Ex Parte Gale et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 21, 201311716152 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/716,152 03/09/2007 Allan R. Gale 81154641 5985 28866 7590 08/22/2013 MACMILLAN, SOBANSKI & TODD, LLC ONE MARITIME PLAZA - FIFTH FLOOR 720 WATER STREET TOLEDO, OH 43604 EXAMINER FANTU, YALKEW ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2859 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/22/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ALLAN R. GALE, MICHAEL W. DEGNER, and MICHAEL A. TAMOR ____________ Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, ERIC B. CHEN, and GREGG I. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-17, all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part and enter a new ground of rejection pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates generally to a charging system for storage batteries for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV). More specifically, the charging system detects other loads on the charging circuit and reduces the current load for the PHEV storage battery, reducing or Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 2 eliminating the possibility of a circuit breaker opening during charging. Spec. pg. 2, ll. 12-19. Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A method for charging an electric storage battery in a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle through a power supply circuit, comprising the steps of: (a) coupling the charger to the circuit; (b) determining whether another appliance in the circuit other than the charger is drawing current; (c) determining a maximum charge rate at which the battery can be charged using the charger; (d) charging the battery at the maximum charge rate if no other appliance in the circuit is drawing current; and (e) charging the battery at less than the maximum charge rate if another appliance in the circuit is drawing current. THE REJECTION The Examiner rejected claims 1-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hobbs (US 2004/0169489 A1, issued Sept. 2, 2004) in view of Amano (US 2004/0155624 A1; published Aug. 12, 2004). Ans. 4- 8.1 ISSUES (1) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Hobbs and Amano collectively would have taught or suggested: (a) “charging the battery at the maximum charge rate if no other appliance in the circuit is drawing current,” as recited in claim 1? (b) “charging the battery at less than the maximum charge rate if another appliance in the circuit is drawing current,” as recited in claim 1. 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed January 21, 2010 (“App. Br.”); (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 27, 2010 (“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply Brief filed September 7, 2010 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 3 (2) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Hobbs and Amano collectively would have taught or suggested: (a) “a charger is coupled to the circuit and a second outlet at which an appliance other than the charger can be coupled to the circuit,” as recited in claim 9? (b) “first and second instruments for measuring circuit operating variables that indicate whether an appliance in the circuit other than the charger is drawing current,” as recited in claim 9? (3) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Hobbs and Amano collectively would have taught or suggested: (a) “determining whether a first voltage is present between the neutral terminal and the ground terminal of the first outlet,” as recited in claim 2? (b) “performing step (d) [of claim 1] if the first voltage is zero,” as recited in claim 2? (c) “performing step (e) [of claim 1] if the first voltage is not zero,” as recited in claim 2? (4) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Hobbs and Amano collectively would have taught or suggested “performing step (e) [of claim 1] if a voltage difference between the first terminal and the second terminal is greater than a reference voltage difference,” as recited in claim 3? (5) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Hobbs and Amano collectively would have taught or suggested: (a) “determining a length of a reference period during which the battery can be charged before repeating step (b) [of claim1],” as recited in claim 4? Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 4 (b) “discontinuing the step of charging the battery when the reference period expires,” as recited in claim 4? (c) “repeating steps (b) through (e) [both of claim 1] after the discontinuing step,” as recited in claim 4? (6) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Hobbs and Amano collectively would have taught or suggested “current sensor to determine a magnitude of current drawn by an appliance other than the charger in the circuit,” as recited in claim 7? ANALYSIS Rejection of Claim 1under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The key disputed limitations of claim 1 recite, in pertinent part, “(d) charging the battery at the maximum charge rate if no other appliance in the circuit is drawing current; and (e) charging the battery at less than the maximum charge rate if another appliance in the circuit is drawing current.” Unless otherwise stated, we will reference them as the “maximum charge rate” and “less than the maximum charge rate” limitations respectively. The Examiner relies on Hobbs for all the limitations of claim 1 except the two limitations in dispute. Ans. 6. Amano is cited for teaching these limitations. Id. Specifically, the Examiner found that the automobile power supply of Amano includes a control unit which distributes the electric load based on the condition of the battery and the load. Id. The Examiner also found that the current of the load is limited when said anticipated voltage is smaller than a predetermined value. Id. (citing Amano ¶ [0010]). The Examiner further found Amano teaches that where an excessive load is generated, the voltage of the power supply system may drop significantly. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 5 Id. (citing Amano ¶ [0004]). As a result of the voltage drop, the controller becomes inoperative and “the output of the electric load can not [sic] be generated sufficiently.” Id. Appellants assert the Amano power supply adjusts power to the loads depending on a level of importance to the operation of the vehicle that each the load represents. App. Br. 7. Appellants further note the current produced by the electric generator is controlled such that a predetermined minimum power supply system voltage (Vmin) is obtained. App. Br. 8. Appellants further allege the Amano power supply is directed to delaying, reducing or stopping current flow to electric loads when the battery voltage is less than a minimum power supply system voltage. Id. For these reasons, Appellants assert Amano does not teach or suggest the two disputed limitations. Id. As such, Appellants conclude that, absent impermissible hindsight, a prima facie case of obviousness has not been made. Id. The fact that Amano is not a battery charging system is not persuasive to overcome the Examiner’s rejection. Hobbs relates to a battery charger for a vehicle. Hobbs, Abstract. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on combinations of references.”). Appellants do not argue the combination is improper and the Examiner finds Hobbs and Amano are in analogous arts. Ans. 6. As the Examiner finds, Amano’s power supply and control unit adjust the current to the various loads depending on the status of the load and charge in the battery. Amano ¶ [0010]. The control unit of Amano’s power supply adjusts the current to the loads on the system depending on whether the available voltage is greater than a predetermined minimum voltage. Id. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 6 Amano teaches or suggests permitting a maximum charge rate if the load on the entire system is not in excess of the predetermined voltage. If the available voltage is less than the predetermined minimum voltage, then current is distributed at less than the maximum charge rate. Figure 2 of Amano further illustrates that both the battery and the load are monitored. Amano, Fig. 2, elements 32 and 33. Amano deals with a power supply system intended for distribution among various electrical loads of an automobile, including the battery. Ans. 9. Thus, Amano teaches the limitations “charging the battery at the maximum charge rate if no other appliance in the circuit is drawing current” and “charging the battery at less than the maximum charge rate if another appliance in the circuit is drawing current.” We are not persuaded of any error on the part of the Examiner and therefore sustain the rejection to claim 1. Rejection of Claims 9 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The first disputed limitation of claim 9 recites, in pertinent part, “a charger is coupled to the circuit and a second outlet at which an appliance other than the charger can be coupled to the circuit.” The Examiner finds that Hobbs teaches the first disputed limitation. Ans. 4, 10-11 (citing Hobbs, ¶ [0030], Fig. 2, elements 288, 130 and 110). Specifically, the battery charging system of Hobbs teaches other loads, i.e., another “appliance,” applied to it, including diagnostic device 130, card reader 110 and fan 288. Id. The Examiner also finds Hobbs teaches a power supply cable 125 which supplies current to batteries 152 and other appliances, such as a motor 155. Ans. 10. Amano also teaches multiple Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 7 appliances in an electrical circuit. Id. (citing Amano, Fig. 1, elements 16 a- c). Appellants argue Hobbs does not show a second outlet with a connected appliance. App. Br. 9. Rather, Appellants argue, Hobbs shows “one charger and no additional appliance is connected