Ex Parte Fuks et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 7, 2017

12623170 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 7, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/623,170 11/20/2009 Adam Fuks 81389069US01 5788
65913 7590 03/09/2017
Intellectual Property and Licensing
NXPB.V.
411 East Plumeria Drive, MS41
SAN JOSE, CA 95134
EXAMINER
HUISMAN, DAVID J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2183
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/09/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip. department .u s @ nxp. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ADAM FUKS and ROB COSARO
Appeal 2016-007467
Application 12/623,1701
Technology Center 2100
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejections
of claims 1, 6—15, 17—23, 25, and 26. Claims 2—5, 16, and 24 are objected to
as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if
rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base
claim and any intervening claims. Final Act. 13. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify NXP B.V. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2016-007467
Application 12/623,170
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed “to real time control
systems and event processing unit architecture.” Spec. 11.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A microprocessor configured to handle events, the
microprocessor comprising:
a pattern detector, comprising a plurality of bit slices, that
is configured to monitor a plurality of external inputs for
occurrence of at least one triggering event from a plurality of
triggering events, wherein each bit slice of the plurality of bit
slices monitors a single input of the plurality of external inputs
for a triggering event from the plurality of triggering events;
a memory, comprising an instruction store, that is
configured to maintain a list of instructions for the
microprocessor to retrieve;
a state machine and operation code interpreter (SMOI) that
is configured to retrieve and execute at least one instruction from
the instruction store; and
a clock that is configured to enable SMOI execution of a
series of instructions, wherein the clock stops and halts further
SMOI execution when the SMOI executes a halting command,
and the clock restarts and resumes further SMOI execution when
the clock receives a logical output from the pattern detector,
wherein the SMOI is powered down until triggered to restart by
the logical output from the pattern detector.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
Belt US 6,193,422 B1 Feb. 27,2001
George US 6,779,122 B2 Aug. 17,2004
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Application 12/623,170
REJECTIONS2
Claims 1, 6—11, 13, 14, 17—21, 25, and 26 stand rejected under Pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over George. Final Act. 7—
10.
Claim 12 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over George, either alone, or in view of Belt. Final Act. 10-11
Claims 15 and 22 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over George in view of Official Notice. Final Act. 11—
12.
Claim 23 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over George, Belt, and Official Notice. Final Act. 12—13.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments regarding claims 1, 6—15,
17—23, 25, and 26, and we incorporate herein and adopt as our own: (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken (Final Act. 7—13; Adv. Act. 2), and (2) the reasons and
rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’
arguments (Ans. 4—8). We incorporate such findings, reasons, and rebuttals
2 In addition to the grounds of rejection set forth below, the Examiner also
rejected various claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs.
Those rejections were withdrawn in the Answer. Ans. 2-4.
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Application 12/623,170
herein by reference unless otherwise noted. However, we highlight and
address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows.
Claims 1, 6—10, 13, 14, 17—21, 25, and 26
Appellants argue the Examiner stated that George “does not explicitly
discuss a pattern detector but takes Official Notice.” App. Br. 9. Appellants
argue because George teaches using “a long latency instruction having a
fixed time period to ‘enter and exit a sleep mode, the reliance on Official
Notice is improper and erroneous. Id.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue the Examiner’s reliance on
George column 5, lines 64—67 in the Final Action for the pattern detector
was erroneous because it is not part of the background section otherwise
relied on by the Examiner. Reply Br. 2.
The Examiner finds George teaches all of the limitations except for
the pattern detector in the background section. Final Act. 7—8; Ans. 4—5.
The Examiner further finds George, when discussing the implementation of
the invention, teaches the pattern detector recited in claim 1 of the instant
application. Final Act. 9 (citing George 5:64—67); Ans. 5—7. The Examiner
further finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified
the product described in the background of George with the pattern detector
taught at George column 5, lines 64—67. Final Act. 9; Ans. 5—7.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner
erred. First, contrary to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner did not take
Official Notice.
Second, Appellants do not address the grounds relied on by the
Examiner in the Appeal Brief. That is, although Appellants discuss the use
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Application 12/623,170
of long latency instruction to restart the IFU (Instruction Fetch Unit),
Appellants do not address the Examiner’s reliance on George’s discussion of
various functions, such as “a) an interrupt, b) a timer timing out, or c) a
signal from a device external to the processor” for restarting the processor
clock. Compare App. Br. 9—10 (citing George 3:55—56), with Final Act. 8
(citing George 5:64—67).
Third, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument in the Reply
Brief that the Examiner erred in relying on George column 5, lines 64—67.
Because Appellants did not raise that argument in their opening brief and
good cause has not been shown why it should be considered, we will not
consider this argument. 37 C.F.R. §41.41(b)(2); Ex parte Borden, 93
USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (Informative) (“[T]he reply brief [is not]
an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made in the
principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner’s rejections, but were not.”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, along
with the rejections of claims 10 and 19, which are argued on the same
grounds (App. Br. 10), and claims 6—9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, and 26,
which are not argued separately (App. Br. 12).
Claim 11
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11 for
substantially the same reason as set forth above regarding claim 1. App. Br.
11. That is, just as for claim 1, Appellants argue George relies on long
latency instructions and not a pattern detector. Id. For the same reasons
discussed above regarding claim 1, we are not persuaded by Appellants’
argument that the Examiner erred.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11.
Claims 12, 13, and 22
With respect to dependent claims 12, 13, and 22, Appellants merely
contend because the claims depend from an allowable base claim, the
rejections of the claims should be withdrawn. App. Br. 13—14. Because we
determine that the rejection of the base claims (10 and 19) is not erroneous
for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the rejections of these claims.
Claim 23
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in relying on Official Notice that
“looking up interrupt routine addresses in an IVT is well known” because
George “uses a fixed time period to ‘enter and exit a sleep mode.’” App. Br.
15.
The Examiner finds “that looking up interrupt routine addresses in an
interrupt vector table (i.e., IVT) is well known and accepted in the art” and,
therefore, takes Official Notice. Final Act. 12. The Examiner further finds a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified George based on the
Official Notice. Final Act. 12—13.
Our reviewing court has held that an Appellant adequately traverses a
finding of Official Notice where the appellant’s argument “contain[s]
adequate information or argument” to create on its face “a reasonable doubt
regarding the circumstances justifying the . . . notice” of what is well known
to an ordinarily skilled artisan. In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971).
Appellants have not stated why the Official Notice is not common
knowledge or well-known in the art. Appellants’ argument that it is not
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disclosed in a single prior art reference is not sufficient to show that the
Examiner erred in taking Official Notice.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decisions rejecting
claims 1, 6—15, 17—23, 25, and 26.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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