subject matter. Appellants have not adequately explained why the combination, as proffered by the Examiner, fails to render the subject matter of claim 16 unobivous. Accordingly, we are not apprised of error in the rejection and, therefore, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 1, 2, 4-15, and 17-20 Appellans rely on the same arguments in contesting the rejections of the claims 1, 2, 4--15, and 17-20. See App. Br. 7-8. Therefore, we sustain the rejections of these claims for the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 16. DECISION The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112 are reversed. The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation