Ex Parte Farnworth et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 15, 2013

11888122 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 15, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/888,122 07/31/2007 Warren Farnworth MICS:0237 / POW /
2007-00
3693
52142 7590 11/18/2013
FLETCHER YODER (MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.)
P.O. BOX 692289
HOUSTON, TX 77269-2289
EXAMINER
JONES, ERIC W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2892
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/18/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte WARREN FARNWORTH and KYLE KIRBY
____________________

Appeal 2011-007579
Application 11/888,122
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before DEBORAH KATZ, JOHN G. NEW, and HUNG H. BUI,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3-22 and 24.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.3

1 The Real Party of Interest is Micron Technology, Inc. App. Br. 2.
2 Claims 2 and 23 have been cancelled and are not on appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to a system and method of using a
protective layer to provide features of a semiconductor device. Spec.,
¶¶ [0001], [0016], and Abstract.
Claims on Appeal
Claims 1, 5, 19 and 22 are the independent claims on appeal. Claims
1 and 22 are illustrative of Appellants’ invention and are reproduced below
with disputed limitations emphasized as follows:
1. A method comprising:
forming a via through one or more layers;
disposing a protective layer on a top surface of the one or
more layers such that the protective layer covers the via;
removing a portion of the protective layer covering the
via;
filling the via subsequent to removing the portion; and
removing the protective layer subsequent to filling the
via.

22. A structure, comprising:
a substrate comprising a plurality of features formed in
and on the substrate, wherein the plurality of features include at
least one via; and
a protective layer disposed over the features such that the
via is sealed by the protective layer.

3 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed August 13, 2010
(“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed January 5, 2011 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s
Answer mailed November 15, 2010 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed
March 23, 2010 (“Final Rej.”); and the original Specification filed July 31,
2007 (“Spec.”).
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Evidence Considered
Gilleo US 2004/0056345 A1 Mar. 25, 2004
Babich et al. (Babich) US 6,815,329 B2 Nov. 9, 2004
Ishino US 6,866,972 B2 Mar. 15, 2005
Akram et al. (Akram) US 2006/0043599 A1 Mar. 2, 2006
Larson US 2006/0160274 A1 Jul. 20, 2006

Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 22 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Babich. Ans. 3-4.
(2) Claims 1, 2, 5-10 and 14-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Akram. Ans. 4-7.
(3) Claims 3, 4, 11, 12 and 19-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Akram and Gilleo. Ans. 8-10.
(4) Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Akram and Larson. Ans. 10.

Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellants’ arguments, the dispositive issues on appeal are:
(1) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 22 and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Babich. In particular, the issue
turns on whether Babich discloses “a plurality of features . . . include at
least one via” and “a protective layer disposed over the features such that the
via is sealed by the protective layer,” as recited in Appellants’ claim 22, and
“an insulation layer coats the via,” as recited in Appellants’ claim 24. App.
Br. 5-9; Reply Br. 2-4.
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(2) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 5-10 and
14-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Akram. App. Br.
9-14

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’
conclusion. The Examiner has provided a response, supported by sufficient
evidence, to each of the contentions raised by Appellants. We highlight and
address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows.

§ 102(b) Rejection of Claims 22 and 24
Appellants acknowledge Babich discloses a structure, shown in FIG.
7, comprising a substrate 110 having features and at least one via 450; and a
protective layer 480 disposed over the features such that the via is sealed by
the protective layer 480. App. Br. 6-9 (citing Babich, col. 4, ll. 20-26; col. 6,
ll. 62-64; col. 8, ll. 1-12; col. 9, ll. 4-55; FIG. 6G and FIG. 7). Nevertheless,
Appellants contend Babich does not disclose two disputed limitations: (1) “a
plurality of features … include at least one via” and “a protective layer
disposed over the features such that the via is sealed by the protective
layer,” as recited in Appellants’ claim 22, and (2) “an insulation layer coats
the via,” as recited in Appellants’ claim 24. App. Br. 5-9; Reply Br. 2-4.
In particular, Appellants argue that the via cavity 450, shown in FIG.
7 of Babich, is filled with conductive wiring material 470 prior to deposition
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of the bridge layer 480 and, as such, the via cavity 450 cannot be sealed by
the bridge layer 480. App. Br. 6-7.
FIG. 7 of Babich is reproduced below.

FIG. 7 of Babich shows a structure including a cavity 450 filled with
conductive wiring material 470 and a bridge layer 480 to encapsulate the
structure including the cavity 450.

According to Appellants, “one of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that filling the via cavity 450 with the conductive wiring material
470 [as disclosed by Babich] prevents the via cavity 450 from being ‘sealed’
by the bridge layer 480.” Id. at 7. In contrast to Babich, Appellants’
claimed “via . . . sealed by the protective layer” refers to sealing an unfilled
via, as would be understood based on FIG. 7 of Appellants’ Specification.
Id. citing (Appellants’ Spec., ¶ [0027]) (emphasis added). In other words,
the bridge layer 480 of Babich does not seal the via in the manner that “the
via is sealed by the protective layer,” as recited in Appellants’ claim 22, and
likewise, does not coat the via cavity 450 in the manner that “[sic] insulation
layer coats the via” as recited in Appellants’ claim 24. Id.
We disagree with Appellants. First, Appellants do not adduce because
the via cavity 450, shown in FIG. 6G and FIG. 7 of Babich, is filled with
conductive wiring material 470, the via cavity 450 cannot be “sealed” by the
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bridge layer 480, as claimed. For example, the structure of FIG. 7 of
Babich, including a via cavity 450 filled with conductive wiring material
470 is capped with a bridge layer 480 which, in turn, is formed by one or
more insulating layers, shown as 480 and 490 in FIG. 6K and FIG. 6H.
Babich, col. 7, ll. 21-26. Second, ¶ [0027] of Appellants’ Specification
does not describe any sealing of an unfilled via, as asserted by Appellants.
Instead, FIG. 7 of Appellants’ Specification simply shows protective layer
90 disposed over the topography of substrate 40, including via cavity 80, but
via cavity 80 is already described as being filled with conductive material in
connection with FIG. 5 and FIG. 6. Appellants’ Spec., ¶¶ [0025]-[0026].
Moreover, FIG. 9 of Appellants’ Specification shows a via cavity 80 filled
with fill material 100.
As recognized by Appellants, claim terms are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Am. Acad.
of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369, (Fed. Cir. 2004). However,
interpreting a claim term in view of Appellants’ Specification does not mean
interpreting (or misinterpreting) that very claim term in view of a selective
embodiment, to the exclusion of the Specification’s other embodiments .
Rather, such claim terms are “given their ordinary and customary meaning”
as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
In the instant appeal, the Examiner has interpreted Appellants’
claimed “via [as] sealed by the protective layer” as encompassing a bridge
(protective) layer 480 that encapsulates or covers the structure including the
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top of via cavity 450, as described in connection with FIG. 6K and FIG. 7 of
Babich. Ans. 11 (citing Babich, col. 4, ll. 20-26; col. 6, ll. 62-64). The
Examiner has also interpreted Appellants’ claimed “insulator layer [that]
coats the via” as encompassing sidewall spacers 440 and 500 that coat the
via cavity 450 as described in connection with FIG. 6F and FIG. 7 of
Babich. Ans. 4, 12 (citing Babich, col. 8, ll. 1-12; col. 9, ll. 40-55).
We find the Examiner’s interpretation of the disputed limitations
reasonable and consistent with Appellants’ Specification. We also decline to
read any particular embodiment (FIG. 7) disclosed in Appellants’
Specification into the claim, particularly, when the scope of Appellants’
claims 22 and 24 is much broader than any particular embodiment in
Appellants’ Specification. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants have not persuaded us of
any prejudicial error in the Examiner’s claim interpretation and the
anticipation rejection of claims 22 and 24. Accordingly, we will sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 22 and 24.4

4 In the event of further prosecution, claim 24 should be re-evaluated and
corrected for §112 purposes. For example, there is no antecedent basis for
the term “the protective coating.” In addition, claim 24 is also unclear as to
which element of “the protective coating,” i.e., a polymer and a [sic]
insulation layer coats the via.
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§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1, 5-10 and 14-18 based on Akram
With respect to independent claims 1 and 5, the Examiner finds
Akram discloses a method for forming a structure, as shown in FIG. 9-28,
comprising:
forming a via (1300 in FIGS. 9-13; ¶ [0051]) through one
or more layers (910, 920 and 930 in FIG. 9); disposing a
protective layer (polyimide 1400/resist 1500 in FIGS. 14-15;
¶ [0051]-[0052]) on a top surface of the one or more layers;
filling the via (FIGS. 18-22; ¶ [0052]-[0053]); and removing
the protective layer (1400/1500 in FIGS. 21-22; ¶ [0053]).

Ans. 5.
The Examiner acknowledges Akram fails to disclose that “the
protective layer covers the via; removing a portion of the protective layer
covering the via; filing the via subsequent to removing the portion [of the
protective layer covering the via]” and “removing the protective layer
subsequent to filing the via.” Id. Nevertheless, the Examiner concludes
that:
[I]t would have been obvious that the protective layer
(1400/1500) of Akram et al would have been spin-coated to
cover the via (1300) and exposed, and then patterned by
removing a portion of the protective layer covering the via prior
to filling the via (i.e., filing the via subsequent to the removing
the portion). Id.

Appellants raise several arguments against the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection. First, Appellants argue that, in order to establish a
prima facie case of obviousness, all of the claim limitations must be taught
or suggested by the prior art. In re Royka, 180 U.S.P.Q. 580 (C.C.P.A.
1974). According to Appellants, “Akram merely discloses application of a
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polyimide coat 1400 on either side of an etched away portion of layers 910,
920, and 930.” Ans. 11 citing (Akram, ¶[0051]; FIG. 13 and FIG. 14).
Second, Appellants argue that item 1300, shown in FIG. 13 of Akram, refers
to “the top layer 1300 of the silicon substrate 900” and does not correspond
to Appellants’ claimed “via”. Id. Third, Appellants argue there is no reason
to dispose the polyimide coat 1400 and resist coat 1500, which the Examiner
alleges as Appellants’ claimed “protective layer,” over the via 1600 because,
according to Akram, the via 1600 is not even formed until after the
polyimide coat 1400 and resist coat 1500 are added. Id. at 13. According to
Appellants, Akram does not disclose or suggest disposing any protective
layer over a via in a substrate, and, consequently, removing any portion of
the protective layer to access an existing via, as recited in Appellants’
independent claims 1 and 5. Id. Fourth, Appellants also argue Akram
teaches away from Appellants’ claimed invention. Id. 14. According to
Appellants, Akram discloses stripping the polyimide layer 1400 and resist
coat 1500 prior to filling the via 1600, whereas Appellants’ claimed
“protective layer” is opened over the via but the remainder of the protective
layer stays in place to provide protection while the via is filled. Id. citing
(Akram, ¶ [0053]; FIGS. 20-22 and Appellants’ Spec.,¶ [0028]).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. As an initial matter,
we note that the item 1300, shown in FIG. 13 of Akram, is also an opening
in which a via 1600 is formed, as shown in FIG. 16, and, as such, can also be
considered as Appellants’ claimed “via.” Second, “it is well-settled that all
elements of a prior art reference need not read on the claimed invention;
rather, the proper test for obviousness is what the combined teachings would
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have suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Kotzab, 217
F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In an obviousness analysis, it is not
necessary to find precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter
claimed because inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would employ can be taken into account. See KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). In this regard, “[a] person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Id.
at 421. Here, the Examiner’s factual findings regarding Akram, such as:
forming a via, disposing a protective layer, filling the via and removing the
protective layer, are not disputed by Appellants. Id. 5. What Akram does
not disclose are: “the protective layer covers the via; removing a portion of
the protective layer covering the via; filing the via subsequent to removing
the portion [of the protective layer covering the via]” and “removing the
protective layer subsequent to filing the via,” as correctly found by the
Examiner. Id. However, these steps, including filling the via using the
protective layer and then removing the protective layer subsequent to filling
the via, would have been obvious to one skilled in the art during the normal
course of semiconductor manufacturing to yield Appellants’ claimed
invention, as found by the Examiner. Id. We agree. In considering Akram,
“it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the references
but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
expected to draw therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
In this regard, it is reasonable that one skilled in the art looking at Akram
would draw an inference that, if a via were to be formed on a substrate, as
shown in FIG. 16 of Akram, and filled with conductive material (solder), as
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shown in FIG. 22 of Akram, a protective layer, i.e., photo resist layer 2150
shown in FIG. 21, would be used to ensure that the conductive material is
filled only within the via. For example, the protective layer could be
disposed on the entire surface of the substrate including a via and then the
via could be filled after removing (etching) a portion of the protective layer
over the via, as described in connection with FIG. 21 of Akram. See Akram,
¶ [0053].
In our view, the invention of Appellants’ independent claims 1 and 5
is nothing more than a simple arrangement of known steps - the basic tools
of semiconductor process, yielding no more than one would expect from
such an arrangement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406. The skilled artisan should
be able to use the protective layer, and pattern the same by removing a
portion of the protective layer cover the via prior to filling the via, and then
removing the protective layer subsequent to filling the via since the skilled
artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Id. at 420-21.
In addition, Appellants have not presented any evidence or arguments
to persuade us that Akram would disparage or otherwise discourage one of
ordinary skill in the art from the path described in the subject matter of
Appellant’s claimed invention. Thus, we do not find that Akram teaches
away from the claimed invention. Rather, we find the teachings of Akram
consistent with Appellants’ Specification and consistent with the level of
one skilled in the art.
For the reasons set forth above, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of Appellants’ independent claims 1 and 5. Claims
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6-10 and 14-18 depend on independent claim 5. We also sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 6-10 and 14-18 for the same reasons.
With respect to dependent claims 3, 4, 11, 12 and 19-21, Appellants
reiterate the same patentability arguments. App. Br. 15-18. We are not
persuaded and adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings regarding Akram
and Gilleo and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer.
For the same reasons discussed, we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claims 3, 4, 11, 12, and 19-21.
With respect to dependent claim 13, Appellants present no separate
patentability arguments. For the same reasons discussed, we also sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 13.

CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude that the Examiner has not erred
in rejecting: (1) claims 22 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Babich; (2) claims 1, 2, 5-10, and 14-18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Akram; (3) claims 3, 4, 11, 12, and 19-
21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Akram and Gilleo;
and (4) claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Akram and Larson.

DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejections of claims 1,
3-22, and 24.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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