Ex Parte Cychosz et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 8, 2016

12474663 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 8, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/474,663 0512912009 Joseph M. Cychosz
51344 7590 03/10/2016
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C. /Oracle America/ SUN I STK
1000 TOWN CENTER, TWENTY-SECOND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
SUN090222-US-NP 2006
EXAMINER
MUELLER, KURT A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2157
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/10/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOSEPH M. CYCHOSZ and
HARRIET GLADYS COVERSTON
Appeal2014-004312
Application 12/474,663 1
Technology Center 2100
Before LARRY J. HUME, JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, and
NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1-18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Oracle America, Inc.
App. Br. 1.
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Application 12/474,663
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellants' claimed invention relates to a data policy management
system and method for managing data. Title.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal (emphases added to contested limitations):
1. A data policy management system comprising:
one or more computers configured to execute
an archiving file system,
a database system,
at least one asynchronous update process, wherein the
archiving file system is configured to inform the at least one
asynchronous update process of nodes that have been updated,
and wherein the at least one asynchronous update process is
configured to (i) acquire current information contained within
the nodes that has been updated and (ii) update data contained
within the database system to reflect the acquired information,
and
at least one data policy manager process configured to
(i) query the database system and (ii) enforce a set of data
retention policies upon the archiving file system based on
results of the query.
2 Our decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
July 24, 2013); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Feb. 14, 2014); Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed Dec. 4, 2013); Final Office Action ("Final Act.,"
mailed Feb. 27, 2013); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed
May 29, 2009).
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Application 12/474,663
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Martin et al. ("Martin") US 2002/0156786 Al Oct. 24, 2002
Gordon et al. ("Gordon") US 2002/0194015 Al Dec. 19, 2002
Rejections on Appeal
RI. Claims 1, 5-9, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Martin. Final Act. 4.
R2. Claims 2--4, 10, and 12-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Martin and Gordon.
Final Act. 7.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 3--4), we decide the appeal
of anticipation Rejection RI of claims 1, 5-9, and 11 on the basis of
representative claim 1.
We address remaining claims 2--4, 10, and 12-18 in rejection R2, not
argued separately, infra. 3
3 "Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Application 12/474,663
ISSUE
Appellants argue (App. Br. 3--4; Reply Br. 2) the Examiner's rejection
of claim 1under35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Martin is in
error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses a data
policy management system that includes, inter alia, the limitation of "at least
one data policy manager process configured to (i) query the database system
and (ii) enforce a set of data retention policies upon the archiving file system
based on results of the query," as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments that
Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we
deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claim 1, and
we incorporate herein and adopt as our own: ( 1) the findings and reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and
(2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's Answer in response
to Appellants' arguments. We incorporate such findings, reasons, and
rebuttals herein by reference unless otherwise noted. However, we highlight
and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis
as follows.
Appellants contend, "Martin does not disclose an archiving file
system," "[t]herefore Martin's database is not an archiving file system ...
[and] the [E]xaminer's interpretation of the phrase 'archiving file system'
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impermissibly vitiates the meaning of the term 'archiving' because it
incorrectly suggests that all file systems are archiving file systems." App.
Br. 3.
"In the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretations. Moreover, limitations are not to be read into the
claims from the specification." In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Any special meaning assigned to a term
"must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from
common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the
field of the invention." Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133
F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Helmsderfer v. Bobrick
Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("A patentee
may act as its own lexicographer and assign to a term a unique definition
that is different from its ordinary and customary meaning; however, a
patentee must clearly express that intent in the written description.").
Absent an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the
words take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by
those of ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical,
Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
The Examiner finds, and we agree:
Appellant's statement that "just because something is a file
system does not make that something an archiving file system"
is conclusory. Applicant cites no specific section of the
specification laying out the alleged distinction. Applicant's
statement that "as known in the art, archiving file systems
migrate data across different hierarchies according to a set of
rules or criteria" is footnoted by an example, but applicant does
not cite any external authority which supports this conclusion,
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Application 12/474,663
nor does applicant cite external authority which provides
support for the alleged distinction. If applicant wishes to apply
a specific definition, that definition must either be provided for
in the specification or applicant must provide support showing
the term had a commonly understood meaning at the time of the
invention.
Ans. 2. The Examiner makes further findings with respect to the "archive"
argument, with which we agree and adopt as our own. Ans. 3.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants allege:
The [E]xaminer has the burden of establishing that the term of
art "archiving file system" does not have, to those of ordinary
skill, the meaning that applicant has suggested .... Moreover,
terms of art understood by those of ordinary skill and used in an
application need not be further defined in the specification.
And, external authority need not be cited in order for a phrase
to be a term of art.
Reply Br. 2. We disagree with Appellants' contention.
We agree with the Examiner that Appellants have not cited to a
limiting definition of "archiving file system" in the Specification, nor any
evidence on this record that would preclude the Examiner's interpretation.
Compare Spec. 1 (describing known archiving file systems as background of
the invention; archiving file systems having the capability to maintain a
multiplicity of copies and incarnations of a file or directory), with, e.g.,
Martin i-fi-1 30 (describing a client system connected to a central database
containing an identical set of persistent data). Moreover, on this record, we
find Appellants' assertions regarding what an "archiving file system"
purportedly is or is not known to be by a person with skill in the art amount
to unsupported attorney argument, and therefore we give them little weight.
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See Jn re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Jn re
Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-140 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
In addition, Appellants argue:
Martin does not disclose at least one data policy manager
process configured to query the database system and enforce a
set of data retention policies upon the archiving file system
based on results of the query. Rather, Martin's "Permit
Manager" "manages permission to access persistent object in
database 201 ... such that only one process at any one time
accesses said persistent object." Martin [0043]. More generally,
Martin arbitrates queued access and updates for a database
system using a permit relocation mechanism. Such arbitration,
however, does not define a set of data retention policies that
can be enforced upon the record content of Martin's database.
App. Br. 2--4 (emphasis added).
The Examiner finds, and we agree, Martin's "Permit Manager"
discloses the recited data policy process manager because it "queries the
database to see if the data is currently available for manipulation, and
granting or revoking access based on this, which is [interpreted as] the
enforcement of a set of data policies upon the archiving file system based on
the results of the query." Final Act. 5 (citing Martin i-f 43).
Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on Martin to disclose the
contested limitations of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner's
resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's
anticipation rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 5-9,
and 11, which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
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§ 103(a) Rejection R2 of Claims 2-4, 10, and 12-18
In view of the lack of any substantive or separate arguments directed
to the obviousness rejection of claims 2--4, 10, and 12-18 under§ 103 (see
App. Br. 4), we sustain the Examiner's rejection of these claims. We deem
arguments not made waived. 4
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellants may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in the
Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in
the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner's
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 3 7 C.F .R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellants have not shown.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to anticipation Rejection
RI of claims 1, 5-9, and 11under35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over the cited prior art
of record, and we sustain the rejection.
(2) The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejection
R2 of claims 2--4, 10, and 12-18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over the cited
prior art combination of record, and we sustain the rejection.
4 Appellants merely argue "Claims 2--4 and 10 are patentable because they
depend from claim 1. Claim 12 is patentable for the reasons claim 1 is
patentable. Claims 13-17 are patentable because they depend from claim
12. Claim 18 is patentable for the reasons claim 1 is patentable." Ans. 4.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-18.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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