Ex Parte Cotton

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 20, 2018

14506550 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/506,550 10/03/2014
20995 7590 12/25/2018
KNOBBE MARTENS OLSON & BEAR LLP
2040 MAIN STREET
FOURTEENTH FLOOR
IRVINE, CA 92614
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jeffrey S. Cotton
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
AUTLT.OOlCll 2127
EXAMINER
HOLLY, JOHN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/25/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
j ayna.cartee@knobbe.com
efiling@knobbe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEFFREY S. COTTON
Appeal2018-006740
Application 14/506,550
Technology Center 3600
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOHN A. EV ANS, and CARLL. SILVERMAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
EV ANS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner's final rejection of claims 2-20. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM. 2
1 Appellant states the real party in interest is AutoAlert, LLC. App. Br. 4.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of the Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed January 8, 2018, "App. Br."), the Reply Brief
(filed June 20, 2018, "Reply Br."), the Examiner's Answer (mailed April 20,
2018, "Ans."), the Final Action (mailed June 8, 2017, "Final Act."), and the
Specification (filed October 3, 2014, "Spec.") for their respective details.
Appeal2018-006740
Application 14/506,550
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to methods for generating customer-specific vehicle
proposals based on ongoing vehicle finance payment information. See
Abstract.
INVENTION
Claims 2 and 12 are independent. An understanding of the invention
can be derived from a reading of illustrative Claim 2, reproduced below with
some formatting added:
2. A computing system comprising:
a network interface coupled to a data network
configured to repeatedly receive packet flows comprising
updated data regarding a plurality of prior customers of
an automobile dealership;
a computer processor;
one or more non-transitory computer readable
storage mediums storing:
prior customer identifiers associated with
the prior customers,
existing vehicle identifiers associated with
the prior customers' existing vehicles acquired
from the automobile dealership,
existing terms associated with the prior
customers' existing financial agreements for the
existing vehicles, and
available vehicle identifiers associated with
vehicles available from the automobile dealership,
program instructions configured for repeated
execution by the computer processor in order to
cause the computing system to evaluate the most
recently updated data and with the updated data
identify when a particular prior customer with a
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Application 14/506,550
particular existing vehicle on which the prior
customer is currently obligated to make payments
qualifies as a deal prospect, without receiving a
request from the prior customer, the program
instructions comprising:
a replacement-vehicle module configured to
reduce a number of possible replacement vehicles
for the prior customer by identifying from the
available vehicle identifiers a replacement vehicle
identifier associated or suitably related to the prior
customer's existing vehicle,
a trade-in-value module to determine a
trade-in value and a trade equity associated with
the prior customer's existing vehicle,
a determination module to receive input
from the replacement-vehicle module and the
trade-in-value module and determine a prospective
term for a prospective financial agreement for the
prior customer, based on a plurality of factors
comprising the identified replacement vehicle
identifier, the determined trade-in value, and the
determined trade equity for the prior customer,
a prospect identification module to qualify
the prior customer as a deal prospect when the
prospective term for the prior customer is within a
threshold amount of a corresponding existing term
of an existing financial agreement for the prior
customer, the deal prospect identified regardless of
whether the prior customer has negative trade
equity or positive trade equity,
an alert module to transmit an electronic
notification to an entity of the dealership that the
prior customer is a deal prospect, and
a graphical user interface configured to
allow a user to sort contact management entries.
App. Br. 58-9 (Claims Appx.).
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Appeal2018-006740
Application 14/506,550
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejection on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability, the Examiner relies on the following
prior art:
Gill et al.
Nabe
us 4,736,294
US 7,216,102 B2
Apr. 5, 1988
May 8, 2007
The Rejection on Appeal3
Claims 2-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Gill and Nabe. Final Act. 20-31.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejection of claims 2---6 in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this Decision
only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Brief. Any other
arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the
Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We are
not persuaded that the Appellant identify reversible error.
Upon consideration of the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief
and the Reply Brief, we agree with the Examiner that all the pending claims
are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We adopt as our own the findings
and reasons set forth in the rejections from which this appeal is taken and in
the Examiner's Answer, to the extent consistent with our analysis below.
We provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific
arguments and findings primarily for emphasis.
We consider Appellants' arguments seriatim, as they are presented in
3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of Claims 2-20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Ans. 3; Reply Br. 2.
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Appeal2018-006740
Application 14/506,550
the Appeal Brief, pages 47-56.
CLAIMS 2-20: OBVIOUSNESS OVER GILL AND NABE.
Replacement vehicle identifier.
Claim 2 recites, inter alia, "identifying from the available vehicle
identifiers a replacement vehicle identifier associated or suitably related to
the prior customer's existing vehicle." Appellant argues Nabe teaches a
process that is "configurable to predict when a customer might purchase a
second auto." App. Br. 48 (citing Nabe, col. 9, 11. 30-31).
The Examiner makes extensive findings regarding the details of
Nabe's algorithm. Ans. 5---6. In agreement with Appellant, the Examiner
finds the process ofNabe, Figure 5, "configurable to predict when a
customer might purchase a second auto." Id., 6.
Appellant argues Nabe discloses a process to identify customers likely
to prepay their loan and configurable to predict when a customer may wish
to purchase "a second auto." Reply Br. 3 (citing Nabe, col. 9, 1. 32).
Appellant's argument draws an unpersuasive distinction between a
"second auto" and the claimed "replacement auto." Appellant's argument is
at best conclusory because Appellant fails to proffer facts to show that a
"second auto" cannot be a "replacement auto." Arguments of counsel
cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. In re
Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-140 (Fed. Cir. 1996); attorney argument is not
evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974); nor can it take
the place of evidence lacking in the record. Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F .2d
775, 782 (CCPA 1977). Lawyer's arguments and conclusory statements,
which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative
value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Contrary to
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Application 14/506,550
Appellant's contentions, we find Nabe explicitly teaches "some customers
will want to take advantage of an offer for a product upgrade or
replacement." Nabe, col. 16, 11. 34--35 (cited by the Examiner in another
context). Thus, the claimed replacement auto is explicitly disclosed.
