Ex Parte GHANNAM et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 19, 2018

14273914 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 19, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/273,914 05/09/2014
28395 7590 09/21/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mahmoud Yousef GHANNAM
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83438660 8502
EXAMINER
EDWARDS, JERRAH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/21/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MAHMOUD YOUSEF GHANNAM, ABRAHAM G. PHILIP,
DAVID JAMES TIPPY, YERUVA SATYA REDDY,
JENNIFER DANIELLE SHAW and TANIA VASQUEZ
Appeal2018-001055 1
Application 14/273,9142
Technology Center 3600
Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, KENNETH G. SCHOPPER, and
BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the decision
rejecting claims 1, 2, and 4--20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our Decision references Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.," filed
May 1, 2017) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Nov. 10, 2017), the
Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Sept. 11, 2017) and Final Office Action
("Final Act.," mailed Dec. 2, 2016).
2 Appellants identify "Ford Global Technologies, LLC" as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimed Subject Matter
Appellants' invention relates to "an integrated sensing system for
parking aid and pedestrian impact detection." Spec. ,r 2.
Claims 1, 10, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claims 1
and 16, reproduced below, are illustrative of the subject matter on appeal,
and recite:
1. A vehicle sensing system comprising:
a plurality of sensing components, each component
including a housing configured to maintain a first sensor and a
second sensor; and
a parking module configured to receive distance data
from the first sensor and transmit a message to a restraint
module in response to the data indicating the presence of an
object within a predefined proximity to a respective component,
the message including instructions to awaken a restraint system
controlled by the parking module prior to a detected impact at
the vehicle.
16. A vehicle system comprising:
a first module coupled to a sensing component within the
vehicle and configured to: receive distance data from the
sensing component;
transmit, to a second module in response to the distance
data indicating the presence of an object within a predefined
proximity to the vehicle and prior to a detected impact at the
vehicle, a message including instructions to awaken a vehicle
system controlled by the second module.
Appeal Br., Claims App.
2
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
Rejections3
Claims 1, 2, and 4--20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as failing
to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 1, 2, and 4--15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as being
indefinite for insufficient antecedent basis.
Claims 1, 2, and 4--15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Reeves, 4 Midorikawa, 5 Takahashi, 6 and Gray. 7
Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Reeves and Gray.
Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over
Reeves, Gray, and Takahashi.
ANALYSIS
Written Description Requirement
The Examiner finds that the subject matter of claims l, 2, and 4-20 is
not adequate]y described in the Specification in such a way as to reasonably
convey to one skmed in the relevant art that the inventor at the time the
application was filed had possession of it, and, thus, the Examiner rejects the
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as failing to comply with the written
description requirement. Final Act. 4. Citing the l'vianual of Patent
Examining Procedure (rvIPEP) § 2161.01, the Examiner asserts that the
3 We interpret the Examiner's lone assertion that "there is no explanation of
any dormant or sleep state, so it is unclear what operation is intended to be
described by the recited message to awaken the restraint system." (Final Act.
5) as an observation as to the breadth of the claim language.
4 US 2007/0088488 Al, pub. Apr. 19, 2007.
5 US 2003/0015864 Al, pub. Jan. 23, 2003.
6 US 2006/0212201 Al, pub. Sept. 21, 2006.
7 US 5,620,202, iss. Apr. 15, 1997.
3
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
Specification "must provide 'a disclosure of the computer and algorithm in
sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the
inventor possessed the invention including how to program the disclosed
computer to perform the claimed function.'" Id. According to the
Examiner,
Id.
the [S]pecification does not provide any explanation of what it
means to awaken the restraint system, what function is
performed in order to awaken the system, or what specific steps
would be taken to awaken the system. There is no explanation
of any dormant or sleep state, so it is unclear what operation is
intended to be described by the recited awakening. It is also
unclear how the undisclosed functions performed during the
awakening are determined "prior to a detected impact" or how
they relate to the recited data indicating the presence of an
object.
Alleging error in the rejection, Appellants argue that paragraph 47 of
the Specification "provides sufficient support for the [limitation] 'the
message including instructions to awaken a restraint system controlled by
the parking module prior to a detected impact at the vehicle."' Appeal Br. 4.
Appellants' description as filed is presumed to be adequate, unless or
until sufficient evidence or reasoning to the contrary has been presented by
the Examiner to rebut the presumption. See, e.g., In re Marzocchi, 439 F .2d
220, 224 (CCP A 1971 ). As such, the Examiner has the initial burden of
presenting by a preponderance of evidence why a person skilled in the art
would not recognize in Appellants' disclosure a description of the invention
defined by the claims. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257,263 (CCPA 1976).
This initial burden has not been met because the Examiner's mere assertion
4
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
supra and response 8 to Appellants' argurnent that the Specification does not
provide a disclosure of an algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate
possession of above contested step does not provide a reasonable basis to
challenge the adequacy of the written description. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 492
F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that "[MPEP] § 2163.04
[subsection] (I)(B) as written is a lawful formulation of the prima
facie standard for a lack of written description rejection.").
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § l 12(a)
as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Indefiniteness
In rejecting claim 1 as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, the Examiner determines there is insufficient antecedent basis for
the limitation "the data indicating the presence of an object within a
predefined proximity to a respective component ... because it's unclear if
the recited 'data indicating a presence of an object' is the previously recited
'distance data,' and it's unclear which component corresponds to the recited
'respective component."' Final Act. 5.
In contesting the rejection, 9 Appellants argue that " [ v] arious sensors
may indicate a proximity of object, or a proximity of two items with respect
8 See Ans. 4 ("Therefore, the claims, as worded, vaguely invoke a
generalized notion of the well-known functionality of known vehicle
controllers - preparing to receive data, receiving data, initiating processes -
while omitting any explanation of any algorithm, process or steps for
awakening or changing state of the specific controller contemplated by the
invention, according to knowledge in the possession of the inventor.")
9 Appellants indicate that after Final amendments were submitted in an effort
to further prosecution, but the Examiner refused entry in the Advisory
Action mailed February 15, 2017. Appeal Br. 5.
5
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
to one another, with neither of those two items being the sensor supplying
the data. That is, distance data from one sensor could include information
regarding proximity to the other components." Appeal Br. 5.
Whether a claim is indefinite is an issue of law. Credle v. Bond, 25
F.3d 1566, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The second paragraph of§ 112, requires
that a patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution
history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with
reasonable certainty. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig, Insts., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120,
2129-30 (2014). We determine that the term "distance data" provides
explicit antecedent basis for "the data" as recited in claim 1. As for the term
"to a respective component," the Specification provides that "[t]he sensing
components include a housing configured to hold a pair of sensors such as a
parking sensor and an impact sensor." Spec. ,r 16. As shown in Figure 2,
"the component 105 may include a pair of sensors 120, 125 including a first
sensor or a parking sensor 120, corresponding to a parking aid system within
the parking aid module 135, and a second sensor or an impact sensor 125,
corresponding to the restraint control module 130." Id. ,r 22; id. ,r 27 ("data
from the sensors 120, 125 may be transmitted to the modules 130, 135 via
the interface 145."). Therefore, a respective component is broadly recited to
include any one of the pair of sensors corresponding to the first sensor
providing distance data because, as Appellants assert supra, "distance data
from one sensor could include information regarding proximity to the other
components."
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
as indefinite for lacking proper antecedent basis.
6
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
Obviousness
Independent claim 16
In contesting the rejection of claim 16 as obvious over Reeves and
Gray, Appellants acknowledge that Gray discloses transmitting a "wake up
message" in response to an acceleration signal from an accelerometer, but
argue that
such message is not within the context of the claims. Gray does
not transmit the wake up message 'in response to distance data
indicating the presence of an object within a predefined
proximity to the vehicle,' as claimed, but instead issues a wake
up message in response to an impact at the accelerometer.
Appeal Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 2.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument because Appellants
are attacking Gray individually; the rejection is based on the combined
teachings of Reeves and Gray, not on any one of them alone. See In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Nonobviousness
cannot be established by attacking the references individually when the
rejection is based on the teachings of a combination of references). In
particular, the Examiner relies upon Reeves for disclosing "transmit[ ting] a
message to a second module (Fig. 1, processing unit 50) in response to the
data indicating the presence of an object within a predefined proximity to the
housing." Final Act. 10 (citing Reeves, Fig. 1, paras. 5, 10-12, 30-34). The
Examiner finds that "Reeves does not disclose sending an awaken message
to a second control module" and, instead relies on the teachings of Gray to
cure this deficiency. Id. Appellants' argument does not address the
combined teachings of the references, on which the rejection of record is
7
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
based upon and, therefore, this argument cannot demonstrate reversible
error.
Further, Appellants concede that in Gray, "an accelerometer may
register a high acceleration and transmit a wake up message in response to
that acceleration," but argue that a response to an impact at the
accelerometer is "not 'prior to a detected impact at the vehicle.'" Appeal
Br. 6. The Examiner determines that
the broadest reasonable interpretation of awakening the system
"prior to" detected impact clearly corresponds to "arming" the
system when "an impending crash" is identified, because the
term "impending" indicates that the crash has not yet happened.
Gray specifically defines an "impending" crash in a manner that
covers the "prior to" language of the claim, especially because
Applicant's specification provides no explanation or definition
of "awaken" or "prior to a detected impact" that clearly
indicates a different meaning of those terms. Gray clearly
teaches that the message to arm the system is sent be/ ore the
actual crash is detected (when the crash is "impending"), and
that the deploy message is sent after the crash is detected;
therefore the message to arm (awaken) the system it is sent
"prior to a detected impact."
Ans. 6-7; see Gray 1 :24--27 ("[W]hen the accelerometer output reaches a
given threshold value an impending crash is identified and in response the
deployment system is armed"). The Examiner has the better position.
Appellants have not meaningfully distinguished the difference
between the teachings of Gray and the claimed awakening feature, which as
the Examiner observes is not defined in the Specification. The Specification
indicates that "[a]n impact sensor may be an accelerometer" (Spec. ,r 26) and
"[b]y awakening features of the control module 130, the control module 130
may be prepared to receive impact data." Spec. ,r 47. And as discussed
above, the Examiner relies on Reeves for transmitting a message to a second
8
Appeal2018-001055
Application 14/273,914
module in response to data indicating presence of an object within a
predefined proximity to the vehicle, and on Gray for the explicit teaching of
arming the deployment system when the accelerometer reaches a given
threshold. Cf Spec. ,r 49 ("any impact data over a nominal threshold may
indicate impact."); Spec. ,r 50 ("the reaction may be to activate or deploy
certain pedestrian protection systems. This determination regarding the
impacts' severity may be based on at least one of an acceleration, delta
velocity, displacement, etc., as indicated by the impact data."). On the
record before us, the preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's
determination that the combined teachings of Reeves and Gray would have
suggested the claimed subject matter. Appellants have not adequately
explained why the combination, as proffered by the Examiner, fails to render
the subject matter of claim 16 unobivous. Accordingly, we are not apprised
of error in the rejection and, therefore, we sustain the rejection of
independent claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Claims 1, 2, 4-15, and 17-20
Appellans rely on the same arguments in contesting the rejections of
the claims 1, 2, 4--15, and 17-20. See App. Br. 7-8. Therefore, we sustain
the rejections of these claims for the same reasons discussed above with
respect to claim 16.
DECISION
The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112 are reversed.
The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
9