Ex Parte GargiDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 23, 201310247221 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 23, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte ULLAS GARGI ____________________ Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, THU ANN DANG, and DEBRA K. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Introduction According to Appellant, the invention relates to a system and method for reviewing a virtual 3-D environment (Abstract). Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for reviewing a virtual 3-D environment comprising: generating a persistent virtual 3-D environment; recording virtual activity taking place in said persistent virtual 3-D environment, including content selected from a group consisting essentially of JPEG, MPEG, slide, video, picture, photograph, 2-D model of an external object, and 3-D model of an external object, introduced by an outside source, wherein said recording said virtual activity does not require recording of said persistent 3-D environment; introducing a physical object into said persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live video into said persistent virtual 3-D environment; Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 3 recognizing a user associated with said virtual activity based on computer being used by said user; storing said recording of said virtual activity in a central location; replaying a video of said virtual activity in said persistent virtual 3-D environment, wherein said replaying may be performed by remote access; and identifying said user associated with said virtual activity during said replaying said video of said virtual activity. REFERENCES Toomey Payne Namma US 6,119,147 US 6,167,426 US 6,182,116 B1 Sep. 12, 2000 Dec. 26, 2000 Jan. 30, 2001 Poon Myers US 2001/0035976 A1 US 2002/0163577 A1 Nov. 1, 2001 Nov. 7, 2002 (filed May 7, 2001) REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: (1) Claims 1 and 3-6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Toomey and Poon (Ans. 5). (2) Claims 2 and 9-15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Toomey, Poon, and Myers (Ans. 11). (3) Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Toomey, Poon, and Namma (Ans. 18). Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 4 (4) Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Toomey, Poon, and Payne (Ans. 19). (5) Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Toomey, Poon, Myers, and Namma (Ans. 20). (6) Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Toomey, Poon, Myers, and Payne (Ans. 21). (7) Claims 18-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Toomey, Poon, Myers, Namma, and Payne (Ans. 22). We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2011). ISSUE 1 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 1 and 3-6 Appellant asserts their invention is not obvious over Toomey and Poon because the combination does not teach or suggest the invention and specifically, the limitation of “introducing a physical object into said persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live video into said persistent virtual 3-D environment” (App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 2-3). Appellant contends Toomey discloses exiting a 3-D environment to show a video in a browser, or possibly opening a browser to show a video on a user's computer (App. Br. 11). Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 5 However, Appellant argues Toomey does not teach the disputed limitation. Appellant additionally asserts Poon does not teach or suggest the disputed limitation because Poon does not teach introducing a physical object into the persistent memory (App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 3). Further, Appellant argues no motivation exists to combine Toomey with Poon and instead, Toomey teaches away from Poon (App. Br. 12-13). According to Appellant, Toomey teaches a system and method that use simple graphic images in a compositing process which is much easier than using video (App. Br. 13). In addition, Appellant contends, Toomey describes that with video, considerable effort is required to merge multiple sources of video images into a composite (id.). Thus, Appellant argues, Toomey discourages merging media sources into a composite video while Poon discloses capturing and transmitting a video and creating a composite video with another video presentation (id.). Issue 1a: Has the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Toomey and Poon teaches or suggests “introducing a physical object into said persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live video into said persistent virtual 3-D environment” as recited in claim 1? Issue 1b: Has the Examiner erred by improperly combining the teachings and suggestions of Toomey and Poon? Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 6 ANALYSIS Issue 1a: We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. We adopt the Examiner’s interpretation of “introducing a physical object” and Appellant has not disputed that interpretation (Ans. 31). Specifically, we agree with the Examiner that Toomey teaches users can load a specified video file (Ans. 5 and 31-32). We further agree with the Examiner’s findings regarding Poon and adopt them as our own (Ans. 31-32). Appellant has not identified sufficient argument or evidence that persuades us the Examiner’s findings regarding Poon are in error (see App. Br. 11-12). We also emphasize Appellant appears to be arguing the references individually when the Examiner is relying on the combination of Toomey and Poon as teaching the invention as recited (App. Br. 11-12). Specifically, Appellant argues Poon teaches a virtual meeting and introducing video into a virtual meeting but does not teach introducing a physical object into the persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live video into the persistent virtual 3-D environment (App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 2-3). However the Examiner relies on Toomey’s teaching of a persistent virtual 3-D environment and loading a specified video file and Poon’s teaching of transmitting and displaying live video created on a writing surface during a presentation (Ans. 6 and 31-32). In addition, the Examiner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated (Ans. 31-33). Specifically, the Examiner states since Toomey Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 7 teaches users can load a specified video file, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate Poon’s technique of introducing live video into the virtual meeting to provide real-time video interaction to users in the virtual meeting (id.). Appellant’s argument that Toomey teaches away from Poon is similarly not persuasive. Appellant points to Toomey’s disclosure at column 3, lines 17-26 as teaching away from Poon (App. Br. 13). This portion of Toomey states the system and method of the Toomey invention uses simple graphic images for avatars and scenes, creating a composite scene in which current meeting participants’ avatars are inserted into earlier scenes (col. 3, ll. 17-22). Toomey further states “[t]his compositing process is much easier than is possible using video” since video requires “considerable effort… to merge multiple sources of video images into a composite” (col. 3, ll. 23-26). A reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention from amongst options available to the ordinarily skilled artisan, and the reference does not discredit or discourage investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, we do not find Toomey’s statements that the disclosed invention is easier or simpler than using video does not persuade us the reference is discrediting or discouraging Poon’s teaching. Instead, we determine Toomey is presenting an alternative. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Toomey and Poon teaches or suggests “introducing a physical object into said persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 8 video into said persistent virtual 3-D environment” as recited in claim 1. We are further not persuaded the Examiner improperly combined the teachings of Toomey and Poon. Dependent claims 3-6 are not separately argued and thus, fall with claim 1. Therefore, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1 and 3-6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Toomey and Poon. ISSUE 2 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 2 and 9-15 Appellant asserts their invention is not obvious over Toomey, Poon, and Myers because Myers does not cure the deficiencies of Toomey and Poon and because the modification would change the principle of operation of Toomey and render it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose (App. Br. 14-18). Specifically, Appellant contends Myers does not teach “introducing a physical object into said persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live video into said persistent virtual 3-D environment” (App. Br. 15). Appellant further contends Toomey teaches providing computer- mediated multi-modal asynchronous meetings in a virtual space while the Examiner relies on Myers as teaching “archiving said recording of said virtual activity in a central location, wherein periods of said recording of virtual activity in which no activity is taking place are not archived” (App. Br. 16). According to Appellant, modifying Toomey with Myers creates a teleconference system that comprises a physical recording device intended to detect events outside of a 3-D virtual environment (id.). Thus, Appellant Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 9 argues Toomey’s principle of operation has been changed from a software program to a system coupling a physical camera that records movement (id.). Appellant further contends the proposed modification would render Toomey unsatisfactory for its intended purpose (App. Br. 17). Specifically, Appellant argues the modification results in a system that records virtual activity with a physical means for monitoring a scene coupled with a sensor (id.). Therefore, Myers’ teaching of a separate physical camera to record non-virtual world events would render Toomey unsatisfactory for its intended purpose of recording a virtual teleconference (id.). Issue 2: Has the Examiner erred by improperly combining the teachings and suggestions of Toomey, Poon, and Myers? ANALYSIS As set forth above in Issue 1, we find the combination of Toomey and Poon teaches or suggests “introducing a physical object into said persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live video into said persistent virtual 3-D environment” as recited in claim 1 and commensurately recited in claim 9. Therefore, claim 2 which depends from claim 1 falls with its independent claim. Further with respect to claim 9, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that modifying Toomey with the teachings disclosed in Poon and Myers would have changed the principle of operation of Toomey and rendered Toomey unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. Specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s findings. Indeed, both Toomey and Myers are Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 10 directed towards recording a scene and saving the recording (Ans. 36 (citing Toomey, col. 2, ll. 13-30; col. 5, l. 33 to col. 6, l. 20; and Myers, [0014])). We further agree with the Examiner that including Myers’ technique of determining occurrence of an event, producing a signal indicative of an even occurring within the designated portion of a scene, and keeping only those portions of interest into the system of Toomey would not change the principle of operation of Toomey (Ans. 36). Toomey is also saving the recording (Ans. 36). Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the proposed modification would change the principle of operation of Toomey. We are similarly not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the proposed modification would render Toomey unsatisfactory for its intended purpose (App. Br. 17-18). We agree with the Examiner’s findings and reasoning (Ans. 37-38). We further emphasize Appellant has not persuaded us adding Myers’ technique of not storing a recording of virtual activity in which no activity is taking place into the system of Toomey would not render Toomey’s computer-mediated, multi-modal, asynchronous meetings in a virtual space unsatisfactory for enabling, recording, reviewing, and augmenting meetings that take place in the virtual environment. Therefore, we are not persuaded the Examiner improperly combined the teachings of Toomey, Poon, and Myers. Accordingly, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 2 and 9 and dependent claims 10-15, not separately argued under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Toomey, Poon, and Myers. Appeal 2013-004963 Application 10/247,221 11 ISSUE 3 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 7, 8, and 16-25 Appellant did not separately argue claims 7, 8, and 16-25 instead asserting none of the cited references, alone or in combination, teaches “introducing a physical object into said persistent virtual 3-D environment by plugging live video into said persistent virtual 3-D environment” (App. Br. 18-25). As set forth above, we find the combination of Toomey and Poon teaches the disputed limitation and therefore, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7, 8, and 16-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness. DECISION The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED tj Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation