Ex Parte Dawson et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 7, 2018

12636668 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/636,668 12/11/2009
79980 7590 11/09/2018
Keohane & D'Alessandro
1881 Western Avenue Suite 180
Albany, NY 12203
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Christopher J. Dawson
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
END920090106US 1 1799
EXAMINER
CIVAN,ETHAND
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3684
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/09/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
drubbone@kdiplaw.com
Docket@Kdiplaw.com
lcronk@kdiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPHER J. DAWSON, VINCENZO V. DILUOFFO,
MICHAEL D. KENDZIERSKI, and JAMES W. SEAMAN
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, WSTIN BUSCH, and STEVEN M.
AMUNDSON
KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1, 3-5, 7, 8, 10-12, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, and 22,
which are all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction
over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claim 1 is exemplary and illustrative of the invention and reads as
follows:
1. A method for brokering Cloud services across a network of a Cloud
computing environment, comprising:
receiving, via at least one computing device, a request for Cloud
resources of a Cloud service from an endpoint computing device, wherein
the endpoint computing device initiates the request to a broker residing in
the network of the cloud computing environment;
identifying, via at least one computing device, a set of Cloud service
providers capable of providing the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud
service based upon criteria established by the user, the criteria comprising a
desired price for obtaining the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud
service, and wherein the set of Cloud service providers capable of providing
the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud service is continuously updated;
presenting, via at least one computing device, the set of Cloud service
providers capable of providing the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud
service to the endpoint computing device via a display device configured to
display the set of Cloud providers capable of providing the Cloud service
and to display an associated pricing rate plan for each of set of Cloud service
providers for obtaining the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud service;
communicating across the network, via at least one computing device,
with a specific Cloud service provider from the set of Cloud service
providers to provide the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud service at
the desired price;
receiving from the endpoint computing device, via at least one
computing device, a selection of the specific Cloud service provider
comprising the Cloud computing resources;
submitting over the network, via at least one computing device, a
request to execute the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud service to the
specific Cloud provider;
determining, via at least one computing device, whether another
specific Cloud service provider is offering the Cloud computing resources of
the Cloud service at a lower price than the specific Cloud service provider
after the request to execute the Cloud service is submitted to the specific
Cloud provider and before the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud
service is executed by the specific Cloud provider;
2
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
determining, via at least one computing device, whether to de-select
the specific Cloud service provider after the request to execute the Cloud
computing resources of the Cloud service is submitted to the specific Cloud
provider and before the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud service is
executed by the specific Cloud provider and submit the request to execute
the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud service to the another specific
Cloud service provider based on a cost-benefit analysis; and
executing, via the at least one computing device, the Cloud computing
resources by the specific Cloud service provider or the another specific
Cloud service provider, based on a result of the determining whether to de-
select the specific Cloud provider;
wherein each of the set of Cloud service providers comprises at least
one computing device, and
wherein the Cloud computing resources of the Cloud service
comprises at least one of a server or a storage device.
Supplemental Appeal Br. 2.
EXAMINER'S REJECTION
Claims 1, 3-5, 7, 8, 10-12, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, and 22 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3-8.
DISCUSSION
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the
Supreme Court reiterates an analytical two-step framework previously set
forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 79 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in
the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts," such as an abstract idea. Id. If the
3
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
claims are directed to eligible subject matter, the inquiry ends. Thales
Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Enfzsh,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims "individually
and 'as an ordered combination'" to determine whether there are additional
elements that "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). In
other words, the second step is to "search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself."' Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
In rejecting claims 1, 3-5, 7, 8, 10-12, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, and 22
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determines these claims are directed to
a "series of steps instructing how to broker telecommunications services,
which is a fundamental economic practice, and hence, an abstract idea," and
include limitations that are analogous or akin to (i) "comparing new and
stored information [ criteria and current rate plans] and using rules [ cost
benefit analysis] to identify options," as discussed in SmartGene; and
(ii) "creating a contractual relationship----a 'transaction performance
guaranty"' as discussed in buySAFE. Final Act. 3-5 (citing SmartGene, Inc.
v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App'x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014); and
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). The
Examiner also finds "the brokering steps" recited in the claims are mental
steps that can be performed without the use of a computer. Final Act. 8; see
4
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
The Examiner further determines that the additional elements ( e.g., a
computing device, cloud, network, cloud computing, display device),
whether separately or in combination, do "not amount to significantly more
than the judicial exception" because these additional elements are generic
elements and are simply a conventional "implementation of the abstract
idea." Final Act. 5-6.
Alice/Mayo--Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry, Appellants argue the
Examiner has over-generalized and mischaracterized the claimed method.
Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 1-2. This argument is not persuasive because the
Examiner is required to review all claims at some level of generalization and
determine whether those claims are directed to an abstract idea under Alice
step 1. However, there is no single definition of "abstract idea." As the
Federal Circuit succinctly put it:
The problem with articulating a single, universal definition of
"abstract idea" is that it is difficult to fashion a workable
definition to be applied to as-yet-unknown cases with as-yet-
unknown inventions.
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Because there is no single definition of an abstract idea, the Federal
Circuit instructs us "to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel
descriptive nature can be seen-what prior cases were about, and which way
they were decided." Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1294 (citing Elec. Power Grp., v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); accord USPTO
Memorandum, July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (July 30, 2015),
5
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-
update.pdf (Instructing Examiners that "a claimed concept is not identified
as an abstract idea unless it is similar to at least one concept that the courts
have identified as an abstract idea."). In this case, the Examiner did just
what he was required to do under the USPTO Memorandum and has
characterized the claims as required pursuant to Alice.
Next, Appellants argue the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because (1) the claims are directed to computer-related technology, i.e.,
"brokering of Cloud ( computing) services across a network of a Cloud
computing environment" and, like the claims in Enfzsh, Appellants'
invention "is directed to addressing a problem not solved by prior art in the
computer-related arts"; (2) the claims "are directed to technology, which
includes tangible elements [e.g., computing device, Cloud computing
resources, network, and server] that could not be implemented simply in the
mind of a person" and, as such, "cannot, therefore, only be abstract"; and
(3) unlike the claims in SmartGene and buySAFE, Appellants' claims require
computing resources and achieve "a tangible result at least in execution of
Cloud computing resources" which is "in contrast to buySafe 's result of
processing of a request for obtaining a transaction performance guaranty."
Appeal Br. 9-14.
Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. First, we note Appellants'
reference to tangible elements and tangible results is misplaced because
( 1) the old "useful, concrete and tangible result" test articulated by the
Federal Circuit in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998), and (2) the so-called "machine-or-transformation" (MoT)
6
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
test endorsed by the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008), have been overruled by Alice. As such, tangible elements and
tangible results are no longer dispositive in determining whether a claim is
directed to an abstract idea.
Second, we also note Appellants' reliance on Enfzsh is misplaced. In
Enfish, the claims were directed to an improved database architecture, i.e., a
self-referential table - "a specific type of data structure designed to
improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory." Enfzsh,
822 F.3d at 1339. Such a data structure has several alleged distinct
advantages over conventional relational databases, including: ( 1) faster
searching of data than would be possible with the conventional relational
model (see US 6,151,604 "Enfzsh '604 patent," 1:55-59, 2:66-3:6); (2) more
effective storage of data other than structured text, such as storage of images
and unstructured text (Enfzsh '604 patent, 2: 16-22, 2:46-52); and (3) more
flexibility in configuring the database (Enfzsh '604 patent, 2:27-29).
In Enfzsh, the Federal Circuit characterized the "directed to" inquiry
as a stage-one filter to the claims, "considered in light of the specification,
based on whether 'their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter."' Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. In particular, the Federal Circuit
interpreted the "directed to" inquiry as asking "whether the claims are
directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed
to an abstract idea." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335 (emphasis added). "[T]he
focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database)." Id.
Based on the "plain focus of the claims," the Federal Circuit concluded that
Enfish 's claims were directed to "a specific improvement to the way
7
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table," and, as such,
were more than a mere abstract idea. Id. at 1336. Because the Federal
Circuit decided step 1 of the Alice two-step analysis was satisfied, analysis
under Alice step 2 was not required. Id.
In contrast to Enfzsh, Appellants' claims and Specification are directed
to "the brokering of Cloud services within a Cloud computing environment."
Spec. ,r 1. According to Appellants, "[t]he present invention provides a
solution to perform pricing and brokering of Cloud services" and "provides a
way to display a price next to service." Spec. ,r 3; Abstract. Contrary to
Appellants' arguments, there is no improvement of any underlying
technology; instead, Appellants' claimed invention simply utilizes existing
technology to broker Cloud services within a Cloud computing environment,
similar to the risk-hedging service discussed in Bilski, 2 and the
intermediated-settlement service discussed in Alice.
Based on the limitations recited in the claims and also Appellants'
Specification, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to an
abstract idea of brokering telecommunications services, which is considered
as a "fundamental economic practice" similar to fundamental economic,
transactional practices and other concepts identified in Alice and Bilski.
Final Act. 3; Ans. 2. Such activities are squarely within the realm of abstract
ideas. Brokering services within a Cloud computing environment or any
other environments is a fundamental business practice prevalent in our
system of commerce, like (1) the risk hedging in Bilski, 561 U.S. 593;
(2) the intermediated settlement in Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356-57;
2 Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)
8
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
(3) verifying credit-card transactions in CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370;
(4) guaranteeing transactions in buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354; (5) distributing
products over the Internet in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F .3d 709
(Fed. Cir. 2014); (6) determining a price of a product offered to a purchasing
organization in Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2015); and (7) pricing a product for sale in OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Brokering services
within a Cloud computing environment or any other environments is also a
building block of a market economy and, as such, is an "abstract idea"
beyond the scope of§ 101. See Alice 134 S. Ct. at 2356.
Moreover, the steps recited in Appellants' claims 1, 8, and 15 are only
abstract processes of collecting, storing, analyzing and sending information
of a specific content, e.g., information identifying a specific Cloud service
provider that best meets the needs of a user (e.g., price, schedule).
Information, as such, is intangible, and data analysis and transmission are
abstract ideas. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
451 n.12 (2007); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
589, 594--95 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
"[C]ollecting information and analysis, including when limited to particular
content (which does not change its character as information)," and
"analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more," are "within the realm of abstract
ideas." Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353-54; see also Internet Patents
Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs.for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); CyberSource 654 F.3d at 1370.
9
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
As further recognized by the Examiner (Ans. 8), the steps recited in
Appellants' claims 1, 8, and 15, including: (1) "receiving ... a request for
Cloud resources of a Cloud service"; (2) "identifying ... a set of Cloud
service providers ... based upon criteria [including price]"; (3) "presenting
... the set of Cloud service providers ... [with] associated pricing rate
plan"; (4) "determining ... whether another specific Cloud service provider
... at a lower price"; and (5) "executing ... the Cloud computing resources
[based on a cost-benefit analysis]" are also "mental steps" that could be
performed on a computer. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372-73 ("[A]
method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract
idea and is not patent-eligible under§ 101."); see also In re Comiskey, 554
F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[M]ental processes-or processes of human
thinking-standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical
application."); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 ("Phenomena of nature ... ,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as
they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work" ( emphasis
added)). Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable even when
automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been
done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 ("That purely
mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer,
was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.").
Separately, we note Appellants' claims 1, 8, and 15 do not improve
the performance of a computer or solve a problem specific to computers.
Appellants' Specification and arguments do not demonstrate the claims
"improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory," as the
claims in Enfish did via a "self-referential table for a computer database."
10
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
See Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336, 1339. Neither the steps recited in Appellants'
claims 1, 8, and 15, nor the rest of Appellants' Specification supply any
description or explanation as to how these data processing and transmission
steps are intended to provide: (1) a "solution ... necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
the realm of computer networks," as explained by the Federal Circuit in
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2014); (2) "a specific improvement to the way computers operate," as
explained in Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336; or (3) an "unconventional
technological solution ... to a technological problem" that "improve[ s] the
performance of the system itself," as explained in Amdocs, 841 F .3d at 1302.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claims 1, 3-5, 7, 8, 10-
12, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, and 22 are directed to an abstract idea of "[pricing]
and brokering Cloud services," which is "a fundamental economic practice"
similar to fundamental economic and transactional practices identified in
Alice and Bilski.
Alice/Mayo--Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
In the second step of the Alice inquiry, Appellants argue (1) the
"collection of steps [ recited in claims 1, 8, and 15] in itself, comprises
'significantly more' [i.e., inventive concept] than the purported 'abstract
idea' submitted by the Examiner"; and (2) "[t]he absence of any current
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or§ 103, evidences that the claims are, in
fact, novel and non-obvious." Appeal Br. 10-12.
Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. At the outset, we note that
(1) "the concept of inventiveness is distinct from that of novelty" and
(2) "[t]he inventiveness inquiry of§ 101 should therefore not be confused
11
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
with the separate novelty inquiry of§ 102 or the obviousness inquiry of
§ 103." Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1311. We may even assume that the
techniques claimed are "[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant," but
that is not enough for eligibility. Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013); accord buySAFE, 765 F.3d at
1352. Nor is it enough for subject-matter eligibility that claimed techniques
be novel and nonobvious in light of prior art, passing muster under 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89-90; Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[A] claim
for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101
inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty.");
Intellectual Ventures I LLCv. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (same for obviousness). The claims here are ineligible because
their innovation is an innovation in ineligible subject matter. Their subject
matter is nothing but pricing and brokering Cloud services (Spec. ,r 3). An
advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting.
For example, the Federal Circuit decisions in (1) DDR, 773 F.3d at
1257, and (2) Amdocs, 841 F.3d 1288, are more instructive because, like
Appellants' invention, these cases also involve business-centric inventions.
For example, in DDR and Amdocs, the Federal Circuit opted to bypass
Alice step 1 in favor of step 2. In particular, the Federal Circuit found
DDR 's claims contain an "inventive concept" under Alice step 2 because
DDR 's claims (1) do not merely recite "the performance of some business
practice known from the pre-Internet world" previously disclosed in Bilski
and Alice, but instead (2) provide a technical solution to a technical problem
unique to the Internet, i.e., a "solution ... necessarily rooted in computer
12
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks." DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Likewise, the Federal
Circuit also decided Amdocs ' claims contain a sufficient "inventive concept"
because like the claims in DDR, Amdocs' claims "entail[] an unconventional
technological solution ( enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a
technological problem (massive record flows which previously required
massive databases)" and "improve the performance of the system itself."
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302.
Under current Federal Circuit precedent, an "inventive concept" under
Alice step 2 can be established by showing, for example, that the patent
claims:
(1) provide a technical solution to a technical problem
unique to the Internet, e.g., a "solution ... necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks" (see DDR, 773 F.3d
at 1257);
(2) transform the abstract idea into "a particular,
practical application of that abstract idea," e.g., "installation of a
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users,
with customizable filtering features specific to each end user"
(see BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); or
(3) "entail[] an unconventional technological solution
([ e.g.,] enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological
problem ([e.g.,] massive record flows [that] previously required
massive databases)" and "improve the performance of the system
itself' (see Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302).
In this case, however, we find no element or combination of elements
recited in Appellants' claims 1, 8, and 15 that contains any "inventive
13
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
concept" or adds anything "significantly more" to transform the abstract
concept (i.e., "pricing and brokering Cloud services") into a patent-eligible
application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. We agree with the Examiner that the
recited computer elements (such as a computing device, cloud, network,
cloud computing, display device) cannot transform the abstract idea into a
patent eligible invention. As our reviewing court has observed, "after Alice,
there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does
not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible." DDR, 773 F.3d at
1256 ( citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358).
Because Appellants' claims 1, 8, and 15 are directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract concept and do not recite something "significantly more"
under the second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claims 1, 3-5, 7, 8, 10-12, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, and 22 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have not
demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3-5, 7, 8, 10-12, 14,
15, 17-19, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION
As such, we affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 3-5, 7, 8,
10-12, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
14
Appeal2017-004630
Application 12/636,668
AFFIRMED
15