Graphical user interface.
Claim 2 recites, inter alia, "a graphical user interface configured to
allow a user to sort contact management entries." Appellant contends Gill
and Nabe, either alone or in combination, fails to teach or suggest this
limitation. App. Br. 49.
The Examiner finds the disputed limitation is taught by Nabe at col., 1.
65 - col. 2, 1. 5. Ans. 7. The Examiner further finds Nabe discloses a user
screen 270 as a graphical user interface. Id.
Appellant argues the cited passages ofNabe fail to teach a graphical
user interface, as claimed. Reply Br. 3.
As found by the Examiner, Nabe discloses "selecting, from an
electronic user interface, at least one grouping of customers." N abe, col. 1,
11. 65---66. Figures 11-16 are clearly graphical user interfaces. We are not
persuaded the disputed limitation is not taught.
Negative or positive trade equity.
Appellant contends the prior art fails to teach, "the deal prospect
identified regardless of whether the prior customer has negative trade equity
or positive trade equity," as recited in Claim 2. App. Br. 49; Reply Br. 3--4.
The Examiner finds Nabe teaches this limitation. Ans. 8 ( citing Nabe,
col. 8, 11. 20-25; col. 16, 11. 33--44).
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Appeal2018-006740
Application 14/506,550
As found by the Examiner, and not disputed, Nabe teaches calculation
of monthly loan payments which account for, inter alia, capital remaining on
a loan. Nabe, col. 8, 11. 20-29. Nabe further discloses "[t]he models
described herein make it possible to estimate the residual value of the
original vehicle as a function of time, and therefore predict the residual value
of the vehicle at the time that it is accepted as a trade-in, knowledge useful
to both customers and dealers." Nabe, col. 16, 11. 33--44) (cited by the
Examiner). We find a person of ordinary skill in the loan origination arts
would understand "the residual value of the vehicle at the time that it is
accepted as a trade-in," as disclosed by Nabe, to encompass "negative trade
equity or positive trade equity," as recited in Claim 2. We are not persuaded
the Examiner errs.
Packet flows comprising updated data.
Appellant contends Gill fails to teach "packet flows comprising
updated data regarding a plurality of prior customers of an automobile
dealership," as recited in Claim 2. App. Br. 49. Appellant argues Gill
teaches a bank may receive data which is later used to update a service
reference file, but that the data, itself, has not been updated. Id., 50. We
disagree.
Gill discloses a system whereby customer records are updated and
passed among a bank branch network, a bank central computer installation,
and a credit bureau. See Gill, Figs. 1-3 (see Examiner citations to related
text, Ans 9. We find this disclosure teaches the claimed "packet flows
comprising updated data."
Appellant further argues Gill teaches customers of a bank, but not
"prior customers of an automobile dealership," as claimed. Id. Contrary to
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Appellant, Gill discloses "[ t ]his application relates to data processing
methods and apparatus for managing vehicle (e.g., automobile) financing."
Gill, col. 1, 11. 12-14. Nabe discloses "[d]ealers will pay lenders for
generating customer lists which have high probabilities of success in
attracting or retain [sic retaining] business." Nabe, col. 3, 11. 19-21. The
retained business is prior customers of an automobile dealership.
Existing vehicle identifiers.
Appellant contends the prior art fails to teach "existing vehicle
identifiers associated with the prior customers' existing vehicles acquired
from the automobile dealership," as recited in Claim 2. App. Br. 50.
The Examiner finds Nabe discloses "[p ]ropensity and timing models
122 use customer characteristics, including, but not limited to, age of current
auto." Nabe, col. 9, 11. 16-17 (cited by Examiner). The disclosed "age of
current auto" certainly teaches "existing vehicle identifiers associated with
the prior customers' existing vehicles." Nabe further discloses:
In addition, some customers will want to take advantage of an
offer for a product upgrade or replacement. For example, in
the auto industry, many auto dealerships offer schemes
whereby they will upgrade a customer's vehicle at some point
in the future, taking the original vehicle as a part of the
exchange. The models described herein make it possible to
estimate the residual value of the original vehicle as a function
of time, and therefore predict the residual value of the vehicle
at the time that it is accepted as a trade-in, knowledge useful to
both customers and dealers.
Nabe, col. 16, lines 35 -44 (cited by the Examiner). We find the cited
disclosure at least suggests the claimed "existing vehicle identifiers
associated with the prior customers' existing vehicles."
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Appeal2018-006740
Application 14/506,550
Available vehicle identifiers.
Appellant contends Nabe fails to teach "available vehicle identifiers
associated with vehicles available from the automobile dealership," as
recited in Claim 2. App. Br. 51. Appellant argues Nabe teaches a financial
arrangement for the purchase of a hypothetical, unspecified vehicle. Id.
The Examiner finds this limitation is taught by N abe. Ans. 11 ( citing
Nabe, col. 13, 11. 11-29). Based on the Record before us, we disagree.
We agree with Appellant (App. Br. 51) that Nabe teaches a financial
arrangement for the purchase of a hypothetical, unspecified vehicle. We
find no disclosure relating to a specifically identified vehicle.
DECISI0N4
The rejection of Claims 2-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is REVERSED.
REVERSED
4 In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may wish to consider re-
instating the rejection of all claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as reciting
ineligible subject matter. Although the Board is authorized to reject claims
under 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board
elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) §
1213.02.
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