to the power grid.” Id. Per Appellants, Hobbs Figure 2 shows that the card reader 110, diagnostic device 130 and fan 288 for cooling transformer 280 are components of the charger 100. Reply Br. 2. Appellants find Amano lacks the disputed element, pointing out that Amano teaches power supply and battery which are “onboard.” App. Br. 9. Appellants again contend Amano discloses nothing about a battery charger or charging a battery. Id. Nothing in claim 9 limits the scope of “second outlet” or “appliance.” The Specification has no definition for either term. The “second outlet” is described generally as in the same circuit as the first outlet. Spec. 2. “Appliance” is shown generally as part of the same circuit. Spec., Fig. 1, element 36. Appellants acknowledge the charger of Hobbs is an “appliance.” Reply Br. 2. We therefore give both terms, “second outlet” and “appliance,” their broadest reasonable interpretation. In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We therefore agree with the Examiner that Hobbs Figure 2 does teach additional “appliances,” i.e., devices that draw current, which are connected to a “second outlet,” i.e., a circuit to which the battery is also connected. Appellants’ argument that the card reader, diagnostic device and fan of Hobbs are a part of the charger 100 of Hobbs Figure 2 is unpersuasive where the battery or vehicle 150 or 152 are Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 8 part of the entire circuit disclosed, all of which are referenced very generally as the “charger 100.” Further, nothing in claim 9 limits the connection of the appliance to the “power grid,” as Appellants argue. App. Br. 9. The circuit of the charger and the vehicle of Hobbs or Amano are within the claim scope. There is also no claim language requiring that loads, i.e., appliances, must be “onboard,” as Appellants suggest. Reply Br. 9. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (arguments to alleged limitations not recited in the claim are disregarded). The second disputed limitation of claim 9 recites, in pertinent part, “first and second instruments for measuring circuit operating variables that indicate whether an appliance in the circuit other than the charger is drawing current.” The Examiner finds the Hobbs charger 100, which includes a controller, and the diagnostic device 130 are configured to measure circuit operating variables such as voltage and current. Ans. 10-11 (citing Hobbs, ¶ [0013], Fig. 1). The Examiner finds it is common knowledge electric vehicles require measurement of current and voltage to distribute power. Id. Finally, Amano also discloses instruments for measurement of voltage and current. Id. (citing Amano, ¶¶ [0017], [0022], Fig. 1, elements 21-23). Appellants again argue the elements cited by the Examiner in Hobbs are “onboard.” Reply Br. 2. Appellants also contend the only appliance of Hobbs for which measurements are made is the charger 100. Id. We agree with the Examiner’s findings. The “onboard” argument was previously addressed. The charger 100 of Figure 1 includes several electrical components. Measurements of the “charger” would necessarily Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 9 include other “appliances” as already discussed. Appellants do not respond to the Examiner’s additional finding that taking the measurements claimed is common knowledge to one of ordinary skill in the art. We therefore sustain the rejection to claim 9 and to claim 13, which is not separately argued. Rejection of Claims 14 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Claim 14 includes the same language as claim 9 relative to the “second outlet” and “appliances.” Claim 14 also recites as an element “an instrument for measuring current drawn by an appliance.” The language is virtually the same as the second disputed element of claim 9. However, Appellants make no distinction between the two in their arguments. The arguments relative to claim 14 are virtually identical to those made with respect to claim 9. App. Br. 9-10, Reply Br. 3. The rejection of claim 14 is therefore sustained for reasons set forth in connection with claim 9. Claim 17 is not argued in Appellants’ Brief. Claim 17 is separately argued in the Reply Brief. Reply Br. 3. There is no showing good cause, the arguments are untimely and will not be considered. By not presenting separate arguments thereto in their original Brief, the Appellants elected to have claim 17 stand or fall with claim 14. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.192(c)(7) (2003). The rejection of claim 17 is therefore sustained. Rejection of Claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The first disputed limitation of claim 2 recites, in pertinent part, “determining whether a first voltage is present between the neutral terminal and the ground terminal of the first outlet.” Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 10 The Examiner finds Hobbs teaches three phase wires includes neutral with ground for and a ground terminal that is connected mutually at a second terminal. Ans. 7 (citing Hobbs, ¶ [0032]). The Examiner relies on the same section of Hobbs for the disputed limitation. Id. Appellants argue Hobbs does not disclose the determining step in dispute. App. Br. 11. Appellants’ Reply Brief does not address the limitation. Merely pointing out what claim 2 recites and then asserting Hobbs does not teach the limitation is not considered a separate argument for patentability. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error based on the first disputed element of claim 2. The second disputed limitation of claim 2 recites, in pertinent part, “performing step (d) [of claim 1] if the first voltage is zero.” The Examiner cites to Hobbs paragraph 9 to teach maximum charge rate as recited in the second disputed limitation. Ans. 7. The Examiner also relies on Amano paragraph [0010] for distribution voltage depending on the load as discussed above. Id. Finally, the Examiner cites to Amano paragraph [0034] to show that maximum power goes to the battery when the load current is zero. Appellants respond that Hobbs discloses checking whether the battery takes a charge and completes its charge, but does not mention the second disputed limitation. App. Br. 11. Appellants do not address Amano. The cited portion of Hobbs does teach “a method for charging batteries that can be used reliably to charge batteries at or near the optimal or maximum rate.” Hobbs thus teaches charging at a maximum rate. As Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 11 already discussed, Amano teaches relative voltage and current distribution in the circuit. Amano, ¶ [0010]. Related directly to what the Examiner relies on, Amano also teaches measuring the current values of all the electric loads and monitoring the battery. Amano, ¶ [0033]. As the Examiner finds, the total load current plus the battery current is equal to the electric generator current. Amano, ¶ [0035]. If the load current goes to zero, the battery receives all the current, voltage. Given these findings by the Examiner, many of which are not contested by Appellants, we are not persuaded of any Examiner error in finding the references show the second disputed limitation of claim 2. The third disputed limitation of claim 2 recites, in pertinent part, “performing step (e) [of claim 1] if the first voltage is not zero.” The Examiner mistakenly cites to Hobbs ¶ [0028], which is clearly not applicable.2 Ans. 7. Appellants’ argument notes this error and the rejection of claim 2 on the specific grounds cited by the Examiner is not sustained. Rejection of Claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Claim 3 is virtually identical in scope to claim 2 with the exception of the following language which recites, in pertinent part, “performing step (e) [of claim 1] if a voltage difference between the first terminal and the second terminal is greater than a reference voltage difference.” The italicized language highlights the difference between the two claims. 2 The Examiner appears to have intended to cite to paragraph [0028] of Amano. This requires us to enter a new ground for rejection below. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 12 The Examiner advances the same grounds for rejection as claim 2. Appellants make all but identical arguments to those made in connection with claim 2 in response. The Examiner does not cite to either Hobbs or Amano for teaching use of a “reference voltage difference” as a basis to charge at less than the maximum rate. The Examiner has therefore failed to make a prima facie case of obviousness. The rejection of claim 3 on the specified grounds is not sustained. A new ground of rejection is entered as below. Rejection of Claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Claim 11 is a system claim dependent on claim 9, for which we sustained the Examiner’s rejection. Claim 11 is very similar in scope to claim 2 and the Examiner relies on the same grounds of rejection. Ans. 6-7. Appellants make arguments already advanced and found not persuasive in connection with claims 9 and 2. App. Br. 13-14. The rejection of claim 11 is sustained for reasons previously stated in connection with claims 9 and 2. Rejection of Claims 4, 5, 6, 12, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The first disputed limitation of claim 4 recites, in pertinent part, “determining a length of a reference period during which the battery can be charged before repeating step (b) [of claim1].” The Examiner finds that Hobbs teaches the first disputed limitation. Ans. 7 (citing Hobbs, ¶ [0051]). The Examiner relies on the controller 270 which uses data from memo and look-up table for all charging activities. Id. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 13 Further, the Examiner finds Amano teaches monitoring the battery condition for a period of time to charge or not charge. Ans. 12 (citing Amano, ¶¶ [0033]-[0034]). Appellants contend the cited portion of Hobbs lacks any reference to charging the battery while the reference period is unexpired. App. Br. 14. According to paragraph 51 of Hobbs, the “charger 100” may have look-up tables. In rejecting claim 4 the Examiner also cites to Hobbs paragraph 52, which further discusses the look-up table cited. Ans. 7. The look-up table includes battery information, including a “threshold current” at which charging should be stopped. The Specification does not define “reference period,” other than correlating it to a length of time. Spec. 3, ll. 3-6. Hobbs’ controller accessing the look-up table for battery status suggests a length of time is involved. Both Hobbs and Amano monitor the battery condition and Amano monitors the loads as well. The teachings suggest a time element to charging. Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us otherwise. The second disputed limitation of claim 4 recites, in pertinent part, “discontinuing the step of charging the battery when the reference period expires.” The Examiner finds the second disputed limitation in paragraph 52 of Hobbs. Ans. 7-8. Appellants argue the cited portion does not show discontinuing charging upon expiration of the reference period. App. Br. 14. A person of ordinary skill would, based on Hobbs monitoring of battery condition, cease charging. Appellants’ argument does not persuade us otherwise. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 14 The third disputed limitation of claim 4 recites, in pertinent part, “repeating steps (b) through (e) [both of claim 1] after the discontinuing step.” The Examiner cites to Hobbs as teaching “repeatedly” determining and comparing the state of charge and continuing to charge until the battery is charged. Ans. 7 (citing Hobbs, Fig. 3, elements 308 and 315). Appellants again assert there is no specific teaching of this limitation. App. Br. 14. Hobbs’ Figure 3 shows feedback loops which repeat based on the state of battery charge. Appellants do not respond to the Examiner’s finding and we are not persuaded to find otherwise. The rejection of claim 4 is sustained. Claim 5 depends on claim 1 and claim 6 depends on claim 5. Appellants make the same arguments for patentability of claim 5 as were made for claim 4. Claim 6 recites the third limitation of claim 4 and Appellants argue the limitation is not present. We have already decided the limitation is taught by the cited prior art. Claim 12 is a system claim dependent on claim 9. Claim 16 is a system claim dependent on rejected claim 14. Claims 12 and 16 mirror the limitations of claim 4. The arguments made are the same as made for claim 4, which were not persuasive. The rejection of claims 5, 6, 12, and 16 is sustained for reasons already stated in connection with claims 1, 14, and 4. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 15 Rejection of Claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Claim 7 depends on claim 1 and tracks claim 2 with the exception of using a “current sensor to determine a magnitude of current drawn by an appliance other than the charger in the circuit.” Claim 2 determines voltage, rather than a current.3 Other than switching current for voltage, claim 7 is all but identical to claim 2. Accordingly, the issue presented is whether a current sensor is taught by the references. Accordingly, the Examiner cites to Amano for teaching a current sensor for indicating a magnitude of current in the circuit. Ans. 8 (citing Amano, ¶ [0010]). Amano, per the Examiner, uses the current sensor to determine a magnitude of current drawn by an appliance other than the charger. Id. Amano also teaches maximum charging (claim 1 step (d)) if the current sensor indicates that no current is being drawn in the circuit by an appliance other than the charger. Id. (citing Amano, ¶¶ [0033]-[0035]). Less than maximum charging (claim 1 step (e)) occurs if the current sensor indicates that current is being drawn in the circuit by an appliance other than the charger. Id. (citing Amano, ¶ [0016]). In connection with the issue presented, Appellants argue neither Hobbs nor Amano teach an instrument for measuring current. App. Br. 18. Amano teaches sensing the “operative condition of said electric load.” Amano, ¶ [0010]. Furthermore, the “current of the electric load is limited” when the supply voltage drops below a predetermined value. Id. We agree with the Examiner that sensing current is taught by Amano, and the other 3 Ohm’s Law, voltage equals current times resistance (V=IR), establishes a direct relationship between voltage and current. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 16 aspects of claim 7 have been previously addressed in our discussion of claims 1 and 3. The rejection of claim 7 is sustained. Rejection of Claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 We agree with Appellants that the rejection to claim 8 does not give adequate notice of the rejection made. The rejection of claim 8 is not sustained. A new ground of rejection is entered. Rejection of Claims 10 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Appellants argue claims 10 and 15 are patentable for the reasons claims 7 and 1 are argued as patentable. App. Br. 19-20. The rejections to claims 7 and 1 have been sustained and the rejection of claim 10 is likewise sustained. NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) We enter the following new ground of rejection: Claims 2, 3, and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Hobbs and Amano. Rejection of Claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The findings of the Examiner as above in connection with the first and second disputed limitations are incorporated herein as though fully set forth. With respect to the third disputed limitation, “performing step (e) [of claim Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 17 1] if the first voltage is not zero,” new grounds for rejection are set out below. Amano teaches determining the battery voltage. Amano, ¶ [0028]. The voltage changes according to the increase in the electric load. Amano, ¶ [0029]-[0030]. “The power supply voltage expecting part 35 expects the voltage drop in accordance with the expectation value of the load current and the battery condition, and the load control commanding part 39 has a task for preventing the voltage drop by limiting beforehand the operation of the load according to need.” Amano, ¶ [0031]. In other words, Amano teaches that, when the supply voltage drops, the charger supplies less current to the load “according to need,” as per the third disputed limitation. Appellants make several other arguments for patentability of claim 2. App. Br. 11. The same or similar arguments were made in connection with claim 1 or claim 9 as already addressed above. Appellants do not draw our attention to any claim language that would cause us to supplement our analysis. For reasons already stated, those arguments are not persuasive. Claim 2 is rejected on the grounds set forth above and the new grounds set forth here. Rejection of Claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The third disputed limitation of claim 3 is performing step (e) [of claim 1] if a voltage difference between the first terminal and the second terminal is greater than a reference voltage difference.” The disputed limitation is taught by Hobbs and Amano as discussed in the new grounds of rejection of claim 2 with the exception of a voltage difference between the Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 18 first and second terminal being greater than “a reference voltage difference.” Claim 2 required the voltage be a value greater than zero as analyzed above. Amano teaches use of a reference voltage (Vb), the terminal voltage of the battery. Amano, ¶ [0028]. For reasons set forth in the rejection of claim 2, Hobbs and Amano teach charging of the battery at less than maximum charge rate based on the voltage difference in the circuit falling below some value greater than zero. The selection of an arbitrary reference voltage in that range is within the level of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Claim 3 is rejected on the grounds set forth above and the new grounds set forth here. Rejection of Claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Claim 8 depends on claim 1 and tracks claim 3 with the exception of periodically determining a “reference state of charge” rather than determining a reference voltage as was recited in claim 3. We begin by construing “reference state of charge.” The Specification states only that the state of charge the battery is determined and, if the battery is not charged above a reference charge, charging continues. Spec. 3, 7-11. Conversely, if the reference charge is exceeded, charging continues. Id. There is no definition of the term provided. We construe state of charge to be the voltage of the battery. Simply stated, claim 8 charges the battery if the voltage is low. Hobbs Figure 3 shows charging a hybrid electric vehicle battery if the battery charge or voltage is low. “If the voltage measurement (from step 308) fits within a defined range of voltages of battery packs or batteries, (as determined for example, in Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 19 decision step 310), then charger 100 may proceed to start charging (step 315) the battery or batteries (e.g., batteries 152).” Hobbs, ¶ [0079]. Claim 8 rejected on the grounds set forth above and the new grounds set forth here. ORDER The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 4-7, and 9-17 is affirmed. We enter a new ground of rejection for claims 2, 3, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. Appeal 2011-000485 Application 11/716,152 20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) rwk Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation