Ex Parte Etchegoyen et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 22, 2016

13734175 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 22, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/734, 175
96051 7590
Uniloc USA Inc.
Legacy Town Center
7160 Dallas Parkway
Suite 380
Plano, TX 75024
01/04/2013
11/25/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Craig S. ETCHEGOYEN
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
UN-NP-SC-083 1018
EXAMINER
LAGOR, ALEXANDER
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/25/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
sean. burdick@unilocusa.com
tkiatkulpiboone@unilocusa.com
kris.pangan@unilocusa.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CRAIG S. ETCHEGOYEN,
DONO HARJANTO, and SEAN D. BURDICK
Appeal2015-007726
Application 13/734,175 1
Technology Center 2400
Before HUNG H. BUI, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-5. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2
1 The Appeal Brief identifies Uniloc Luxembourg S.A. as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellants' Appeal Brief, filed March 9, 2015
("App. Br."); Appellants' Reply Brief, filed August 21, 2015 ("Reply Br.");
Examiner's Answer, mailed June 29, 2015 ("Ans."); Final Office Action,
mailed September 8, 2014 ("Final Act."); and Appellants' Specification,
filed January 4, 2013 ("Spec.").
Appeal2015-007726
Application 13/734,175
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention relates to "a method and system for
implementing zone-restricted behavior of a computing device." Spec. i-f 2.
Claims 1 and 3 are independent claims. Claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. A method for implementing zone-restricted behavior of a
computing device, the method comprising:
identifying wireless access points using the computing
device;
determining, by the computing device, a number of
authorized wireless access points from the identified wireless
access points by receiving digital fingerprints of the identified
wireless access points and comparing each of the received digital
fingerprints to digital fingerprints of authorized wireless access
points;
determining that the computing device is located within a
restricted access zone when the number of authorized wireless
access points accessible by the computing device from a fixed
location exceeds a predetermined threshold of authorized
wireless access points; and
enabling a zone mode of the computing device when the
computing device is determined to be located within the
restricted access zone.
Nguy en et al.
Bradley
References
US 2008/0076572 Al
US 2011/0090896 Al
Examiner's Rejection
Mar. 27, 2008
Apr. 21, 2011
Claims 1-5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Nguyen and Bradley. Final Act. 14--21.
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ANALYSIS
Claims 1 and 5
Appellants contend Nguyen does not teach "identifying wireless
access points using the computing device," as recited in claim 1. App. Br.
6-7; Reply Br. 2--4. According to Appellants, "Nguyen's methods operate
based upon mobile device detection of wireless access points by mobile
gaming devices, but not by identifying the wireless access points." App.
Br. 7. Appellants cite dictionary definitions of "identify" and "identity" and
argue that the identifying step requires the computing device to uniquely
identify wireless access points and differentiate among individual wireless
access points. App. Br. 7.
In response, the Examiner finds Nguyen's disclosure of distinguishing
wireless access points that are associated with a first zone versus a second
zone based on different types of heartbeats emitted by the access points
teaches "identifying" within the meaning of claim 1. Ans. l 0-11 (citing
Nguyen i-f 12). Nguyen discloses:
At a basic level, areas where mobile wager gaming is allowed,
for example casino floors, nightclubs, and bars, have an
underlying zone which has transmitters or antennas that transmit
a security signal to the gaming device which allows the device to
execute game play. As long as the device is in that zone it will
hear the beacon or heartbeat from the transmitter and allow game
play. If the device is taken to an area where wagering games are
not allowed, for example, a video arcade, a hotel room, a family-
style restaurant, the underlying zone may have transmitters that
send a different type of heartbeat that tells the device that
wagering game play is not allowed while other services are
allowed, such as non-wager game play, concierge services,
viewing restaurant menus and video entertainment, and the like.
Nguyen i-f 12 (emphasis added).
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Application 13/734,175
We agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the term "identifying wireless access points" recited in
Appellants' claim 1 encompasses distinguishing access points based on
types of signals as disclosed by Nguyen. Appellants cite various passages of
the specification in an attempt to support their interpretation of
"identifying." Reply Br. 2-3. For example, Appellants argue: "To
determine location, the disclosure states that the 'computing device utilizes
the wireless access point identifiers to identifY the authorized wireless access
points.['] (Emphasis added.) See i-f 11." Reply Br. 2. However, Appellants
omit the preceding sentence, which provides context for the cited disclosure:
It is particularly challenging to distinguish between a
computing device just inside a restricted access zone and one just
outside the restricted access zone, both of which are connected
to a local area network wirelessly. To make this distinction, each
of one or more authorized wireless access points within the
restricted access zone transmits wireless access point identifiers.
The computing device utilizes the wireless access point
identifiers to identify the authorized wireless access points.
Spec. i-f 9. 3 Thus, this instance of identifying is concerned with
distinguishing access points associated with different zones, which is what
the Examiner finds Nguyen teaches. Therefore, this instance of
"identifying" in Appellants' Specification does not distinguish the claimed
"identifying" step from the disclosure ofNguyen.
Appellants also point to their Specification's disclosure regarding a
"digital fingerprint" as a unique identifier of a wireless access point. Reply
Br. 3 (citing Spec. i-f 40). However, "digital fingerprints" are explicitly
3 It appears Appellants use paragraph numbers from the published
application. Our Decision refers to the paragraph numbers in the application
as filed.
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recited only in the second step of claim 1, which is directed to
"determining ... a number of authorized wireless access points." Claim 1
does not recite that the "identifying" step must use "digital fingerprints."
Moreover, as we discuss below, the Examiner relies on Bradley to teach
"digital fingerprints," and, therefore, Appellants' arguments that Nguyen
does not teach such identifiers are not responsive to the Examiner's findings.
See Final Act. 15-16.
Appellants further contend Nguyen does not teach "determining ... a
number of authorized wireless access points from the identified wireless
access points," as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 4--5.
According to Appellants, "Nguyen provides no teaching or suggestion that
the mobile device should distinguish authorized transmitters from
unauthorized transmitters." App. Br. 8, 9.
We disagree. As the Examiner explains, Nguyen discloses
transmitters that emit different types of heartbeats that enable the device to
unlock certain functionality depending on the heartbeat received. Ans. 11-
12 (citing Nguyen i-f 12). The Examiner further explains that "if a guest
takes the wagering device to an area with 'transmitters that send a different
type of heartbeat' (i.e. unauthorized transmitters for the purposes of
permitting wagering game play), the device restricts game play." Ans. 11
(citing Nguyen i-f 12). Nguyen discloses: "If the device is taken to an area
where wagering games are not allowed ... the underlying zone may have
transmitters that send a different type of heartbeat that tells the device that
wagering game play is not allowed while other services are allowed .... "
Nguyen i-f 12. We agree with the Examiner that this disclosure of Nguyen
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teaches distinguishing authorized transmitters from unauthorized
transmitters.
Appellants also contend Nguyen does not teach or suggest
"determining that the computing device is located within a restricted access
zone when the number of authorized wireless access points accessible by the
computing device from a fixed location exceeds a predetermined threshold
of authorized wireless access points." App. Br. 10-11. We are not
persuaded. Claim 1 does not recite what the threshold number is that must
be met in order to determine that the device is in a restricted access zone.
Therefore, determining that the device is in a restricted access zone when
only one authorized wireless access device is accessible from a fixed
location is within the scope of this "determining" step. See Final Act. 7
("Since it merely is a number, the number by itself could be a single
device."). Nguyen discloses determining that the mobile gaming device is in
a restricted access zone if only one authorized transmitter is accessible to it.
See Nguyen i-f 12 ("As long as the device is in that zone it will hear the
beacon or heartbeat from the transmitter and allow game play."). Thus, we
disagree with Appellants' contention.
Appellants still further contend Bradley does not teach or suggest a
computing device "receiving digital fingerprints of the identified wireless
access points and comparing each of the received digital fingerprints to
digital fingerprints of authorized wireless access points." App. Br. 11-12.
Appellants argue "the UUIDs [universally unique identifiers] that are
broadcast by Bradley's participant access points are received only by the
other participant access points, and not by any computing devices," and,
therefore, "there is no teaching or suggestion in Bradley that a computing
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device (or an access point) receive UUIDs and compare them to authorized
UUIDs." App. Br. 12.
We are not persuaded by these arguments because the Examiner relies
on Bradley's disclosure of unique identifiers for access points in
combination with Nguyen's disclosure of the mobile gaming device's
detecting and identifying wireless access points based on different signals
received, as discussed above. The Examiner finds that "Nguyen already
discloses the use of 'heart beats' to differentiate between different zones"
and explains that "it would be even more efficient to use fingerprints of
[Bradley] that identif[y] the wireless access points to permit a more fine
grained access control of the devices." Ans. 15. We find this to be
articulated reasoning with rational underpinning underlying the conclusion
of obviousness, and we find this reasoning to be supported by the evidence
of record. For example, Nguyen identifies the need for zone differentiation
(i-f 72) and describes that areas of a casino may be changed even temporarily
to restrict or allow certain mobile device activity (i-f 49). Nguyen describes
that further granularity may be beneficial to allow different classes of
wagering games. See Nguyen i153 ("In some implementations, the type of
wagering game play allowed (e.g., Class II or Class III) is based on the zone
in which the mobile device is located."). Nguyen still further describes:
[A] "customized" functionality level can be created for a
weekend poker event where participants can only play a new
variation of poker and can only order certain food and drinks
from a vendor sponsoring the event. As can be seen, there can
be dozens of pre-defined and ad hoc levels of functionality
defined in the mobile gaming network of the present invention.
Nguyen i153. Thus, Nguyen's disclosure of the benefits of various levels of
zone differentiation supports the Examiner's determination that a person of
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ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to incorporate digital
fingerprints, such as the unique identifiers in Bradley, into the system of
Nguyen to facilitate more granular access control and greater zone
differentiation.
Based on the foregoing, Appellants' arguments that there would have
been no reason to combine the teachings of Nguyen and Bradley are not
persuasive. See App. Br. 13-14; Reply Br. 6. Appellants argue that Bradley
"is directed to synchronizing data in a network" and "the Examiner has not
explained how or why a skilled artisan would modify Nguyen's system of
beacon signals to synchronize wireless access control settings, much less
how such modification would require an exchange ofUUID amongst the
various access points." Reply Br. 6. However, as discussed above, the
Examiner's rejection is based on Bradley's disclosure of unique identifiers
(digital fingerprints), not on Bradley's disclosure of data synchronization.
We further disagree with Appellants' contention that the UUID in
Bradley is not sufficiently unique to be a digital fingerprint. Reply Br. 5.
Bradley discloses:
The use of UUIDs may enable a network such as network 11 to
uniquely identify multiple access points without central
coordination and without needing to resolve name conflicts. For
example, the participant ID may be converted to a participant
UUID using a name-based hash function. The hash function may
be a function of an access point's media access control (MAC)
address, serial number, and any other data that uniquely
identifies the access point.
Bradley i-f 45 (cited at Final Act. 16). This description is consistent with
Appellants' Specification, which states that "a digital fingerprint is a unique
identifiers [sic] of an individual computing device that is derived from data
stored on the device that identifies individual components of hardware or
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software or the system configuration of the device." Spec. if 41. The
Specification further states that the device fingerprint can be generated by
"hashing" device-specific data, such as "serial numbers." See id. iii! 42--43.
We find the Examiner's conclusion of obviousness to be consistent
with the Supreme Court's guidance that "if a technique has been used to
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize
that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is
obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." KSR Int 'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); see also id. at 416 ("The
combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results."). Appellants
have not presented evidence sufficient to show that combining the prior art
was "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" or
"represented an unobvious step over the prior art." Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550
U.S. at 418-19). Nor have Appellants presented evidence that any of their
incorporations of known limitations yielded more than expected results.
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding the subject
matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Nguyen
and Bradley. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a), as well as the rejection of claim 5, for which Appellants present no
additional argument. See App. Br. 19.
Claim 2
Appellants' contentions with respect to claim 2 also do not persuade
us the Examiner erred in concluding the subject matter would have been
obvious. See App. Br. 14--16. Referring to paragraph 18 of Nguyen,
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Appellants acknowledge "Nguyen discloses a security signal emanating from
a gaming server which signal contains information in the form of an ID of
the mobile device," but they argue "the security signal does not emanate
from an access point, contains no information about an access point, and
does not result in (nor in any way facilitate) identification and authorization
of an access point to a gaming device." App. Br. 15. This argument,
however, does not address the disclosure of paragraph 60 of Nguyen, which
the Examiner also relied upon to reject claim 2. See Final Act. 17-18 (citing
Nguyen i-fi-f 12, 15, 18, 60).
Nguyen discloses:
In a preferred embodiment, NFM communication is used to
transmit a security signal originating from a network component,
such as a mobile gaming server, to a mobile gaming device. As
described in greater detail below, NFM signals emanate from
antennas in a zone and are received by a mobile gaming device
that is within two meters of the antenna.
Nguyen i160 (emphasis added). In the Answer, the Examiner explains, and
we agree, that based on this disclosure, "Nguyen teaches how a security
signal that originates from a mobile gaming server is received by a mobile
gaming device from antennas (as depicted in Fig. 3)." Ans. 16. Because
Nguyen teaches a signal being relayed through an antenna ("access point"),
Appellants' contention that "the security signal does not emanate from an
access point" is incorrect. See App. Br. 15.
Furthermore, as discussed above with respect to claim 1, Nguyen
teaches identifying authorized access points based on signals ("heartbeats")
received from transmitters. See, e.g., Nguyen i-f 12. Therefore, we disagree
with Appellants' contention that "the security signal ... contains no
information about an access point, and does not result in (nor in any way
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facilitate) identification and authorization of an access point to a gaming
device." See App. Br. 15.
We are also unpersuaded by Appellants' contention that "neither
Nguyen alone nor Nguyen in combination with Bradley teaches the latter part
of this claim 2 element, that of 'receiving verification from the restricted
access server."' App. Br. 16. The Examiner has shown that Nguyen teaches
signals originating from a gaming server going through antennas or
transmitters to a gaming device, resulting in the gaming device's
determination that gaming is or is not allowed in a particular zone. See Final
Act. 17-18 (citing Nguyen i-fi-f 12, 15, 18, 60); Ans. 15-16; see also
discussion of claim 1 above.
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding the subject
matter of claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Nguyen
and Bradley. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
Claim 3
With respect to independent claim 3, Appellants argue "[n]either
Nguyen alone nor Nguyen in combination with Bradley teaches the use of
signal strength received from identified and authorized wireless access
points." App. Br. 17. Claim 3, however, recites no such limitation. Rather,
claim 3 requires "detecting signal strength of each of a number of wireless
access points." We agree with the Examiner that Nguyen teaches this
limitation. See Final Act. 18 (citing i1 61 ("The signal strength attenuates or
falls off at a ratio of 1/r(6) as the distance from an antenna increases .... ")).
Appellants also advance arguments similar to those for claim 1 that
there would have been no reason to combine the teachings of Nguyen and
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Bradley because Bradley teaches identifying access points to one another,
not to a computing device. See App. Br. 17-18. As we explain above with
respect to claim 1, the Examiner relies on Bradley's disclosure of unique
identifiers for access points in combination with Nguyen's disclosure of the
mobile gaming device's detecting wireless access points. See Final Act. 18-
20. For the reasons explained with respect to claim 1, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred in combining the teachings of Nguyen and Bradley.
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding the subject
matter of independent claim 3 would have been obvious over the
combination of Nguyen and Bradley. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of
claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Claim 4
Claim 4 depends from claim 1 and recites "identifying only wireless
access points which have a signal strength greater than a predetermined
signal strength threshold." Appellants argue "[t]here is no teaching or
suggestion in Nguy en that the identification of wireless access points by the
computing device be restricted based on signal strength." App. Br. 19. We
disagree. Nguyen describes that signals from access points become
attenuated as distance from the access point increases such that, at certain
distances, the signal strength is such that the access point cannot be
identified. Nguyen discloses:
The signal strength attenuates or falls off at a ratio of 1/r(6) as
the distance from an antenna increases, as represented by the
circular lines emanating from the end of the antennas shown in
FIG. 3. An outer line 320 shows where the signal becomes too
weak to be detectable for most practical applications. For
example, at three meters, the strength of a NFM signal is 0.14%
of the original signal strength.
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Nguy en if 61 ; Ans. 13 (quoting Nguy en if 61 but mislabeling it as if 60).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Nguyen teaches or suggests a
predetermined signal strength threshold beyond which wireless access points
will not be identified (e.g., the signal strength at outer line 320).
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding the subject
matter of dependent claim 4 would have been obvious over the combination
of Nguyen and Bradley. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 4 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-5.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIR1\1ED
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